Chapter 8

Citizen Security: Achieving a Safe and Secure Caribbean

Anthony Clayton

8.1 National and citizen security

The concept of national security includes all of the measures taken by a state to ensure the survival of the nation, the protection of national interests and the integrity of the state, and the safety and welfare of the people.

There are many potential challenges to the integrity of the state and to the welfare of its citizens. These threats include the use of conventional or unconventional forces to destabilise a government, annex resources or impose regime or policy change; a range of threats to economic, institutional and social structures, such as trafficking in people, weapons and illegal narcotics; money laundering and tax evasion; a range of resource threats, such as the need to ensure adequate, affordable supplies of energy, food and water; and environmental threats, such as hurricanes, droughts and floods.

So national security includes all necessary measures to deter, mitigate and protect against significant external or internal threats. This requires the maintenance of police, intelligence and other security services to ensure the maintenance of law and order, to control and deter crime, corruption, violence and disorder, to maintain cyber security, to protect sensitive information and to prevent fraud. It may also require the maintenance of standing armed forces to deter attack by conventional or unconventional forces, including terrorism and narcoterrorism, and to support the police and civil authorities in the event of civil unrest. Finally, it involves ensuring civil defence and emergency preparedness, protecting vital infrastructure and building resilience into social and economic systems so that they can withstand shocks.

Citizen security is one of the primary objectives of national security, but the concept of citizen security also incorporates factors that can cause a reduction in perceived safety and the quality of life, such as fear of violence, corruption in public life, incivility, the loss of safe public spaces, poor-quality public transport, the growth of informal settlements and enclaves dominated by particular gangs or political factions, the retreat of the middle class from deteriorating urban neighbourhoods, and the loss of businesses and public services. If these problems become entrenched, they can effectively undermine the process of development. High levels of crime destroy social capital by generating fear, eroding the level of trust in society, undermining cohesion and weakening institutions (IDB 2012). Crime and violence can therefore be serious obstacles to the formation of social and human capital, sustainable economic development, investment and economic growth.

The extent, nature and combination of these problems varies significantly, both within and between Caribbean nations, so every country has to develop specific programmes to address the local factors that are doing the most to undermine citizen security. The IDB 2012 report notes:

> *Given the multiple layering of crime and violence, policymakers are beginning to shift away from menu-like checklists of single-sector interventions: citizen security approach is one such integrated approach… citizen security approaches incorporate interventions from varied disciplines and policy perspectives that prevent and reduce violence through a menu of different initiatives.*
>
> IDB 2012, 5

There are also key commonalities. As the *Caribbean Human Development Report* 2012 notes, it is also important to focus both national and regional programmes of action on prevention and institutional strengthening, on the root causes of violence, such as poor-quality urban environments, bad schools and the lack of legitimate economic opportunity, and on building effective, accountable police and judicial systems (UNDP 2012a).

The quality of police and judicial systems is a particularly important determinant of citizen security. *The Caribbean Human Development Report* states:

> *Of primary concern with citizen security is the issue of public confidence in state capacity to protect citizens and ensure justice. If citizens lack confidence in the police, the judiciary and other public authorities, no amount of repression will restore security. The success of any law enforcement system depends on the willingness of the people to participate and contribute. For the state to enjoy the trust and commitment of the people, it must strive to eradicate exclusion, improve transparency and create opportunities that encourages a sense of belonging for all.*
>
> UNDP 2012a, V

Citizen security also takes account of the reciprocal relationship between the causes and the consequences of crime: high levels of crime serve to undermine development and entrench poverty, which then creates the conditions for a further surge in crime. This effect operates at both the individual and societal levels. At the individual level, the World Bank states:

> *Crime and violence victims face trauma and stress related to experiencing violent situations, both from community violence and gangs, and from intra-family violence. The consequences include low educational attainment, a lack of employment alternatives, dysfunctional families, high teenage pregnancy rates, an increase in HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases, child and teenage prostitution. In addition victimization results in social stigmatization (sometimes exacerbated by the media), increased drug and alcohol abuse, greater levels of gang membership and delinquency. All of this fuels criminal activity and the continuation and deepening of the cycle of violence.*
>
> World Bank 2012a

Women are significantly more likely to be affected by many of these issues. For example, the VAWG report (World Bank 2015) states that women are about six times more likely to be the victims of domestic violence than men.

At the societal level, there is an equally broad range of destructive macro-economic and social impacts. The National Security Policy for Jamaica (Government of Jamaica 2014) states that:

> *Crime has deterred investment, destroyed capital formation and discouraged business development. The cost of crime and corruption includes lost life expectancy, injuries and health care, but also includes the higher cost of doing business in a low-trust society, losses to theft and extortion, business closures, capital flight, the emigration of skilled workers and the loss of foreign investment.*
>
> Government of Jamaica 2014, 4

This can be at least partly explained by the fact that the perception of risk is not the same as statistical risk; it varies by context and between individuals. For example, most people take threats far more seriously when they believe themselves or their families to be directly exposed to the risk, so will effectively assign a lower value to a stranger being murdered further away. The killing of a friend, relative, acquaintance or neighbour is more directly and personally threatening. Violence is typically concentrated in particular areas, so that perpetrators are also more likely to be victims. In Jamaica, for example, the homicides are concentrated in four of the nineteen police divisions. This means that people living in areas with relatively low levels of violence do not feel that they are exposed to undue personal risk, which indicates a potential disconnect between the interests of two key groups. Decision-makers in society tend to live in secure homes in good areas, and therefore are less likely to be personally affected by violence, while the majority of the victims of violence have little influence on the decision-making process, and can therefore do less to change their circumstances. By contrast, in Italy and Colombia, the elite (including judges and politicians) were targeted and, probably as a result, there was sufficient political commitment to start breaking the power of organised crime in those countries. This highlights the critical importance of strengthening social cohesion in all attempts to increase citizen security.

The *Caribbean Human Development Report* (2012) concludes, therefore, that:

> *Caribbean countries need to focus on a model of security based on the human development approach, whereby citizen security is paramount, rather than on the traditional state security model, whereby the protection of the state is the chief aim. Indeed, the contrast between prevention on the one hand and repression and coercion on the other is ill conceived. Social inclusion to help prevent crime and violence and efficient and effective law enforcement are by no means incompatible or mutually exclusive. In a truly democratic society, broad based social inclusion and swift criminal justice – or 'prevention' and 'coercion' – serve to reinforce and complement each other.*
>
> UNDP 2012a, V–VI

The broader concept of citizen security also takes account of the relationships between rights and responsibilities, freedoms and necessary limitations, which highlights the potential tension between individual human rights and freedoms, and the need to maintain security and protect the integrity of the state. For example, there has been public concern in many countries about the monitoring of private communications by police and security forces. Few people disagree with the need to monitor the communications of known criminals and terrorists, but the problem is that police and security forces do not always know who the criminals are, and so argue that they need to monitor many innocent communications in order to find patterns of suspicious connections, suspect financial transfers or other indicators of criminal activity. This can then conflict with the common desire for a reasonable level of personal privacy, so societies have to develop protocols for the permitted surveillance of private communications, with appropriate oversight.

Citizen security is also determined by the stability of essential supplies, such as food, water, energy and medical services, and vulnerability to natural hazards (Tulchin and Espach 2000). These are particularly important concerns for many Caribbean nations: in particular, those that depend largely on imports of energy, food and manufactured goods, and are consequently exposed to economic shocks, and those that are potentially vulnerable to seismic events, extreme weather events and climate change. These can all be considered to be aspects of societal resilience: an important concept with a wide array of implications (Clayton et al. 2012).

In the context of ecological systems, resilience refers to the capacity of the system to resist damage and recover quickly. With regard to socio-economic systems, however, resilience refers to the ability of an economy to continue to generate wealth and employment throughout technological discontinuities, economic restructuring, the loss of uncompetitive businesses and shocks such as a spike in energy prices. As this suggests, resilience does not mean resisting change; it means maintaining system integrity and output while continuously adjusting to changing circumstances. With regard to citizen security, resilience would usually entail protecting livelihoods and access to resources, ensuring better protection against economic and environmental shocks, building the capacity for rapid recovery from shocks, and strengthening the ability to prepare for and deal with the consequences of natural hazards, particularly those related to climate change. The *Commonwealth Secretariat Strategic Plan 2013/14–2016/17* identifies building resilience as a key priority (Commonwealth Secretariat 2013).

8.2 State of citizen security in the Caribbean

There are currently a number of threats to citizen security in the Caribbean. Crime is the most urgent crisis in the region. High levels of violence, in particular, impose a wide range of social and economic costs: they erode faith in the institutions of government, undermine democracy, destroy the quality of life, deter investment, and encourage the migration of skills and capital. Some of the countries are contending with high rates of homicide and violent crime; trafficking in guns, ammunition and illegal narcotics; the rise in cyber crime; the compromising of government

programmes by organised crime; and the threat of the importation of violent fundamentalist ideologies. The growth in the wealth, power and reach of the Mexican drug cartels also now threatens much of the Caribbean region.

However, crime is just one of a number of profound challenges facing Caribbean nations. These countries also have to adjust to a world that is being rapidly reshaped by the accelerating pace of scientific and technological advance; changes in the nature of employment; demographic trends; the rise of new centres of global manufacturing; surging demand for resources and equally rapid shifts in the pattern of environmental impacts; fundamental changes in the nature of risk, political and economic influence, competition and conflict, and the geopolitical balance of power; and possible global threats such as climate change. Many of these changes represent important new opportunities, but some also represent existential challenges for the nations of the Caribbean.

Both the extent of the changes and the pace of events present serious challenges to the small, relatively vulnerable nations of the Caribbean, which must rapidly strengthen their capacity to manage a number of simultaneous changes and absorb a range of potential impacts. Failure to do so is likely to have serious consequences.

8.2.1 Violent crime

The Caribbean nations lie at the epicentre of world violence; the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) *Global Study on Homicide* (2013) notes that eight of the ten most violent nations in the world are in Central America and the Caribbean, with three from the Caribbean. In 2014, the countries with the highest homicide rates were as follows (see Table 8.1).

A number of the other Caribbean island nations are not in the top ten, but still have some of the highest per capita rates of homicide in the world (see Figure 8.1, in which the countries in the selected sample are marked with *).

For comparison, the homicide rate for the UK is 1 per 100,000 people per annum. So the rate in Jamaica, for example, is about 40 times higher than in the UK, while the rate in Barbados – a relatively low-crime society by Caribbean standards – is still more than

Table 8.1 Countries with highest homicide rates

Rankings	Countries
1	Honduras
2	Venezuela
3	Belize
4	El Salvador
5	Guatemala
6	Jamaica
7	Swaziland
8	St Kitts and Nevis
9	South Africa
10	Colombia

Figure 8.1 Rate of homicide per 100,000 people per annum



Sources: Compiled from UNODC 2013; World Bank data on intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) up to 2014; and national sources, taking the most recent year available

seven times higher than in the UK. The impact is compounded by the much smaller populations of the Caribbean nations, as there is a far higher probability that citizens will know someone who has been murdered and will therefore be affected by the crime.

The situation varies greatly both between and within countries. There are high- and low-crime countries in the region, and high- and low-crime areas within each country. However, perceived insecurity is not solely determined by proximate risk; a country with a high homicide rate tends to be perceived as dangerous, even though there are many relatively safe areas within that country. Similarly, even those citizens who live and work in relatively safe areas still report a high level of perceived insecurity (UNDP 2012b).

While there are areas within all Caribbean countries that are relatively safe, and some nations that still have relatively low rates of violence, perceived insecurity affects decisions of investors to invest in a given country. Perceptions can be as powerful as reality as a deterrent to investment that dampens growth prospects. The threat environment is evolving rapidly and no Caribbean nation can remain immune. Transnational threats are emerging:

- Mexican drug cartels are diversifying across Central America and the Caribbean; Central America *maras* (gangs) are now active in a small number of Caribbean nations; and Chinese Triads are now active in Latin America and the Caribbean, largely following the pattern of legitimate Chinese investment, but also forming connections with the Mexican drug cartels to supply the precursor chemicals for synthetic narcotics.
- US Southern Command has linked about 100 Caribbean nationals to the Islamic State (IS), and has stated that there is an increased threat risk from fundamentalist terrorism in a number of Caribbean nations.

- In addition, patterns of crime change in response to effective interventions. In the 1980s, for example, a large part of the narcotics from Colombia was routed through the Caribbean. Vigorous policing increased the risk of shipping through the Caribbean, but the trade rerouted through Mexico. Now, partly as a result of greater vigilance at the US–Mexican border, there is a renewed surge of activity on the Caribbean route: 16 per cent of US cocaine imports were routed via Caribbean islands in 2013, up from 4 per cent in 2011. As this suggests, the measures taken by any one Caribbean nation to improve its security are likely to displace the impacts to another country, which is why a co-ordinated regional approach is essential.

The high levels of violence in several Caribbean countries result from a number of factors, but the most significant include the trans-shipment of narcotics through the region into the North American and European markets, and the ready availability of illegal weapons. In Jamaica, for example, about 80 per cent of murders are committed with imported firearms (mostly illegal).[1] The main sources of illegal weapons in Caribbean nations are the USA, Venezuela, Colombia and Haiti.

The profits from trafficking and associated corruption have resulted in the growth of increasingly sophisticated criminal organisations, some of which are now involved in narcotics and weapons trafficking, human trafficking, extortion, cybercrime and frauds such as the lottery scam, the misappropriation of public funds and other forms of crime.

Caribbean police forces currently do not have the capacity to eradicate these threats. Most of them lack the necessary technical and forensic capabilities. In some cases, they are also handicapped by outdated legislation (especially in areas such as proceeds of crime, the use of DNA, electronic control of the chain of evidence, and video-conferencing for witnesses) and dysfunctional justice systems. In some cases, these problems are compounded by a low level of trust in police forces and governments, which is largely due to the perception of corruption.

8.2.2 Narcotrafficking

The Caribbean nations lie on one of the world's busiest trade routes. This represents an economic opportunity, and a number of Caribbean nations are now expanding their trans-shipment operations. However, most of the world's illegal narcotics and weapons are also now transported in shipping containers, so the illegal traffic flows through the same hubs as the legitimate traffic. Illegal narcotics and weapons are also transported through the Caribbean by narco-submarines and small boats. Figure 8.2 (published in *The Economist* in May 2014) shows the main routes.

This is, in turn, part of a larger global pattern of criminal enterprise, shown in Figure 8.3 (published in Stratfor 2011).

These criminal flows are connected. Everywhere there is a trade in illegal narcotics, there is a parallel trade in illegal firearms. Patents and contracts cannot protect investments in an illegal trade, so transactions depend on violence or the credible threat of violence in order to ensure control over territory and payment for supplies. Then, once criminal organisations are established, they diversify into other areas of

Figure 8.2 Map of narcotrafficking routes

Source: The Economist 2014

Figure 8.3 Flow of transnational organised crime

Source: Stratfor 2011

both criminal and 'legitimate' business activity in order to increase their profits and reduce their risks. A common pattern of criminal diversification is into extortion, human trafficking and fraud, while diversification into 'legitimate' business activity may include construction, leisure and entertainment, shipping, vehicle sales and so on.

8.2.3 Deportees

Caribbean nationals that have committed crimes in other jurisdictions are now likely to be deported back to the Caribbean on completion of their sentence, and some of those deported to the Caribbean are dangerous criminals. This can add significantly to existing problems in the region. It is therefore important to build stronger co-operation between governments and law enforcement agencies to ensure that the recipient countries are adequately prepared, and options here include support for rehabilitation programmes, electronic monitoring bracelets, halfway houses and the rehabilitation and expansion of penitentiaries in the Caribbean.

It is also important to note, however, that most deportees are returned to the Caribbean for infractions of the US Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, usually for overstaying their visa limit (Headley 2006). The deportees also include those convicted of minor crimes, most commonly possession of drugs, but also including shoplifting, petty theft, drunk driving, obstruction of justice and unpaid traffic fines. The majority of these cases are deported after their first offence. So the majority of deportees are not serious criminals. However, many of them have difficulty in finding legitimate employment after it becomes known that they are deportees, which means that some of them do subsequently become involved in criminal activity. It is therefore important to ensure that there are mechanisms in place for controlling the high-risk deportees and re-assimilating the low-risk deportees.

8.2.4 Narcoterrorism

The Mexican drug cartels are currently the dominant criminal networks in the Americas. They supplanted the Colombian cartels in the 1990s, and now control about 90 per cent of all the illegal narcotics exported to the USA. They are full-spectrum criminal organisations, involved in drug and weapons trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, contract killing, human trafficking, money laundering, corrupting public officials and theft, among other forms of crime. Estimates of their combined income from narcotics trafficking alone range from US$13.6 billion to US$49.4 billion annually (Cook 2007). If these estimates are accurate, their annual income is substantially larger than the GDP of most Caribbean states. They have an estimated 100,000 'soldiers', and subcontract some tasks to the *maras* (gangs) in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Calle 18 (18th Street Gang or M18), which also have an extensive presence in the USA. MS-13 is estimated to have some 30,000–50,000 members, while M18 is estimated to have some 65,000 members. The Mexican and Central American cartels and *maras* have a combined strength of at least 250,000 'soldiers', and have a presence throughout the Americas.

The cartels are currently expanding aggressively, acquiring production facilities and money-laundering opportunities in Central America, undermining and hollowing out government structures in order to be able to operate with impunity, taking over downstream distribution in the US and Canadian markets, and forming connections with other organised crime cartels, such as the N'drangheta, in Italy, for narcotics distribution in Europe. They also have contacts and business dealings with criminal organisations in Spain, Albania, Serbia and Eastern Europe, the coastal states in West Africa, Japan and many other regions.

Threat

The issue is whether the Mexican cartels might seek to expand their interests across the Caribbean. Their sophistication, contacts, capabilities, wealth, numbers and ready access to military-grade weapons and explosives would make them a formidable opponent. The Caribbean nations offer an attractive combination of hotels and casinos, which can be used for money laundering, and marinas and trans-shipment operations, which can be used for the distribution of narcotics and weapons. The cartels are known to be interested in these kinds of assets.

Early signs of Mexican drug cartel interest may take the form of foreign investment in trans-shipment facilities, hotels and casinos, entertainment complexes, shipping and fisheries, which would allow them to establish a presence and acquire the strategic assets needed to support their core business activities. Without prior warning as to the true identity of the investors, these investments would be welcomed as a sign of confidence in the economy. The more sophisticated cartels use a *plata o plom*[2] strategy, so the first approach might be to corrupt officials to facilitate their transactions and establish front companies.

8.2.5 Violent fundamentalism

One of the most significant recent developments in the pattern of terrorism is the emergence of IS, a fundamentalist Sunni group (Byman and Williams 2015). At the time of this report, IS had captured about one-third of Iraq and about half of Syria. It is estimated to have an army of about 30,000, although some have suggested that it may now be as large as 200,000, largely because they have been able to mobilise young men in the territories they have captured. Its wealth, which comes from bank robberies, looting, extortion and sales of oil from captured Iraqi fields, has been estimated at more than US$2 billion. IS's success has attracted disaffected youth from more than 90 countries. Some estimates suggest that as many as 20,000 have gone to fight for IS, of whom some 3,000 have come from the West. About 1,200 have gone to Syria from France, 600 from the UK, 600 from Germany and smaller numbers from Belgium, Australia, the Netherlands, Canada, the USA and Spain.

With regard to the Caribbean, US Southern Command General John F Kelly said in March 2105 that a total of perhaps 100 recruits have gone from the region to fight for IS (Baron 2015). The reliability of this figure is uncertain, but it is clear that the problem in the Caribbean could rapidly become more serious.

8.2.6 The link between disaffected youth, violent gangs and terrorism

A country that has many disaffected young people and existing gangs, with the potential to be radicalised, may be particularly vulnerable. Disaffected young people are the primary recruits to both local criminal gangs and international terrorist networks. There are common factors in many of these cases. Most of them feel alienated and rootless, or have failed to achieve legitimate recognition and success. Many of them are young men who are already involved in gangs and narcotics; they come from dysfunctional families and give their loyalty to the gang that adopts them. From there, they can be readily attracted by a violent ideology that appears to welcome them as brothers and gives their life purpose and meaning – especially when that message comes from a group such as IS, which encourages enslaving, raping and torturing captives. Their initial link is often made through other gang members, through contact with a charismatic fundamentalist preacher and, increasingly, via internet sites.

Transnational organised crime now forms another link between local gangs and terrorist networks. As the US National Security Council (2010) *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime* (TOC) notes:

> *In the past, TOC was largely regional in scope, hierarchically structured, and had only occasional links to terrorism. Today's criminal networks are fluid, striking new alliances with other networks around the world and engaging in a wide range of illicit activities, including cybercrime and providing support for terrorism*.

As this suggests, gangs can serve as a 'force multiplier' for terrorism. Terrorist organisations look for weak and/or corrupt states that they can exploit for territory, supplies, trafficking, money laundering and other essential functions.

Threat

Countries such as Jamaica,[3] Trinidad and Tobago[4] and Guyana,[5] with significant numbers of economically and socially disadvantaged young men, a number of violent gangs and high rates of homicide, represent good potential recruiting grounds for fundamentalists.

Warning signs for the police and security forces would therefore include the return to the Caribbean of someone who has recently visited Syria, Somalia, Libya or another current conflict zone, the arrival of a charismatic, fundamentalist preacher with a message of violence, or the dissemination of contacts via dangerous internet sites. This highlights the importance of border control and screening, intelligence sharing and co-operation, and the monitoring of internet traffic on particular websites.

8.2.7 The tourism industry: a potential target

Random terrorism may be specifically targeted at the innocent and vulnerable for two reasons. The first is that killing the innocent graphically demonstrates the state's failure to protect its citizens. Second, it helps to create revulsion, fear and panic.

Media management has always been important to terrorist organisations, who try to demoralise their numerically or militarily superior opponents and convince them

that they cannot win. However, it is even more important to practitioners of random terrorism, who need 'spectaculars' (highly visible mass killings) in order to achieve the desired impact against the state and to ensure the continuing flow of funds and recruits.

Tourists are usually both innocent and vulnerable. In some countries, they also represent mobility, secularity, affluence and consumption, which may be perceived as corrupt and immoral. Vulnerability and a lack of familiarity make tourists easy prey for crime and terrorist attacks, and tourism-dependent economies rely heavily on their image as destinations, and so are more vulnerable to the repercussions of attacks (Korstanje and Clayton 2012). The tourism industry is economically vital to a number of countries, but it is also a very soft target – so it offers the opportunity to cause mass casualties and inflict extensive economic damage to countries that may be seen as sympathetic to the West.

It is important to note that the intended targets in such cases may be foreign nationals, not locals. Terrorism need not be targeted at the Caribbean for the region to be affected. Terrorism elsewhere can and has been shown to affect the region.

After the 9/11 events, global tourism volumes fell by 10 per cent, and visitor arrivals to some countries fell by 30 per cent. Caribbean arrivals fell by nearly 15 per cent (which led to the temporary loss of an estimated 365,000 jobs in the region) and in some cases more.

The tourism industry is now the largest source of employment and foreign revenue for a number of Caribbean countries. This means that anything that makes people more or less likely to travel, or to choose one destination over another, or affects the rate of growth in the industry, tends to have immediate and relatively widespread consequences in these countries. This dependency has been highlighted by a number of recent disasters, which have indicated the extent to which tourism can be affected by external risks (Lepp and Gibson 2008; Peattie et al. 2005; Tsai and Chen 2010; Park and Reisinger 2010; Korstanje and Clayton 2012).

Any terrorist incident that damages confidence in the tourism industry would therefore have immediate and widespread consequences for the Caribbean nations, even if they were affected only as third parties, but even more so if any of them were the chosen location for the attack.

8.2.8 Seismic events

The islands of the Caribbean sit on top of a highly complex set of geological faults. The Caribbean plate sits at the junction of four larger plates (the North American, South American, Nazca and Cocos). In addition, the area between the Caribbean and North American plates is broken up into a patchwork of small platelets, such as the Gonave platelet. The fault lines between all these plates and platelets are seismically active, resulting in earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions.

For example, Haiti sits on top of the Enriquillo–Plantain Garden fault (EPGF), which is the boundary between the Caribbean plate to the south and the Gonave platelet

to the north. The Caribbean plate is sliding east, while the Govave platelet is sliding west, so the EPGF is a lateral (or 'strike-slip') fault. It accumulates strain, which is periodically released when sections of rock rupture. The 7.0 magnitude earthquake that killed more than 200,000 people in Haiti on 12 January 2010 happened because the underlying section of the EPGF had been locked since the last major slip in 1770, so it had built up about two lateral metres of unrelieved pressure. However, the section of the EPGF that ruptured was only 50km long, which is just 10 per cent of the length of the fault, so it is likely that the sections of the fault line to the east and to the west are now carrying even more load.

8.2.9 Climate change

The World Bank *Turn Down the Heat* report (2012b) noted that the average surface temperature has now risen by nearly 1°C, and that a rise of 3.0–3.5°C by 2100 is now considered probable. It also notes that this could lead to a rise of one metre in the average sea level, with extreme heat waves up to 9°C hotter than today. This could eventually force large-scale migration out of low-income countries in tropical and subtropical latitudes, as these will be among the first to be seriously affected, and they also have relatively little capacity to mitigate the impacts (Mora et al. 2013).

As the oceans gradually warm as a result of climate change, hurricanes may get stronger, as wind speeds increase by about 5 per cent for every 1°C rise in tropical ocean temperatures (Emanuel 1987). However, it is difficult to predict whether global warming will lead to more hurricanes in the Caribbean, as warmer seas would tend to encourage the early stages of development, but there may also be stronger winds that would disrupt systems before they could gather strength. It is likely that several such factors will change at the same time, so one possible scenario is that there will be fewer but more powerful storms in the Caribbean.

Climate change presents a particular threat to the Caribbean nations. However, as the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) *Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction* for 2013 points out, because the SIDS nations are mostly small islands, much of the housing stock, economic operations and transport infrastructure is on coastal plains that are vulnerable to sea-level rise, increased incidence of severe weather, flooding and storm surge, so SIDS have the largest percentage of total capital stock exposed to hazard. The issue, therefore, is the extent to which SIDS nations can survive impacts that are far more extensive in terms of the percentage of the population or the economy affected than is the case for large mainland states.

The Caribbean is also the most tourism-dependent region in the world, as the travel and tourism industry is the largest source of both foreign exchange and employment. Tourism earnings now account for approximately 25 per cent of the Caribbean's GDP, and significantly more in some Caribbean islands. Five Caribbean nations are now in the global top 20 in terms of the percentage of total employment that is related directly or indirectly to the industry. Unfortunately, the travel and tourism industry is also a significant contributor to the carbon loading of the atmosphere and the associated climate change.

The nations of the Caribbean are therefore facing a serious dilemma. For many of them, their hopes for development rest largely on tourism, especially as other sectors, such as traditional agriculture, continue to decline, and most of them are currently committed to expanding tourist volumes or margins or both. However, the increase in demand for travel and tourism is contributing directly to climate change, which will have serious consequences for the islands. Moreover, this sector is also most likely to be affected by increased hazards arising from climate change, as the industry is heavily concentrated on coastal areas.

8.3 Current efforts to improve citizen security in the Caribbean

The UNDP *Caribbean Human Development Report* (2012a) notes that the Caribbean countries still operate with fundamentally unreformed police structures, and that, despite progress in some nations, the predominant policing model is still focused on state security, not citizen security. According to this report, the three main challenges facing the police services of the Caribbean region are:

- **Performance legitimacy:** The need to improve effectiveness and responsiveness to the security demands of citizens.
- **Integrity:** The need to eradicate corruption. Corruption among police officers invariably undermines performance; it also has a corrosive effect on public confidence, because it conflicts with stated police values and thereby weakens the authority and legitimacy of the police.[6]
- **Human rights:** Police officers are entrusted with significant power over other citizens, so it is important to ensure that there are mechanisms to control abuses of power and to ensure that policing is done on a basis of respect for human rights.

However, the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 (reported in the UNDP *Caribbean Human Development Report* 2012) offers some grounds for optimism. It found that many citizens across the Caribbean region perceived their police to be 'moderately' legitimate and competent, were willing to become the co-producers of their own security, and supported government investment in more resources for the police to transform police services and enhance their effectiveness (UNDP 2012a, 114).

The UNDP *Caribbean Human Development Report* (2012a) therefore concludes that a transition to citizen security in the Caribbean region will require institutional reforms within police forces and significant changes in police work patterns, behaviour and attitudes. This would include a transition to community-based policing, i.e. a redeployment of officers into geographical divisions; longer periods of deployment to allow the development of a 'same cop, same neighbourhood' model; slow patrolling; frequent meetings with the citizens; mutual problem-solving; and a greater emphasis on accountability, with regular reporting of police performance indicators. The purpose of all these measures is to enhance citizen security, and help to change attitudes, so that people become more willing to co-operate with the police to prevent crime and control criminality.

Deosaran (2002) found that there are two main reasons for the introduction of community policing in the Caribbean: first, traditional law enforcement approaches are not working well; and, second, community-based approaches have popular and political appeal. Popularity does not, of course, guarantee success; much depends on the extent to which policy commitments are actually translated into operations and the deployment of assets, and the integrity and competence of both the police service and the political directorate.

In the last five years, most of the police services in the Caribbean region have developed new strategic plans, and have gone through some level of reform and modernisation, often with the assistance of external advisers (mainly from the UK, the USA and Canada, as well as other police forces in the region). They have undertaken these initiatives separately, rather than as part of a co-ordinated regional programme, so there are still significant differences between the Caribbean police services in terms of their priorities, capabilities, commitments and culture. This can be seen in the summary of the current position in the countries in the sample. However, it is also important to note that some of these differences probably result from the diversity of definitions of 'community policing'; most police forces are now committed to community policing in principle, but practices vary widely between jurisdictions. As a general rule, the main difference between traditional and community policing is that traditional policing is typically more reactive, while community policing focuses more on working with the community to identify and solve problems and thereby prevent crimes. Yet in practice every police force uses a mixture of both approaches. This makes it more difficult to assess the impact of community policing, partly because it is never applied in isolation, and partly because it can only be measured over an extended period. This is for two reasons: one is that it takes time to build the trust and sense of co-responsibility needed to support a preventative approach; the other is that, it is harder to measure crimes that, as a result of the new approach, did not happen. Hence it is necessary to undertake both longitudinal and comparative assessments in order to determine whether the new approach has been more or less successful than the traditional model.

- **The Bahamas:** The Royal Bahamas Police Force has to police an extended archipelago of islands with exceptionally porous borders and a population of some 350,000 people with some 3,000 officers. In 2002, the force started to implement a policing strategy based on both community and intelligence-led policing, and crime rates fell over the subsequent three years (de Guzman et al. 2014). The Commissioner's Policing Plan 2012 placed strong emphasis on improving community safety, one of six priority areas, with the goal of bringing the police and citizens together to prevent crime and solve neighbourhood problems, thereby giving citizens more control over the quality of life in their community and promoting urban renewal. Its model of community safety includes a 'citizen-focused' approach; community-based policing programmes in all policing divisions; increasing police visibility; civilianising many posts in the police force to release trained police officers to return to operational police duties; focusing on crime prevention; the formation of neighbourhood crime watch groups and involving them in keeping their communities safe; using environmental design as a means of crime prevention and encouraging community clean-up campaigns to

remove derelict vehicles, demolish abandoned buildings and clear away debris and overgrown shrubs in neighbourhoods; establishing a victim support unit at each divisional police station; informing potential offenders about the consequences of a life of crime and sensitising them to the harm that crime causes to communities; regular updates and information about potentially dangerous wanted persons; deployment of CCTV in public spaces; enforcing laws governing loud music and the sale of alcohol to minors; and refusing permits to event promoters who create distress to communities and cause social conflict.

- **Barbados:** The Royal Barbados Police Force polices one island with a total population of 287,000 with some 1,400 officers, mostly unarmed. The RBPF has had a commitment to community policing since the 1970s, and has placed particular emphasis on community relations since the 1980s, when the Office of Public Relations was established. The Community Policing Unit has been relatively effective in taking educational and other crime prevention programmes to the communities. Largely as a result, public support for the police in Barbados is higher than in most other Caribbean nations (UNDP 2012a). However, this progress has been partially overshadowed by recent controversies, including the resignation in 2013 of the Commissioner as a result of allegations of illegal wiretapping, and disagreements over the role of the police in helping to negotiate a truce between two rival gangs in 2015. In 2013, the Attorney-General and Minister of Home Affairs said in the House of Assembly that there had been 'some damage done' to the relationship between the police and the community over the years, and called on the police to work with communities, rather than just sending officers into communities when there was an upsurge in violence (*Barbados Advocate* 2013).

- **Grenada:** The Royal Grenada Police Force polices one main island and six surrounding smaller islands with a total population of 106,000 people with a force of 830 officers and 200 rural constables. It developed a model of community policing, using patrol cars to serve as substations in some neighbourhoods, which allowed residents to file complaints, report crimes and obtain information without having to travel to the main police station. The force also conducted a competition among divisions to develop and carry out projects involving neighbourhoods; these included a health fair and cultural display.[7] Gomes (2007) noted, however, that the force had no internal police investigative division, no ombudsman and no civilian oversight body, and that there had been occasional allegations that police beat detainees (although there were no allegations of extra judicial executions or major corruption in the force).

- **Guyana:** The Guyana Police Force polices a relatively large country (by Caribbean standards) of 215,000km^2 with a total population of some 800,000. The aims listed in its Strategic Plan 2011–2015 (Guyana Police Force 2011–15) include respecting and recognising human rights; working with all communities to develop policing services necessary and appropriate to those communities; and building partnerships with all sectors of Guyana society, indicating a significant change in approach in the intervening years. A potentially more problematic aim was to work to develop community policing programmes in conjunction with

community policing groups, indicating that the potential for vigilante violence and other abuses of the system (a serious problem in the past) is still there. However, the Strategic Plan also indicates the need to strengthen neighbourhood policing, which could help to prevent the re-emergence of vigilante activity. Gomes (2007) notes that the effectiveness of the force is severely limited by poor training, poor equipment and acute budgetary constraints, and that public confidence in and co-operation with the police has been low for years.

- **Jamaica:** The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) polices the island of Jamaica with a population of 2.7 million with some 14,000 officers organised into 19 geographic (and a number of non-geographic) divisions. Some of the geographic divisions – notably West Kingston – now have a strong commitment to community policing, and a number of officers have become highly skilled in proximity policing tactics.[8] The West Kingston Division has operated entertainment events and, a health fair for adults and has supplied, treats for children and essential goods to elderly and infirm residents, which has done much to improve the relationship between the police and the community, leading to improved community relations, a significantly better flow of intelligence, and the resolution of gang conflicts. Fear of crime has also fallen; more people are now willing to come forward, provide witness statements and appear in court to give evidence, which indicates that they are no longer so afraid of criminals, and now feel that they can rely on the JCF to protect them. In addition, the number of locally organised weekend entertainment events has tripled, which suggests that people are no longer afraid to go out in the evening. The absence of competent, effective government in the troubled communities has left a vacuum that has been filled in the past by area dons, so removing the dominant criminal structure can leave these communities without a functioning social hierarchy. In divisions such as West Kingston, these problems are well understood, and some JCF officers have taken on the additional roles of community leaders and arbitrators, so that members of the community will now approach them to help solve a wide range of social, domestic, personal and employment problems, which suggests that they have transferred their loyalties.[9] Since the beginning of 2015, however, the homicide rate has increased significantly, which suggests that the gains made by community policing were less durable than appeared at first.
- **Saint Lucia:** The Royal Saint Lucia Police Force polices a small island nation with a total population of some 183,000 with about 900 officers, including two paramilitary units (the Special Service Unit and the Coast Guard). Community policing in Saint Lucia started in the late 1990s with the initiation of the Police Reform Implementation Team, which clarified the vision, mission and strategic objectives for the police force. The community policing component of the new mission was then operationalised with the construction of a new police station (Marchand Police Station) in an at-risk community as the prototype for the implementation for community policing in Saint Lucia. Its Strategic Plan 2008–2011 notes that 'community policing is at the centre of its thrust to obtain respect, trust, confidence, and provide an accountable, effective and efficient service to citizens and other persons within the country' (Royal Saint Lucia Police Force (2008–2011). This commitment was central to six of the seven strategic objectives

for the force: reducing crime, disorder and the fear of crime; enhancing police presence in the communities; strengthening relations with local communities; improving public satisfaction in policing; increasing effectiveness in crime investigation; and ensuring that policing is delivered professionally, with integrity and accountability. It continued to operate other modes of policing, but the commitment to community policing did result in the development of strong partnerships (partnership policing) with groups in the community. This in turn resulted in initiatives such as talk shows, police participation in sporting events, town hall meetings and the appointment of community liaison officers at all police stations, all of which served to strengthen police–public relations and helped to make the public more aware of the role of the police, as well as their own role in assisting in crime prevention/reduction and solving crime. In August 2011, the US government provided support to the Royal Saint Lucia Police Force for additional training in community policing.

- **Trinidad and Tobago:** The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service polices the two-island nation with a population of 1.3 million with some 7,000 officers. It made a particularly strong commitment to community policing in 1996, with an extensive restructuring and associated redeployment of resources specifically to support a transition to community policing. Then in 2001 the force began an 'immersion programme' of community policing sensitisation seminars for police officers of all ranks (Deosaran 2002). However, Wallace (2011) reviewed the impact of the 2007–2010 developmental plan for Trinidad and Tobago (a component of the 2020 National Strategic Plan), and critiqued community involvement for lack of consistency and continuity. There was also a failure to link the community policing strategy to systems of education or employment: the majority of cases in court today involve young people from troubled communities, who have dropped out of school and could not then get a place in vocational training facilities. This problem may have been inadvertently compounded by short-term unemployment relief programmes, some of which appear to have been politically directed into particular constituencies, which are widely abused by gang members and disaffected young people who take the offered pay but do little or no work. This is consistent with the assessment by Deosaran (2002), who found a large gap between favourable police impressions held by the public in Trinidad and Tobago their actual willingness to co-operate in community policing activities, and their knowledge of or involvement in any community policing activity, indicating that community policing had failed to engage the public. This finding was also supported by Wallace (2014), who looked at the impact of 'hot-spot' policing, with the deployment of additional patrols in the troubled Laventille community, and found that those who knew about the programme had a higher level of trust in the police, but that most of the residents were unaware of the programme.

8.4 Possible future scenarios

The Caribbean nations face a number of challenges, but they have the resources and the capacity needed to solve all of the problems listed in this chapter. With good leadership and the right policies, the police and justice systems of the islands can be reorganised

to deliver far better results. A new emphasis on citizen security would enable the police and security forces to address the social problems at source, secure the support of the citizens, isolate the hard-core criminals, degrade and dismantle the networks of organised crime, break the power of those who facilitate organised crime and money laundering, and sever the links between politics and criminality. This would probably do more than any other measure to help the Caribbean nations to attract and retain human and financial capital. The decisions made today will therefore determine the future of the Caribbean, illustrated in the scenarios below.

8.4.1 Business-as-usual scenario

In the 'business-as-usual' scenario, the Caribbean nations continue to suffer some of the highest rates of homicide in the world. Attempts to implement a citizen security strategy are largely confined to particular areas, and lack the commitment needed to make them work. There is little effective preparation or planning to mitigate the threat of natural hazards or climate change, or to ensure food, water and energy security. As a result, most attempts to build a sustained process of economic development and growth are constantly undermined. Human capital continues to emigrate, and investment capital becomes harder to attract as emerging economies around the world become increasingly competitive and overtake the Caribbean, which becomes an economic backwater.

8.4.2 Worst-case scenario

In the worst-case scenario, the Caribbean nations fail to address their problems, and their weaknesses are then exploited by narcoterrorists who want to utilise the hotels, casinos and entertainment facilities for money laundering, and the marinas and trans-shipment operations for the distribution of narcotics and weapons. Caribbean governments are increasingly intimidated and dominated by powerful criminal organisations, who murder politicians, police officers and citizens who speak out against the developments. There is a wave of migration and capital flight, and a number of countries issue advisories against visiting the worst-affected Caribbean nations, leaving Caribbean governments increasingly desperate and dependent on the favour of the criminals.

8.4.3 Best-case scenario

In the best-case scenario, the Caribbean nations deal resolutely with their problems. They build competent, effective and trusted police forces, efficient and unbiased justice systems and regional intelligence-sharing networks, and proceed to dismantle domestic and transnational criminal organisations. Young people at risk are identified early, with prompt intervention to ensure that they do not become criminals, and humane and effective penitentiaries ensure a low rate of recidivism. Strong national planning systems ensure that major settlements and infrastructure are not built in areas that are vulnerable to natural hazards. The Caribbean nations become peaceful, prosperous, resilient and stable, with low levels of crime and high standards of integrity in public life. This scenario is built on a vision for citizen security in the Caribbean by 2050, whereby:

- The Caribbean nations are peaceful, prosperous, resilient and stable, with robust democratic systems, high levels of public participation, broad media diversity, and an electorate that demands high standards of performance from political representatives.
- There are low levels of violent crime, including homicide, robbery with violence, wounding, rape and other forms of physical and sexual abuse; there are high standards of integrity in public life, with zero tolerance for corruption, tax evasion and money laundering.
- Domestic and transnational criminal organisations have been dismantled, and young people at risk are identified early, with prompt intervention to ensure that they do not become criminals.
- Educational systems produce a workforce with the advanced skill sets needed in a fast-moving, dynamic world economy; shrewd public investment in key infrastructure helps to 'crowd in' private investment; the combination of strong, unbiased institutions, a skilled workforce and robust economic growth helps to retain and attract human and financial capital to the region.
- The police and security forces are competent, well equipped, effective and trusted by citizens; the justice systems are efficient and unbiased, and deliver swift and impartial justice; and the penitentiaries provide decent and humane conditions, and emphasise rehabilitation. The Caribbean nations have good intelligence systems, with rapid sharing of intelligence across the region and with external allies, allowing a rapid response to emerging threats.
- National planning systems ensure that major settlements and infrastructure are not built in areas that are vulnerable to earthquakes, landslides, coastal or alluvial flooding; that cities are organised to enable efficient transport, communications, energy, water and sanitation systems and are designed to reduce levels of incivility and crime, by ensuring that public spaces and transport systems are accessible, safe and clean, preventing the formation of political or criminal garrisons, and normalising informal settlements. Regulatory systems and building control codes ensure that buildings operate to net zero energy standards, with rainwater harvesting and grey water systems, thereby increasing national energy and water security; the modernisation and intensification of agriculture has increased food security, and strong environmental protection ensures that critical environmental support services remain fully intact and viable.

The key is the action plan for achieving this best-case scenario.

8.5 The action plan

8.5.1 Strategic framework for resolving regional citizen security issues

The nations of the Caribbean need to have flexible but robust plans for dealing with the profound challenge of living in a world of rapidly evolving threats and shifting opportunities. In an age of uncertainty, it is vital to act quickly and effectively to deal with new and evolving threats to national and citizen security.

8.5.2 Assessing probabilities and impacts

The Caribbean nations are all relatively small countries, but have a remarkable concentration of social, economic and environmental threats to the security of their citizens. However, it is not necessary to accord every possible threat the same level of priority. Some threats are much more likely to happen, or have the potential to cause far more harm, and it is therefore sensible to give them higher priority. It is therefore important to have a clear and logical process for assigning an appropriate priority to each potential threat, as this will in turn determine the necessary allocation of time and attention, people, equipment, money and other resources. This is especially important given the resource-constrained nature of these countries. Every allocation of scarce resources means that those resources have to be taken away from somewhere else. If every threat were given the same priority, this would mean that resources would be stretched too thinly to be effective anywhere.

It is therefore necessary to identify the main threats to each nation. This will include threats that constitute a clear and present danger (such as a high rate of crime), and major risks within a given time horizon (such as a storm surge that could flood heavily populated areas), although the strategies for dealing with these are markedly different. These diverse threats and risks can be weighted and ranked in a probability–impact assessment matrix to determine the priority that should be attached to each threat. This involves estimating the probability that an event will occur within a given time horizon, and estimating the potential impact of each event in terms of fatalities and casualties, damage to infrastructure and economic losses. Each category in the probability–impact matrix corresponds to a 'threat tier', and each tier can then be assigned an appropriate response.

Tier 1 threats are clear and present dangers, and are therefore the top priority. Tier 1 threats, such as violent crime, require an active response. Tier 2 threats are major potential or imminent threats, rather than present threats, but it is important to note two important caveats. First, some of them have the potential to cause catastrophic harm. It is therefore very important to actively monitor all Tier 2 items, and to be prepared to rapidly upgrade them to Tier 1 if necessary. Second, the concept of 'low probability' always refers to a particular period of time. For example, it is inevitable that a country that sits above several active faults will experience a major earthquake one day. If the geological data suggests that will probably happen within the next 100 years, and if this risk is evenly distributed over the period, there is a 1 per cent chance of a major earthquake in any one year over the next century, with a 10 per cent chance of it occurring within the next decade.

Table 8.2 Social, economic and environmental probability-impact matrix

	High impact	Low impact
High probability	Tier 1	Tier 3
Low probability	Tier 2	Tier 4

This raises an important issue as to how to deal with high-impact, low-probability events. How much time, effort and money should be assigned to preparing for something that is not currently happening? When resources are highly constrained, this is a highly pertinent question. The answer is that countries cannot afford to neglect high-impact, low-probability events, but they require a different kind of response. They usually require monitoring, building early-warning systems and taking steps to increase resilience in the most affordable way possible. For example, if the sea level is expected to be higher in future, then the first step is to stop any new permanent construction from being built too close to the shore. That way, by the time the sea level has risen, there are fewer people in harm's way than would otherwise have been the case.

8.5.3 Addressing the problem of violence in the Caribbean

There is a small group of factors that appear to account for most of the difference between violent and peaceful countries. The violent countries tend to have similar weaknesses, and the ones that are becoming more peaceful have similar strengths (or have made similar reforms).

Many of the violent countries have weak or corrupt governance, poorly performing economies, and incompetent or compromised institutions (especially with regard to policing and justice) that are not trusted by the people. There are opportunities to make significant profits from crimes such as extortion, fraud or trafficking narcotics and weapons, and the risk that criminals will be arrested and prosecuted is low. Many politicians and other leading members of society are unprincipled and self-serving. In these circumstances, many people have recourse to violence to settle their disputes, rather than the law.

The countries with falling levels of violence are those that have made progress with regard to social control (including better urban planning with regard to public spaces and transport, improved street lighting, stronger security systems for buildings and vehicles, more CCTV cameras, and the replacement of cash by electronic transactions); social leadership, where influential members of society emphasise honesty, self-control, civility and respect; effective rule of law, with transparent and accountable public institutions that can be trusted by the public, and the will and the capacity to eliminate corruption, especially among public officials; and evidence-based policing, where systematic reviews of police strategy, tactics and organisation are used to ensure that resources remain focused on reducing the most damaging forms of crime, often with an emphasis on preventative policing and early intervention.

A strategy to transform a violent society therefore has to simultaneously resolve the weaknesses associated with violence and poverty, and develop the strengths associated with peace and prosperity.

The majority of the serious crimes in the Caribbean fall roughly into two groups:

1. **Corruption and organised economic crimes**: motivated primarily by profit, with the associated use of violence in some cases to further criminal goals and protect criminal enterprises. These are more typically associated with powerful

and well-connected criminals involved in activities such as corruption and misappropriation of funds, construction and contracting, large-scale trafficking, organised robbery, the import of counterfeit goods, cyber crime, fraud, money laundering and tax evasion.

2. **Violent crime rooted in social tensions and problems**: motivated by a range of factors, including profit, status, power and reprisal, and including domestic violence and abuse, gang feuds and turf wars, fights to control particular areas or activities (such as the proceeds from scamming), theft, extortion, local trafficking in weapons and narcotics, and contract killing. These problems are largely concentrated in low-income, troubled and unstructured communities. In some cases, the development and growth of these communities was the result of political patronage. Many of these communities suffer from multiple disadvantages, including bad housing, limited access to amenities, no proper waste disposal services, with the associated hazards to health and safety, poorly performing schools, low levels of educational achievement and few legitimate employment opportunities. This combination often results in fatalism and low self-esteem, which can result in high levels of aggression and physical and sexual abuse, thereby perpetuating the cycle of violence.

Two different approaches are required.

1. The serious economic crimes typically require detailed intelligence assessments (and often international co-operation) in order to identify both the criminals and their facilitators; the latter include corrupt public officials, businessmen, lawyers and so on, who channel funds to criminals, launder cash for them or help them to conceal the source of their funds and cycle them back into the formal economy.

2. The problems in the low-income, troubled and unstructured communities are complex, with social, economic, political and cultural dimensions, and require a multiagency approach. The police have to take the lead (as little can succeed in the absence of security), but they also have to recruit the support of other government agencies, the private sector, churches and voluntary organisations in normalising and reintegrating these communities.

8.5.4 Responding to the threat of terrorism and narcoterrorism

The response to the threat of both terrorism and narcoterrorism is the same: to improve intelligence sharing (with appropriate protocols), co-operation with regard to monitoring individuals with known links to terrorist or organised crime networks, joint operations, mutual extradition accords, and co-operation on tracing terrorist finance and the proceeds of organised crime.

8.5.5 Responding to the threat of natural hazards and climate change

The level of a country's economic development and the structure of its economy are important components of its general ability to adapt to climate change and natural hazards (Clayton 2013; Clayton 2009). The domestic distribution of impacts partly

depends on the distribution of wealth and poverty in society, on levels of education, on the availability of good public health services, and on the quality of the housing stock, water, and transport and communication infrastructure. These variables overlap, which makes it possible to make generic predictions about the communities that are likely to be most severely affected. For example, young children in poor fishing communities with limited resources, bad schools, basic housing, poor drainage, problems with water contamination, bad roads and limited access to health services are likely to be among the most vulnerable members of that society. As this suggests, many of the measures needed to protect the most vulnerable people will overlap with well-managed, focused poverty reduction programmes. Better schools, health services and infrastructure will increase the resilience of these communities. However, it is also very important to establish clear planning guidelines and 'no-build' zones in order to direct people and infrastructure out of areas that are likely to be subject to increasing risk of coastal and alluvial flooding in future. In this way, appropriate government action can reduce the exposure to risk, build resilience and thereby increase the security of citizens.

Some approaches include:

- Reviewing national planning guidelines and building codes, identifying the most vulnerable areas, and upgrading emergency planning and disaster management.
- Ensuring that all permanent new buildings are built to the requisite standards, especially public buildings such as schools, and encouraging all citizens to strengthen their own homes.
- Ensuring that the core functions of government can continue to operate at all times, including in a post-disaster situation, by reinforcing critical government offices, army barracks, police headquarters, hospitals and communications centres, or relocating them into buildings that can withstand severe shocks.
- Ensuring that all government departments are aware of the need for disaster preparedness and emergency management, and that essential records are regularly backed up to secure sites.
- Establishing basic earthquake education in schools.
- Ensuring that there are essential supplies in secure depots, including shovels, tents, plastic sheeting and shelter material, mosquito nets, kitchen sets, portable toilets, hygiene and sanitation equipment, stores of food and water, and medical supplies for dealing with crush and other trauma injuries, respiratory disease, obstetrics and vaccinations against infectious disease.
- Making an inventory of essential equipment and locations in advance. This will include firms that own earth-moving equipment, so that these can be used after an earthquake to clear major roads, and large areas of clear ground, such as sports fields, as these may be needed for emergency evacuation centres, temporary hospitals and heliports.

8.5.6 Summary of the most urgent regional measures

The most urgent measures required are as follows:

1. With regard to the threats from crime, corruption, violence and the possible incursion of fundamentalist ideologies:
    - Countries must strengthen their security capabilities, streamline their justice systems, and increase intelligence sharing within the Caribbean and with key partners.
    - Countries must change the emphasis from protection of the state to citizen security, to build trust in the government and the police, and ensure that the people are protected.
2. With regard to the risks from natural hazards and climate changes:
    - Countries must build their social and economic resilience by moving core government functions, communications and healthcare systems into secure locations, using planning and zoning to gradually move centres of population and key infrastructure out of most vulnerable areas, and developing and enforcing stronger building codes.

8.5.7 Budgetary constraints

The average public sector debt in the Caribbean is about 70 per cent of GDP. In 3 of the 15 English-speaking Caribbean nations it is more than 100 per cent of GDP. In Jamaica, one of the most indebted nations, public debt peaked in 2013 at 147 per cent of GDP. As a result, debt servicing now takes more than 50 per cent of all public expenditure in Jamaica; education and health combined represent just 20 per cent. These financial problems make it harder to make the case for significant investment in measures to improve citizen security, as constrained budgets usually lead to the lowest-cost choices. However, there are several possible solutions. First, even modest incremental advances in key areas can be highly effective over time, provided that the programme is coherent, integrated and underpinned by a clear strategy. Second, the integration of policies for planning, housing, economic development, health, education and citizen security can be used to achieve multiple outcomes as efficiently and economically as possible. The *favela* normalisation model used in Rio de Janeiro (see below) is a good example of how both of these goals can be achieved.

8.5.8 Normalising the *favelas*

The state of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil has a long-term goal of normalising all of the *favela* (informal) communities in the state, but is doing so one at a time. Each *favela* is pacified and normalised by the 'Pacifying Police' (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, or UPP) before the focus moves to the next troubled community. In this way, more than 1,000 informal communities will eventually be reintegrated.

The first priority of the UPP programme is to ensure security, as little else can happen in the absence of effective security; however, the emphasis then moves to social

regeneration, economic investment and improvements to the infrastructure. As part of the process of normalising the *favelas*, the city runs public transport services into the area, city maintenance crews start to upgrade the infrastructure (alleyways are concreted, drains installed), the alleys are given names and the houses are given numbers (so that every resident gets an address). The private sector is encouraged to set up businesses in the UPP *favelas*, and allowed to offset investments in *favelas* against tax. This has generated a substantial flow of investment capital and donations into these communities.

As a direct result of the UPP programme, the homicide rate in the City of Rio de Janeiro almost halved in just seven years – falling from 42 per 100,000 in 2005 to 24 per 100,000 in 2012. Crimes that previously went unreported in the *favelas* (mainly theft, domestic violence and rape) are now being reported to the UPP, and perpetrators are being arrested. Unemployment has fallen, and average incomes are rising. Before normalisation, there were very few legitimate businesses inside the *favelas*. People would travel to work (mostly at low-end jobs) in other parts of the city. Now there are thriving businesses inside these communities. Some former *favelas* are seeing rapid rises in property values, as relatively affluent citizens are migrating into the now-safe areas. Before the UPP programme, few people paid for their electricity and water; they paid the local gang instead, which would prevent the utility companies from disconnecting supplies. The UPP programme has normalised the situation; people now pay the utilities for properly metered, legal supplies.

The cities of Medellín and Bogotá in Colombia have taken a similar approach. They have linked their *favelas* into the city with new public transport routes, and located major new public buildings in some of the poorest areas. This has greatly improved the quality of life and the self-esteem of the residents, and rates of crime have fallen dramatically.

These approaches demonstrate that a long-term commitment to reduce crime and improve living conditions in the most troubled areas can generate a wide range of social and economic gains, which ensures that residents then resist any attempt by criminals to regain control. This provides a durable basis for a permanent improvement in citizen security.

Notes

1 No firearms are manufactured in the Caribbean nations, so both legal and illegal weapons are imported.
2 *Plata o plomo* means 'silver or lead' (take a bribe or a bullet).
3 The 2012 homicide rate for Jamaica was 39.3 per 100,000 people, the sixth highest in the world. However, this was down from the peak years of 2005 and 2009.
4 The 2012 homicide rate for Trinidad and Tobago was 28.3 per 100,000 people. Much of this violence is gang-related; there are more than 100 criminal gangs in Trinidad and Tobago, linked to weapons and narcotrafficking, fraud and corruption (RISC 2014).
5 Guyana's 2012 homicide rate was 17.0 per 100,000 people, the fourth highest murder rate in South America, behind Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil, not including Central America (US Department of State, 2014).

6 It should be noted that corruption among police officers in the Caribbean has ranged from soliciting bribes to overlook traffic offences, to actual involvement in kidnappings or narcotics or weapons trafficking, and has also included willingness to tamper with evidence and compromise cases in court. It is also important to note, however, that corruption is not confined to the police, and that corruption in the judiciary and/or in the political directorate can be at least equally damaging.
7 Reported in 'The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security', chapter 4 in UNDP 2012a, 95.
8 This includes cultivating relationships with intelligence sources in the community while protecting their identity.
9 If true, this development is particularly significant, as it suggests that the police are winning the hearts and minds of the people. This is the key to effecting a permanent and substantial reduction in levels of crime and violence.

References

Barbados Advocate (2013), 'Community policing being pushed', 23 January 2013, available at: www.barbadosadvocate.com/newsitem.asp?more=&NewsID=28823 (accessed 30 September 2015).

Baron, K (2015), 'US military concerned ISIS fighters returning to Caribbean could reach border', *Defense One*, 12 March 2015, available at: www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/03/us-military-concerned-isis-fighters-returning-caribbean-could-reach-Border/107421/ (accessed 16 June 2015).

Byman, D and J Williams (2015), *AQ vs. IS and the Battle for the Soul of Jihad*, available at: www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/24-lawfare-byman-williams-battle-soul-jihad?utm_campaign=Brookings+Brief&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=16712327&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9lPJdSxoIMg3kyPJheT1v5-x42VS8GEgvoos2MPV_7SyHOI4aW4HwbMe0yN8kyVQXqJrN6xjv0q5uueTKjp9Rq7AKE1Jqp5Sbf_IkDP_On5zeTFH8&_hsmi=16712327 (accessed 16 June 2015).

Clayton, A (2009), 'Climate change and tourism: the implications for the Caribbean', in *Worldwide Hospitality and Tourism Themes.* Vol. 1 No. 3.

Clayton, A (2013), 'Building resilient systems', United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Inter-Regional Preparatory Meeting, in preparation for the Third International Conference on Small Island Developing States: Building Climate Resilience and Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction Knowledge Management, 27 August 2013.

Clayton, A and I Boxill (2012), 'Tourism, crime and terrorism: what are the risk, challenges and policy options?', in *Worldwide Hospitality and Tourism Themes: Tourism, crime and terrorism*. Vol. 4 No. 1, 98–100.

Clayton, A, N Radcliffe and CA Bruce (2012), 'Systems thinking', in Fogel, D, S Fredericks and I Spellerberg (Eds.), *The Encyclopedia of Sustainability: Measurements, Indicators, and Research Methods for Sustainability*, Vol. 6, Berkshire Publishing, Great Barrington, MA.

Commonwealth Secretariat (2013), *Commonwealth Secretariat Strategic Plan 2013/14–2016/17*, Commonwealth Secretariat, London.

Cook, CW (2007), *Mexico's Drug Cartels,* CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service.

Deosaran, R (2002), 'Community policing in the Caribbean: context, community and police capability', *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and*

Management, Vol. 25 No. 1, 125–46, available at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=195134 (accessed 16 June 2015).

The Economist (2014), 'Drugs trafficking in the Caribbean: full circle', 22 May 2014, available at: www.economist.com/news/americas/21602680-old-route-regains-popularity-drugs-gangs-full-circle (accessed 16 June 2015).

Emanuel, KA (1987), 'The dependence of hurricane intensity on climate', *Nature*, Vol. 326, 483–5.

Gomes, C (2007), 'Police accountability in the Caribbean: where are the people?', paper presented at the workshop on Police Accountability at the Civicus World Assembly, 23–27 May 2007, Glasgow, Scotland.

Government of Jamaica (2014), *A New Approach: National Security Policy for Jamaica March 2014*, available at: www.japarliament.gov.jm/attachments/1286_2014%20Ministry%20Paper%2063.pdf (accessed 16 June 2015).

Guyana Police Force (2013–2017), *Strategic Plans*, available at: http://guyanapoliceforce.gy/police/about-us/strategic-plan (accessed 16 June 2015).

de Guzman, MC, AM Das and DK Das (2014), *Evolution of Policing: Worldwide Innovations and Insights*, Taylor and Francis, Florida.

Headley, B (2006), 'Giving critical context to the deportee phenomenon', *Social Justice Journal*. Vol. 33, 40–56.

Inter-American Development Bank (2012), 'Citizen security: conceptual framework and empirical evidence', IDB Discussion Paper No. IDB-DP-232, September 2012.

Korstanje, ME and A Clayton (2012), 'Tourism and terrorism: conflicts and commonalities', *Worldwide Hospitality and Tourism Themes*, Vol. 4 No. 1, 8–25.

Lepp, A and H Gibson (2008), 'Sensation seeking and tourism: tourist role, perception of risk and destination choice', *Tourism Management*, Vol. 29, 740–50.

Mora, C, A Frazier, R Longman, R Dacks, M Walton, E Tong, J Sanchez, L Kasier, Y Stende, J Anderson, C Ambrosino, I Fernandez-Silva, L Giuseffi and T Giambelluca (2013), 'The projected timing of climate departure from recent variability', *Nature*, 10 October 2013, Vol. 502/183.

Park, K and Y Reisinger (2010), 'Differences in the perceived influence of natural disasters and travel risk on international travel', *Tourism Geographies*, Vol. 12 No. 1, 1–24.

Peattie, S, P Clarke and K Peattie (2005), 'Risk and responsibility in tourism: promoting sun-safety', *Tourism Management*, Vol. 26, 399–408.

Pinnock, F (2012), *Caribbean Cruise Tourism: Power Relations among Stakeholders*, Lambert Academic Publishing, Saarbrücken, Germany.

Research & Information Support Center (RISC) (2014), *Trinidad & Tobago 2014 Crime and Safety Report, OSAC*

Royal Saint Lucia Police Force (2008–2011) *Strategic Plan*, available at: www.rslpf.com/docs/STRATEGIC%20PLAN.pdf (accessed 16 June 2015).

Stratfor (2011), *Mexican Drug Wars Update: Targeting the Most Violent Cartels*, 21 July 2011, available at: www.stratfor.com/user/login?destination=analysis/mexican-drug-wars-update-targeting-most-violent-cartels (accessed 16 June 2015).

Tsai, CH and CW Chen (2010), 'An earthquake disaster management mechanism based on risk assessment information for the tourism industry: a case study from the island of Taiwan', *Tourism Management*, Vol. 31 No. 4, 470–81.

Tulchin, J and R Espach (2000), *Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation*, Woodrow Wilson Center for Current Studies on Latin America, Washington, DC.

UN Development Programme (UNDP) (2012a), *Caribbean Human Development Report on Citizen Security: Human Development and the Shift to Better Security*, UNDP, New York, NY, available at: www.gy.undp.org/content/dam/guyana/docs/HDR/Caribbean_HDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf (accessed 16 June 2015).

UN Development Programme (UNDP) (2012b), 'The police: transitioning to citizen security', in *Caribbean Human Development Report on Citizen Security: Human Development and the Shift to Better Security*, UNDP, New York, NY, 93–114.

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (2013), *Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2013*, available at: www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/33013 (accessed 16 June 2015).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2013), *Global Study on Homicide*, available at: www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf (accessed 16 June 2015).

US Department of State (2014), *Guyana 2014 Crime and Safety Report*, US Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Overseas Security Advisory Council, available at: www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=16163 (accessed 16 June 2015).

US National Security Council (2010), *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Introduction*, available at: www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/introduction (accessed 16 June 2015).

Wallace, W (2011), 'Introduction of a community involvement component in policing in Trinidad and Tobago: reality or rhetoric?', International Police Executive Symposium, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Paper No. 37, September 2011.

Wallace, W (2014), 'The social impact of the hearts and minds programme as a component of hot spot policing on communities in Laventille, Trinidad and Tobago', *Journal of the Department of Behavioural Sciences*, Vol. 3 No. 1.

World Bank (2012a), *Social Development in Latin America and the Caribbean: Citizen Security Brief*, available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/EXTLACREGTOPSOCDEV/0,,contentMDK:23325337~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:847655,00.html (accessed 16 June 2015).

World Bank (2012b), *Turn Down* The *Heat,* World Bank, Washington, DC.

World Bank (2015), *The World Bank Violence against Women and Girls Resource Guide: Citizen Security*, Law and Justice Brief, available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21091/929660REVISED00ity0Brief0APRIL02015.pdf?sequence=5 (accessed 16 June 2015).