Chapter 9

The Role of the Diaspora in Southern Africa with Special Reference to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland

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9.1 Introduction

The volume of international migration has more than doubled since 1975 and Africans have become the most mobile population globally. Although much of the movement from and within sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is voluntary, a substantial part is triggered by a combination of political and economic events which may force professionals to migrate. A high proportion of these migrants are skilled and the 'brain drain' effect of this skilled emigration was perceived as a blight on the region's economy before the twenty-first century. According to United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates, between 1990 and 2003, 20,000 skilled people left African countries annually for destinations elsewhere (Mutume 2003). By 2000, SSA had the highest probability (13.6%) of emigration of skilled people in the world, and the vast majority (over 90%) went to Europe, the USA and Canada (Easterly and Nyarko 2008). Between 1993 and 2004, the number of skilled Africans admitted to the United States rose from 28,000 to 66,000. By 2005, an estimated 300,000 African professionals lived outside the continent. The cost of producing human capital in Africa is quite high. Government spending on educating nationals ranges from 8.7 per cent of total government expenditure in Zambia to 26.9 per cent in Senegal (Easterly and Nyarko 2008).

Since the 1980s, researchers, governments and families have increasingly acknowledged the rewards of skilled and unskilled emigration. There is growing awareness of the positive contributions of the new diaspora (henceforth referred to as the diaspora) to people living in the ancestral home country through remittance of money and goods, economic investment, and social and political ideas which have helped to shape socio-economic development in sending countries. Although the history of African diasporas goes back to before the eighteenth century, the most notable determinants of the diaspora are political and economic factors which 'forced' many Africans to leave their countries for better conditions elsewhere.

Before the 1960s was a period of relative political and economic stability within the region, fostering unperturbed appreciation of the social and cultural benefits of the homeland (country of birth). International labour migration was perceived to be temporary, with a view to returning home at the end of a contract or schooling or on retirement in the host country. However, by the mid-1960s the political economy in several independent countries began to change. This was most pronounced in west

Africa, where a coup in 1966 toppled President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and a civil war from July 1967 to January 1970 almost crippled Nigeria as a nation. During the next two decades, the political situation in several west and east African countries altered considerably, with the frequent occurrence of military coups and violent ethnic conflicts. For those who returned home during this period, the vision of personal economic and social development was seldom realised, especially where the migrants had substantially enhanced their expectations while living abroad. Although many African immigrants in SSA still cherished the idea of returning home to retire and be buried there when they died, professional migrants increasingly began to perceive their home countries with much ambivalence.

In southern Africa, the situation was slightly different, as it plunged into violent struggle for majority rule, especially in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique. Education abroad served as an opportunity for many to stay in the host country until the political environment at home was suitable for return migration. Also, South Africa provided opportunities for the poorly skilled to be gainfully employed and generate much-needed income. Table 9.1 indicates that the volume of migration from the main sending countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to South Africa rose from 1.1 million in 1991 to 5.3 million in 2005 (average annual increase of 1.13%). However, it should be noted that these figures may be overstatements because they include short-term visitors and traders who may have travelled multiple times a year and may not necessarily have become migrants in South Africa.

Many professional migrants cherished a hope of improvement in the political economy at home, and this kept alive the desire to return home eventually. Perhaps it is for this reason that Gaillard (2003) assumed that most migrations by African professionals in the 1980s were temporary. Indeed, they seemed that way to most of those whose host countries were in SSA, partly because of the similarity in political and social conditions. It should be recalled that, when the economies of several African countries were in turmoil in the 1980s, few policy-makers in the countries that were doing well expected these economies also to falter within a decade. Thus, even if migration within SSA appeared temporary to some, it increasingly became

Table 9.1 Migration to South Africa from main sending SADC countries

Country	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003	2005
Botswana	135,002	371,490	446,707	563,365	797,315	798,455
Lesotho	243,710	1,184,893	1,190,848	1,559,422	1,291,242	1,668,826
Malawi	27,229	41,706	63,952	70,732	89,469	107,258
Mozambique	35,507	140,576	339,167	491,526	474,790	648,526
Namibia	140,527	188,887	187,594	206,022	216,978	220,045
Swaziland	182,792	546,651	712,491	742,621	809,049	911,990
Zambia	20,193	40,409	61,956	75,882	115,650	128,390
Zimbabwe	362,082	534,865	557,475	477,380	568,626	783,100
Total	**1,147,042**	**3,049,477**	**3,560,190**	**4,186,950**	**4,363,119**	**5,266,590**

Source: Crush et al. (2005a)

permanent during the 1980s. The political and economic climate in the region has improved significantly since the 1990s and international migration has taken a more circular form, especially in southern Africa.

9.2 Methodology

This chapter was prepared mostly from desk research, using tertiary data from published documents. To have a feel of what is happening at the policy level in each of the four study countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) field visits were included in the study design to collect primary data (from key informants). With regard to tertiary data, this chapter draws heavily on the following publications of the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP): *Degrees of Uncertainty: Students and the Brain Drain in Southern Africa* (Crush et al. 2005b) and *Migration, Remittances and Development in Southern Africa* (Pendleton et al. 2006).

Key informants were interviewed in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in September 2011. Owing to unavoidable circumstances, interviews were not conducted in Namibia. In Lesotho and Swaziland, government officials (in the ministries of finance and economic development and of labour and home affairs as well as the Central Statistics Offices) and university experts in migration were interviewed. In Botswana, the Central Statistics Office was excluded for technical reasons. The interviews were carried out using a questionnaire designed to find out the extent of knowledge about emigration statistics and international migration policies (see Appendix 9.1 for sample questionnaire).

9.2.1 Conceptual evolution of contemporary diaspora

The need to differentiate between classic and new diaspora is premised on the African Union's (AU) definition of African diaspora. The AU recognises and targets two categories of African diaspora in its attempt to meet the challenges of migration and development in the continent: (1) people of African heritage who involuntarily migrated to North Africa, Europe, the Caribbean, Brazil and Latin America ('classic diaspora'); and (2) people who recently migrated voluntarily from Africa ('contemporary diaspora'). Although this paper excludes the effect of (1), the author is mindful of the contribution of the AU towards the potential success (or failure) of the efforts of governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the inclusion of the diaspora in migration and development in southern Africa. In addition, there seems to be a lack of consistency in the use and understanding of the concept of diaspora and, probably because of its loose association with contemporary migration, social scientists tend to ignore the positive contribution of the classic diaspora to African socio-economic development.

Until recently, the 'diaspora' was to historians a field quite distinct from the geographers' perception of migration. Diaspora has traditionally been perceived through the eyes and minds of the Jews, who suffered immensely over a significant period from trauma while living in exile and nursing hopes of return to their ancestral homeland (Appiah and Gates 1996, Cohen 1997, Okpewho 1999). Cohen (1996, 1997) should be given

credit for having contributed immensely to ongoing debates about the changing faces of the diaspora and its evolution through numerous dimensions during the twentieth century. His treatment of the concept reflects recognition of Jewish diaspora as well as the diasporic effects of African slave movements to the Americas and mass movements of the British, Irish and Indians.

Changing perceptions of the diaspora have been recognised in the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, which, in its 1993 edition, adopted a contemporary stance by defining diaspora as 'any body of people living outside their traditional homeland' (Yew 2002). This new position was recognised earlier by Conner (1986) when he defined a diaspora as a segment of a people living outside the homeland. This represents a change from classical scholars' perception of the concept, and forms the basis of this chapter. After all, as Echeruo (1999) observed, the constitution of a diaspora is neither new nor the result of remote historic events alone. Events such as those the Jews experienced in biblical times have recurred in different forms over centuries until now. Whereas Rassool (1999) interprets classical diaspora as a mass movement, based on socio-economic and political crises, with the intention of seeking new cultural identities in the host country, Sheffer (1986) describes modern diaspora as the residence and action in host countries of ethnic minority groups who maintain strong sentimental and material ties with their home countries.

Although a seemingly complex subject, the diaspora is about identity and could frequently be associated with transnational conditions given that people in diaspora are caught between two or more cultural identities. In effect, diaspora is increasingly being equated with recent trends in migration. Although theories of migration are mostly based on voluntary decisions to move, recent events in SSA have increasingly forced professionals and non-professionals to flee their country of birth and eke out a living in foreign countries, sometimes under hostile conditions. If what connects events to classic diasporas includes 'coercion, … conscious cultivation of collective memory of their homeland, … return, … preservation of culture [and] maintenance of communication' (Anand 2003: 214), the same is true of the exiling of skilled professionals as a result of political dictatorship and corruption in SSA. While recognising the coercion etc. involved in many 'voluntary' decisions to migrate to other SSA countries, the process of diaspora formation takes time. Considering a more practical (*de jure*) definition of migration (United Nations 1970), the formation of a diaspora should be seen from a *de jure* rather than a *de facto* perspective (Cohen 1997; Anand 2003; Hugo 2006). Hugo (2006) assumed a definition of diaspora that includes a threshold of two generations for an identifiable group of migrants to form a diaspora. Considering that contemporary international migration of Africans increased remarkably after the 1950s, it is now safe to refer to contemporary migrants within the concept of the diaspora.

9.2.2 Characteristics and patterns of migration in southern Africa

Southern Africa has a long history of migration dating back to the middle of the nineteenth century, when labour migrants went to work on the Kimberley diamond mines, including workers from modern-day Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and

Swaziland. The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand changed the entire pattern of labour migration in the region. Initially, most migrants came independently. Male labour migration to the mines and commercial farms and plantations was the most enduring form of legal cross-border labour migration within the region. Mine migration was the most highly regulated, through systems of recruitment by a single agency, The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA) (Crush et al. 2006). For much of the twentieth century, the region experienced two major forms of labour migration: in-migration of white immigrants primarily from Europe; and temporary migrant workers (primarily male) from one country in the region to another (Crush et al. 2010).

By 1970, there were over 260,000 male labour migrants working in the mines in South Africa. Miners came from as far north as Tanzania. Other mining centres in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Tanzania also became magnets for labour migrants from other countries. The other major employers of migrants in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Swaziland, Mauritius and Tanzania were commercial farms and plantations. During the colonial period, migrants worked in urban centres in construction, domestic service and industry (Crush et al. 2006).

The South African mining industry recruited migrants from almost every other country in the region. After independence, most governments reassessed the question of labour migration to other countries. Some, such as Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia, tried to prevent it. Tanzania and Zambia withdrew their workers from the South African mines after independence. Malawi withdrew all its workers in 1972. A renegotiated agreement in the late 1970s saw about 20 per cent return to the mines. Employment remained at this level until 1987, when the Malawian government withdrew workers after a dispute with the apartheid government over human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) testing. In the 1980s, the supplier states formed the Southern African Labour Commission (SALC) in an effort to form a common policy on labour migration to South Africa. The SALC was unsuccessful in its efforts to develop a policy of phased withdrawal, primarily because countries such as Lesotho and Mozambique were unable to dispense with contract labour migration (Crush et al. 2006).

The end of apartheid, a system designed to control movement and exclude outsiders, produced new opportunities for internal and cross-border mobility and new incentives for moving. The ensuing integration of South Africa with the SADC region brought a major increase in legal and undocumented cross-border flows, and new forms of mobility. The region's reconnection with the global economy has opened it up to forms of migration commonly associated with globalisation. Growing rural and urban poverty and unemployment have pushed more people out of households in search of a livelihood. One aspect of this has been a significant gender reconfiguration of migration streams. HIV and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) have also had a considerable impact on migration. Rapid diffusion of the epidemic is inexplicable without reference to human mobility. New forms of migration are emerging in response. Finally, the countries of the SADC are still dealing with the legacy of mass displacement and forced migration. The impact of the Mozambican

and Angolan civil wars continues to reverberate. Recurrent civil strife in the rest of Africa has generated mass refugee movements and new kinds of asylum seeker to and within the region. The cessation of hostilities and threat has confronted countries of asylum with issues of repatriation and integration (Crush et al. 2006).

The stock of migrants in Southern Africa reached 2.2 million people in 2010 – with an average annual increase of 7.3 per cent since 2005. South Africa hosts the majority of these migrants (1.9 million) (see Figure 9.1). Since 1990, migration within the SADC and from the rest of Africa to the SADC has increased dramatically. Informal movement of people across borders also has a long history in southern Africa. Botswana and South Africa were experiencing the greatest influx of irregular migrants at the time of writing (Crush et al. 2010). The most significant increase in irregular labour migration in the last five years has been from Zimbabwe. The number of persons migrating from Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia to the commercial farms of Zimbabwe has declined considerably since the land transfer programme in Zimbabwe. However, the number of Zimbabweans migrating to work or to look for work in Botswana and South Africa has increased dramatically. Opportunities for Zimbabweans to work legally in other countries are limited but that has not prevented many from migrating (Crush et al. 2010).

Most irregular migrants in the SADC are from other countries within the SADC. South Africa, for example, has deported over 1.5 million migrants to neighbouring countries since 1994 (with Mozambique and Zimbabwe making up 90 per cent of the total) (Crush et al. 2010). An IOM assessment of the irregular movement of men from east Africa and the Horn to South Africa estimates the number of male irregular migrants handled by smugglers to be 17,000 to 20,000 per year. Forced

Figure 9.1 Stock of migrants in southern Africa, by destination, 2000, 2005 and 2009



Source: IOM (2010)

migrants are not normally classified as labour migrants. However, the distinction is sometimes blurry in practice. This is because successful refugee claimants are allowed to work in some SADC countries, making them de facto labour migrants. Conversely, labour migrants sometimes attempt to use refugee protection systems to access other countries. Many eventually have their claims rejected (Crush et al. 2010). Between 1994 and 2004, around 150,000 refugee applications were received by the South African Department of Home Affairs. In the same decade, only 26,900 were granted refugee status. Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) accounted for a quarter of these refugee claims (Crush et al. 2010). The major change since 2000 has been the dramatic increase in the number of applications lodged by migrants from Zimbabwe and Malawi.

The feminisation of poverty in many countries has prompted female household heads and other members to seek work through migration. This process coincides with a growing preference among employers for female workers. Farmers in border areas prefer to employ female migrants from neighbouring countries in the fields and canning factories. There is also evidence that child labour is increasing, particularly from Mozambique. In addition, studies show that, when a miner loses his job, he tends to relinquish his career as a migrant and stay home, and women household members are forced to migrate for work in other low-wage sectors (Crush et al. 2010).

9.2.3 Contemporary diasporas in sub-Saharan Africa

The colonisation of territories in Botswana by the Tswana in the nineteenth century, the violence associated with hut tax in 1897 and subsequent expulsion of 4,000 Tswana people to South Africa by the British to work as unpaid labourers reflect the trials and tribulations of an ethnic group living in diaspora (Anonymous 2004). The Bakalanga, an ethnic minority in the northern parts of Botswana, also lived in exile when they fled from South Africa in the late nineteenth century and settled in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Following civil conflict and the banishment of their chief, they were forced to flee again, this time to southern Zimbabwe, where they received refuge in 1947. Their eventual return to Botswana was granted in 1958 (Dube 2002). This has had significant effects on the relationship between Botswana and Zimbabwean citizens since Zimbabwe's economic problems began in the late 1990s. The Nigerian and Burkinabe settlements in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, respectively, spread over several generations.

More recently, several diasporas have been (and are being) formed on the continent and they make substantial contributions to development in the home and host countries. Among the most notable is the Tutsi diaspora, which originated from the Hutu uprising in 1963–64, forcing thousands of Tutsis to flee Rwanda and resettle in neighbouring Uganda. Partly because of acute unemployment and the economic slump in Rwanda in the 1980s, Hutus vented their frustration once more on the Tutsis and the accompanying genocide in 1994 forced thousands of Tutsis out of the country (Edwards 1997). Many of the skilled workers live in Europe and the USA as well as in African countries such as the DRC. Botswana has several groups of naturalised citizens whose ancestral homes are Ghana, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, and who

have lived in Botswana from the 1970s. New diasporas or extensions of earlier ones may emerge from commercial migration to various parts of Africa.

9.2.4 Diaspora contribution to development of host country

The recent rise in African governments' interest in the diasporas for their investment potential has led to the identification of several 'new' African diasporic communities in and outside the continent. The Ghanaian diaspora is mostly found in SSA, Europe (especially the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy and Germany) and Canada. There were an estimated 20,000 Ghanaians in Toronto alone in 1995 (Akyeampong 2006). Large communities of Ghanaians also exist in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Given Nigeria's huge population and long history of international migration, it has the largest diaspora globally. The Burundian diaspora places a great emphasis on promoting young migrants and the national culture. The mutualité des Grands Lacs (MGL), which was founded by members of the Burundian diaspora in 2001, has established a banking system in Europe and Burundi to minimise the cost of remittances from migrants. The Burundian community in Belgium provides financial support for small-scale commercial projects in Burundi. Both Burundian and Rwandan diasporas have contributed substantially towards post-conflict reconstruction in their ancestral homes. By comparison, the Ugandan government has failed continuously (since 1986) to attract resettlement and investment by the Asians who were forced to flee the country in 1972.

Among the contributions of migration to South Africa's economy is the introduction of the informal sector, an area which has been little documented. The informal economic sector, which has historically been a common feature of west and east African lifestyle, hardly existed in South Africa, Botswana and Namibia before 1990. Considering the high levels of unemployment in the cities, there is a likelihood of increasing migrant involvement in South Africa's informal sector. Many migrants who fail to find work or are refused work permits in the country become self-employed, at times illicitly setting up barber, food or clothing shops etc. Zimbabweans constitute the highest proportion of migrant street vendors.

Mozambicans and, to a lesser extent, Batswana, Basotho and Swazi are also quite active in promoting the informal sector in South Africa. Zimbabweans predominate among migrants who participate in South Africa's informal sector. Tevera and Zinyama (2002) observed that, among all visitors and migrants to South Africa, the highest proportion of men and women who buy and sell goods is from Zimbabwe. Basotho, Mozambican and Namibian migrants also buy and sell goods in South Africa (Sechaba Consultants 2002). Zimbabwean men seem to be in South Africa as much to work or look for work as for commerce; but almost three quarters of the Zimbabwean migrant women are there for commercial purposes (Tevera and Zinyama 2002). Besides personal development within the new diaspora, a common feature of this group is the remitting of money and goods to families in the ancestral home.

Trade in goods and services has increasingly become an additional source of labour migrants' household income and is an important component in the diaspora in

southern Africa. The trade diaspora falls within the context of commercial migration. Ghanaians were among the first west Africans to settle in southern Africa. The very high standards of education maintained in secondary and tertiary institutions in Ghana assisted their employment in the educational, legal and administrative sectors in the region. Several of the men were accompanied by their wives, and these women brought along skills which could be applied in the area of commerce. It was soon realised that there was a market for business in hairdressing because this was not a common skill among southern Africans. Ghanaian women soon prospered in the private sector by introducing and establishing hair salons. They also entered the clothing market and sold clothing imported especially from Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. In Botswana, Van Dijk (2003: 571) personally noted that there were 'thirty-one Ghanaian-owned salons and/or clothing boutiques, most of which had been established from the mid-1980s onwards'. An informal economic sector hardly existed in South Africa, Botswana and Namibia before 1990, a lack that contributed to the apparently high unemployment rates in these countries at that time.

Commercial activities of migrants, especially from Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Mali, have generated employment for numerous South Africans who would otherwise have been unemployed (Adepoju 2003). The significance of commercial migration in the country is manifest in the 2003 draft of a national policy on street vending, with assistance from the International Labour Organization (ILO). Although most current street vendors are South African citizens, there is substantial involvement of migrant women. However, the negative side of migrants' trading activities is that it occasionally involves organised crime. South Africa has become a haven for the international drug trade and hijacking. It has been established that west African crime syndicates dominate the trade of cocaine in South Africa, and this practice dates back to the 1980s (Gastrow 1999, Shaw 2001). The increasing participation of immigrants in southern Africa's commercial industry reflects traits of populations in trade diaspora. Generally, these migrants make frequent visits home with the objective of diversifying the objects of commerce and maximising their spheres of influence in host countries.

9.2.5 Diaspora contribution to development of origin country

Remittances

Financial and social remittances are an important factor in the co-operation and policy dialogue agenda among countries. Social remittances include the ideas, identities, language, behaviour, food, music, other arts and social capital that are transferred from destination to origin countries (Levitt 1998). Their roles are subtle and usually ignored initially but they highlight the impact of migration and transnationalism in the sending communities. The World Development Report 2011 indicates that the inflow of financial remittances to Africa quadrupled between 1990 and 2010, from US$9.1 billion to $40 billion, increasing its contribution to Africa's gross domestic product (GDP) from 1.9 per cent in 1990 to 2.6 per cent in 2010. The main reasons for this growth are the increase in emigration from Africa and the rising incomes of African migrants, led by a booming global economy before the financial crisis in

2008–2010 (Ratha et al. 2011). Since the 1990s, the modes of money transfers have changed, making it easier to transfer a large amount of money from the destination country to the country of origin. This is chiefly through money transfer organisations (MTOs) such as Western Union and Money Gram, which have reached agreements with African banks and post offices to facilitate easy transfer of money. Within the continent, north Africa receives the highest amount of remittances, followed by west, east, southern and central Africa in that order.

Ongoing debates about the impact of remittances on development do not nullify the reality that education and remittances contribute considerably to household incomes, particularly in rural areas. Those who hold the view that remittances do not contribute significantly to development tend to perceive development within a macroeconomic framework. However, the financial returns from migration do not necessarily have to be realised in macroeconomic terms. In Africa, the effect of migration at the micro-economic level (i.e. the family) is what matters most. Africa has produced governments which have exhibited gross unfairness in the distribution of national wealth, and this has been largely responsible for the poor human development of its population. Africa has been the most affected by this situation because of notoriously bad governance, lack of transparency and poor justice systems (especially between the 1960s and 1980s). Hence, particular attention should be placed on the mechanisms that families have employed to access basic assets such as food, cash, education, medical facilities, water and electricity. As Stark (2004) observed, professionals who stay at home will accumulate significantly less income than they would have if they had migrated.

In the context of co-operation and policy dialogue, policies related to remittances can be taken from two perspectives. From the perspective of the countries of origin, the focus is often on attracting more remittances from abroad with the intention of spending them on development projects. The World Bank reports and other studies have identified certain organised migrant groups established in the destination countries which target certain projects in their communities of origin. From the perspective of the destination country, policies have been designed with the intention of preventing criminal activities, such as money laundering or using funds for terrorism. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) monitors activities relating to MTOs to gain insights into regular remitters, tracing their remittances back to their countries of origin and identifying those engaged in clandestine activities with innocent customers. The destination countries have developed policies on remittances to regulate, monitor and manage money transfers against the backdrop of the events of 11 September 2001, which have dramatically revolutionised the migration regime. Thus, from the perspective of the countries of origin, national policies should of necessity target different ways for the migrants abroad to make more remittances through 'safer' channels and by cheaper means, on the assumption that remittances can in one way or another be used towards development initiatives.

Data on the sources of remittance flows to SSA are scant and unreliable. However, estimates based on bilateral migration stocks, incomes in destination countries and incomes in countries of origin indicate that the top sources of remittances for SSA

are the European Union (EU) (15 countries, 41% of inflows) and the United States (28%) (Ratha and Shaw 2007, Ratha et al. 2011). The remaining sources are other developing countries, primarily in Africa (13%), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (9%) and other high-income countries (8%). North African countries are even more dependent on remittances from western Europe (54%) and the GCC countries (27%), receiving only 5 per cent of remittances from the United States (Ratha et al. 2011).

It has been widely recognised that migrant remittances contribute considerably to the reduction of poverty in southern Africa. Although the region receives the smallest amount of international remittances in Africa, it contributes significantly to national development in several countries, especially Lesotho. Migration, remittances and development have a long history in the region. Bilateral agreements between South Africa and several southern African countries, including Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, had a built-in system of deferred pay which channelled significant remittances back into the national economy. In 1984, 18,691 Batswana miners generated nearly R17 million ($2.6 million) in officially recorded remittances alone, which helped to grow Botswana's rural economies in particular. However, subsequent improvement in the economy of Botswana reduced the significance of remittances considerably. Hence, when downsizing and redundancies ('retrenchments') in South African mines occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s, a decline in monitored remittances to only R383,000 ($59,447) by 1997 from some 12,000 Batswana workers hardly affected the fast-growing national economy. Still, at the micro-economic level, remittances are crucial in the process of poverty mitigation, especially in rural areas. From a macroeconomic perspective, remittances contribute 1 per cent, 3 per cent and 29 per cent, respectively, to the GDPs of Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho. It may therefore be surmised that, except in Lesotho, migrant remittances do not have a significant impact on national development. However, that is not true; families in Lesotho and Swaziland depend largely on the remittances they receive to survive each month.

Brain circulation

Return migration is a pattern that is gaining momentum in many African countries. Africa is experiencing two main patterns of return migration: the return of refugees to their home countries, resulting primarily from the end of conflict; and the return of skilled and professional migrants from outside the continent. The latter trend emerged when the financial crisis engulfed the economies of migrant-receiving countries. Some countries document a trend of more and more of their nationals returning from living abroad. Ghanaians, Nigerians and Sudanese who have been working abroad for years are now returning to their home countries. Return migration is partly due to deliberate government policies to induce their nationals abroad to return and invest in their home countries. Such policies include incentive packages of exemptions from customs and land for housing, connecting professional and skilled migrants to relevant institutions at home. A more important dimension to these policies is their potential to attract skilled emigrants back home. This return is operationally referred to as brain circulation.

Brain circulation occurs when international migrants who left the home country with acquired skills to live and work elsewhere return to the home country (Saxenian 2005, Logan 2009). A major asset in this process is that migrants return home having acquired new and advanced skills during their stay in host countries. It provides an opportunity for the returnees to contribute considerably more to the development of their home country than they might have done if they had not moved. Although brain circulation has had a huge impact in the developed and emerging economies of the USA, the EU, China, India etc., it did not seem until very recently that Africa would benefit. The success of this process is largely influenced by migrants' opinions of the political economy at home. There are several social and economic factors that have inhibited its effectiveness in Africa (Wickramasekara 2002). In developed nations, the environment for setting up the networks required for profitable professional, academic and commercial ventures is more advanced. Moreover, the populations are highly heterogeneous, highly skilled and development-oriented. Meanwhile, within developing countries in Africa, these structures are still being implemented and so the populations are unable, as yet, to benefit from these advancements.

The successful implementation of diamond mining in Botswana received a considerable boost from the performance of Batswana (citizens of Botswana) who used to work in the South African gold mines. Family planning in Botswana was aided by the observations of mine workers about the economic and social advantages of fertility regulation. Men assisted by encouraging their spouses and partners to use effective contraceptives. This helped to reduce average family size from about six to four within a much shorter time than it took west and east Africans to reduce their fertility significantly. A noteworthy demonstration of good practice is the effort made by some African leaders to attract people in the diaspora back to their home countries. President Obasanjo made numerous visits to the USA, Europe and Asia to persuade Nigerian professionals there to return home. One incentive already in place is permitting Nigerian citizens to hold dual citizenship (Oyelaran and Adediran 1997, Honoré 2004). President Mbeki of South Africa pledged about $71 million to encourage highly skilled citizens to stay in (or return to) the country.

In 2005, the government of Sierra Leone amended its Citizenship Act to allow its current and former citizens to hold dual citizenship. In an attempt to ease the effect of emigration of health workers in Lesotho, the Minister of Health and Social Welfare met with Basotho health professionals in the UK to discuss the plans that the Lesotho government had for those who would return. To attract skills back home, African governments should implement strong and sustainable economic policies that would guarantee employment, investment and internationally competitive income. Hence, the government of Malawi has introduced economic and investment policies since 2000 that have improved economic performance and attracted the attention of potential professional returnees. In collaboration with the UK Department for International Development, the government is offering incentives that would discourage emigration of health professionals. The Ethiopian government has also implemented a policy that would ensure effective use and adequate remuneration of return migrants. It includes employment in higher education institutions and good investment opportunities.

9.2.6 Gender and migration

Research indicates that there is a definite trend towards the feminisation of labour migration in southern Africa, including an increase in the number and proportion of women migrants (Dodson 1998). This trend is also accompanied by a shift in the reasons for women's migration. More and more women are becoming independent migrants in their own right. Dodson indicates that:

> Men and women migrate to South Africa for different reasons. Men go primarily in search for employment, whereas women's migration is driven by a wide range of social and reproductive factors in addition to economic incentives. Even the economic motives for migration are gender-specific, with women going largely to trade and men to work in formal employment. Thus migration is closely tied to socio-economic roles and responsibilities allocated on the basis of gender.
>
> (Dodson 1998: 1)

This was seen to have a significant effect on reproductive preferences and adoption of family planning methods in Botswana, among other countries. Mine layoffs in South Africa contributed to the process of renegotiating gender roles in more traditional societies such as in Lesotho and Swaziland.

In Africa, males still predominate among immigrants currently residing in destination countries. The ratio of men to women among migrants in a sample of African countries in 2007 was generally high (i.e. 100 or more to one) except in Morocco, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Mauritius and Réunion. The very high gender imbalance of migrants in South Africa and Botswana is partly explained by the levels of skills desired for development where mining is a key economic sector. The history of migration in SSA points towards preferences for men in related industries. The motivators of migration to South Africa are different for men and women. Men are predominantly motivated by employment opportunities whereas women are influenced by several social and cultural factors. Where economic issues are involved, the movement is usually for trade purposes. In effect, men still dominate the formal employment sector while women are more prevalent in the informal economic sector (Ulicki and Crush 2000). One factor that works in favour of Basotho is the availability of work in South African farms, largely because local labour is not easily accessible, and women are hired more frequently in these farms than men. Moreover, the downsizing of foreign labour in South African mines left many men waiting for similar jobs while women took the lead in emigrating to sustain the household income. Probably because of this factor plus opportunities for informal trade, unemployment in Lesotho is less among women than men.

Overwhelmingly (almost 100%), the destination of both sexes from Lesotho and Swaziland is South Africa. In Botswana substantially more men than women prefer to emigrate alone, whereas more women than men choose to move with several dependants (Campbell 2007). The growing feminisation of migration may result from the duration of migration. Among migrants from Lesotho and Swaziland, males predominate where the duration is more than ten years whereas females predominate among durations of six to ten years and even more so for one to five

years (Dodson et al. 2008). Most female migrants from Lesotho and Swaziland are married, separated, divorced or widowed. Whereas the males are generally poorly educated (primary or no education), their female counterparts are generally educated at the level of secondary school or more. This is particularly true of Basotho and Swazis. Relatively few migrant household heads are females, probably because of the differential dependency burden of men and women. Basotho men work mainly in South African mines whereas the women are mostly in domestic work. Although the majority of Swazi men (66%) work in the mines, the women are distributed mainly between the domestic and professional sectors.

Feminisation of migration introduces independence for women from traditionally subservient positions relative to men. Dependence is being gradually replaced with individuality and a sense of rational distribution of responsibility. From a sample of 4,700 migrants in five SADC countries, it was observed that women's migration was generally not their own decision because the decisions were taken mostly by other family members (Lefko-Everett 2007). However, with female migrants becoming increasingly educated and moving beyond short distances, decisions to emigrate are becoming personal. South Africa offers women a wealth of economic opportunities, and the prospect of mobilising financial capital is a good migration motivator. For irregular female migrants the risks are quite high, including robbery, sexual abuse, rape and trafficking. Although this is not likely to be a strong deterrent for women in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, it serves to remind governments of the need for policies to address human rights by strengthening, for example, anti-trafficking laws. The benefits of emigrating are quite high for women. Many go through gratifying economic and social changes, especially where opportunities exist to enhance one's educational status. Some women interpret their socio-economic enhancement as achievement (Lefko-Everett 2007). The economic burden of single motherhood has also become less strenuous with migration.

9.3 Partnerships in migration and development

South Africa has had the highest share of the benefits from increased trade in general, while several other countries in the SADC, including Lesotho and Namibia, have been left behind. This is not exceptional in SSA. International trade statistics indicate that Africa's share in world trade has declined from around 6 per cent 25 years ago to about 2 per cent now; less than 1 per cent if South Africa is excluded. This trend points to the continent's increased marginalisation in the context of world trade (UNECA 2011). The situation is no better, or even worse, with regard to intra-Africa trade, which has consistently remained minimal compared with its intercontinental trade. The pattern of African exports continues to be heavily influenced by historical links with the rest of the world. More than 80 per cent of African countries' exports are still destined for markets outside the continent, with the EU and the USA accounting for more than 50 per cent of the total. On average, over recent decades only about 10 to 12 per cent of African trade has been with other African nations. This is not an encouraging trend, especially when compared with other world regions (UNECA 2011).

In striving for unity and collective development strategy, African countries have come up with a number of partnerships, which the continent has endeavoured to cope with collectively. These partnerships include:

- multilateral partnerships in the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO);
- the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP)–EU partnership; and
- bilateral initiatives in support of African development such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, United States), the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD, Japan) and similar initiatives with China, India, Brazil and Turkey (United Nations 2009).

9.3.1 Diaspora policies

The fieldwork in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland indicated that none of these countries has a comprehensive international migration policy. They also do not have policies on the diaspora and it seems very likely that the position is the same in Namibia. The lack of comprehensive migration policies was noted at the African Regional Dialogue on International Migration Conference of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in Addis Ababa in October 2011 as a major mitigating factor in progress on international migration and development in the continent. In view of this gap, this chapter will discuss diaspora policies generally to call attention to the interest in the subject among the African Union and other international organisations.

In September 2007, the Capacity Development Management Action Plan Unit produced a concept note on Mobilizing the African Diaspora for Development. It noted the AU's plan to collaborate directly with the diaspora in order to boost the chances of achieving sustainable development and meet the continent's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In this regard, the AU and African governments are co-operating with the World Bank to form strategies on collaborative activities with the African diaspora. Co-operation with the Bank is justified because it is a major development partner of Africa. It also has the capacity to co-ordinate programmes, provide advisory services and convene related meetings. The Bank already has strong technical links with the diaspora and is the most powerful financial organisation in the world. Among the programmes the AU and the World Bank agreed to undertake are those that would:

- Enhance capacity for the delivery of improved services in strategic public sectors and institutions. This will be done through support to diaspora professionals and entrepreneurs to build on ongoing efforts towards attaining short-, medium- and long-term placements, return and retention and institutional partnerships and networks.
- Increase the quality of design and implementation of diaspora-led investment initiatives in participating countries through, among other things, facilitating business and investment promotion networks through mechanisms for diaspora and home country partners to access development funds.

- Improve communication and working relationship between African governments, donor agencies and diaspora professionals (AFTCD 2007).

Training organisations help people in the diaspora who aspire to become entrepreneurs to acquire the skills required to establish and maintain successful businesses. On occasion, the training goes along with provision of business services which drive the transfer of business knowledge from diaspora experts to home country entrepreneurs. It also affords entrepreneurs at home opportunities to have some education in business management and ways of accessing funds when starting a business. Several agencies, including the Programme Solidarité Eau, offer training designed to suit cultural and other practices in the entrepreneur's home country (Newland and Tanaka 2010).

NGOs assist the diaspora investment enterprises a great deal. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has donated $1 million to the Ethiopian government and the Ethiopian diaspora, which are in a co-operative venture (Ethiopian Commodity Exchange) that helps Ethiopian farmers at home to access information about national and international agricultural products and to maximise benefits from the sale of their products. Ethiopians in the USA, with joint citizenship and appropriate skills, are granted job contracts for three years by this organisation to transfer their skills to at least one local resident. Since its inception in April 2008, the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange has granted its membership to over 450 coffee suppliers.

The Forum International for Ethiopians Living in Diaspora (FIELD) uses the diaspora as an instrument of development in Ethiopia. Its activities are designed to mitigate poverty and improve health and education in the country. Individuals also contribute to infrastructural development, especially in the construction of buildings. Contributions from the Somali diaspora to household economic development are significant enough to challenge the macroeconomic perception of these remittances as non-developmental (Ahmed 2000). Although remittances are generally voluntary, at the time of writing the government of Eritrea obligated its diaspora population to pay a 'healing tax' which assisted the war (between Eritrea and Ethiopia) effort as well as household economic development.

One of the most significant areas of inter-regional dialogue in Africa occurred at the High-Level UN Dialogue on Migration and Development held in New York in September 2006 and, later, at the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) in Brussels in July 2007. These meetings discussed the extensive potential of the African diaspora to contribute constructively to the social, economic and political development of Africa. The importance of an ongoing policy dialogue was a central theme of the meeting. Although a constructive framework for the inclusion of the diaspora in policy dialogue does not yet exist, important steps are being made towards formalising this process. The subject is beginning to gain top priority on the national and international agenda in Africa, although the views and perspectives of the diaspora itself have not been sufficiently heard. There is respectful recognition in governments and the AU of the human, intellectual and social capital held within the diaspora as the most valuable offshore asset of Africa. Hence, interest

in the diaspora goes beyond the immediate financial rewards from remittances to appreciate the managerial and technological skills that Africans abroad could invest in the continent's development process.

The diaspora communities are responsible for implementing key projects and initiatives in the homeland and this makes them key players in the area of migration and development. Unique lessons can be drawn from these projects, and can be an inspirational source to others. For example, the Ethiopian diaspora community formed the Buna Bet Ethiopian Coffee Dir Foundation in 2000 to assist socio-economic development in Ethiopia. It is very active in the Netherlands (and Ethiopia) in stimulating development in the home country. This also includes bringing Ethiopia closer to the Netherlands, with the potential of mutual benefit and exchange. One of the projects implemented is a coffee corner in Amsterdam. The project was developed to improve the living conditions of former prostitutes by creating a means of living for them. The coffee that is sold in the Netherlands is bought directly from the farmers in Ethiopia and refined by members of the diaspora community. It targets a broad group of the poor and marginalised in the community. (In Ethiopia the *lingua franca* is Amharic and Dir is the Amharic word for 'thread').

9.3.2 Policy actions

In February 2011, the South African government in co-operation with the African Union Commission (AUC) hosted a Technical Committee of Experts Meeting. The participants were expected to develop strong policy proposals for viable projects that would address political, economic and social co-operation within the AU member states. Among the areas of interest to initiate was the implementation of the first key element of the AUC/South Africa African Diaspora roadmap. Another key element, presented by South Africa and endorsed by the AU, was to hold an African Diaspora Summit in 2012. The commitment to organise a Diaspora Summit on the continent is a key priority of the African Diaspora Initiative that the AUC has launched to connect the diaspora to the development of the continent (ADPC 2011).

The AUC is committed to widening the development area in the continent by incorporating the diaspora in the development process as valuable partners. For instance, the AUC has created the African Citizens Directorate (CIDO) to manage the relationship between overseas diasporas and homeland governments. The diaspora is now seen as a force for positive change that should be harnessed for the benefit of Africa, and one of the expressed policy goals of the AU is to involve the diaspora more actively in the development of the continent. As a sign of recognition, the AU recently designated Africans in the diaspora as members of its 'sixth region'. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has also made efforts to reach out to the diaspora and involve it more closely with development efforts on the continent. This indicates that the continent is committed to doing everything possible to benefit from the human, financial and capital resources available within its huge population residing outside Africa.

This is in response to the increasing involvement of the diaspora in the development of the homelands on a larger scale, for members of the African diaspora have already

positioned themselves as critical development actors in development co-operation policy circles. They have become the key drivers for a diaspora-led development sector that is quite different from the traditional development co-operation sector, which is typically the domain of more developed donor governments. Consequently, members of the African diaspora are contributing huge resources to the social welfare and economic growth of their respective homelands, remarkably exceeding the level of official development assistance (ODA).

Among the issues of great concern to Africans and EU governments is labour migration of west Africans to the EU through the Maghreb routes. This is particularly worrying because many of these movements are irregular, involving people smugglers and physical dangers within the Maghreb. There are several obstacles to the healthy living of undocumented migrants, which require regional co-operation of governments to address. There is considerable difficulty in reaching agreement in some cases, but it is best to work towards win–win outcomes.

In December 1998, the General Assembly of the United Nations determined the need for an intergovernmental committee to find a solution to the trafficking of women and children. The need was due to the absence of laws which relate to human trafficking. This recognition formed the basis for devising the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. According to Article 2, the main objectives of the protocol were to prevent and combat trafficking in persons, paying particular attention to women and children, to protect and assist the victims of such trafficking, with full respect for their human rights, and to promote co-operation among states parties on the subject.

The East African Community has been quite determined to encourage intergovernmental co-operation within its community to ensure the success of the protocol on movement of persons. Included in Article 104 are (1) the easing of border crossing by nationals of member states and (2) the harmonisation and maintenance of common employment and labour programmes and legislations (Kanyangoga 2010).

9.4 Country profiles

The four countries included in this study are divided down the middle between the faltering economies of Lesotho and Swaziland and the relatively buoyant economies of Botswana and Namibia. This has helped to produce two different models of international migration patterns. Whereas the first two countries do not attract many immigrants and export a fairly high proportion of their labour force, the latter two are quite attractive to labour migrants and export relatively few of their labour force. Although this may give the impression that it is not worth investigating the diasporas of Botswana and Namibia, quite the opposite is true. Many of Namibia's skilled emigrants are of the generations (or their descendants) which emigrated before the country's political independence in 1990. The non-returnees from this group still maintain economic and social links with families at home. Meanwhile, most of Botswana's skills within the diaspora are from the group of people which

have gone abroad since 1960 to study or work in the other African countries, the EU, the USA, Australia, Asia etc. and have not yet returned home. A study of potential brain drain in SADC by the SAMP in 2002/03 indicates the potential for growth in the diasporas of the four countries in this study and this will be discussed below. The sample was taken from final year students (citizens) in tertiary education institutes (Crush et al. 2005b).

9.4.1 Botswana

Botswana is among the few countries in SSA with a vibrant economy. Its economy is based primarily on diamond and beef exports. Since attaining independence in 1966, Botswana has made remarkable economic strides thanks to the export of diamonds. Its real per capita GDP grew from $350 in 1966 to $2,720 in 1994/95 and $3,310 in 1998 and was over $8,000 at the time of writing. By 1993, the country's per capita GDP growth was the third fastest in the world, after Korea and Thailand. The country's foreign reserve was $10.2 billion in 2007 (Gaolathe 2008). Employment opportunities have multiplied by more than ten since 1966. As a result of vigorous efforts by the government to improve health services throughout the country, the national infant mortality rate (IMR) dropped from 100 (per thousand live births) in 1971, through 71 in 1981 to 37 in 1988. The only country in SSA with an IMR lower than this is Mauritius. By 1993, the average daily calorie intake per person was higher than that for SSA. Education has also improved considerably, especially in the urban centres. Although HIV/AIDS has reduced the life expectancy of people in the country, the most recent statistics on HIV prevalence in the country (17%) suggest that life expectancy is still high (GoB 2004). However, notwithstanding the economic and social gains made by the government over the post-independence period, there is still evidence of poverty throughout the country, especially the rural areas. A substantial proportion of the population in Gaborone is either poor or very poor, but the level of poverty is arguably declining in the city.

The history of remittances by Botswana's citizens goes back to the nineteenth century, when they began to migrate to South Africa. Largely to care for families and pay the hut tax (see Schapera 1947, Dube 2002), men sought recruitment to work in South African mines. Through deferred payments and personal efforts, these workers remitted substantial amounts of their salaries home to Botswana and their families (Taylor 1986, 1990). Women also remitted while working in South Africa's domestic sector (Izzard 1985). Internal migration occurred in Botswana for personal and household development. The economic and settlement policies of the national government after independence in 1966 contributed considerably to create opportunities which enhanced internal labour migration. Households used these opportunities to send young men and women out to work (Lucas 1982). These migrants assisted the families at home largely through remittances. The national education policy (GoB 1994) provided additional opportunity to rural families to maximise remittances from their educated children.

The World Bank (2011) estimated that there were about 63,000 Batswana living outside Botswana and 3.6 per cent of them were highly skilled (i.e. tertiary educated)

Table 9.2 Immigration and emigration statistics

Category	Botswana	Lesotho	Namibia	Swaziland
Total population (2009)	1,900,000	2,100,000	2,200,000	1,200,000
No. of emigrants (2010)	63,000	427,500	16,500	163,300
Emigrants (% of total population, 2000)	3.2	20.5	0.7	13.3
Skilled (tertiary) emigrants (%)	3.6	4.3	3.5	0.5
Emigration of physicians (%)	11.4	33.3	45.0	28.5
Emigration of nurses (%)	2.2	2.8	5.4	2.8
Immigrant stock (2010)	114,800	6,300	138,900	40,400
Emigrants (% of total population)	3.2	20.5	0.7	13.3
Immigrants (% of total population)	5.8	0.3	6.3	3.4

Source: World Bank (2011)

(see Table 9.2). Of the four SADC countries, Botswana has the lowest proportion of emigrants (60.3%) in other African countries, mostly in South Africa. In 2001 there were about 15,000 Batswana in South Africa (United Nations 2009). As Table 9.3 shows, 21 per cent were in the European Union and 11 per cent in North America (Canada and the USA). The profile of emigrants has changed considerably between the early twentieth century and now. Emigration began in the nineteenth century when recruitment of foreign labour began for work in South African gold mines. Up to the 1960s, most emigrants were poorly educated male employees in the mines. Batswana women also went to South Africa to seek work, mostly domestic, in the cities. Emigration of the educated became significant in the 1960s with the establishment of the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (UBLS). The vigorous implementation of the national education policy motivated many nationals to seek tertiary education at UBLS. Since then, increasing numbers of males and females have gone abroad (to South Africa, Malaysia, the UK, the USA, Canada and Australia) to seek higher education. In 2006, 79 per cent of all Batswana students studying abroad were in South Africa. In 2007, about 3,500 and 500 students were studying in South Africa and Malaysia, respectively (Molutsi and Kobedi 2008). This drive towards higher education has had an equalising effect on the incomes of tertiary-educated men and women. Whereas in 1993/94 men with less than upper secondary school education earned about twice as much as their female counterparts, the

Table 9.3 Percentage of emigrants in destination regions

Country of origin	Africa	Asia	Europe	Latin America & Caribbean	North America	Oceania
Botswana	60.3	2.7	21.3	0.2	10.8	4.7
Lesotho	93.5	2.3	2.8	0.1	1.1	0.2
Namibia	77.8	2.5	11.3	0.2	5.4	2.7
Swaziland	72.5	3.2	14.9	0.2	7.1	2.1

Source: United Nations (2009)

income difference for those with tertiary education was almost zero (GoB 1996). In 1971, the number of Batswana living (and mostly working) abroad was about 45,800. Because the South African government increased localisation of mine workers, and Botswana's economic performance improved, this figure fell to about 28,200 in 2001.

Remittances

Botswana's diaspora has contributed much to the national economy through financial and social remittances. This became significant because the bilateral agreement between South Africa and Botswana for recruitment of mine workers included a system of deferred payment which generated $2.6 million for the economy of Botswana in 1984. Additional remittances were made by male and female workers, most of which were not transferred officially. Although the reduction of mine workers reduced substantially by the 1990s, resulting in a dramatic fall in remittances, subsequent increases in the education and income of international migrants have raised remittances considerably since 2000. Diaspora remittances increased by almost 100 per cent between 2004 and 2006, from P238.5 million to P459.6 million (GoB 2007). In 2007, migrant remittances to Botswana totalled $141 million (United Nations 2009). Although remittance outflow from Botswana was also substantial ($120 million), the country still had a net gain of $21 million. Remittances constitute 1.2 per cent of the country's GDP and they exceed the net ODA by over 130 per cent.

Most (75%) of the remittances to Botswana originate in Africa (predominantly South Africa) and 99 per cent of these are from South Africa. The remittances from the EU and North Africa form only 13 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively, of the total. A study by the SAMP indicates that the most preferred method of money transfer is for the migrant to bring it home personally (see Table 9.4). This preference is much stronger (75%) where transfer of goods is done (Pendleton et al. 2006). The second preferred method is to send money and goods by friends or co-workers. About 11 per cent of migrants use TEBA while 15 per cent remit through banks and post offices. This

Table 9.4 Methods of remittance transfer in selected SADC countries

Method	Botswana	Lesotho	Swaziland
Post office	7.4	5.1	10.4
Wife's TEBA account	5.0	1.8	6.1
Bring home personally	46.6	54.1	51.4
Friend or co-worker	21.3	33.4	22.1
Bank in home country	7.5	1.8	3.3
Own TEBA account	10.7	0.7	2.3
Bank in South Africa	0.0	1.0	1.3
Taxi or bus	0.1	0.2	1.2
Other method	1.3	1.9	1.9
Don't know	0.1	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	863	1,480	1,247

Note: Namibia was excluded from the survey.
Source: Pendleton et al. (2006)

is consistent with the patterns in Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. A large amount of remittances received goes into domestic consumption (see Table 9.5). Most of it is spent on food, school fees, clothing and transport fares. Cattle purchase is the primary farm item that remittances are used for. Other significant farm-related expenditures are on small livestock and cattle treatment. The government spends a huge amount of its budget subsidising farm production. Large-scale cattle producers also contribute to ease small farmers' farm expenditure by offering loans of cattle, tractors etc. These reduce individuals' expenditure on items such as ploughing, tractor hire, fertiliser and seed. Much of the financial remittances are spent on construction and repair of buildings. Apparently, purchase and maintenance of vehicles absorb little because ownership of these items is largely determined by a person's earned income.

Table 9.5 gives no indication that Batswana households invest remittances in productive commercial establishments. However, interviews with key informants in the ministries of labour and home affairs and of finance and economic development revealed that several miners, in particular, have invested their earnings in small

Table 9.5 Monthly expenditure of remittances on selected items (%)

	Botswana	Lesotho	Swaziland
School fees	42.9	56.0	54.9
Food	87.5	89.3	83.4
Clothing	62.9	76.1	24.0
Cattle purchase	20.8	1.4	1.6
Small stock purchase	13.3	1.1	0.2
Dipping and veterinary cost	10.4	2.6	1.3
Transport fare	27.0	50.0	29.2
Roofing	21.6	3.6	3.5
Wall	16.3	0.7	0.7
Cement	26.7	5.2	7.2
Brick	20.3	4.5	2.7
Door/window	22.0	3.8	3.6
Wood	2.3	1.3	1.2
Fuel	3.6	9.9	2.0
Funeral	4.4	28.7	0.3
Marriage	16.7	1.1	0.9
Paint	7.5	2.0	0.4
Other building material	8.3	0.0	1.6
Repay loans	6.8	1.9	4.2
Labour	5.0	5.1	4.1
Seed	2.4	24.4	44.4
Fertiliser	1.1	18.5	34.2
Tractor	1.5	12.5	39.7
Vehicle purchase and maintenance	3.4	0.8	0.1
Savings	8.6	18.7	4.7
Insurance policies	0.5	4.5	0.2
Other personal investment	0.0	0.0	0.0

Note: Percentages are averages of multiple responses to the same questions.
Source: Pendleton et al. (2006)

shops, bus transportation and expanded cattle rearing. The SAMP study also revealed that the expenditure pattern of households' earned income was not dissimilar to that of remittances. This implies that the contribution of remittances to national development which macroeconomists expect may normally not be realised. It would require deeper co-operation between society and government to realise the macroeconomic benefits of migrant remittances. The question which needs addressing is whether recipients actually intend to invest these monies in financially profitable ventures. If so, would they be implementing the intentions of remitters and what are the constraining factors? There remains the question of what constitutes economic development. The fact that a large portion of remittances goes towards educating children reflects families' intentions to maximise the human resource capacity of the society, without which the potential to optimise national production may not be realised. Furthermore, the huge expenditure on food (a primary basic need) highlights the ability of remittances to improve the health and living conditions of receiving households beyond what they might have been without remitting migrants. Medical attention has not featured among the items remittances are spent on, and this may be partly explained by the highly developed and subsidised health delivery services in Botswana. Expenditure on clothing and other items which attract tax contributes indirectly to the tax revenue which accrues from manufacturing and importation of consumable goods.

Potential addition to the diaspora

In a sample of 1,201 students, 63 per cent were female. One third had given a great deal of consideration to emigrating from Botswana and in 82 per cent of the cases the motivators were economic (especially income, prospect of professional advancement, cost of living and poor access to jobs). The highest proportion of likely emigrants was in the groups that were about to graduate in computer science/mathematics/engineering, nursing and medicine, followed closely by those in agriculture/biological sciences and public administration. The most likely destination (MLD) for students who intended to emigrate was North America (32%). Europe was a close second (29%), with southern Africa (effectively South Africa) ranking third (23%). Almost three quarters of students indicated a desire to reside in the MLD for more than two years (Campbell 2007). The peak preferred duration of stay in the MLD was two to five years (43 per cent indicated this). An additional 30 per cent preferred to stay for more than five years. In effect, most students who intend to emigrate would not mind spending a substantial part of their future career as labour migrants. Males were significantly more prone than females to prefer a long stay in the MLD.

Almost half (49%) of the potential emigrants had no intention of visiting Botswana more than once a year while living and working in another country. More significantly, 16 per cent of those who were most likely to emigrate intended never to return or to visit only once every few years. There was no significant difference between men's and women's intention to remit money and there was an observed link between intention to remit and the maintenance of economic and social links with the home country. Over half of potential emigrants who wanted to stay at the destination for more than five years intended to apply for naturalised citizenship. It was understood that those

intending to obtain citizenship in another country would have to give up Batswana citizenship, and 22 per cent of those in this category were prepared do so. This category of emigrants – those intending to stay for more than five years-, also wished to be buried in the MLD. The preferred duration of residence was also associated with willingness to move all of the migrant's assets out of Botswana (Campbell 2007).

9.4.2 Lesotho

Before the 1970s, Lesotho, a country surrounded by South Africa, was the largest sender of workers to the South African mines after Mozambique. This changed in 1975, when it became the primary sender, with 81,973 workers in the mines (Cobbe 1982). By 1990, with 108,780 workers, Basotho provided 57 per cent of all Africans working in South African mines. Indeed, Lesotho has been the dominant supplier of African workers in South Africa since 1975. Thirty-three years later (in 2008) Basotho workers in the country had increased substantially. Before 2000 those who migrated to South Africa were mostly young unmarried men. This has changed since the start of the twenty-first century, with women becoming increasingly migratory too. Skilled and irregular migration have also increased. Notwithstanding that its national population was higher than either of Botswana and Swaziland in 1976–77, Lesotho had the lowest wage employment force (32,000) and the lowest per capita gross national product (GNP) ($210) of the three countries. In 2004, the GDP was about $1.5 billion at current prices, although when calculated at purchasing power parity it was $4.8 billion. This method also produced a GDP per capita of $2,074 (Mobbs 2004). By 2007 it still had the lowest per capita GNP ($4,340) and the highest infant mortality rate (91 per thousand live births) in southern Africa. Only about 13 per cent of the country's total land surface is suitable for crop farming even though over 70 per cent of its population live in rural areas. Continuous land use, irregular rainfall and erosion have substantially reduced the fertility of the soil. Lesotho has 427,500 nationals (one fifth of its total population) living and working outside the country and about 4 per cent of them are highly skilled. Some 94 per cent of them are in other African countries, mostly in South Africa. About one third of Lesotho-born physicians have emigrated for higher income and much enhanced standards of living. The country has also lost 3 per cent of its nurses. The cultural similarities between Lesotho and South Africa and long tradition of labour migration between the two countries have strengthened South Africa's accessibility to the Basotho. Most of them go to South Africa to buy household consumable goods.

Remittances

The most dramatic contribution of the diaspora to Lesotho is economic. In 2007 the remittances sent home accounted for 29 per cent of the country's GDP (United Nations 2009); 98 per cent of the remittances were from Africa (mostly South Africa) and only 1 per cent was sent from the EU, with much less from the USA. The methods of remitting are mostly unofficial: 54 per cent take the money home personally and 33 per cent send it through friends and co-workers. Only about 10 per cent use banks or TEBA accounts (see Table 9.4). Unofficial transfer methods are made easy by the close proximity of Lesotho to South Africa. Only 5 per cent

of remitters have encountered difficulty with the remitting method; for most of them either the method was too slow or the money was never delivered. The peak frequency of remitting is monthly. Indeed, remitted monies contribute much more than wage work to household incomes in Lesotho (see Table 9.6). As many as 95 per cent of households depend highly on remittances to survive, much more than in Botswana and Swaziland. Among the reasons for the high need for remittances is the very low value of the pension and disability allowances that eligible Basotho receive at home. Remittances to Lesotho almost doubled between 2003 and 2010, from $288 million to $525 million. In the same period, the outward flow of remittances declined from $27 million to $13 million, generating a net gain of nearly $500 million dollars in 2009.

Table 9.5 shows that food, clothing, school fees and transport fares are the main items that remitted monies are spent on. Funeral and burial policies take a much bigger share of remittances than they do in Botswana and Swaziland. Probably because Basotho depend almost entirely on remittances for their household needs, more recipients save from them than is the case in the other two countries. There is also much more investment in crop farming than in Botswana. The need for money seems to be strongest in Lesotho. According to Pendleton et al. (2006), almost 70 per cent of Basotho borrowed money during the year preceding the enumeration (i.e. in 2003/04), thereby highlighting the great importance of remittances to Basotho households at the source.

Because of the high level of domestic needs, very little of the remittances is invested. Few women have successfully established small businesses, especially shops. It is very difficult to start a viable business in Lesotho because of poor access to capital. The banks are frequently unwilling to grant loans for small-scale entrepreneurship. For Basotho women, long-term investment may be a new venture, as the tradition has been for men to invest in long-term activities, such as cattle breeding and rearing, whereas women were expected to participate only in short-term ventures such as brewing local beer (Francis 2002). In Botswana, for example, married women could not obtain bank loans without official permission from their husbands. These traditional obstacles to economically viable investments posed challenges to the

Table 9.6 Sources of income of migrant-sending households in Lesotho

Source of income	%	Mean annual income (maloti)
Wage work	9.5	7,420.83
Casual work	6.3	2,618.28
Remittances – money	95.3	10,186.44
Remittances – goods	20.0	2,487.70
Income from farm products	2.7	1,525.93
Income from formal business	2.0	6,708.00
Income from informal business	6.8	3,066.41
Pension/disability	0.6	1,025.00
Gifts	2.2	1,178.86

Source: Crush et al. (2010)

ability of women to use remittances for long-term investment. However, with the gender roles in the household changing fast, these obstacles may soon erode.

Potential addition to the diaspora

In 2003, 44 per cent of the Basotho students in the SAMP study sample had given a great deal of consideration to the prospect of emigrating from Lesotho to live and work elsewhere (Crush et al. 2005b). Although the most important factor influencing the desire to emigrate was economic, the proportion was much lower (50%) than in Botswana. Social factors (including the ability to find good schools for family and children, children's future in Lesotho, family's safety and the ability to find good housing) had considerable influence on the intention to move. The MLDs for students who intended to emigrate were southern Africa (effectively South Africa) (44%), Europe (32%) and North America (16%). About 44 per cent of students indicated a desire to reside in the MLD for more than five years and 27 per cent wished to stay for two to five years. This indicates a really strong desire to stay out of Lesotho for a very long time. There was much greater willingness among Basotho students to visit their homeland after moving than among their Batswana counterparts. Whereas the majority of Batswana who intended to visit might do so once a year, over half of the Basotho students preferred to visit home monthly or once every few months. Still, a substantial proportion (4%) had no intention of visiting Lesotho at all after they moved. More significantly, 16 per cent of those who were most likely to emigrate intended never to return or to visit only once every few years. There was no significant difference between men and women's intention to remit money and there was an observed link between intention to remit and the maintenance of economic and social links with the home country.

9.4.3 Swaziland

Swaziland is landlocked and almost surrounded by South Africa except for the section where it borders Mozambique. Of its national population of 1.2 million people, 160,300 live in other countries, the majority being in South Africa. Its economy is based on agricultural production and manufacturing, livestock and tourism. Until recently, when exports slowed down, the economy was quite good, to the extent that the World Bank once classified it as a middle-income country. In the early 1990s, agriculture and forestry products contributed about 28 per cent of GDP, 70 per cent of export earnings and 30 per cent of the paid employment in the formal sector, and provided a living for about 70 per cent of the rural population (Abalu 1995). Among the factors contributing to the country's resilient economy in the early 1980s was the depreciation of the South African rand, which in turn pushed Swaziland's currency, the lilangeni, down against the US dollar. This increased the competitiveness of the country's exports. In the 1980s, GDP rose steadily but was still low compared with that of Botswana. The government maintained policies to encourage the establishment of small enterprises, but domestic expenditure consistently exceeded GDP between 1978 and 1982, as government and private consumption increased, causing a dramatic fall in savings (McLoughlin and Mehra 1988). However, the needs of the rural population are not entirely met from

agricultural produce. The households depend a great deal on remittances sent by migrants in non-farm employ (especially those employed in South African mines) and this has been the case since the middle of the twentieth century. Pendleton et al. (2006) observed that remittances of cash and goods account for 81 per cent of household income in Swaziland. The constraints on economic sustainability in Swaziland include inadequate or inappropriate use of modern technology in agriculture, a fall in demand for export goods and the dramatic increase in HIV/AIDS in the country.

There are conflicting data on the educational attainment of the Swazi diaspora. Some reports put the proportion of Swazi emigrants with skills at 0.5 per cent. Probably because mine workers once constituted 62 per cent of all Swazi emigrants, the assumption is that most of them are unskilled. Whereas the World Bank (2011) reports that professionals are fewer than 4 per cent and skilled manual workers are 6 per cent of all migrants, the United Nations (2009) states otherwise (43% tertiary educated). The peak duration of absence from home is between one and six months, which is less than the overall peak for southern African migrants (between six and twelve months). Some 29 per cent of its physicians and 3 per cent of its nurses live and work elsewhere. This has affected health services considerably and Swazis have become increasingly dependent on South African health facilities for treatment of HIV/AIDS. Meanwhile, staff retrenchment in South African mines has affected the volume of remittances to many rural households.

Remittances

Swazi migrants remit less than their Botswana and Lesotho counterparts. Pendleton et al. (2006) found that, on average, Swazis remitted R6,279 home annually while Batswana and Basotho sent home R10,413 and R9,094, respectively. The United Nations recorded remittance inflow to Swaziland in 2007 as $99 million, with 94 per cent of this accruing from Africa (almost wholly South Africa) and only 3 per cent being from the EU. The outflow of remittances was quite low ($8 million), netting the country a remittance gain of $91 million. The strong reliance of rural households on cash remittance is reflected in the frequency of remitting. About 71 per cent of Swazi migrants remit once a month and an additional 10 per cent remit more than twice in three months (Pendleton et al. 2006).

Again, the unofficial modes of transferring remittances to individuals and families in Swaziland are the most popular: 74 per cent of remitters prefer to take the money home personally or send it by a friend or co-worker (see Table 9.4); about 10 per cent use post offices while 6 per cent use their wives' TEBA accounts. Over three quarters of migrants remit goods personally. The burden of carrying large amounts of goods does not seem to favour having them sent by friends and co-workers. As observed elsewhere, most of the remittances are spent on food and groceries. The next popular items of expenditure are fuel, farming and education as well as agricultural needs such as seeds, tractor hire and fertiliser. Transport fares also take a fair share of the remittances. Still, it appears that Swazi households do not depend on remittances for food as much as households in Lesotho and Botswana do.

Potential addition to the diaspora

With the exception of Zimbabwe, Swaziland had the highest proportion (56%) of persons who had seriously considered moving to live and work in another country. As many as 55 per cent of the students were likely to leave the country within two years of graduating, and 59 per cent would leave after five years. The peak MLD was southern Africa (effectively South Africa) (39%), and another 28 per cent and 22 per cent would most likely move to Europe and North America, respectively. Unsatisfactory performance of the economy had the greatest influence on the emigration intentions of Swazi students. Apart from Zimbabweans, Swazis were the nationals in the SADC region who most perceived economic conditions as being better or much better in the MLD than at home. The low income offered in Swaziland was by far the greatest emigration motivator. Second was the difficulty in getting a job of one's choice, followed by low prospects of professional advancement.

The field visits and other previous visits to the country produced information which suggests the existence of much nepotism in the appointment and promotion processes. This seems to have demotivating effects on potentially good work performers, leading generally to emigration or taking up second and third jobs. It also contributes to minimising national production which, in turn, reduces the chances of national economic recovery. Informal interviews during the fieldwork also exposed the tendency of teachers to move to South Africa, thereby depriving the home country of the best of this professional group. The SAMP study echoed this effect, as a considerable proportion of potential Swazi emigrants (5%) were motivated to move by the ability to find good schools for children. However, emigration of teachers may not be the primary problem, because three other countries in the SAMP study (Botswana, Namibia and Lesotho) have more than 5 per cent of their potential emigrants influenced by availability of good schools. Meanwhile, only 1 per cent of Zimbabweans intended to move for this reason; and Zimbabwe has been credited with high educational standards, thereby attracting several educational migrants from Botswana and other SADC countries in the past.

Just like in Lesotho, a high proportion of Swazis (44%) intended to stay in the MLD for two to five years and, on average, nearly 60 per cent wished to become permanent residents or citizens of the MLD. But there is a slim chance of this intention being implemented, largely because of the strong cultural allegiance of Swazis. Indeed, the peak frequency of visiting home (32%) after emigrating was once every few months and the peak frequency of remitting money was monthly – at 67 per cent, the highest proportion in the region. Moreover, about 30 per cent of the final emigration decisions would be taken by other family members.

9.4.4 Namibia

Compared with the other three countries in this study, very little information exists on international migration of Namibians. The focus of the limited migration studies in the country is on internal migration, mostly analysing the effect of rural poverty on rural–rural migration. Even SAMP could not obtain much about Namibia from its regional studies beyond potential brain drain and migration across the

Namibia–Angola border. The lack of interest in international migration may be partly explained by the history of the country's relationship with South Africa, to which the majority of southern Africans go, and lack of inclination to move to Western countries as a result of unpleasant experiences with German occupation. Relations with South Africa are also tainted by the extension of the apartheid-induced discrimination which accompanied South African occupation of the country (an experience which other southern Africans did not have to endure). Incentives to emigrate may be affected by the educational achievement of the young. Although the government provided opportunities for universal primary education, the retention rates of students at primary and secondary levels are low. In the 1990s fewer than 30 per cent of boys and about 38 per cent of girls completed primary school. It was even lower at secondary school level, with fewer than 20 per cent of boys and girls successfully completing their education. Hence, the literacy rate in English, the official language, is below 50 per cent (Arowolo 2000). Notwithstanding this situation, Namibia has about 16,500 nationals living outside the country, the smallest number of the four study countries.

Namibia is a lower middle-income economy, with a total population estimated at 2.2 million in 2009. Some 70 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, where female-headed households (43%) are more common than in urban areas (40%), largely because of rural–urban migration by men. Remittances from internal migration contribute a lot to household consumption in rural areas. Agricultural production was affected by several factors, including rapid population growth. Since the 1990s, Namibia's economy has been driven primarily by diamond (which contributes 25% of GDP) and uranium mining. Other major economic sectors include manufacturing and tourism. Notwithstanding per capita GNP of over $5,000, the level of income inequality is among the highest in the SADC region. Unemployment increased from 20.2 per cent in 1999 and 21.9 per cent in 2002 to 29.4 per cent in 2008.

Very little is known about the transfer and use of international remittances in Namibia compared with the three other countries in this study. Information from the United Nations and World Bank indicates that remittances to Namibia increased from $65 million in 2003 to $100 million in 2007 and the total was estimated to be $118 million in 2010.

Potential addition to the diaspora

With 29 per cent of Namibian students having seriously considered emigrating, Namibians seem to be the least motivated in the SADC region to leave home. This may be partly explained by the students' optimism about the country's future national economic prospects. Namibians were the only ones in the SAMP study to have fairly favourable opinions about the future of almost everything, including cost of living, prospect of professional advancement, income level and quality upkeep of public amenities. Still, about 58 per cent felt that they were likely to emigrate within five years of graduating. With the exception of Zimbabweans, Namibians were the only SADC nationals whose principal MLD was not South Africa. The peak (45%) choice of most likely destination was Europe, while 25 per cent and

18 per cent preferred North America and Australia or New Zealand, respectively. Only 7 per cent were most likely to move to South Africa. Although income had the most important influence on emigration considerations, the motivators were less skewed towards economic factors than in most other countries in the region. The potential emigrants were also highly concerned about finding good schools for children, availability of good-quality affordable products and high-quality upkeep of public amenities.

About 8 per cent of the potential emigrants had already applied for permits to work in the MLD. As was the case in all of the SAMP study countries, some Namibian students had reportedly applied for permanent residence and citizenship in the MLD. These may be clients or potential clients of people smugglers or human traffickers because, as they have not resided in the MLD yet, it is unlikely that any of the applications would be approved. Still, about 34 per cent and 26 per cent of the sample wished to become permanent residents and citizens, respectively, of the MLD and 11 per cent were willing to give up Namibian citizenship in due course. The peak length of stay in the MLD was split between one to two years and two to five years (26% in each case), while 22 per cent intended to stay for more than five years. Like other SADC nationals, Namibians intended to maintain close socio-economic links with the ancestral home. The peak frequencies of home visits and remitting were yearly and monthly, respectively. About 30 per cent of the migration decisions were likely to be made by other family members.

9.5 Observations from the field

The field investigation revealed no immediate certainty about the total number or proportion of Basotho, Batswana, Namibian and Swazi emigrants living in various continents, for example Africa, Europe and North America. This is largely because immigration departments are primarily interested in the effects of international migration in their national territories. Although SADC governments have acknowledged the positive effects of African diasporas, they have not yet revised the terms of reference which guide the actions of the immigration departments (for example to include initial destinations of emigrants and residential changes over time). There was a general lack of knowledge about the number or proportion of economic and student migrants who work or study outside their country of nationality. Beyond remittances, there was little definite information about the educational status of people in the diaspora, and there was limited knowledge of the definition of diaspora and its implications for development in the home countries. The statistics or information about numbers of professionals (i.e. medical doctors, nurses, engineers, accountants etc.) who lived and worked outside their countries were also uncertain. A couple of times, the collection and analysis of diaspora statistics were expected to be done by other ministries. For example, the Immigration Department in Swaziland referred the question on the number of economic professionals in the diaspora to the Ministry of Labour and the latter subsequently referred it back to the former. Others referred this issue to TEBA on the assumption that almost all Swazis living abroad were in South African mines.

On the number or proportion of students outside Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland, each country's ministry of education was cited as the best source. But the ministry did not seem to have the complete picture partly because of a lack of interest in the migration process. However, it is clear from the United Nations' Demographic Yearbook that less than 75 per cent of the Swazi diaspora is in South Africa. Moreover, as observed earlier, the preferred destinations of potential emigrants in the SAMP data indicate that fewer than 50 per cent of Swazis chose South Africa as their MLD. Therefore the public feeling that over 90 per cent of Swazi emigrants are in South Africa is an exaggeration of the fact. The limited knowledge of number and proportion of nationals in the diaspora and their characteristics is excusable because, after several decades of post-independence concentration on maximising national security, African governments have only recently started to accept the notion of the diaspora–development relationship for policy consideration. It was unfair to expect at this stage that the information requested would be easily recalled, even if available.

It was also revealed that none of the three countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) has ever formulated a comprehensive international migration policy. Both government officials and university academics seem convinced that the governments were implementing immigration control actions on the basis of immigration policies. Actually, they operate from the immigration acts, which simply outline a few vital actions related to immigration (including identification of international travel documents, irregular migration, apprehension and deportation). Although the acts have been amended to improve performance, they do not include details relevant to human rights, for example, as does the Immigration Bill of South Africa. They certainly exclude most aspects of emigration, especially emerging ones such as diaspora, remittances, brain circulation, xenophobia and human trafficking. The reality is that, whereas arrival cards at border posts and airports provide for a distinction between short visits and migration, the departure cards do not seek information from nationals and non-nationals from which statistics on emigration (a time-specific move) may be obtained. Where nationals fill in departure and arrival cards (not done in Botswana), they give information, indirectly, about the occupation and education of out-bound and in-bound travellers. The occupation and education of migrants change with increasing duration of residence away from home. In most cases there was uncertainty about the government's plan to formulate a comprehensive immigration policy. However, there was certainty that the governments of all three countries planned to formulate comprehensive immigration policies.

It was clear that none of the countries visited has a diaspora policy, and only in Lesotho was certainty expressed that such a policy is being considered. Apart from Lesotho, the key informants had no idea about their government's plan to partner with the diaspora. However, everyone interviewed knew that migrants generally remit money and goods to their non-migrant families. Among the goods mentioned are electronic equipment, such as mobile phones, DVD players, computers, TVs and agricultural aids. Although no one was specific about the amount of remittances, most knew how they are transferred and used. The information provided is consistent with general knowledge that most of the remittances are spent on domestic consumption, such as food, groceries, school fees and other household needs. It is not certain that remittances are invested in viable

businesses. It was suggested that several migrants, especially those working in South African mines, save enough to invest in small shops, houses or agricultural expansion (especially in Lesotho and Swaziland) and to purchase minibuses for commercial use, but it seems that the investors were not fully equipped with business skills and knew little about capital needs and running the business. There was no success story. Examples were given of villages in Swaziland and Botswana which seemingly prospered from remittances during peak periods of recruitment in South African mines but declined after the retrenchment of foreign workers in the mines.

There is some knowledge about the contribution of social remittances to development in the three countries. But only once (in Swaziland) was reference made to the effect of emigration and foreign intervention on political development. Apparently, the South African trade union movement once attempted to pressure the Swazi government to effect political change.

9.6 Data needs

This section addresses the dearth of migration research and data, but it implicitly covers diaspora research, which is the focus of this chapter. Among the primary concerns about international migration in the SADC region is the lack of consistency between the figures produced by various statistical sources of SADC emigrants living in other African countries (or in South Africa). Most reports point to South Africa hosting the highest proportion of SADC nationals. Although this may be true, there is definitely much disagreement between the statistics of numerous sources. For example, the *Migration and Remittances Factbook* (World Bank 2011) reports the number of Namibian emigrants as 16.5 thousand. Meanwhile, Ajayi et al. (2009) had reported it to be 15.1 million in 2007. This may be an editing error, given the similarity between 15.5 and 16.5 (three years later). The attitudinal surveys of SAMP revealed much less preference for South Africa, thereby indicating considerable inconsistency between the destination intentions of SADC nationals and reality.

Among the conclusions of the Global Forum on Migration and Development in 2006 was the serious lack of the data and evidence needed to guide the actions to be taken within international migration and development. This was not the first call to improve the evidence, availability, timeliness and reliability of migration data. In his classic article, Byerlee (1974) calls attention to the importance of migration to economic and social development and the need for in-depth research into the subject. The article is clearly informative about the role of migration as a means of redistributing human capital and income, transferring investment capital and attaining gender equality. It also emphasises the importance of such research in the development of theories that would guide the formation and successful implementation of economic and social policies. Methodological improvement is also addressed. Although the article received global acclaim for its contribution to scholarship, the main thrust of its message was practically ignored as social science researchers shifted attention to fertility and infant/child mortality studies. However, since the late 1980s, there has been a strong and positive response to the shift of interest among funding organisations from migration towards issues related to reproductive health. According to Findlay and Gould (1989: 10),

'government, employers and academic researchers … need to acquire rather different information from the past and make it available whenever possible in a more flexible form. Research is needed on systems of collecting, managing and presenting data on skilled international labour migration.' This is consistent with Black's (2003) observation of an urgent need to focus research on migration issues in order to obtain the basic information required to develop policies on irregular migration.

There have been great advances in the collection and processing of data on internal migration since the mid-1980s, but the systems for collecting and managing international migration data have received much less attention. This limitation was compounded by changes in the nature of international migration, and particularly the increased importance of skilled transients. Also, there is still no universally acceptable definition of key concepts. Migration itself is defined variously according to convenience. For example, the United Nations defines international migrants as people who have lived in the host country for at least one year. This restricts the threshold for migration and leaves out people who have 'migrated' for shorter-term business and education (Campbell 1988). The United Nations has advised that in censuses migration data should be collected on the basis of place of birth and place of previous residence. However, the analyses in several African countries are still done from the place of birth statistics only. This introduces technical problems in the interpretation of the data. It also limits the variables that could practically be included in the study. Worse, it introduces errors in the reports. Where national censuses and surveys were conducted in a period which included festive seasons, visitation has been erroneously found to be the primary reason for migrating. The place of previous residence gives a realistic picture of motivation for migration and allows control for duration of stay at the destination and is therefore the most appropriate method.

No region in the world has developed migration strategies which guarantee that the negative experiences suffered by many individuals in diaspora will be reduced in the long term. As mentioned earlier, one of the reasons for this is the complex nature of the migration process. This has discouraged demographers and other social scientists from seriously and continuously researching current and emerging migration issues. Migration is really not more complex than fertility and mortality, and the wealth of theories of migration is testimony to this. What apparently distinguished the other subject areas from migration was the perception that they held serious health risks associated with reproduction and child care, whereas the risk associated with migration was insignificant. Before 1980, migration was not widely perceived to be a serious health issue. The economic and social models focused on economic and social risks. However, global experiences indicate that international migration involves serious health risks, and indeed may have fatal consequences.

Because empirical research on irregular migration, including human trafficking, is scarce, very limited data exist on volumes of irregular migration or on the characteristics, activities and aspirations of migrants in Africa. Some work has been done in the EU and South Africa, but the elusive nature of these migrants renders the results unreliable. Various attempts to determine the number of irregular migrants in South Africa have produced diverse and usually misleading estimates. The Human Sciences Research

Council (HSRC) estimated that were between 2.5 and 4 million irregular migrants in the country. Although this was subsequently discovered to have been grossly exaggerated (Crush 1999, Waller 2006), it fuelled widespread alarm in public and political circles.

Regarding the diaspora, there are many areas of its activities that need scientific investigation. Among these are remittance, investment and intention to return home. Little is known about the willingness of members of the diaspora to remit beyond the recipient family, to invest in the ancestral home and to return. The financial ability and professional aptitude of diaspora individuals to successfully implement business entrepreneurship are also still unknown. Some studies have been done in these areas in the SADC region by the SAMP, but they barely scratch the surface of the problem. There is increasing progress in this subject in west and east Africa. There is an apparent assumption that almost everyone in the diaspora is prepared to invest or return. However, it should be considered that many skilled Africans left the continent quite disappointed at the political economies of their countries and may not be eager to take immediate actions that may sustain the corrupt systems they fled. There is a need to reassure the diaspora that its developmental effort would not be something to regret in future. Considering the huge investments involved in maximising skills abroad, several professionals in the diaspora may not willingly return home because the political economies of many African countries have not evolved from the previous state of bad governance. It is necessary to know what proportion of the diaspora is willing or unwilling to invest in the home country or return before formulating long-term policies on diaspora links.

In this regard, this chapter calls for developed and developing states to undertake longitudinal World Migration Surveys, along the lines of the World Fertility Surveys and Demographic Health Surveys. These surveys would serve to inform migration policies as well as monitor progress and identify problems during their implementation. If, as Widgren and Martin (2002) predict, migration will increase for the next 21 years, now is the time to obtain reliable data that would ensure its eventual decline – as well as the maximisation of returns from migration and the minimisation of its costs.

A major challenge to attaining meaningful partnerships with the diaspora is lack of coherence between government departments. This has been particularly apparent in Lesotho, where the African-Caribbean Partnership, in collaboration with the International Organization for Migration, is in the early stages of establishing an experimental observatory to build capacity, train government staff and give financial and expert support to the government to deepen socio-economic links with the diaspora. The government of Lesotho (a new IOM member) requested this project, and this is an encouraging step in the right direction. However, progress in establishing the project is seemingly slow. There has been no parliamentary debate on diaspora partnership.

Other challenges include:

- adequate data mobilisation;
- maximising diaspora trust in home governments; and
- policy cohesion between ministries.

9.7 Final recommendations

The potential of diaspora remittances to reduce poverty in the short or long term depends almost entirely on the success of national development policies. Poor physical and financial infrastructure, underdeveloped markets, corruption and poor investment climate would restrict the potential of remittance-focused strategies for those who receive them. Because many African economies fall in the category of weak infrastructure, it is unlikely that remittances would contribute significantly to long-term sustainable development at the macro level. To attain improved macroeconomic development with diaspora involvement requires applying models that would utilise human capital from the diaspora to a large extent. Three models worth trying are:

- the Taiwanese 'brain trust' model, which focuses on attracting human capital from the diaspora;
- the Chinese model, which focuses on attracting direct investment and trade opportunities through overseas Chinese communities; and
- the Indian model, which is multipronged, seeking direct investment, portfolio investment, technology transfer, market opening and outsourcing opportunities.

Other recommendations are:

- In view of the foregoing, all regional unions that have not formulated and/or implemented protocols that would at least facilitate movement of people should do so immediately because they are more likely than otherwise to have positive effects on national economies and societies. In view of current and future brain drain, and possible effects of immigration, it is expedient for each member state to develop an immigration policy that spells out what migrants should expect in terms of settlement and establishment and management of trade and business enterprises.
- It is expedient for governments in the four study countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) to borrow from a project (for example, that of Mauritius) which has been designed to map out the diaspora overseas, including location and profile of the diaspora, and develop a preliminary roadmap to enhance the involvement and contribution of the diasporas in the development strategies (IOM 2010).
- It is important to consider that international and internal migrations are no substitute for sound policies for national economic development. As African governments' efforts to maximise the positive economic and social impacts of migration are intensified, there should be a simultaneous strengthening of solutions to unemployment, poverty, low income and corruption in each country.
- Deepen social integration within and between the regional integrated unions. The plausibility of a plan towards cultural integration in Africa is worth considering by the AU and regional economic communities (RECs). Just as it has helped to strengthen the diaspora, it could also help to strengthen implementation of

strategies which were designed to improve human rights issues in the welfare of international migrants and their families. National laws on migration management should be improved to be more specific about whom to admit or deport.

- One of the areas that require immediate and seriously focused attention is the Plan of Action of the second Decade of Education for Africa, 2006–2015 (African Union 2006). Education is a very important determinant of the success of the RECs' co-operative actions on migration management for development. However, at the end of the first decade (2006), very few of the objectives of the plan of action had been achieved. Successful implementation of the policies aimed at deepening social integration may not achieve maximum effect if the plan receives minimum attention. Increased literacy and awareness of the rights of migrants will assist the dialogue and creation of the migration and development strategies.
- Develop close links between educational institutions and the labour market through research and internship, among others. Governments and NGOs should also commit to the implementation of the Ouagadougou Declaration on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa.
- A further obstacle to maximising diaspora and immigrant influence on socio-economic development in the source and destination countries is several African countries' practice of not permitting dual citizenship. Dual citizenship increases confidence in the intention to invest in home and destination countries.
- Efficiency of transfer and use of remittances could be facilitated by removing all restrictive licensing of money transfer agencies. For instance, bank rates and other rates charged by money transfer agencies constitute indirect taxes and limit the amount remitted as well as mode of transfer. Zero-tax alternative and reliable money transfer systems could be provided that would be accessed easily in remote areas. Visits may be reduced and unofficial methods of transfer increased if these and other restrictions on actions are minimised or abolished. This will also increase savings and ensure viable investment. Abolishing these measures would involve total government control of MTOs (which may very likely become unproductive). Implementation of this recommendation will therefore rely greatly on collaboration between government and private sectors.
- Within the framework of immigration policies, it is expedient that African countries formulate national diaspora policies which would include educating their populations on the subject, capacity building, advocacy, and monitoring and evaluation. Ties between African governments and the diasporas would be best strengthened if each country established a department of/for diaspora within the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs. This department should, among other things, introduce cultural and other programmes which will improve nationals' awareness of the important contribution of the country's diaspora to social and cultural development in the sending country.
- Within the framework of international policy, the Ministry of Labour should develop mechanisms to strengthen youth employment. This may be done in

several ways, including financing projects related to self-employment and training in small and medium-sized enterprises and setting up programmes which would attract investments in the sending countries. The latter would involve improving the economic climate of the country and offering concessions to investors.

- The private economic sector in each country should be fully involved in the diaspora linkage process. Every practice which forms an obstacle to private investment in the country should be removed and investors permitted to operate in local markets within one month of the declaration of intent to invest.
- Although gender has been mainstreamed in many areas of population development, its position in migration studies lacks depth. Women are the most affected by international migration factors (including poverty, human trafficking, unemployment and income). The empowerment of women in the SADC region should be strengthened to minimise the negative effects (including sexual harassment) of their actions as international migrants, and to ensure the complete success of migration and development policies.

From a regional integration perspective:

- National employment policies should include integration and mainstreaming of labour migration and its contribution in both sending and receiving countries. This should be accompanied by the promotion of positive roles of labour migration to deepen social integration in the RECs.
- Funding mechanisms should be instituted to maximise the investment potential of remittances to sending countries. This requires enhancing good governance which will improve trust in governments and increase the willingness of the diaspora to co-operate in national development programmes. It will also boost the chances of reverse transfer of technology (otherwise known as brain circulation).

9.8 Conclusion

The relationship between migration and development has been recognised universally, and several calls for regional co-operation and dialogue with government and non-governmental partners have received positive responses. Although the main concerns have been the negative effects of international migration, including brain drain, many African governments now realise the dominance of South–South migration in, from and to Africa and are increasingly recognising the positive effects that migration has, and will continue to have, on national economic, social and political development. Brain drain is now acknowledged to have win–win effects through the new diaspora, remittances and brain circulation. While there remain negative factors in the migration and development process, such as human rights, human trafficking and xenophobia, research points to education as a powerful tool for the effective control of these practices. Hence, the net effects of migration reward migrants as well as family members who remain at home, thereby contributing significantly to poverty mitigation in many African countries and bringing the continent closer to achieving a crucial MDG. Migration is culturally rewarding and this is perhaps even more obvious than the contribution of financial remittances by African migrants. Theory

and practice make it clear that the propensity of Africans to remit is largely influenced by altruism, which derives from the parent–child relationship and culturally instilled expectations of the roles of children in their (extended) family's development. The increasing volume of remittances from migrants since the late 1980s is largely due to an astronomical rise in the generation of financial capital, especially in the USA, Europe and Asia. Although this is projected to persist, regardless of the ongoing global financial crisis, it is expedient for African governments to be more focused on improving national economic development and revising their legislation to suit the development of migrants and non-migrants in the country.

The contemporary benefits of diasporas throughout the world were overlooked for quite a while, partly because many researchers associated the term with classic diasporas, but also because not much attention was paid to the positive effects that may accrue from brain drain, which is perceived with regret. Given that economic and political mismanagement worsened poverty in Africa, and that remittances received from international migrants have helped many households survive the bruising effects of ethnic conflicts and structural adjustment programmes, it has been accepted throughout the continent that the diasporas (classic and new) could be harnessed to assist economic development in the continents. In the process, attention has been called to the social benefits of ideas received from the diaspora. Hence, the SADC is among the first of the RECs to have taken action, through the Regional Consultative Process on Migration and with assistance from international organisations such as the IOM, the United Nations and the World Bank, to put measures in place which will maximise the chances of utilising the diaspora to attain economic and social development in the region. Although progress has been made in this direction in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, this study does not reveal much about the position in Namibia. Meanwhile, there are clearly several economic, political and administrative challenges which must be overcome soon to achieve the goal of involving the diaspora in the economic and political activities of countries in the SADC region.

Appendix 9.1 Questionnaire for Key Informants

Data collection instrument:

Commonwealth Secretariat

Migration and Development: The Role of the Diaspora in the SADC Region

(SWAZILAND)

July – September, 2011

Questionnaire Protocol for Migration Experts (University)

1. How many migrants from Swaziland are currently living outside the country?..... Don't Know.....
2. How many are living in Africa..... EU..... USA..... Elsewhere..... Don't Know.....

3. How many are economic migrants?..... Don't Know.....
4. How many are students?..... Don't Know.....
5. What are their levels of education? No Educ..... Tertiary..... Tertiary.....
6. How many are professionals? Med. Doctors..... Nurses..... Economist..... Scientist.....
7. What is attitude of the host population towards the migrants? Good..... Bad..... D.K..... .
8. Are they allowed to work? Yes..... No..... D.K.....
9. Do they have access to jobs? Yes..... No..... D.K.....
10. What rights do they have?.....
11. How are they impacting Swaziland in terms of economic, social, infrastructure, public service, health services as well as politically? Very Good..... Good..... None.....
12. Do the remit money and goods to Swaziland? Yes..... No..... D.K.....
13. Are the remittances helpful at home? Yes..... No..... D.K.....
14. How do they remit?.....
15. Who do they remit to?.....
16. How much do they remit (Total)?.....
17. What are the remittances used for?.....
18. Do the migrants invest in Swaziland? Yes..... No..... D.K.....
19. What do they invest in?.....
20. Do the investments make an impact on the development? Yes..... No..... D.K.....
21. What social contributions does the Diaspora make to Namibia?.....
22. What political contributions does the Diaspora make to Namibia?.....
23. Does the government remit to migrants? Yes..... No..... D.K.....
24. What plans do you have to partner with migrants in Diaspora?.....
25. Why do you want to partner with the Diaspora?.....
26. What efforts are being made to partner with the Diaspora?.....
27. Is there a policy on the Diaspora? Yes..... No..... D.K.....
28. If No, are there plans to develop one? Yes..... No..... D.K.....
29. Does Swaziland have a comprehensive international migration policy? Yes..... No.....
30. If No, are there plans to develop one? Yes..... No..... D.K.....

31. What has been done or is currently done to encourage research in the Diaspora and migration?.....

32. Does government influence monetary transfer to Swaziland? Yes ..... No .....

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