

Chapter 7

Migration and Remittances in Development: A Study of Jamaica

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Summary

Challenges and benefits of migration since the 1970s

Migration has been associated with high levels of remittances, which are viewed as having a positive impact on the economy. This chapter assesses the effects of migration on Jamaica; the policies employed by the public sector and other sectors of the society to minimise drawbacks and maximise benefits of both; policies applied in other sectors that affect immigration; successful policy approaches adopted; and other policy options which could address the challenges of development and migration.

Jamaica's economic performance since independence in 1962 has been characterised by low growth, averaging the lowest – 0.77 per cent – between 2000 and 2011, and high public debt, which was 129 per cent of GDP in 2009/2010. Jamaica's economic challenges were exacerbated by the recession following the global financial crisis, which affected its major foreign exchange earners, bauxite and tourism, and those markets have been slow to recover. Projected growth for 2013 was 0.1 per cent (UNECLAC 2013: 10), but only if Jamaica secured a deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It has also experienced a fall-off in FDI, from 15 per cent of GDP in 2008 to 3 per cent in 2010 (UNECLAC 2011: 250) and in ODA, from 1.3 per cent of GDP in 2009 to 1 per cent in 2010 (World Bank 2011). Remittances, which contribute significantly to Jamaica's GDP (13.8% in 2010), fell off during the recession but have proven more resilient than other sources of inflows, reaching pre-crisis levels in 2011 (BOJ 2012). The recession has also exacerbated already high levels of poverty, which reached 17.6 per cent in 2010 (PIOJ and STATIN 2012: iii).

Jamaica's remittances receipts are fuelled by high levels of migration, largely to the USA, the UK and Canada. Migration, however, is not without its challenges. The Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ 2009: vii) suggests that it contributes to Jamaica's weak economic performance, instability of families, a weakening of social capital and the 'emergence of negative social values and mindset'. It is also a likely contributor to Jamaica's weak competitiveness and low labour productivity, which ultimately affect economic growth. Migration has to be seen increasingly from the perspective of Jamaica's ageing population, especially as young people and children constitute the majority of migrants. Jamaica demographic transition places a greater burden of care on society, both economically and socially, at a time when its young people are declining in numbers, and it faces shortages of skilled health professionals. The feminisation of migration since the 1960s has significance for the care of children

and the elderly. The high levels of migration of health professionals, in particular nurses, have negative implications for the quality of healthcare delivery, even as the challenges arising from the growth of non-communicable diseases such as diabetes and hypertension and the spread of HIV/AIDS mount. The education sector also suffers from poor quality at the primary and secondary levels, exacerbated by the migration of teachers.

In addition to the attraction of reuniting with family overseas and greater opportunities for promotion and higher pay, certain conditions at home help to fuel migration. These include the weak performance of the Jamaican economy, which serves to limit employment opportunities, especially for youth, and deflate earnings; and high levels of crime and human insecurity.

Remittances are considered one of the positive effects of migration. In Jamaica they are an important source of foreign exchange and contribute to the balance of payments (Ramocan 2010). They also contribute significantly to the income of households, especially female-headed households (PIOJ and STATIN 2010, 2.7) and the unemployed (Ramocan 2010: 18, 20). Other positive effects of migration identified in the literature are the return of skilled migrants and the circulation of skilled migrants between the home country and host country. Migrants are viewed potentially as both investors and markets for niche products as well as lobbyists on behalf of the home country.

General development strategy with regard to migration

Jamaica has used a number of strategies to increase the development impact of migration, with varying degrees of success. These include creating an enabling environment for the inflow of professional and skilled workers; managing the framework for migration at national, regional and international levels; increasing the training of persons in professions with high levels of emigration to meet perceived external demand while meeting local needs; negotiating, with target countries, short-term labour contracts for less skilled workers for the temporary relief of labour unemployment; and engaging the diaspora as a source of skills, investment and support.

Strategies aimed at creating an enabling environment for the inflow of professionals are located both in the legal framework governing migration and in the active recruitment of desired skills. Existing legislation provides for companies, in particular foreign companies, to employ non-Jamaicans. Jamaica's obligations under the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) allow entry to Caribbean Community (CARICOM) nationals with specified skills. This has the potential to encourage the flow of nurses throughout the region, although that is mitigated by the prospects of higher salaries in traditional destinations as well as in non-CSME member states such as The Bahamas and the Cayman Islands. Jamaica has sought to address its shortfall of nurses from countries outside the region, such as Cuba and India.

Efforts at addressing nurse migration have occurred at the national, regional and international levels. At the national level, this includes bonding nurses whose training

it has subsidised, but this has not proved to be particularly effective. At the regional level, efforts include the Managed Migration Programme, supported by CARICOM, out of which emerged the Regional Task Force for Managed Migration. This was to have promoted the temporary migration of nurses. Assessment of the regional managed migration initiative suggested that it was not particularly successful because it was not integrally incorporated into regional mechanisms to allow it to function as a regional initiative (Salmon et al. 2007). The economic partnership agreement between CARICOM and the Dominican Republic on the one hand and the European Commission (EC) on the other (CARIFORUM–EC EPA), which came into effect in 2009, provides for the temporary movement of skilled persons, including nurses. Such a programme will address migration only if it is an attempt to shift the current appetite for permanent migrants towards temporary schemes.

The government has also engaged at the international level, along with other governments in the region, in helping to regulate the framework for skills recruitment, particularly in health and education. The focus has been on ensuring that such recruitment is done ethically and that migrants are treated fairly in the host country. Initiatives in health include the Commonwealth Code of Practice for the International Recruitment of Health Workers (Commonwealth Health Ministers 2003) and the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel, adopted in May 2010. Initiatives to address the outflow of teachers include the Savannah Accord, adopted at the 2002 meeting of Commonwealth Ministers of Education, which found expression in the 2004 Commonwealth Teacher Recruitment Protocol. These initiatives are non-binding and are useful in so far as they establish codes for acceptable practice. On their own they are unlikely to ensure the transfer of resources from host to source countries and are even less likely to do so in the face of economic challenges brought about by the prolonged recession.

One of the policy approaches adopted to stem the outflow of nurses was to increase training opportunities for health professionals, particularly nurses. This was motivated both by the desire to increase the numbers available locally and by the prospect of ever higher levels of remittances from the increasing numbers expected to migrate.

A World Bank-funded study (World Bank 2009) explored the feasibility of increasing the training of nurses to meet the needs of a number of CARICOM countries identified in the study. In the report's best-case scenario for Jamaica, of increasing nursing completion rates to 85 per cent and increasing student intake by 100 per cent, Jamaica would still have met only 75 per cent of its need for nurses by 2025 (Ibid.: 39).

Jamaica, like other Caribbean governments, has sought to actively woo offshore medical schools to take advantage of the global demand for healthcare. Over 30 such schools operate across the Caribbean region.² The primary market for these schools is North America (Canada and the USA). These schools rely on clinical internships, primarily in the USA,³ both to compensate for the absence of training hospitals and to increase their competitiveness. In Jamaica, two such institutions established operations in 2009 to take advantage of the market for healthcare professionals: the All American Institute of Medical Sciences (AAIMS) and Marmicmon Integrated

Marketing and Communications, a Canadian-based firm, which specialises in addressing manpower needs, including for health professionals. Marmicmon's engagement with Jamaica was short-lived, however. Traditional nationally based training schools have also responded to the perceived 'global' market for health professionals by expanding student intake as well as the range of programmes offered.

Jamaica participates in three temporary managed migration schemes that provide short-term employment opportunities for low-skilled workers:⁴ the Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme (CSAWP), the US Farm Work Programme and the US Hotel Work Programme.⁵ In the 2010/2011 financial year, nearly 11,000 Jamaicans, mostly men, were employed under these programmes, earning over US\$20 million (see Table 7.1). The recession had a negative impact on earnings, but these reached pre-recession levels in 2010/2011.

Since the mid-1990s the Jamaican government has sought to take advantage of its diaspora. The government has established a number of institutions through which to engage the diaspora. Most noteworthy of these are the biennial diaspora conferences. Its commitment is also evident in the establishment of a Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade with specific responsibility for Diaspora Affairs. Other structures established to formally engage the diaspora include the Diaspora Advisory Board, a Jamaica Diaspora Foundation, Jamaica Diaspora Day (16 June), the Jamaican Diaspora Institute and a National Working Group on Migration and Development at the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ). Formal mechanisms allow for a more structured engagement with the diaspora but also have the potential to marginalise sections of the diaspora that are not viewed as potential investors or as a resource.

International organisations and donor countries have had a significant role to play in the national policy focus on migration and remittances. Such organisations include the International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The IMF has refined the definition of remittances and standardised the recording in national data. The World Bank's annual reports on migration and remittance statistics have helped keep both at the forefront of policy. The IOM is also an important source of statistics on migration. International organisations have been at the forefront of attempts to link migration positively to development. The UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development 2006, and the Global Forum on Migration and Development that followed, sought to underscore the positive role that migrations play in destination countries. The European Commission's collaboration with the UN and other agencies, under the EC-UN Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMIDI), supported 51 projects between 2008 to 2012, a number of which were conducted in Jamaica.⁶ In Jamaica at the time of writing, the IOM was funding the development of a National Policy and Plan of Action on International Migration and Development, while the Swiss Development Corporation was financing initiatives to mainstream migration into national development strategies. The EU is also funding the development of a migration profile. Earlier initiatives supported by the IOM include the UK's Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) programme.⁷

Table 7.1 Remittances earned under overseas employment programmes, 2006/07–2010/11 (US\$)

Category	2010/11	2009/2010	2008/09	2007/08	2006/07
Total overseas workers	21,021,942.12	17,782,393.23	21,429,081.00	25,389,832.92	24,659,122.00
Male overseas workers	19,701,896.12	16,881,999.23	19,227,759.00	20,894,086.71	19,919,665.00
Female overseas workers	1,320,046.00	900,394.00	2,201,322.00	4,495,746.21	4,739,457.00
Total US farm and hotel workers	7,116,789.12	6,058,426.00	9,345,847.00	14,350,793.10	13,904,159.00
Male US farm and hotel workers	6,246,557.12	5,396,210.00	7,613,153.00	10,020,072.30	9,164,612.00
Female US farm and hotel workers	870,232.00	662,216.00	1,732,694.00	4,330,721.10	4,739,457.00
US Farm Work Programme (all male)	5,520,423.12	4,901,497.00	6,158,048.00	5,855,413.97	4,528,260.00
Total US Hotel Work Programme	1,596,366.00	1,156,929.00	3,187,799.00	8,495,379.43	9,375,809.00
Male US hotel workers	726,134.00	494,713.00	1,455,105.00	4,164,658.33	4,636,352.00
Female US hotel workers	870,232.00	662,216.00	1,732,694.00	4,330,721.10	4,739,457.00
Total Canadian farm/factory programme	13,905,153.00	11,723,967.23	12,083,234.00	11,039,039.41	10,755,053.00
Male Canadian farm/factory workers	13,455,339.00	11,485,789.23	11,614,606.00	10,874,014.41	10,755,053.00
Female Canadian farm/factory workers	449,814.00	238,178.00	468,628.00	165,025.11	0.00

Source: Data provided directly to the author from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security

The main avenue of private sector engagement with migration is as a conduit for remittances. The Jamaica National Building Society has gone further by establishing special instruments to capture savings as well as engaging with the diaspora directly through its Foundation, which, under the Jamaica Partnership for Education (JPE), focuses on channelling contributions from persons in the diaspora to initiatives in education at the primary and secondary levels.

International migration is one of the main areas of focus of Vision 2030's Population Sector Plan, which is directed at measuring and monitoring of migration to meet development needs. This has resulted in institutional strengthening with the establishment of a Migration Policy Project Unit (MPU) at the PIOJ. The unit has responsibility for developing a national policy and plan of action on international migration and development; mainstreaming migration into national development strategies; developing a migration profile; and establishing a national working group on international migration and development.

The remit of migration has broadened to take account of an emerging challenge, that of trafficking in persons. The US Department of State's *Trafficking in Persons Report 2012*⁸ lists Jamaica as 'a source, transit, and destination country for adults and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor' (2012: 197). The sex trafficking of children was of particular concern. The government of Jamaica has extended the legislation addressing immigration to include the Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Suppression and Punishment) Act (2007) as a response. It has also had a National Task Force against Trafficking in Persons since 1995. Despite these initiatives, the USA deemed Jamaica to be not compliant with the minimum standard for the elimination of trafficking (US Department of State 2012) and has placed it on its Tier 2 watch list (see section 7.2.7).

Assessing the efficacy of policy and institutional practices

In assessing the effectiveness of some of the approaches taken by government, we focus on efforts to expand training in a deliberate effort to increase numbers of skilled people available for export; and on attempts to expand options for migration, including short-term labour employment schemes.

Initiatives in training for export across the region have been driven largely by the foreign private sector, although with encouragement from governments. The focus of training is to meet external demand. US students are a prime target group given the over-supply of prospective students, which onshore training institutions are unable to meet. Parallel to this development are initiatives by government-supported tertiary institutions to expand training opportunities, largely directed at students from Jamaica and the region. Increasing training presents challenges, among them securing spaces for clinical training both locally and in the USA. In Jamaica, expansion in the training of nurses, doctors and other medical personnel is already exerting pressure on local facilities. The Nursing Council of Jamaica (NCJ), the body responsible for regulating the training of nurses, is already rationing the intake of nursing students among existing training institutions. There is also mounting pressure in the USA for states to restrict access to clinical training for students from offshore institutions.

Efforts to court the diaspora are occurring in an environment of reduced investment, low labour productivity, weak competitiveness and general sluggish economic performance. Jamaica's attractiveness to the diaspora is likely to be mitigated by existing challenges to doing business in Jamaica, which include perceived high levels of corruption and high levels of bureaucracy. Moreover, high levels of crime are likely to be an important consideration for potential investors from the diaspora. Engaging with the diaspora may also generate tensions with the local population if the former are viewed as privileged, and such tensions must be managed. One approach to minimising tension within the diaspora would be to establish different avenues for engagement for different sections of the diaspora. Another would be to widen the focus of engagement with the diaspora to take a concrete interest in social, economic and political issues that affect its members.

Jamaica is actively considering the establishment of a diaspora bond, although this is also not without its challenges. Diaspora bonds offer the advantage of capturing a wide base of savers as well as drawing on the emotional attachment of the diaspora. The experiences of some countries with diaspora bonds suggest caution, however. The low take-up of bond issues in Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria, influenced by concerns over devaluation and government accountability, hold lessons for Jamaica (Fatunta 2012, Kottasova 2011).

Governments view short-term labour programmes as an avenue for expanding employment. Governments, however, have no control over such programmes, as they are subject to conditions in host countries such as recession and changes in immigration policies.

Policy proposals

Migration has been a central feature of Jamaican life with deep historical roots. Its magnitude in such a relatively small country as Jamaica suggests that it should have an important place in development policy. Any attempt to embed migration as a development tool in policy must begin with the observation that migration is first and foremost a personal choice based on an individual's or family's assessment of possibilities, and that it is influenced as much by conditions at home as by the labour and migration policies of host countries. A government's role in influencing who migrates is thus limited. A government's ability to deliberately affect migration is at the international level, in its engagements in setting codes and standards for treatment of migrants and in negotiating access in respect of short-term labour movements. The government's approach to migration has been limited by an outward focus on training for markets and courting the diaspora. However, for migration policy to function as a tool of development, it must be embedded in a more holistic view of Jamaica's development. This must take account of the local conditions that propel people to migrate and the effects of such migration on the economy and social life. Addressing these factors would also help to create an environment that is more conducive to engaging the diaspora in economic and social life.

Migration policy should be embedded in a broader development framework that takes account of the skills needs of the society, the effect of skills loss on the country's

development trajectory and the demographic shifts in the population. In addressing the migration–development nexus, government has to address the main economic, political and social challenges that affect the society and the complex relationship between these and migration. High levels of crime, weak economic performance and political instability fuel migration; yet high levels of outmigration aggravate these challenges.

We propose the following policies.

- **Research:** more targeted research to establish the extent of migration's reach in society as a basis on which to ground labour policy planning.
- **Retention:** government should work towards the creation of a databank of local skills to complement efforts to compile a databank on skills available in the diaspora, as the basis of a more informed labour policy, with a focus on training and retention initiatives.
- **Remittances and diaspora:** expand contributions to the National Housing Trust to allow persons abroad to save on behalf of relatives in Jamaica. Similarly, expand access to the National Insurance Scheme to the diaspora to save on both their own and their relatives' behalf.
- **Diaspora engagement:** engage in a more differentiated and nuanced way with the diaspora to reflect their varied conditions and ways of relating to home.

7.1 Challenges and benefits of migration since the 1970s

7.1.1 Introduction

Debates on the place of migration and remittances in development are of central concern to Jamaica, given its standing as one of the leading migrant countries and recipients of remittances per capita. The World Bank (2011) ranks Jamaica as the second-largest per capita supplier of skilled labour, with some 85.1 per cent of its tertiary-educated population in the migrating stock of OECD countries.⁹ Associated with this are large inflows of remittances – US\$2,025.1 million – amounting to 13.8 per cent of GDP in 2011, surpassing traditional sources of foreign exchange inflows such as FDI (US\$227.7 million in 2010 and US\$540.9 million in 2009) and ODA (US\$2.8 billion in 2011). Per capita GDP in 2011 was US\$5,434.76, while per capita remittances were US\$747.98 (13.8% of per capita GDP). Despite the apparent financial windfall that remittances represent, particularly in a stagnating economy marked by prolonged low growth, the corollary of the large outmigration of the vast majority of its skilled population suggests a tension between migration and remittances that presents a challenge for academics and policy-makers alike. A trend in the literature focuses on the challenges that such high levels of skilled migration present to the sending country, but much of the literature identifies positive effects, including return migration and brain circulation, focused on possibilities of transferring skills. The strongest positive outcome of migration, however, has been its linkage to high levels of remittances, reflected in a plethora of literature and consultations, the latter driven by international agencies. Much of this was focused on how to harness remittances

to increase their impact on the economy, but there has been a recent shift towards embracing the diaspora as a source of networks and related support (Saxenian 2002).

This chapter seeks to synthesise the available evidence on migration and remittance patterns and impacts, and make recommendations for policy reform to maximise the benefits and reduce the costs and risks of migration. More to the point, it seeks to establish the effects of migration – both negative and positive – on Jamaica; the policies employed by the public sector and other sectors of the society to minimise consequences and maximise benefits; policies applied in other sectors that affect immigration; successful policy approaches adopted; and other policy options which could address the challenges of development and migration.

7.1.2 Overview: economic and social profile

Jamaica, which is classified by the Commonwealth Secretariat as a small state, covers a land area of 10,991 km² with a population of 2.7 million people (PIOJ 2012: 20.1). Jamaica is listed on the UNDP's 2011 Human Development Index (HDI) among countries experiencing medium human development, ranked at 79 out of 187 countries (UNDP 2011). Jamaica reported significant improvements in each of the HDI indicators during the period between 1980 and 2011. These include high life expectancy at birth, from 68 years in 1970 (UNDP 1990: 135) to 73 years in 2011; high adult literacy, rising from 70 per cent in 1970 (UNDP 1998: 148) to 96.4 per cent in 2011 (UNDP 2011); and high gross enrolment at the primary, secondary and tertiary school levels, 99.6 per cent, 97 per cent and 33.1 per cent,¹⁰ respectively (PIOJ 2012: 22.2). The mean years of schooling for Jamaicans rose by 4.4 between 1980 (5.2 years) and 2011 (9.6 years), although the expected years of schooling were 13.8, up from 11.1 in 1980 (Table 7.2).


Jamaica has seen positive strides in other human development indicators, as reflected in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These include declining under-five mortality rates from 86 per thousand in 1960 (UNDP 1990: 135) to 21 per thousand in 2011 (UNDP 2011) and improved access to safe supplies of water and sanitary

Table 7.2 Human development indicators for Jamaica, selected years

Year	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	Gross national income per capita (2005 US\$ at purchasing power parity)	HDI value
1980	70.5	11.1	5.2	4,675	0.607
1985	71.1	10.9	5.8	4,172	0.611
1990	70.7	11.2	6.4	5,374	0.637
1995	70.3	11.5	7.4	6,628	0.665
2000	70.5	11.6	8.6	6,275	0.680
2005	71.5	12.5	9.0	6,600	0.702
2010	72.9	13.8	9.6	6,430	0.726
2011	73.1	13.8	9.6	6,487	0.727

Source: UNDP (2011)

Figure 7.1 Jamaica’s public debt as a share of GDP, external and domestic, 1990/91–2010/11



Source: Computed from data accessed from the Ministry of Finance and Planning, Debt Management Unit

facilities, 81.3 per cent and 99.9 per cent (UNDP 2014), respectively.¹¹ These, however, mask a number of challenges.

Jamaica’s economic performance since independence in 1962 has been sluggish, characterised by low growth. Jamaica’s real average rate of GDP growth, which was 4.4 per cent between 1960 and 1969, fell to 1.2 per cent between 1970 and 1979 and 1.7 per cent between 1980 and 1989, rising to 2.3 per cent between 1990 and 1999. It fell again to 0.77 per cent between 2000 and 2011 (BOJ 2011), making Jamaica one of the world’s slowest-growing economies (ranked 180 out of 196 countries) (World Bank 2011: 44). At the time of writing, growth was projected at 0.1 per cent by UNECLAC (2013: 10), and only if Jamaica secured an IMF agreement. This lacklustre performance is also reflected in weak growth of per capita income (World Bank 2011: 45). In 1980, Jamaica’s per capita GDP at constant purchasing power parity (PPP) was US\$9,960. This fell to US\$5,434.76 by 2011 (UNDP 2011). Despite a 39 per cent increase in per capita gross national income (GNI) between 1980 and 2011, Jamaica lags behind similarly placed countries; its GNI remains at the lower end of Commonwealth Caribbean countries, US\$6,487 per capita (PPP) (UNDP 2011).

Jamaica maintains a persistent deficit in its balance of payments, with imports as a percentage of GDP far outstripping exports (45 per cent as opposed to 11 per cent in 2011; PIOJ 2012: 1). This has led to high levels of government borrowing, leaving Jamaica with high levels of unsustainable debt, amounting to 129.3 per cent of GDP in the 2009/2010 fiscal year (see Figure 7.1). This fell slightly to 128 per cent at the end of March 2012 (Phillips 2012). The global recession has had a negative impact on the economy, threatening to reverse some of these gains and exacerbating existing challenges. The economy suffered a fall-off in the major economic sectors such as bauxite and tourism.

Figure 7.2 Jamaica's real GDP growth, 2000–11

Source: BOJ (2011)

Figure 7.2 indicates that, for three consecutive years (2008–2010), the Jamaican economy contracted after realising sustained (though minimal) growth for the eight years preceding the recession. This led to the economy contracting by 1.3 per cent (UNECLAC 2011: 245). Despite some signs of improvement, recovery in the major economic sectors has been slow, with declines in 2010 in all sectors except for agriculture, forestry and fishery, and tourism (Ibid.: 249), although there were modest improvements across all sectors in 2011. The mining and quarrying sector declined by 3.4 per cent in 2010, whereas prices increased by 14.3 per cent from 2009 (PIOJ 2011: xi). The sector's performance improved in 2011, raising its contribution to GDP from 2.1 per cent to 2.4 per cent (PIOJ 2012: xi). Manufacturing output fell by 2.6 per cent in 2010, representing an 8.3 per cent fall in value, but grew by 1.4 per cent in real value added in 2011, the first growth recorded since 2007 (Ibid.: xii). Construction also suffered a 2.2 per cent decline in real value added in 2010, accompanied by the highest job loss of any sector, at 6.7 per cent. It experienced marginal growth of 0.6 per cent in 2011 (Ibid.: xii). The tourism sector, however, recorded a 3.7 per cent increase in earnings in 2010, which continued into 2011 with a 2 per cent estimated increase (Ibid.: xiii). The agriculture sector recorded a 10.6 per cent increase in real value, increasing its share of GDP to 6.6 per cent, up from 5.8 per cent in 2010 (Ibid.: xiii). Overall, modest economic growth of 1.5 per cent was recorded for 2011 (BOJ 2011).

The recession's impact was evident in the social sectors, with increases in unemployment and poverty. Unemployment, which had fallen from 15.5 per cent in 2000 to 9.8 per cent in 2007 (PIOJ 2011), rose steadily to reach 15.2 per cent by the end of 2013 (PIOJ 2014: 21.1). Public sector workers' salaries have stagnated, at best, with a three-year wage freeze in 2009 (UNECLAC 2011: 249) and a rapidly declining

dollar. Poverty follows a similar trend, with the recession causing significant roll-back in gains made over the years. Poverty, which had been falling sharply, from 19.9 per cent in 1997 to 9.9 per cent in 2007, increased more than seven percentage points to reach 17.6 per cent in 2010 (World Bank 2011).

Given Jamaica's weak economic position, it relies heavily on funding from the multilateral financial institutions. The IMF, with which it has a 15-month stand-by agreement, sets fiscal and debt reduction targets and guides the disbursement of loans from the other international financial institutions (IFIs) (the Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank) (see UNECLAC 2011, PIOJ 2011: ix, x, ch. 3). The government was, up to January 2013, in negotiations with the IMF for a 24-month extension of an IMF stand-by agreement, which was viewed as crucial to Jamaica's economic stability, but which was expected to result in austerity measures. Private investment flows declined with the onset of the recession, falling from 15 per cent of GDP in 2008 to 3 per cent in 2010 (UNECLAC 2011: 250). Net ODA has also slowed. In 2009 it represented 1.3 per cent of GDP. This fell to 1 per cent in 2010 (World Bank 2011). It also recorded a decline of 51.8 per cent in 2011 to US\$541.6 million, compared with US\$1.1233 billion in 2010 (PIOJ 2011: 2.3). Against this backdrop, remittances, which were 15.8 per cent of GDP in 2009 (BOJ 2013: 10), became increasingly important to the economy, although their contribution to GDP fell steadily to reach 13.8 per cent in 2012 (Ibid.: 13). Nevertheless, inflows in 2011 were US\$2.025 billion, slightly above the US\$2.021 billion remitted in 2008 (Collinder 2012). Despite the recession's adverse impact on the flow of remittances, however, remittances proved to be far more resilient than other sources of inflows, emphasising their importance to the economy.

7.1.3 Historical trends in Jamaica's emigration flows

Migration is very much a part of Jamaica's colonial and post-colonial experience. Thomas-Hope et al. (2009a: 15) summarise the broad migration trends, which include, in the post-emancipation period, emigration to Panama and Central America as labourers on the construction of the Panama Canal and the trans-Isthmian railway and on sugar estates in Cuba; to the United Kingdom and the USA to contribute to the first and second world wars and post-war reconstruction, but continuing thereafter focusing on specialised areas of need, such as nurses; and later to pursue jobs in the tourist sectors in other Caribbean islands and the USA. The UK changed immigration legislation with the introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 which restricted immigration to those possessing skills, further modified by the 1965 White Paper (BBC n.d.); this effectively stemmed migration from the Caribbean. At the same time, US immigration law was modified by the Immigration Act of 1965, replacing national quotas with hemispheric quotas, but with a 20,000 annual limit on any one country. At the same time, however, it also expanded the categories of family members allowed to enter, leading to increases in migration to the USA (Daniels 2008). Adjustments to immigration regulations in Canada between 1962 and 1967 also moved in the direction of reducing discrimination but shifting eligibility in favour of skilled persons (McIntyre 2001).

The top destination countries for Jamaican immigrants today are the USA, the UK and Canada. Jamaica is an important source of migrants to the USA, ranking 11th among sending countries, contributing 1.9 per cent (21,783¹²) of all persons granted permanent residency in 2009 (PIOJ 2011: 20.8). There was a 9 per cent decline in permanent visas granted in 2010, however, reducing Jamaica to 14th place, representing 0.8 per cent of all migrants (PIOJ 2012: 20.7). The PIOJ projected a slight increase in 2011. This decline is also reflected in migration to the UK and Canada. In 2009 some 3,148 Jamaicans were granted indefinite stay ('grants of settlement') in the UK, representing 30.7 per cent (the highest proportion) of all immigrants from the Americas (PIOJ 2011: 20.10). This number fell to 2,958 in 2010, with similar projections for 2011 (PIOJ 2012: 20.8). In 2010, 2,255 Jamaicans were granted permanent status in Canada. This number, although small compared with the USA and the UK, nevertheless represented 1 per cent of all migrants to Canada. Jamaica was ranked 24th of all sending countries in 2009 (PIOJ 2011: 20.09). A decline to 1,485 in 2011 reduced Jamaica's rank to 28th, accounting for 0.8 per cent of all migrants to Canada (Ibid.: 20.8).

Emigration trends for the USA show no clear pattern. As Table 7.3 shows, the numbers of Jamaican immigrants to the USA increased sharply in the 1980s and then fell off somewhat in the 1990s, although they were still at higher levels than the 1970s, before rising close to the 1980s level between 2000 and 2010. Much of this increase occurred in the second half of the 2000s, which saw a jump from 14,430 in 2004 to 21,783 in 2009 (PIOJ 2011: 20.10). This fell to 19,825 in 2010 and was not expected to change significantly in 2011 (PIOJ 2012: 20.8). Emigration to Canada shows a steady decline from the 1970s, moving from 59,921 in the 1970s to 25,968 between 2000 and 2011 (see Table 7.3). The numbers of Jamaicans accorded permanent status in the UK also declined steadily from the 1970s to the late 1990s, falling from a total of 13,832 for that decade to 4,266 in the 1990s, averaging around 300 a year up to 1999, when it jumped to 1,435. This upward trend continued into the 2000s, up to 32,932, ranging from a low of 1,882 in 2000 to 3,520 in 2005 and just under 3,000 in 2011 (see Table 7.3).

Table 7.3 Main streams of Jamaican migration since 1970

Decade	Total	USA	Canada	UK
1970s	201,747	127,994	59,921	13,832
1980s	257,354	215,158	38,117	4,079
1990s	211,034	170,218	36,550	4,266
2000–2011	275,469	216,569	25,968	32,932
Total	945,604	729,939	160,556	55,109

Note: These figures are revised from those reported in past volumes of the *Economic and Social Survey Jamaica* produced by the PIOJ. These revised figures are based on data provided by official government records of host countries. The UK figures have undergone the largest revision, as previous data were based on immigration records from Jamaica, which did not capture Jamaicans already living in the UK who obtained 'regularised settlements of right to abode'. The data and explanation were provided by Ms Toni-Shae Freckleton, Acting Manager of the Population and Health Unit, Social Policy, Planning and Research Division of the PIOJ.

Source: Data up to the 1990s provided by PIOJ (2011). Data for 2000–2011 computed from PIOJ (2012, Table 20.5a).

As Thomas-Hope et al. (2012: 27) have observed, migration flows are determined by immigration laws and regulations in host countries. There are a number of developments in UK and US immigration regulations that might affect Jamaican migration. Changes to UK immigration rules which took effect on 9 July 2012 are likely to see a slowing of migration streams to the UK. These include the introduction of a minimal threshold of £18,600 (US\$29,243.52) for sponsoring a spouse or partner, which increases to £22,400 (US\$36,391.49) if a child is included. This figure increases by £2,400 (US\$3,899.14) for each additional child. In addition, the regulations make it more difficult for the spouses of UK citizens to get citizenship, even if they can meet the monetary requirements, by increasing the probationary period to ‘test the genuineness of the relationship’ from two to five years, even for spouses and partners who have been living together overseas for at least four years, who were granted immediate settlement under the old rules (UK Border Agency 2012). The regulations also make it more difficult for elderly dependants to migrate.¹³ US President Obama’s executive order that allows young undocumented aliens to apply for jobs, join the military and pursue an education as a temporary stop-gap measure (Cohen 2012, USCIS 2012), which would prevent their deportation for two years, could well have favourable implications for undocumented Jamaicans.¹⁴

Jamaica also receives immigrants, although the numbers are significantly smaller.¹⁵ The categories of immigrants to Jamaica include returning residents and deportees, Commonwealth citizens, aliens (non-Commonwealth) and refugees. In response to the CSME, which allows the movement of skilled nationals across the CARICOM region, Jamaica now reports on the numbers of skills certificates issued, although this does not necessarily reflect the numbers of such persons resident in Jamaica.¹⁶

The numbers of immigrants entering Jamaica since the mid-1990s appears to be fairly consistent, under 9,000 for most years, as Table 7.4 shows. The table suggests a steady decline in the numbers of voluntarily returning residents, and fluctuations in the numbers of involuntarily returned residents (deportees), although the data for the 2000s suggest higher levels of involuntary return than in the 1990s. Most of the fluctuations occur within the Commonwealth citizens and aliens groups, which increased dramatically between 2006 and 2008, more likely than not reflecting the manpower requirements of foreign companies at the time. Most work permits issued were to persons from China and India, ranging from 45 per cent in 2006 to nearly 60 per cent in 2011 (PIOJ 2008: 21.8 and 2012: 21.8). From 1997 to 2010, 718 persons were granted skills certificates under the CSME (PIOJ 2012: 20.15).

Table 7.4 Patterns of immigration to Jamaica, 1996–2011

Category	1996	2000	2005	2006	2008	2010	2011
Total	8,146	6,810	8,194	15,132	18,059	8,721	7,519
Returning residents	2,268	1,282	1,299	1,236	1,031	1,134	1,068
Deportees	1,765	1,730	3,320	3,004	3,234	2,825	2,629
Commonwealth citizens	3,182	2,600	1,500	5,930	5,283	3,487	2,770
Aliens	931	1,198	2,075	4,962	8,511	1,275	1,052

Source: PIOJ (2011, 2012)

7.1.4 Migration and its effects on service delivery

There is an extensive literature that seeks to assess the effects of migration on the source country, which will not be reiterated here. A brief summary of benefits includes the remittances that migrants repatriate, easing of population pressures, benefits from higher levels of skills from returned migrants, greater possibilities of investment, and technology and skills transfers by way of brain circulation. The negative impacts include loss of investment in education and loss of skills in short supply, resulting in shortages and lower-quality services. The challenges of migration extend beyond these, however, and speak to broader issues of competitiveness with implications for the country's economic performance and negative social consequences. The PIOJ (2009: vii) identified the effects of migration as contributing to Jamaica's weak economic performance, instability of families, a weakening of social capital and the 'emergence of negative social values and mindset'. Jamaica's low international competitiveness, which is at the centre of its poor economic performance, cannot be divorced from high levels of skills migration. The 2005 Human Development Report (PIOJ and UNDP 2005: 124) noted a connection between the low levels of qualifications across the society and Jamaica's weak competitiveness. This also appears to affect the competitiveness of Jamaican migrants. The World Bank (2004: 109) suggested that 'returns to education are lower in the US market for Jamaican educated immigrants than immigrants from several other countries'.

The importance of migration in explaining Jamaica's poor economic performance is now being acknowledged. The World Bank (2011) has identified migration as one of the key explanatory factors in Jamaica's weak economic performance because of its effects on labour productivity; the country has a low level of human capital as a result of poor quality of education and training, and high levels of migration of qualified workers. This is important, as the tendency in the literature has been to treat broad macroeconomic issues and migration as disparate, with no connection between the two.

Demographic dimensions

Migration is an important factor in the population dynamics of Jamaica. The PIOJ commented that migration 'continued to impact the population growth and structure, as well as other social and economic factors' (PIOJ 2011: xii). It has contributed to the slowing of Jamaica's population growth, which moved from a rate of 1 per cent in 1996 to 0.2 per cent in 2011 (PIOJ 2012). In 2010, the emigration of Jamaicans was a larger source of population attrition than death: 18,500 and 16,100, respectively (PIOJ 2011: xii). Given the volume of migration, its impact is expected to be felt at all levels of society. The government views migration, in particular, as contributing to Jamaica's post-independence challenges. In his foreword to Vision 2030, the government of Jamaica's blueprint for achieving developed country status, Wesley Hughes, Director of the PIOJ at the time, identified migration, along with rapid urbanisation and globalisation, as having a 'negative impact on the structure and stability of the Jamaican family', the result of which has been 'a weakening of social capital and the emergence of negative social values and mindset' (PIOJ 2009: vii).

Migration is widespread across economic sectors, age groups, genders and skill sets. The migration data for the top destination country for Jamaican migrants, the USA, showed children and persons in the prime working-age population as constituting the majority of migrants: 22.7 per cent in the 0–17 age group; 14 per cent in the 25–34 group; and 20.7 per cent in the 35–44 group (PIOJ 2012: 20.9). Similarly for Canada, the majority of migrants are in the 10–39 age group. The concentration of the young in migration statistics is likely to be generalised given that family unification is the main reason for migration, accounting for 96.7 per cent of total migrants (PIOJ 2012: 20.8). This has implications for the structure of Jamaican society, which has shown signs of population ageing. Jamaica is classified as being at the intermediary stage of demographic transition, with declines in the 0–14 age group and increases in the working-age (15–64) and dependant-age (65+) groups (PIOJ 2011: 20.3). The working-age population is expected to peak by 2030 (Ibid.). This development has potentially positive and negative effects. The increase in the working-age population is generally viewed in positive terms, as it presents a window of opportunity for governments to harness this population for development. On the other hand, this group could be potentially destabilising if the economy is unable to absorb them. This is the more likely outcome if Jamaica continues on a path of slow growth, characterised by high levels of youth unemployment. In January 2004, some 41.8 per cent of people between the ages of 14 and 19 and 31.4 per cent between 20 and 24 were unemployed (STATIN 2012). The effects of the recession in further slowing down the economy, and the outcome of IMF austerity measures that exacerbate unemployment, coming on the back of already astronomical levels of youth unemployment and reduced wages, suggest challenges for the short and medium term. When these are placed alongside high levels of youth involvement in crime,¹⁷ including violent crime, the picture is grim.

Another aspect of the demographic shift which Jamaica is experiencing is the increase in the categories of the elderly (60 and older) and the dependent elderly (65 and older), both of which are expected to grow substantially up to 2050 (PIOJ 2011: 20.3). The likely effect of this is a greater burden of care on society, both economically and socially, at a time when its young people are declining in numbers, and it faces shortages of skilled health professionals.

Skills

It is difficult to determine the effects of migration on the Jamaican economy. Studies on the effects of migration have focused on the health and education sectors, although this is unlikely to reflect the true extent of the problem for society as a whole. Even so, despite the reach of the problem across all areas of specialisation in health, the focus has been on the impact of nurses' migration, the effects of which are more obvious. The education sector has also been addressed in the literature, where the effects are felt in lower quality and in shortages in some specialisations (Sives et al. 2006). The literature has focused on the high proportion of people with tertiary education among the migrants, yet it overlooks the high proportions of skilled people with lower educational levels, the loss of whom also has a negative impact on the economy and society. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the construction sector has

suffered from a loss of skilled craftsmen such as carpenters, plumbers and electricians which is likely to increase the cost of construction while negatively affecting quality. Emigration data give little indication of the range of skills lost, as the majority of migrants do not report an occupation. For example, 72 per cent of persons migrating to the USA between 2006 and 2009 did not indicate a profession.¹⁸ Of the 28 per cent who reported an occupation, 16 per cent were in services. These data need to be further deconstructed to be analytically useful. It should not be assumed that the large numbers indicating no occupation were not employed before leaving and that their loss has no economic impact. Thomas-Hope (2009a: 19) notes that, contrary to the widely held assumption that migration functions as a pressure valve providing an outlet for large numbers of unemployed people, those already employed were the ones most likely to migrate. A 2007/08 survey cited by Thomas-Hope et al. (2012) revealed that migrants were more educated than the rest of the society, with 20 per cent holding university degrees compared with 7 per cent of the Jamaican population. In addition, they also earned more, on average, than the rest of the population.

Effect on gender

Another element of the migration dynamic is that women were the largest group of migrants,¹⁹ 55.6 per cent in 2010: 10,995 compared with 8,830 men (PIOJ 2011: 20.9). This represents a shift towards women since the 1960s (Thomas-Hope et al. 2009a, citing Momsen 1992, Timur 2000 and Mortley 2003). This is significant for the elderly and dependent elderly, who are more likely to be left behind, especially given women's roles as the main caregivers. The high proportion of women among migrants also has negative implications for children. Despite the large proportion of the young who migrate with their parents, there are many who are left behind for a while, if not permanently. In Jamaica the term 'barrel children' has been coined to describe these children's dependence on the remittances of loved ones. Recent literature examines the psychosocial effects of migration on such children (Crawford-Brown and Rattray 2001, Gibbison 2002, Bakker et al. 2009). The child psychologist Audrey Pottinger (*Jamaica Gleaner* 2008) argues that Jamaican children whose parents have migrated are more susceptible to suicide and depression. She also indicates that there are implications for the academic performance of such children and a heightened risk of sexual abuse. Pottinger et al. (2009) also pointed to the under-explored psychological effects on the migrant parents who have left children behind and the challenges of integrating in the host country when family re-unification does occur.

Health

Despite improvements in Jamaica's health sector, challenges remain, which are likely to be exacerbated by high levels of migration of health professionals. These include access to good-quality healthcare, which is reflected in the UNDP's health-adjusted life expectancy of 67 (UNDP 2011: 160) and persistently high levels of maternal mortality, 94.8 per 100,000 live births in 2010. Jamaica also faces significant challenges related to lifestyle diseases, maternal health and child/adolescent health. As reported by UNDG (2011), HIV and AIDS still pose a serious threat to Jamaica's health development even though the government has developed preventative policies

to sensitise the public. The National HIV/STI Programme (GoJ 2010) estimated that there were 32,000 persons living with HIV and 50 per cent of the infected individuals were not aware of their health status. Persistent high levels of migration of health personnel increase the country's difficulty in addressing these outstanding challenges.

Although high levels of migration occur across the medical professions, the migration of nurses has been most visible and so has received most attention from the media, academia and policy-makers. Jamaica experiences high levels of nurse migration, which gives rise to high levels of vacancies, with estimates ranging from 58.4 per cent (Caribbean Commission on Health and Development 2005, cited by Mortley 2009) to 25.5 per cent of all approved positions (World Bank 2009: 60). The latter may under-represent the real situation, as approved positions are based not on need, but on budgetary considerations. More highly trained and experienced nurses are over-represented in the migration data, with an estimate in 2001 that 20 per cent of specialist nurses had migrated, compared with 8 per cent of Registered Nurses (RNs) (Bell 2001). The effects of migration on the health system are well documented and include nurse shortages, lower quality of care, a greater burden of work on existing staff, lower staff morale, higher levels of industrial action, cancelled surgeries, merged patient care units and reduced government subsidy to train nurses, inter alia (see Hewitt 2004, Mortley 2009). Patient dissatisfaction with service delivery is also a problem associated with shortages of medical personnel (PIOJ 2009: 47).

Education

Jamaica's education sector has also suffered from migration. Although this has not generated shortages across the board, it has led to shortages in specialist areas such as maths, sciences, information technology and English (Sives et al. 2006). It has also had an effect on the quality of education delivered. According to UNDG (2011), Jamaica has experienced great improvement in the education system over the years, but still faces several limitations. These include 'quality constraints, inequalities, governance and management issues' (Ibid.: 2). The report indicates that the main issues faced by the education sector are 'issues of access, quality, accountability, supply of teachers for the formal education system and security' (Ibid.: 2). According to the World Bank (2011), Jamaica's quality of education relative to other developing countries is low because few resources are available to train and educate workers. High enrolment rates, particularly at the secondary level, obscure a fall in the expected years of schooling from 13.8 to 9.6. There are quality issues at the primary and secondary levels, as well as problems in gaining equity in access to good-quality education.

The effects of migration on quality are likely to undermine the strides Jamaica has made in the education sector. Jamaica's favourable enrolment statistics mask an education system that has been labelled as failing large numbers of its children, particularly those from poor social backgrounds. This is evident in performance in maths and English at all levels of the education system. In the Grade Four Numeracy and Literary Tests (GFNT and GFLT) administered at the primary level two years before the end of primary school, only 41.6 per cent of students achieved 'mastery' of numeracy and 67.1 per cent 'mastery' of literacy in 2010 (PIOJ 2011: 22.10). When

disaggregated by gender, the results were much worse for boys, who achieved scores of 34 per cent in numeracy and 56.4 per cent of literacy.

In the Grade Six Achievement Test (GSAT), which determines placement at the secondary level, the mean scores for maths and language arts were 57 and 58 per cent, respectively, with girls outperforming boys. At all levels, children from kindergarten and preparatory schools outperformed those from public schools.²⁰ The situation is even more dismal at the secondary level, with only 80.2 per cent of the eligible grade 11 cohort sitting the Caribbean Secondary Education Certificate exams. This percentage fell dramatically for English and maths, with only 42.4 per cent of the enrolled cohort sitting maths and 49.1 per cent sitting English; of these, 70.8 per cent passed English language and 44.7 per cent passed maths (PIOJ 2011: 22.14, 22.15).²¹ Behind these statistics lie deep social divisions that permeate the society. The UNDP/PIOJ *Jamaica Human Development Report 2005* noted that 68.3 per cent of the poorest children between the ages of 15 and 16 were enrolled in school (PIOJ and UNDP 2005: 121). The figure for the wealthiest group was 93.1 per cent. This inequity is mirrored in the wider society, where 92 per cent of people in the lowest quintile had no qualifications while 63 per cent of those in the wealthiest group had some (Ibid.: 122). Migration is likely to affect schools which poorer children attend and which already experience low levels of resources, poor working conditions, higher teacher-to-student ratios and lower pay.

7.1.5 The push factors for migration

It is possible to identify general push factors that work across different sectors of the population and professions as well as those more specific to a particular profession. General push factors are likely to result from the weak performance of the Jamaican economy, which gives rise to high levels of unemployment, particularly youth unemployment; limited opportunities for promotion and upward mobility; low pay relative to cost of living; and high levels of crime and human insecurity. Factors more specific to the nursing profession, which has been the main focus of investigation in the literature, include poor working conditions, limited opportunities for promotion and lack of professional development and training (see Lewis 2011). A World Bank (2009) study on nurse migration from a select group of CARICOM countries, including Jamaica, suggests the importance of pay, work conditions and opportunities for promotion in influencing nurses' decisions to migrate. A small survey of Jamaican migrant and non-migrant nurses, reported in the study, found that 95 per cent of nurses who migrated²² identified dissatisfaction with salary as an important reason for migrating. Further, 85 per cent of nurses who had migrated declared themselves satisfied with their pay, as opposed to only 6 per cent of non-migrant nurses²³ (Ibid.: 25). The authors also suggested that the importance of sending remittances back home may have influenced the decision to migrate, as nearly 80 per cent of migrant nurses interviewed sent remittances amounting to around 5 per cent of their net income (Ibid.: 26). Some 57 per cent of 165 RNs residing in Jamaica were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their work conditions.²⁴ Of the migrant RNs interviewed, 60 per cent identified educational opportunities for their children as an important reason for emigrating and 81 per cent identified 'better work and career development

opportunities' as important reasons (Ibid.: 26). The study also sought to establish the importance of GDP performance and wage differentials between host and source countries as factors influencing the decision to migrate.²⁵ In general, the country's weak economic performance, reflected in low wages, high levels of unemployment and crime, is likely to influence the decision to migrate (see Pienkos 2006).

7.1.6 Deriving benefits from migration

Despite the many challenges that migration presents, the literature has pointed to a number of positive outcomes which the source country could seek to maximise. These include remittances, the return of skilled migrants and the engagement of the diaspora as a source of expertise and investment, a market and a lobby group on the source country's behalf. Declining inflows of ODA and FDI, commented on earlier, alongside increasing inflows of remittances, which remain strong even in times of crisis, provide the basis for viewing remittances in a positive light. The literature has been concerned with how to increase and maximise remittance flows in the service of development. This has led to a focus on reducing the cost of remittances, so that a larger proportion enters the home country, and channelling its use to productive enterprises rather than consumption. This raises questions of what constitutes consumption as opposed to investment and how to accurately record and measure remittance flows, especially given the variety of informal channels open to remitters. The challenge here is that remittances are primarily private flows over which a government has little control. Government policy would thus be limited to providing incentives to encourage more productive uses of remittances.

The literature has also identified the return of migrants to their home countries as one of the positive outcomes of migration (Ammassari and Black 2001). Such migrants are expected to have gained experience in the host country as well as greater familiarity with technology, which could be employed in the home country. They are also likely to have funds which could be channelled to investment. There has been a more recent focus on the value of migrants engaging with the home country while still resident in the host country. Advances in technology and its greater availability allow migrants to invest in the home country without having to return. AnnaLee Saxenian (2002, 2005, Saxenian et al. 2002), drawing on her work on the role of highly skilled Asians operating in Silicon Valley as a source of skills and financing to their home country, describes this phenomenon as 'brain circulation', a concept which seeks to shift the focus from the negative 'brain drain' to a more positive treatment of the engagement of the migrant with the home country. Through communications technology, migrants are able to 'act as middlemen connecting corporations in their adopted country with expertise in the home country, drawing the latter into processes of globalization while expanding market access of the former, or can themselves invest directly in the home country' (Lewis 2011: 71). This has thus shifted the focus to the role of the diaspora in development.

The following discussion focuses on the importance of remittances to Jamaica. Return migration and the diaspora are discussed in section 7.2 under policies employed by government to address migration.


7.1.7 The impact of remittances on Jamaica

Remittances have been identified as one of the positive outcomes of migration and, as already noted, feature prominently in Jamaica's national accounts. Analysis of remittance inflows to Jamaica shows a marked jump in their importance since the 1990s, escalating in the 2000s. Thus, as noted by Brown (2012), remittances moved from US\$1.5 billion over the 1980s to US\$4.7 billion in the 1990s, climbing to US\$14.8 billion in the first decade of the 2000s (Brown 2012: 32). In annual terms this represents a movement from US\$121 million in 1980 to US\$2.0251 billion in 2011 (Ibid.). Jamaica's remittances inflows were at their highest in 2008 (US\$2.02 billion) just before the economic crisis began. Consistent with the main destination of Jamaican migrants, the main sources of remittance inflows were the USA, the UK, Canada and the Cayman Islands. Between April 2010 and February 2012, the USA accounted for 55–63 per cent of inflows; the UK 14–20 per cent; Canada 10–14 per cent; and Cayman 2–8 per cent (Bank of Jamaica, cited by Brown 2012; see Figure 7.3).

The impact of the global financial crisis imposed significant constraints on remittance senders to Jamaica; in 2008/09, 70 per cent experienced job losses, reduction of working hours and/or increases in miscellaneous expenses. This resulted in 53 per cent of the recipients experiencing drastic reductions in remittance flows (Ramocan 2010). Remittance flows have picked up since, surpassing 2008 levels (US\$2021.3 million by the end of 2012 (BOJ 2013: 13).

These data on historical remittance flows should be read with caution, as changes in the channels through which funds are remitted and regulations governing the reporting of remittances partly account for the comparatively low figures recorded before the 1990s. They include adjustments made by the IMF in its 5th Balance of Payments manual in the reporting of remittances in the BOP, which Jamaica adopted, more stringent reporting requirements introduced since 2001 following the events of 11 September 2001 in the USA, and the strengthening of legislation in Jamaica, which gave the Bank of Jamaica regulatory functions over the setting up of remittance agencies (Brown 2012: 35).

Figure 7.3 Remittance inflows since 1960



Source: Bank of Jamaica, cited by Brown (2012)

In Jamaica remittances make a significant contribution to the income of households. The BOJ notes that they also have a positive impact on foreign exchange inflows and the balance of payments position (Ramocan 2010). Over the period 2001–2010, the numbers of households receiving remittances ranged from a low of 26.6 per cent in 2002 to a high of just over 45 per cent in 2006. This fell to 44.1 per cent in 2010 (PIOJ and STATIN 2012: 2.8, table 2.5). In Jamaica, the wealthiest households receive higher levels of remittances than the poorest households. The *Survey of Living Conditions 2010* (PIOJ and STATIN 2012: 2.8) indicated that 50.9 per cent of households in the highest quintile received remittances, compared with 34.7 per cent of those in the lowest quintile. This appears to support Alleyne and Williams's 2009 study, which found that, while remittances had some effect on reducing poverty (by 2.7 per cent) and the poverty gap (by 4.7 per cent), they contributed to a worsening of the inequality gap (cited by Brown 2012: 15). The *SLC* also showed a higher percentage of female-headed than male-headed households benefitting from remittances, 48.3 per cent and 40.5 per cent, respectively (PIOJ and STATIN 2012: 2.8). In addition, at the individual level, women were also the greater recipients of remittances. The BOJ's Remittance Survey Report (Ramocan 2010: 17) showed that 75 per cent of the recipients were female. A significant proportion of the labour force also benefitted from remittances. Some 44 per cent of remittance recipients were between 26 and 40 years old; of these persons, 40 per cent were not a part of the labour force (Ibid.: 18, 20). The educated were the major beneficiaries of remittances, the majority (90%) having at least a secondary education. Nearly 30 per cent (27.5) had tertiary education (Ibid.: 20). Further, nearly 40 per cent of recipients were unemployed, 13 per cent of whom were not seeking employment. Considering that the main beneficiaries of remittances are the better educated, this would suggest that there is some credibility to the view that remittances pushes up the reserve wage at which people are willing to work.

Remittances in Jamaica are dedicated mainly to daily expenditure. The BOJ's Remittance Survey results (Ramocan 2010: 36) showed that more than three quarters of remittances are spent in daily expenditures including utility bills and food. Most of the vast sum of money remitted each year is spent on daily consumption, which contributes significantly to Jamaica's GDP. The poorest sector of the population dedicated 12.5 per cent of remittances to education (PIOJ 2006). The BOJ's Remittance Survey (Ramocan 2010) indicated that the funds received were used to cover consumption expenditure: 19 per cent paid utilities bills; 18 per cent was spent on food; and 14 per cent was used for education expenses.

Another major use of remittances in Jamaica is in providing venture capital and entrepreneurship (Chevannes and Ricketts 1997). The BOJ's survey indicated that, as recently as 2010, 6 per cent of remittances were dedicated to investment (Ramocan 2010), which is a moderate contribution to GDP but will also produce further impact given the multiplier effect. These contributions are made both in cash and in kind, the latter consisting of technological products as well as appliances which can be used as personal and investment goods in small businesses. Chevannes and Ricketts (1997) also found that remittances provide Jamaicans with adequate access to formal financial services with a source of capital for investment. Remittances also make a significant contribution to the construction of homes (Dixon 1997). Remittances have

been used as a sort of ‘insurance’ following damages incurred by natural disasters such as hurricanes (Samuel 1996).

7.1.8 Channels through which remittances are received

The main formal channels for remittances are remittance companies, whose importance has mushroomed since the 1990s, with their share of the market growing from 30 per cent to 85 per cent between 1995 and 2011 (Brown 2012: 34). The regulatory framework for remittances was tightened with the extension of money-laundering legislation to the sector in 2002 (in response to the events of 11 September 2001), and legislation introduced in 2004 gave the Bank of Jamaica greater regulatory control over the operations of remittance agencies and agents (Brown 2012: 35, Kirton 2009: 6). The BOJ gathers data on remittances from remittance agents and agencies, commercial banks, merchant banks, credit unions, building societies and post offices as well as the Jamaican Customs Department (Ibid.: 6). Kirton notes that Customs Department, while going some distance towards filling the data gap on in-kind remittances, does not give a true picture of the magnitude of this source of remittances, as it records volumes only above a specified amount per shipment (Ibid.). Ramocan (2010: 3) identifies three ways in which the quality of remittance data is compromised: ‘(1) the large volume of private transfers that bypass the formal system; (2) the loss of data due to predefined thresholds, and (3) the incorrect classifications of remittance as “miscellaneous” or “other”.’

7.2 General development strategy with regard to migration

7.2.1 Policies to address migration

Policies in place to address migration are directed at the following:

- creating an enabling environment for the inflow of professional and skilled workers;
- managing the framework for migration at national, regional and international levels;
- increasing the training of persons in professions with high levels of emigration to meet perceived external demand while meeting local needs;
- negotiating with target countries short-term labour contracts for less skilled workers for the temporary relief of labour pressures; and
- engaging the diaspora as a source of skills, investment and support.

Strategies aimed at creating an enabling environment for the inflow of professionals are located both in the legal framework governing migration and in the active recruitment of desired skills. Thomas-Hope et al. (2009a, b) note that the legal framework for migration is governed by largely outdated legislation. This provides the framework for the private sector, particularly foreign companies, to employ personnel of non-Jamaican origin. As Thomas-Hope et al. (2009b) note, the legislation does not require companies to show that the jobs cannot be filled by Jamaicans. In addition to existing legislation, the government, as part of the fulfilment of its obligations under

the CSME, has extended the legislative framework to ease immigration restrictions on specified categories of persons from CARICOM member states. The initial list comprised musicians, artistes, sports and media personnel and university graduates; it was extended in 2006 to include nurses, teachers and persons with technical and vocational qualifications. This has the potential to encourage greater intra-regional migration of nurses and teachers as an alternative to extra-regional migration.

This element of the treaty has proved particularly challenging for governments to implement since the global financial crisis. Moreover, given the low levels of movement under this scheme, it is likely that governments and/or professional organisations would have to actively encourage and support such movement. This is largely because movement of nurses and teachers has been to countries outside the region. Where movement has occurred within the region, it has been to countries such as The Bahamas and Cayman Islands, which are not member states of the CSME. This suggests that geographical proximity is insufficient to contribute significantly to such movement (see Lewis 2011: 95). Rather, the prospect of higher incomes and improved opportunities for professional development are the main determinants of the migration of professionals. It is also not clear if the CARICOM region can overcome the pull factors of greater salaries in traditional recruiting countries inside and outside the region. The CSME does provide the space for the circulation of nurses and teachers by offering an opportunity to experience the region, but this will probably have to be actively promoted.

The free movement of professionals throughout the CSME is not without potential problems. The most obvious challenge is the extent to which such movement may aggravate existing tensions within CARICOM. Countries experiencing strong push factors, such as high crime, low pay and few opportunities for advancement, are likely to be less attractive destinations for migrants and may well suffer a net loss of skilled people, especially where more attractive remuneration is offered. This is a consideration that cuts across skills but may have even greater impact given the visibility of health and education and the well-recognised challenges in delivering quality in both.

In Jamaica, the shortfall in nurses has been addressed through the active recruitment of nurses from outside Jamaica. This occurs at the levels of both government and private institutions. Cuba and India have gained in importance as source countries, although nurses have been recruited from some countries in Africa, particularly Nigeria. The recruitment of Cuban nurses is governed by intergovernmental agreements between the Jamaican and Cuban governments and is strictly regulated. Recruitment of nurses from other sources is driven by particular health institutions but is governed by the regulations of the Nursing Council of Jamaica (NCJ), which monitors applications and ultimately gives approval for their employment.

7.2.2 Managing the framework for migration at national, regional and international levels

Migration of professionals is regarded as a loss of resources invested in training, especially where the government bears a significant proportion of the cost. In Jamaica,

the government bears the brunt of the cost of education at all levels. Traditionally, primary education is free.²⁶ This has been extended in 2007 to the secondary sector.²⁷ The government invests heavily in the tertiary sector, underwriting to a large extent the budgets of the University of the West Indies (UWI) Mona campus and the University of Technology. Some 17 per cent of the education budget goes to the tertiary sector (PIOJ 2012: 22.2), although there have been significant cutbacks in 2007. The UWI Mona campus, for example, had to cope with a J\$1.5 billion (US\$17.2 million) cut in subventions in 2011. The government has also invested heavily in the training of nurses and teachers, although it has reduced the level of support to students in recent years by shifting some of the costs to them. Even so, the government allocates a significant proportion of its budget to education, some 38.5 per cent in 2011 (PIOJ 2012: 22.2). Hospitals such as the University Hospital of the West Indies (UHWI, the UWI's training hospital) also invest heavily in post-basic training of nurses, the migration of whom results in a loss in investment resources. The response to this has been to bond nurses benefitting from such support, requiring them to either serve their bond before migrating or repay the cost of their education. This has not proved to be an insurmountable obstacle, as recruiting agencies opt for paying off the bonds of nurses they recruit. Moreover, the cost of the bond may not reflect the true cost of training. Even if it did, a greater problem is the recruitment of nurses with more years of experience and with higher levels of specialisation, the loss of whom is not addressed by bonds.

The regional response to the challenge of nurse migration has been to introduce a policy of 'managed migration' initiated by a number of regional and national institutions,²⁸ with the establishment of a Regional Task Force for Managed Migration. CARICOM heads of government supported this initiative with the establishment of a Regional Commission on Health and Development (Greene 2005: 4). These efforts were supported by a Commonwealth seminar on 'Managed Migration of Nurses' in 2005, which sought to advance a 'Framework of Action for a Programme of Temporary Movement of Nurses' through arrangements allowing their temporary migration. This could be read as an attempt to extend to nurses the temporary employment concept under which farm and hotel workers programmes operate. Assessment of the regional managed migration initiative suggested that it was not particularly successful, as it was not integrally incorporated into regional mechanisms to allow it to function as a regional initiative (Salmon et al. 2007).

CARICOM, in its negotiation of the CARIFORUM–EC EPA, successfully negotiated greater access for a number of professionals, including nurses, to the EU market on a temporary basis. Whether or not this provision has any effect is questionable. This is because nurses are already in high demand and do not need such schemes to facilitate their access. Language considerations ensure that demand for their services is limited to the UK. This is unlikely to change, given language barriers, unless other EU member states specifically target these nurses with specially tailored language training. This is unlikely to occur under short-term labour programmes such as the EPA offers. Given the health challenges facing the CARICOM region, the rationale for securing increased access for Caribbean nurses is counterproductive. This makes sense only if it is an attempt to shift the current appetite for permanent migrants

towards temporary schemes in what could be interpreted as an enlightened managed migration scheme. Its more likely motivation is the tendency to view remittances positively, and the desire to expand the access of professionals to the EU market in an environment that is not conducive to permanent migration.

Such temporary migration schemes would presumably address the factors of higher salaries and enhanced experience while stemming the permanent outflow of nurses, thus preventing their complete loss to the source countries. This is unlikely to address nurses' desire for greater professional mobility and promotion, however, given the short-term nature of such programmes. It is also unlikely to address the need of host countries to fill increasing numbers of vacancies in their health systems and their longer-term strategic goals for the sector.

The government has also engaged, along with other regional governments, at the international level in helping to regulate the framework for skills recruitment, particularly in health and education. The focus has been on ensuring that such recruitment is done ethically and that migrants are treated fairly in the host country. Such efforts have resulted in changes in domestic regulations in host countries as well as framework agreements developed under the auspices of the Commonwealth and the World Health Organization (WHO). In health, these include the 'Commonwealth Code of Practice for the International Recruitment of Health Workers' (Commonwealth Health Ministers 2003) and the WHO 'Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel' adopted in May 2010. The Commonwealth code is restricted to a limited group of recruiting countries in the Commonwealth, notably the UK and Australia. It addresses 'transparency in recruitment practices; fairness in the treatment of nurses in destination countries; compensation to sending countries for loss of skills; and facilitating return migration' (Lewis 2011: 96). The WHO code is of wider applicability and is more extensive in scope. It is an umbrella code seeking to govern nurse recruitment at all levels: in the public and private spheres as well as at the bilateral, regional and international levels. It attempts to minimise the negative effects of such migration on the source countries by seeking to commit recruiting countries to initiatives that would help to offset some of the more egregious effects of such migration. Specifically, the code seeks to commit recruiting countries to provide 'technical' assistance to source countries to enhance their ability to retain their health personnel; to support training directed at the main health challenges facing such countries; to increase access to specialised training and facilitate technology and skills transfers; and to support return migration (Lewis 2011: 96).

Regional governments agitated for the Commonwealth to address the loss of teachers through recruitment. This campaign was expressed in 'The Savannah Accord' adopted at the 2002 meeting of Commonwealth ministers of education and in the 2004 'Commonwealth Teacher Recruitment Protocol'. These protocols are non-binding and are useful in so far as they establish codes for acceptable practice. On their own they are unlikely to ensure the transfer of resources from host to source countries, and they are even less likely to do so in the face of economic challenges brought about by the prolonged financial crisis.

7.2.3 Increasing training to meet external and local demand

The middle of the first decade of the 21st century was a period of intense media focus on the migration of nurses. One of the policy approaches that became popular in Jamaica then was increasing the levels of training of nurses and other health professionals to meet external demand. This was advocated by newspaper commentators (e.g. Hill 2003, 2004), in policy circles (PIOJ and UNDP 2005: 126–127), at the highest political levels by the Prime Minister, PJ Patterson (*Jamaica Observer* 2003) and, more recently, by IFIs (World Bank 2009). The main justification is the limited influence source countries have in addressing the demand for nurses that exists in host countries, which projections suggest is likely to worsen over time, and, consequently, the challenges they will continue to face in meeting their own health needs. Increasing the numbers of trainees to meet both domestic and international demand thus appeared the logical direction to take. Moreover, and as importantly, it would increase the inflow of remittances, which had begun to play a significant role in the economy.

The *Jamaica Human Development Report* (PIOJ and UNDP 2005: 126) sets out the justification for this approach:

In the absence of any legal power to prohibit migration of skilled workers, countries like Jamaica has [sic] begun thinking in terms of training sufficient workers in specific professions to adequately supply the local market, while making excess capacity available for managed export of these services. Under the Trade in Health and Education Project sponsored by the Commonwealth Secretariat, Jamaica is developing and implementing training for the external market.

It sought to further justify this by arguing that this approach will ‘widen access to tertiary level education to Jamaicans and over time, improve the overall quality of teachers trained locally’, and increase financial flows to the country ‘through payment of more realistic fees and through remittances’ (Ibid.: 127). It goes on to suggest that, ‘without sufficient replacement training, the continued migration of teachers ... will, over the long run, have a deleterious effect on the quality of instruction offered in Jamaican schools’ (Ibid.: 127). This assessment does not consider the problems in the availability of quality applicants for training, given the poor quality of output at the primary and secondary levels. Even more challenges can be expected in finding and keeping highly trained teacher educators, given their greater propensity to migrate.

The World Bank (2009) assessed the feasibility of this approach for the nursing sector. To reduce significant shortages in the sector while meeting the challenge of high levels of nurse migration, it proposed coupling increased training with implementing strategies to significantly reduce attrition from training programmes, which is high across the region. Although Jamaica has one of the highest completion rates for student nurses, this is still only just over 60 per cent (Ibid.: 31). In the report’s best-case scenario, of increasing nursing completion rates to 85 per cent and increasing student intake by 100 per cent, Jamaica would still have met only 75 per cent of its need for nurses by 2025 (Ibid.: 39). The report attributes low levels of student performance to

the quality of student intake, high student-to-tutor ratios and insufficiently qualified nurse tutors (Ibid.: 32). In Jamaica, only half of nurse tutors were said to possess the minimum qualification of a master's degree (Ibid.: 32). A significant expansion in training in the best-case scenario presented above would require significant increases in numbers and quality of nurse tutors. Quality could be addressed by increasing the training of tutors, and quantity by recruiting from abroad (Ibid.: 37, 38). This scenario is unlikely to be feasible given the high demand for nurse tutors internationally and Jamaica's experience of nurse tutors being in high demand by recruiters. It is unclear what the region's comparative advantage in attracting tutors would be.

The World Bank report also recognised that expanding training programmes would require financial outlay, suggesting that this could be addressed by moving more of the burden of the cost of training to the student and securing financial input from the countries that benefit most from nurse migration: the USA, the UK and Canada (Ibid.: 42). The feasibility of getting these governments to bear some of the costs of training nurses in the region is highly uncertain, especially given the reality that nurses recruited from the region do not necessarily go to public institutions in these countries, but often go to the private sector. Shortages in healthcare specialists have generated an offshore industry in the training of healthcare professionals, including nurses, which has not been taken account of in the study.

Beyond the feasibility of expanded training, this approach presents other challenges that are not considered, such as the potential for increasing social tensions. Despite attempts to encourage men to enter the profession, it remains dominated by women, particularly young women. The massive exodus of this group, according to projected demands in developed countries and migration trends in the region, is likely to aggravate existing challenges. These include their role as caregivers for children and the elderly. Even if nurses migrate with their families, this is unlikely to include members of the extended family such as grandparents. In the broader picture, this has the potential to further skew Jamaica's demographics towards an ageing population, with greater healthcare challenges. There is a further danger of distorted development if training needs are based not on an assessment of the country's development strategy and skills needs, but on shorter-term considerations of what the international market wants.

An alternative or complementary model for addressing demand for health professionals is the use of offshore medical schools. The region has been experiencing a dramatic increase in both the number of such schools and the range of programmes offered. Currently, there are over 30 such schools operating across the Caribbean region.²⁹ In addition to traditional medical degrees, there are now institutions offering training in dentistry and nursing. The primary target of these schools, in terms of both student intake and market, is external. The marketing strategy used to attract students is training for employment, primarily for the North American market (the USA and Canada), but there is also a general global pitch. These schools rely on clinical internships in the USA and the UK, to a lesser extent,³⁰ both to compensate for the absence of training hospitals and to increase their competitiveness. They also offer classes for US medical board exams, which students take to increase their portability.

In Jamaica, two such institutions established operations in 2009 to take advantage of the market for healthcare professionals. These are the All American Institute of Medical Sciences (AAIMS), an offshore medical school which established a campus in Black River, St Elizabeth, and Marmicmon Integrated Marketing and Communications, a Canadian-based firm, which specialises in addressing manpower needs, including for health professionals. AAIMS differentiates itself from other programmes by offering a flexible slate of offerings that includes a pre-med programme, targeting high school graduates, leading to an Associated Degree in Health Services and eligibility to enter the Doctor of Medicine (MD) programme; a dual degree that combines an MD programme with a Master of Science (MSc) in a specialist area in public health;³¹ and three degrees over 5.4 years, namely a Bachelor of Science (BSc) in basic health services, an MD and an MSc in public health.

Traditional nationally based training schools have also responded to the perceived 'global' market for health professionals. The regional UWI, which opened its medical programme at its Mona campus in Jamaica when it was established in 1948, has since expanded with medical faculties on both its campuses in Trinidad and Barbados. In addition, the Mona campus increased its intake of medical students in 2010/11. This was done by opening its doors to students who were willing to pay the full cost of training without government subsidy, which had previously limited the numbers of student intake. To support this, it has built a state-of-the-art training facility. UWI has also expanded its programme offering, with the establishment of dental schools at Mona and its St Augustine campus in Trinidad (2012).

Others, such as the University of Technology (UTECH) and the private Pre-University School, responded to the demand for health professionals in North America by both increasing training programmes and, in the case of UTECH, seeking collaboration with Marmicmon and AAIMS. Marmicmon partnered with UTECH and the Pre-University School, and a number of government training schools – Brown's Town Community College, Knox Community College and Nuttall Hospital (Marmicmon 2009) – to expand the training of nurses for the North American market. Training was based on a Canadian curriculum. The programme was specifically targeted at the Canadian market. The Licensed Practical Nursing programme offered the prospect of employment in Canada, guaranteed on the successful completion of background checks. To avoid exacerbating the outflow of trained nurses, there was a commitment not to recruit RNs and enrolled nurses. Marmicmon also entered into a partnership with UTECH's College of Health Sciences, which launched a School of Dental Services in the 2009/2010 academic year, offering BSc programmes in dental hygiene and dental therapy and a Certified Dental Assistant programme based on a Canadian curriculum (UTECH/Marmicmon 2010). UTECH benefitted from the government's divestment of its nursing and dental training programmes. Clinical training was offered at the refurbished Oral Health Centre, formerly the government-owned Dental Auxiliary School. Graduates were to be eligible to pursue further clinical training in Canada and apply for Canadian and American board exams, qualifying them to practise in both countries. Marmicmon was to provide employment overseas for interested students (Ibid.). The partnership between these various institutions and Marmicmon was short-lived, however, with the company pulling out of Jamaica

in 2011. Challenges arose over the availability of clinical training space in local health facilities for students in the programme as well as conflicts with local legislation governing the training curriculum of nurses. Specifically, the Nursing Council of Jamaica, which approves the training curriculum, had not approved the Canadian curriculum used by these programmes. The partnership with UTECH's School of Dentistry was also ended.

UTECH also partnered with the All American Institute of Medical Sciences (AAIMS), which was established in Jamaica in 2009, to offer a dual degree programme (MD/MSc). This partnership, too, was short-lived. Nevertheless, UTECH has established Joint Colleges of Medicine, Oral Health and Veterinary Sciences, although only the oral health programme was on stream at the time of writing (Kadion Dunkley-Johnson, Admission Office of Dean, College of Health Sciences, personal communication, 2013).

The government actively encouraged offshore schools by wooing them and offering them accreditation.³² Pearnel Charles, former Minister of Labour and Social Security, viewed this deliberate targeting of markets for employment as a way of providing employment that the government could not provide (Marmicmon 2009). Reginald Budhan, permanent secretary in the Ministry of Industry, Investment and Commerce, observed that the expansion of medical training facilities in Jamaica were to 'position Jamaica as a premier medical centre in the Caribbean, to take advantage of export medical services, including medical tourism' (*Jamaica Observer* 2012). The government's interest in pursuing medical tourism was also evident in the exhortation by Omar Davies, the Minister of Industry, Investment and Commerce, in his address at the opening ceremony of 'Research Days' of the Mona campus of the UWI, to the UWI to pursue research in medical tourism as one of its priorities.

Other initiatives to stem migration of nurses include retention strategies, usually initiated at the institutional level. These include the recognition of individual nurses' contributions. Under Vision 2030, the government is committed to implement strategies to increase retention of 'qualified, competent personnel and balance the training of the new personnel with the present and future needs of the health care system' (PIOJ 2009: 53). Vision 2030 also speaks about implementing a human resources strategy based on an assessment of competencies/skills required for the health sector in order to ensure a 'sustainable supply to the sector' (Ibid.: 53) and establishing a system to manage the impact of migration on critical healthcare personnel (Ibid.: 53). The government is committed to strengthening performance-based management, which would also act as a retention strategy (Ibid.: 53). The above suggests a more thoughtful approach to the problem of shortages that seeks to put the country's healthcare needs before the needs of the global market. It remains to be seen how this is manifested in concrete initiatives.

7.2.4 Negotiating short-term labour contracts for less skilled workers for the temporary relief of labour pressures

As set out in Vision 2030 in respect of labour policy, the government's intention is 'to develop an efficient labour market ... [to address] the factors that reduce the efficiency with which the supply and demand for labour are matched'

(PIOJ 2009: 151). Specific measures proposed for achieving this are to ‘institute more circular and temporary planned migration programmes’ and ‘develop and promote flexible labour market arrangements, policies and regulations’ (Ibid.: 152).

Although not focused on the diaspora, such strategies could be tailored to address the diaspora as a means of enhancing its engagement in the Jamaica labour market. The policy is also geared at addressing some of the weaknesses in the education system. These can be summarised as a mismatch between skills needs and training (Ibid.: 75); the need to increase the standard of education at the primary and secondary levels, and of training, to enhance the skills of the labour force; and emphasis at the tertiary level on creating entrepreneurs (Ibid.: 73).

Temporary migration schemes

Jamaica participates in three managed temporary migration schemes³³ that provide short-term employment opportunities for low-skilled workers.³⁴ These are the Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme (CSAWP), the US Farm Work Programme and the US Hotel Work Programme.³⁵ The Canadian and US Farm Work programmes provide employment primarily for men in the primary agricultural sector, whereas the US Hotel Work Programme is accessed mainly by women. The CSAWP provides temporary employment for 20,000 workers from Mexico and the Commonwealth Caribbean each year.³⁶ In 2010, 5,952 Jamaicans were employed under the Canadian Farms/Factories scheme (Ministry of Labour and Social Security 2014), which is administered jointly by the Jamaican and Canadian governments.³⁷ The scheme is tightly controlled (as shown in the contract that workers are expected to sign, GoC 2012). The government chooses eligible workers, who are assigned to a particular employer, for a specific time frame – a maximum duration of eight months – and are obliged to return home at the end of the contract period. They do not have the option of changing employers, although the employer could, with the migrants’ permission, subcontract them to other employers. The workers’ entitlements are clearly set out. In the case of farm work, these include a minimum work week of 40 hours, a 30-minute meal break after 5 hours of work, two 10-minute rest breaks, one mid-morning, the other mid-afternoon, and a day of rest after six consecutive days of work, which may be postponed if farm work cannot be delayed (GoC 2012).

An agent of the Jamaican government collects 25 per cent of the worker’s pay: 19 per cent as mandatory savings, returned to workers in Jamaican dollars; 5 per cent to defray costs of administering the programme; and 1 per cent to provide coverage for off-the-job healthcare (Headley 2012). Other deductions are made by employers to cover cost of travel, meals, where provided, and utilities. The employer is obliged to provide accommodation and insurance to cover injuries or diseases contracted on the job. The worker is responsible for securing additional coverage in keeping with guidelines of the specific province in which he or she is based.

The US programme shares similar features. Workers are employed in the primary agricultural and hotel sectors on H-2A and H-2B visas that restrict their employment to a specific employer, limit their time of stay in keeping with the contract period stipulated and provide for the possibility for return. Unlike the Canadian programme,

however, the Jamaican government is not directly involved in its management. This is done by a Liaison Services Office, based in Washington, DC, that is sanctioned by regional governments. It withholds 20 per cent and 16 per cent of wages of H-2B and H-2A workers, respectively, which it returns after they have arrived in Jamaica (Headley 2012). The office oversees the programme, monitors conditions of work and provides a range of social services to augment the limited access these workers have to social security benefits (*Jamaica Observer* 2011). These include 'medical insurance, NIS deductions, workers' compensation in case of injury, ensuring that employers do not mistreat workers, inspection and approval of worker housing, resolving work or domestic problems, maintaining workers' records, ensuring workers save some of their earnings and looking after their families back home in emergency situations'. For this, both categories of workers are charged an administrative fee amounting to 4 per cent of their earnings (*Jamaica Observer* 2011).

There are mixed reviews in the literature of these temporary labour schemes. The positive outlook views these as benefitting the host and source countries as well as the worker (see Wickramasekara 2011: 2 for a summary). They satisfy a demand for agricultural labour in the host country, ease unemployment pressures in the source country and provide the worker with a higher income than he or she would otherwise earn. Because temporary migrants are denied the option to change their status to permanent migrants, such programmes are viewed as avoiding the perceived challenges arising from their integration into the host country (Wickramasekara 2011: 2, 3, 37). Temporary migration programmes have also been heavily criticised for restricting workers' rights, including the right of free association; preventing family unification; removing the possibility of permanent migration; and exposing workers to low levels of pay and poor working conditions (Wickramasekara 2011). The restriction of workers to a specific employer and the denial of their right to choose their employer, which, coupled with the prospect of return, encourages workers to be silent about abuse, have led to charges that such programmes were akin to 'slavery' (Charles Ranglin, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, quoted by Wickramasekara 2011: 44) and 'forced labour' (Mary Bauer and *New York Times*, quoted by *Ibid.*). The US government attempted to stem some of the abuses arising from such programmes with the passage of a law in 2008 prohibiting employers from making deductions from workers' earnings. This presented a severe challenge to the survival of the Liaison Services Office, unable to collect fees from workers since August 2010, jeopardising its viability and leaving Caribbean workers under the US programmes with lower levels of protection (*Jamaica Observer* 2011).

Despite the shortcomings of these schemes, governments have come to regard these programmes as important in helping to create employment opportunities not readily available at home. In the 2010/11 financial year, nearly 11,000 Jamaicans, mostly men, were employed under these programmes (see Table 7.5). Since 2007, Canada has been the main source of employment, primarily under its farm/factories programme, accounting in 2010 for 56.2 per cent of employment under the Jamaican Ministry of Labour and Social Security's overseas employment scheme (computed from Table 7.5). This represented a shift from the USA, which in 2005 and 2006 provided more employment under these schemes (over 56%). The falloff in US employment since

Table 7.5 Employment of Jamaicans under the government's overseas employment programme 2003–2010

Category	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total participants	13,956	13,569	13,320	14,646	13,911	11,959	10,011	10,966
Male overseas workers	11,177	10,885	10,862	11,502	11,600	10,795	9,650	10,081
Female overseas workers	2,771	2,684	2,458	3,144	2,311	1,164	361	885
Total US farm work programme	3,865	3,644	3,429	3,458	3,730	4,128	3,743	3,877
Male US farm workers	3,865	3,643	3,429	3,458	3,730	4,128	3,743	3,877
Female US farm workers	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total US hotel work programme	4,449	4,254	4,078	5,192	4,110	1,735	359	922
Male US hotel workers	1,714	1,741	1,659	2,091	1,850	729	156	336
Female US hotel workers	2,735	2,513	2,419	3,101	2,260	1,006	203	586
Total Canadian farm/factory programme	5,642	5,671	5,813	5,996	6,071	6,072	5,866	5,952
Male Canadian farm/factory workers	5,606	5,501	5,774	5,953	6,020	5,927	5,708	5,770
Female Canadian farm/factory workers	36	170	39	43	51	145	158	182
Total Canadian skill/hotel workers							157	215
Male Canadian skill/hotel workers							43	98
Female Canadian skill/hotel workers							114	117

Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Security (2014)

2007 can be accounted for by a severe contraction in the hotel programme, which, up to that time, had been a more significant source of employment in the USA than the farm worker programme. In 2007, 4,110 workers were employed under the US hotel programme. In the following year, this had fallen to 1,735, and it decreased to a mere 359 in 2009. There was a significant increase to 922 in 2010, although that still lagged far behind the 2007 figure. This has had a significant impact on women,

who were the main source of labour under the hotel programme. Their participation in the programme over the 2005–2010 period ranged from a low of 54.9 per cent in 2007 to 63.5 per cent in 2010. Despite maintaining their proportional participation in relation to men in periods of reduced employment, in absolute numbers and given their absence from the male farm worker programme, they suffered most from this severe curtailment of opportunity. The reduction in the hotel programme, which did not appear to significantly affect the farm worker programme, can be accounted for by the global financial crisis (RJR News 2011) as well as restrictions imposed by the US government on visa approvals under the hotel scheme.

Contribution of overseas employment programmes to remittances

These programmes are also an important source of remittances. In the 2010/11 fiscal year, workers under the programme earned over US\$20 million (see Table 7.1). The available data, which go back to the 2003/04 fiscal year, suggest that the global financial crisis had a negative impact on the programme. The data indicate a steady increase in remittances earned since 2003/04, reaching a high point in 2007/08 (from close to US\$19 million to over US\$25 million), after which it declined in 2009/10 to below 2003/04 levels, before picking up in 2010/11 to reach 2004/05 levels (see Tables 7.1 and 7.6). Not unexpectedly, men were the highest earners, reflecting their larger representation in these programmes (see Tables 7.1 and 7.6). Since the recession, Canada has surpassed the USA as the largest source of remittances from temporary

Table 7.6 Remittances earned under overseas employment programmes 2003/04–2005/06 (US\$)

Category	2005/06	2004/05	2003/04
Total overseas workers	21,367,458.00	17,604,796.00	19,080,758.00
Male overseas workers	17,413,373.00	13,059,641.00	14,775,581.00
Female overseas workers	3,954,085.00	4,545,155.00	4,313,177.00
Total US farm and hotel workers	21,332,355.00	11,922,208.00	11,474,853.00
Male US farm and hotel workers	17,413,373.00	7,377,053.00	7,339,875.00
Female US farm and hotel workers	3,918,982.00	4,545,155.00	4,134,978.00
US farm workers (male)	4,085,507.00	3,632,317.00	3,632,317.00
Total US hotel work programme	7,507,348.00	8,292,891.00	7,842,536.00
Male US hotel workers	3,588,366.00	3,744,736.00	3,707,558.00
Female US hotel workers	3,918,982.00	4,548,155.00	4,134,978.00
Total Canadian farm/factory programme	9,774,603.00	8,952,588.00	7,613,905.00
Male Canadian farm/factory workers	9,739,500.00	8,952,588.00	7,435,706.00
Female Canadian farm/factor workers	35,103.00	–	178,199.00

Source: Data provided directly to the author from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security

migrant workers. This is accounted for by the significant shrinkage in the Hotel Work Programme, where earnings fell from US\$4,739,457 in 2006/07 to US\$662,443 in 2009/10 (see Table 7.1), reflecting the loss of jobs in that sector.

7.2.5 Engaging the diaspora as a source of skills, investment and support

Since the mid-1990s the Jamaican government has sought to take advantage of its diaspora. The potential of Jamaica's extensive diaspora, which Jamaica's ambassador to the USA, Audrey Marks, suggests amounted to 3.2 million individuals in the USA alone (*Jamaica Gleaner* 2011a),³⁸ is recognised as having broader economic potential beyond monies remitted. This more expansive role for the diaspora is specified in Jamaica's National Development Plan, Vision 2030, which views it like this:

[as] a source of investment and entrepreneurship for business ventures; by providing lobbying support for Jamaica in international fora; as a source of academic and technical expertise; as a market for tourism and our exports of goods and services; and as a network for advancement of Jamaicans in international business and other endeavors. (PIOJ 2009: 142)

Trotz and Mullings (2012) note that, as the traditional sources of financing become unreliable, the diaspora is being viewed as a new, valuable, less risk-averse source of FDI, because of its members' emotional connections with home.

The Patterson administration set the legal and administrative framework for actively engaging the diaspora with the establishment of the Returning Residents Facilitation Unit (RRFU) in 1993, subsequently upgraded in 1998 to the Jamaican Overseas Department (JOD). The RRFU emerged from a ministry paper tabled in Parliament (Franklyn 2010: 7) by PJ Patterson as Prime Minister. The RRFU was an attempt to encourage return migration by facilitating re-entry. A number of incentives to return were offered, including tax breaks on customs duties. This reflected the more positive spin in the literature on migration, which placed importance on return migration as a source of skills which the home country could exploit (Ammassari and Black 2001, Patterson 2007). A subsequent motion by Senator Trevor Munroe for debate on the relationship between Jamaicans at home and abroad was unanimously adopted by the Senate, along with calls for a conference of 'overseas residents and Jamaicans' and the appointment of a 'dedicated minister or ministry to address problems facing the diaspora and return migrants' (Franklyn 2010: 8). This represented a broadening of the engagement to Jamaicans who chose to remain abroad, in recognition of the reality of low levels of return.

The statistics show that, of all the Jamaicans who returned to Jamaica between 2006 and 2011, three quarters had been deported. Voluntary returnees averaged around one thousand persons a year for the period 2006–2011, while persons who were forcibly returned averaged three thousand over the period (PIOJ 2012: 20.15). Although the largest number of the deportations were for migration infringements (40.9%), followed by possession of drugs (31.8%), 'deportees', as they are commonly called, are perceived as presenting a security challenge (Headley 2005, 2008; PIOJ 2012: 20:10). Whether or

not this concern is credible, the state is faced with a clear challenge of re-integrating these people into society. Thus, in assessing the benefits of return migration, one must consider the age of returnees, the skills they possess and the level of resources to which they have access as well as the reasons for return.³⁹

This initiative to formally engage the diaspora was strengthened in 2002 when the Patterson administration, which had been returned to power in elections, established a government ministry with responsibility for the diaspora and appointed Delano Franklyn as Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade with specific responsibility for diaspora affairs (Franklyn 2010: 29). This elevation of the diaspora to the highest levels of political life has given rise to a series of annual conferences since 2004 with representatives of the diaspora and a range of institutions and initiatives.⁴⁰ Most of the initiatives eventually adopted to formalise engagement with the diaspora have been proposed at these conferences. They include the establishment of a Diaspora Advisory Board, a Jamaica Diaspora Foundation, trade councils in a number of US cities and states, lobby groups to advance Jamaica's interests, a dedicated day to celebrate the Jamaican diaspora and the decision to hold biennial diaspora conferences in Jamaica (Franklyn 2010). Jamaica Diaspora Day was first celebrated on 16 June 2005 (Franklyn 2010: 32). From then to the time of writing, three biennial conferences have been held: in 2006, when representation was expanded to include persons from Africa, Central America and the Caribbean (Franklyn 2010), in 2008 and in 2011.⁴¹

Other initiatives include the establishment of a National Working Group on Migration and Development at the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) and the Jamaican Diaspora Institute at the Mona School of Business, located at the UWI. The Institute is expected to conduct research on the diaspora and to identify concrete initiatives to engage its members. It has launched a database of skilled persons in the diaspora, which was supported by funding from a joint UN and EU project. There is also the possibility of the Jamaican government launching a diaspora bond in an attempt to channel investment from the diaspora.

This turn to the diaspora as a source of investment and as a resource pool has not been without problems, however. The problem is manifested at the level of attempts to organise the diaspora. On the one hand, this allows a more structured engagement between the diaspora and the home country, or more notably the state; but it holds the danger of marginalising some voices while privileging others. Trotz and Mullings (2012) note the dangers of this trend, as it is based on the identification of an 'ideal diasporic citizen' and the narrowing of the diaspora to the skilled. Thus, in the search for economic resources the ideal diasporic citizen is identified primarily by his or her ability to add value to the home country's economy. Dr Kenneth Baugh, Jamaica's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade and Deputy Prime Minister, made this explicit in his address to the 2011 diaspora conference, where he suggested that the value of the diaspora:

goes well beyond remittances. It also goes beyond the wealth of contributions in response to natural disasters; it includes the potential for investment and entrepreneurship for business ventures, a valuable source of academic and technical expertise, a strong basis for building tourism and trade and an

influential network of activities in the main centre of decision-making in the capitals of their host countries. (*Jamaica Gleaner* 2011b)

This narrow focus on a moneyed and influential diaspora has the effect of marginalising other issues or concerns that exist. It also serves to shift the relational dynamic between the home country and its diaspora, from the home country's role in intervening to protect the interests and rights of its diaspora to a focus on what the diaspora can do for the home country. This has the effect of excluding the majority of the diaspora, who are to be found in more economically modest pursuits and whose contribution is at the level of remittances which are perceived as not adding much value to economic development. This quotation from Marks illustrates the government's conception of the desirable diaspora:

This group accounts for nearly 70 per cent of Jamaica's graduates over the last 30 years. They include a range of successful professionals and academics, who are distinguishing themselves in the American society, as well as a most dynamic segment of Jamaica's entrepreneurial class and a significant cohort of skilled artisans. (*Jamaica Gleaner* 2011a)

Marks ignores the majority of migrants, who are not part of this group. The PIOJ (2012: 20.8) notes that only 2.8 per cent of emigrants to the USA were characterised as 'Employment based preferences'. Beverley Mullings (2009: 11) characterised the segment of the diaspora that the government engages through its diaspora conferences as 'a small constituent group, of largely middle-class, professional migrants, whose experiences significantly differ from the many working-class Jamaicans engaged in low income service work'.⁴²

Such tensions have already emerged in the government of Jamaica's engagement with its diaspora. These have centred around the methods of selecting representatives to the Diaspora Advisory Board, the selection of delegates for the biennial diaspora conferences, and fears of politicising the relationship. The particular concern here is the representativeness of this group of the broader diverse diaspora (B Mullings 2009,⁴³ D Mullings 2011). The fact that delegates are expected to finance their own attendance at the conference places a further constraint on representativeness.⁴⁴ The elevation of the diaspora to new sources of FDI to be courted also has the potential for placing the diaspora in a controversial relationship with elements of the local population, especially if it appears to be devaluing the contributions of those who have stayed. There are already reports of frustration by some persons in the diaspora who reported experiencing 'resentment from some locals, who believe they are coming to Jamaica to steal their jobs' (Reid 2008). Fears that the relationship with the diaspora may be politicised arise from concerns that the government selects the issues for focus at the conference, silencing other concerns in the process (D Mullings 2011).

7.2.6 Influence of external actors in policy-making in respect of migration and remittances

The focus on remittances and migration in policy-making in developing countries in general, and Jamaica in particular, has been encouraged both through the

research focus of IFIs and other international organisations and through the financial support from donor agencies and governments. Central to accounting for remittances in national accounts is the availability of reliable data. This in turn relies on appropriate mechanisms for capturing these flows, which, in turn, must be based on clear guidelines for identifying remittances. The IMF and World Bank, in response to a call from the G8 Heads of State at their 2004 meeting for more quality data on remittances, given their increasing importance to developing countries, were instrumental in the formation of the Luxembourg Group on Remittances, comprising the IMF, the OECD, the Statistical Office of the European Commission and the World Bank, which produced the volume *International Transactions in Remittances Guide for Compilers and Users* (RGC) in 2009 (Eurostat et al. 2009: vi, vii). The publication gave improved definitions of remittances and an improved conceptual framework for them, which had been developed in the sixth edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (IMF 2009: 2). The improved treatment of remittances in national accounts has made their contribution more obvious, encouraging a focus on policy which seeks to reduce the costs of sending remittances, increase the use of official channels and harness their use more effectively in development. The World Bank's annual reports on migration and remittance statistics have also helped keep both at the forefront of policy. The research focus on remittances and migration has also been advanced by institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), respectively, along with the World Bank (2009), which have commissioned studies on these topics. The IOM is an important source of statistics on migration. It has also collaborated in authoring the text *Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning: A Handbook for Policy Makers and Practitioners* (Global Migration Group 2010).

International organisations have also been at the forefront of attempts to link migration positively to development. The UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development 2006, and the Global Forum on Migration and Development that followed, sought to emphasise the positive role that migrants play in destination countries. Linking migration to development serves to focus on minimising the perceived negative consequences to the sending country while maximising potential gains, particularly from engagement with the diaspora. The European Community's collaboration with the UN and other agencies (IOM, ILO, UNHCR and UNFPA), under the JMEDI, is an instance of this. The JMEDI, which was established in 2008, supported 51 projects (between December 2008 and March 2011) a number of which were conducted in Jamaica.⁴⁵ The Jamaican projects focused on challenges arising from migration, such as the human rights of deportees and their families and effects on the elderly and children as well as perceived potential benefits from the diaspora, with support for the launch of a web portal to promote a more structured engagement with its members. The focus of these projects was on the UK diaspora.

Organisations and donors have had a more direct influence in shaping the policy agenda of developing countries. In Jamaica, the World Bank has been providing assistance to the government in the establishment of a diaspora bond as an avenue for channelling funds from the diaspora into concrete development initiatives.

The IOM, which has had an office in Jamaica since 2003, is currently funding the development of a National Policy and Plan of Action on International Migration and Development while the Swiss Development Corporation is financing initiatives to mainstream migration into national development strategies. The EU is also funding the development of a migration profile. Earlier initiatives supported by the IOM include the UK's Assisted Voluntary Return programme (AVR).⁴⁶

Private sector engagement

The private sector's engagement includes the services provided by remittance companies. The Jamaica National Building Society (JNBS), in an effort to capture savings from the diaspora, established a vacation account which gives savers access to all its branches as well as special discounts at major tourist destinations, hotels and car hire companies, inter alia (Jamaica Information Service 2009). The JNBS has engaged directly with the diaspora through its foundation, which, under the Jamaica Partnership for Education (JPE), focuses on initiatives in education at the primary and secondary levels. It provides for the contributions of small payments by members of the diaspora to the JPE, which are dispersed to schools on an annual basis, based on proposals submitted (Jamaica Information Service 2009). The JPE, which was launched in May 2009, includes partnerships with USAID and, more recently, NEM Insurance Co. Ltd, which became a foundation partner in December 2010 (Jamaica National Building Society 2012). Telecommunications companies such as Flow and Landline, Internet, Mobile, Entertainment (LIME, a Cable & Wireless company) have sought to cash in on remittance flows by directly targeting the diaspora, through adverts, exhorting them to send phone credit for family members living in Jamaica.

The non-governmental sector is also engaged in initiatives to connect with the diaspora and in addressing some of the social effects of migration, including deportation. All of the JMDI-funded projects described above involved partnerships between UK-based and Jamaican non-state organisations. The project 'Supporting Jamaican Deported Migrants and their Families'⁴⁷ involved a partnership with a UK-based group, the FPWP Hibiscus, which highlights the challenges facing foreign women in the UK prison system, and the UWI's Institute for Sustainable Development. The project focused on the rights of deportees and their families, specifically the re-integration of deportees into society and the children of imprisoned deportees. The National Organisation of Deported Migrants (NODM) was created under this programme. The UK-funded HelpAge International, which focuses on challenges confronting the elderly, partnered with the Hope for Children Development Company Ltd. Their project, 'Mitigating the Negative Impact of Migration on the Multi-generational Household in Jamaica'⁴⁸, focused on the young and the elderly, arguably the groups most vulnerable to the negative effects of migration. Counselling, health screening and training in parenting and management of remittances were conducted in three inner-city communities under this project. The project 'Knowledge Network for Connecting Jamaica and its Diaspora'⁴⁹ also involved a partnership with the UK-based Kajans. Women's Enterprise Ltd and the UWI's Mona School of Business.

7.2.7 Policies and institutions in place to address migration

Policy approaches that have implications for migration include population policy and labour market policy, already discussed. The treatment of migration in policy has evolved. This evolution in thinking is evident in the government's population policy, which has undergone a number of shifts in recognition of changing demographic features. Policy before the 1980s was focused on controlling population growth by reducing fertility. It was subsequently broadened to take account of mortality, international and internal migration, and urbanisation (PIOJ 2009). After 1996 the policy was further revised to take account of the implications of the demographic shift on children and the elderly and to include gender and the environment as areas of concern (PIOJ 2009: 37). International migration is now one of the main areas of focus of Vision 2030's Population Sector Plan, which is directed at measuring and monitoring migration to meet development needs. This has resulted in institutional strengthening with the establishment of a Migration Policy Project Unit (MPU) at the Planning Institute of Jamaica. The unit has responsibility for developing a national policy and plan of action on international migration and development; the mainstreaming of migration into national development strategies; development of a migration profile; and the establishment of a national working group on international migration and development. This last is an inter-agency body responsible for overseeing the development of the national policy and plan of action on international migration and development.

The remit of migration has broadened to take account of an emerging challenge, that of human trafficking. The US Department of State's *Trafficking in Persons Report 2012*⁵⁰ lists Jamaica as 'a source, transit, and destination country for adults and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor' (2012: 197). The sex trafficking of children was of particular concern. The destinations of such persons are local as well as external, with persons trafficked to other Caribbean countries, Canada, the USA and the UK. The government of Jamaica has extended the legislation addressing immigration to include the Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Suppression and Punishment) Act (2007) as a response. It also established a National Task Force against Trafficking in Persons in 1995. The State Department's report acknowledges that the government was making some effort to address the problem but determines that its efforts were not in compliance with the minimum standard for the elimination of trafficking (US Department of State 2012). It has thus placed Jamaica on its Tier 2 watch list.⁵¹

7.3 Assessing the efficacy of policy and institutional practices

In assessing the effectiveness of some of the approaches taken by government, we focus on efforts to expand training in a deliberate effort to increase numbers of skilled people available for export, and on attempts to expand options for migration, including short-term labour employment schemes.

7.3.1 Training for export

‘Training for export’ is the popular expression used in Jamaica to describe the deliberate targeting of professions in demand to increase the numbers of people trained with an eye to the export market. Despite elevating this to policy, the government has not started spearheading such efforts. Rather, they have been driven by the private sector, specifically the foreign private sector, although the government, through the Jamaica Promotions Corporation (JAMPRO), has sought to attract training institutions. The (foreign) private sector impulse behind the initiative is evident in the upsurge in medical training schools all over the Caribbean seeking to capitalise on the shortage in medical personnel, primarily in North America. This is happening largely independent of government action and more as a result of these institutions’ recognition of market opportunities; nor is the focus on training students from Jamaica or the region. Rather, the target group is students anywhere who want medical degrees and find it difficult to obtain them at home. US students are a prime target group, given the over-supply of prospective students which onshore training institutions are unable to meet. The Caribbean has the appeal of sun, sea and sand – an extension of the tourism sector. Parallel to this development are initiatives by government-supported tertiary institutions to expand training opportunities, largely directed at students from Jamaica and the region.

Challenges are already evident in this drive to expand medical training, which requires access to hospitals for clinical training. In Jamaica, expansion in the training of nurses, doctors and other medical personnel is already exerting pressure on local facilities. The NCJ is already rationing the intake of nursing students among existing training institutions. Offshore medical schools rely on access to North America and the UK but they are also experiencing difficulties in accessing clinical training, given the growing competition for spaces for clinical training in US hospitals. Puerto Rico, Texas and Pennsylvania reportedly prohibit students at such schools from accessing clinical training in their hospitals (Missouri State University n.d.), and other states have been coming under pressure from some universities and related institutions to restrict these students’ access to clinical training (see, for instance, Dalton 2008, McKenzie 2011, Rymer 2012). The World Bank (2009) study focuses on expanding training institutions with the assumption that clinical training facilities are available to accommodate the increased numbers of students in their projections. It may well be underestimating the current capacity in Jamaica as well as demand for clinical space from other institutions that may be established. In other words, in its projections for increasing the training of nurses, it ignores the training of doctors, as well as other institutions that may be established to train both doctors and nurses and other medical professionals who would need clinical training at the country’s hospitals. Accommodating this would require massive injections of funds to expand and upgrade local hospitals. It is not clear how this would be financed. Thus the availability of well-equipped hospitals to accommodate massive increases in training of nurses and other health professionals does not appear to be addressed by government policy.

7.3.2 Courting the diaspora

The courting of the diaspora is occurring in an environment of reduced investment, low labour productivity, weak competitiveness and general sluggish economic performance. An engaged diaspora offers the promise of unproblematic inflows of much-needed capital. Embedded in this is the assumption that the diaspora would find doing business in Jamaica more attractive than investing in their country of residence. However, this cannot be assumed. Challenges to doing business in Jamaica include perceived high levels of corruption, high levels of bureaucracy and an environment with high levels of insecurity. These are likely to be an important consideration for potential investors from the diaspora. Policy cannot ignore the broader social, economic and political environment that exists, which has an important bearing on the decision to migrate in the first place. The conditions that would encourage lower levels of migration are also those that would encourage people, not only those from the diaspora, to invest in Jamaica. These issues must be addressed by policy-makers. The government also has to be mindful, in engaging with the diaspora, that it manages the potential for conflict, both among different segments of the diaspora and between the diaspora and home.

The government should seek to have a more holistic engagement with the diaspora that does not appear to be based on mercenary considerations. There have been calls for a more political engagement with the diaspora that would allow them some say in the governing of the country, even extending full voting rights to them (Meeks 2007: ch. 3). It is important to note, however, that this could generate tension between the diaspora and the home community, as the diaspora could potentially influence what happens at home without having to experience the consequences. This is particularly important in the highly charged, partisan environment that characterises Jamaican politics.⁵² One approach to minimising tension within the diaspora would be to establish different avenues for engagement for different sections of the diaspora. Another would be to widen the focus of engagement with the diaspora to take a concrete interest in social, economic and political issues that affect them. In an attempt to engage the diaspora, policy-makers need to acknowledge that the relationship with the diaspora is not without problems, given that many Jamaicans migrate because of disappointment with conditions at home.

7.3.3 Diaspora bonds

Jamaica has not introduced diaspora bonds at the time of writing but this is being actively considered by the government, with support from the World Bank (RJR News 2012), which has administered a survey to establish interest in the diaspora for such a bond (Jamaica Information Service 2012). It projected raising US\$1 billion from such bonds, which would yield a return of 10 per cent to bond holders (Ibid.). The government had hoped to launch its diaspora bond in August 2012 to coincide with its celebration of the 50th anniversary of Jamaica's independence. Diaspora bonds are actively promoted by the World Bank, as evidenced by the blog of Dilip Ratha (2010), Lead Economist at the World Bank, and his lecture 'Diaspora bonds: partnering with the diaspora for investments and economic growth', delivered at the UWI's Mona

School of Business (Ratha 2012). Ratha, in his blog, points to the experience of Israel and India, especially in periods of liquidity crisis, in raising money through such bonds. The advantages of such bonds as a means of raising funds, he argues, are that they draw on a more diverse income base, as they can include small sums for saving, thus tapping into a wider range of persons; and they take advantage of the diaspora's loyalty and interest in local conditions, so there is an emotional attachment there. Their attractiveness to the diaspora is that they would offer higher rates of interests than can be obtained in saving instruments in their country of residence (Ratha 2010).⁵³ Despite the examples of success Ratha presents, there are also experiences that suggest caution. The low take-up of bond issues in Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria, influenced by concerns over devaluation and government accountability, holds lessons for Jamaica (Fatunta 2012, Kottasova 2011).

There is the danger that diaspora bonds as an instrument for engaging the diaspora could exacerbate some of the challenges in engaging with the diaspora already described. Diane Abbott, a British Member of Parliament, sounded this warning in her column in the *Jamaica Observer*:

DIASPORA Bonds are a bad idea that refuses to die. They reflect the idea that members of the diaspora are just so many walking dollar bills. For too many Jamaicans the diaspora is a financial resource to be harvested. Instead of mutual respect, the relationship between Jamaica and its diaspora can seem almost predatory.

(Abbott 2012)

The transfer of personal loyalties that remittances reflect may not be so easily transferred to the state, especially where there are issues of trust. Abbott's quote below sums up this concern:

But sending money home to people you have an emotional connection to and for entirely transparent purposes (eg [sic] new shoes) is very different from giving to faceless bond salesmen. The diaspora knows exactly where their remittances go. And even in the worst-case scenario (eg money sent for new shoes spent in the rum bar) they know it is being spent in a community they care about. Remittances offer the diaspora transparency and accountability. Diaspora bonds offer neither.

(Abbott 2012)

7.3.4 Short-term labour contracts

Arguably, the government views short-term labour opportunities overseas as important to expanding employment opportunities. There are limits to such programmes, however; the most important is the government's lack of control over access under such programmes. These programmes are subject to conditions in host countries, such as recession and changes in immigration policies, that could significantly reduce access. In addition, home governments have limited influence over the conditions of treatment of their nationals on such programmes, so may well

be exposing their workers to lower standards of treatment than are acceptable at home.⁵⁴

7.4 Policy proposals on migration

Migration has been a central feature of Jamaican life with deep historical roots. Its magnitude in a relatively small country like Jamaica suggests that it should have an important place in development policy. Migration already features in government policy but to a limited extent. As already discussed, this occurs at the traditional level of border controls on who enters the country, and it has been an effective tool in addressing some of the shortfall in nurses by allowing the recruitment of foreign nurses to work in Jamaica. It has also been used to provide short-term employment opportunities primarily in the USA and Canada under overseas employment programmes, although such opportunities are more dependent on labour market policies in the receiving countries than on the policy choices of the Jamaican government. More recent attempts to harness the perceived benefits of remittances have encouraged governments to view the deliberate promotion of the export of skilled people as a policy option. Again, this 'option' depends on the labour and migration policies of the receiving countries; Jamaica's role is limited to providing education and training to those who wish to acquire the skills demanded by these countries. Migration policy has also broadened with the recognition that the diaspora is a potentially important source of investment and social capital which the Jamaican state could harvest.

Any attempt to embed migration as a development tool in policy must begin with the observation that migration is first and foremost a personal choice based on an individual's or family's assessment of possibilities, and that it is influenced as much by conditions at home as by the labour and migration policies of host countries. Conditions at home that propel migration are usually negative. These include limited opportunities for mobility and/or job security; limited opportunities for enhancing skills, especially through training; low economic remuneration; broader macro-economic conditions; and political and social considerations, including crime. The impetus to unite with family already abroad and the desire to experience life outside Jamaica are also important in the decision to migrate. The government's role in influencing who migrates is thus limited, as it does not determine who migrates.

The government's ability to deliberately affect migration occurs at the international level, in its engagements in setting codes and standards for treatment of migrants, and in negotiating access in respect of short-term labour movements. Traditional overseas employment programmes are less a reflection of a government's skills at negotiating than a response to the needs of the host country for short-term labour in the context of shortages at home. The most that governments of sending countries can do is to negotiate a bigger share of the pie, vis-à-vis other countries participating in such programmes. More recent attempts at embedding such programmes in trade agreements, especially in terms of skilled people, have their limitations. The CARIFORUM–EU EPA, of which Jamaica is a signatory, illustrates some of these. The EPA is held to give CARIFORUM countries more generous access to the European

services market than it gives to other signatories of the World Trade Organization. On closer examination, though, access is more limited than at first appears. Many of the categories of occupations for which access has been negotiated already have few restrictions on movement, given the desire of developed countries for such skills. Further, immigration laws hold sway over trade agreements and continue to be the primary bases upon which persons are able to exercise their 'rights' under trade agreements. More specific to the EPA, requirements for prior experience, attachment to firms and equivalency of qualifications severely constrain the numbers of those eligible to move.

There is a real question of whether a focus on outward migration, especially as it favours skilled Jamaicans, is the best use of the government's efforts. The outward focus of Jamaica's migration policy has limited the use of policy as a tool for development. For migration policy to function as a tool of development, it must be embedded in a more holistic view of Jamaica's development. This must take account of the local conditions that impel people to migrate, and the effects of such migration on the economy and social life. The outward focus of current migration policy holds the danger that the internal factors that influence migration may be ignored. The government's job is first and foremost to create the conditions at home that would enable its people to prosper and realise their potential. There will always be people who want to experience a different reality and find migration attractive. The problem arises when people who want to make a life at home feel that they have little option but to migrate. Addressing these factors would also help to create an environment that is more conducive to the engagement of the diaspora in economic and social life.

Migration policy should be embedded in a broader development framework that takes account of the skills needs of the society, the effect of skills loss on the country's development trajectory and the demographic shifts in the population. There is some evidence that, in the push to maximise remittances and court the diaspora, this aspect of government policy is neglected and that the connection between migration policy and development is missed. Migration policy should also recognise that there are social ills from migration. Whether the advantages can be proven to outweigh the disadvantages or vice versa need not concern us. The negative challenges at all levels of the society are sufficiently obvious that they cannot be ignored.

There is also the danger that a focus on migration and the success of the diaspora could continue to aggravate the long-standing divide in policy and perception between the local and the foreign, with the former devalued in favour of the latter. This requires more conscious effort to recognise local successes and expand local opportunities for nationals to increase their contribution. Crucial to this is a conscious effort to address the limited absorptive capacity of small and weak economies, whose limitations contribute to high levels of skills migration in the first place. This should be a primary focus of the government and its international backers. Additionally, the role of the national in economic life should not be undervalued. Although a diaspora bond is viewed as a potential avenue for channelling finances from the diaspora, the role of domestic savings as a major source of government borrowing cannot be ignored; nor must the sacrifices of those who have remained at home in situations of

economic, political and social insecurity be undervalued. This does not mean that the government should not strive for a more engaged diaspora in addressing the many challenges facing Jamaica and implement policies towards this end. The government's approach to engaging the diaspora, however, should be premised on a more nuanced understanding of some of the challenges that may arise. Nor should it proceed along the lines of a one-sided relationship; it should also involve the government in seeking solutions to some of the challenges different segments of the diaspora face.

Finally, in addressing the migration–development nexus, the government has to address the main economic, political and social challenges that affect society and the complex relationship between these and migration. High levels of crime, weak economic performance and political instability fuel migration; yet high levels of outmigration aggravate these challenges. Migration, especially of the highly skilled, weakens Jamaica's competitiveness and contributes to its anaemic economic performance. Likewise, migration of caregivers and parents and the loss of their nurturing role also contribute to youth crime. Further, it is unlikely that the high levels of migration that Jamaica experiences have no effect on the quality of its political life. This requires investigation in its own right.

7.4.1 Policy proposals

Research

Some specific initiatives which the government could consider introducing and which could be the object of support by external donors are offered here. The value of research as the basis upon which to ground policy cannot be overestimated. A fuller understanding of the impact of migration on the development of Jamaican society could begin with more targeted research to establish the extent of migration's reach in society as a basis on which to ground labour policy planning. As noted earlier, research has tended to focus on areas, such as nursing and education, where the effects create situations of crisis. This does not provide a comprehensive sense of the scope of the problem and its more widespread effects.

Retention

Retention policies are premised upon the assumption that there are categories of persons with skill sets whose loss would exacerbate some of the country's development challenges. In addition to existing retention efforts, we propose the following. First, the government should work towards the creation of a data bank of local skills. This would complement efforts to compile a data bank on skills available in the diaspora. The former would be a far simpler process and would provide the basis, once more, for an informed labour policy with implications for education and training; but also for targeted initiatives to encourage these persons to remain at home and to ensure their proper integration into the labour market. For professions already known to be in high demand, such as nurses, teachers and social workers, retention efforts could focus on salaries, professional opportunities and special incentives, such as low-cost housing, to compensate for salary differentials.

Remittances and diaspora

There are some simple initiatives the government could take, with the assistance of donors, that could maximise the inflow of remittances from the diaspora, acknowledging the personal nature of these flows. Thus, special instruments could be developed to facilitate diaspora investment in institutions that enhance social protection for family members at home. Easily identified institutions include the National Housing Trust (NHT), to which all working Jamaicans must contribute. The provisions of the NHT are already fairly liberal in respect of the diaspora. It allows contributions to the fund from anyone, regardless of nationality, and contributors are then eligible for loans within two years (customer service representative, NHT, personal communication, 2013). This should be attractive to members of the diaspora who have hopes of owning their own homes in Jamaica, particularly those considering retiring to Jamaica, and it should be publicised. Currently the NHT does not allow persons to make direct contributions on behalf of a relative in Jamaica. Increasing the access of family members in the diaspora to contribute to the NHT on behalf of their relatives in Jamaica could contribute towards a more productive use of remittances. Similarly, the scope of the National Insurance Scheme (NIS) could be broadened to facilitate contributions from the diaspora on their own behalf and that of their family. Currently, the NIS allows contributions from persons who formerly worked in Jamaica and are resident in countries with which the government has reciprocal social security agreements, namely the UK, Canada and the province of Quebec, and CARICOM states (Ministry of Labour and Social Security n.d.). It also allows workers to submit voluntary contributions within 26 weeks of leaving their jobs (customer service representative, NIS, personal communication, 2013). This allows self-employed persons who have left the country to continue their contributions informally. There is no flexibility for persons to contribute to the NIS on their relatives' behalf. A more flexible approach to voluntary contributions could widen the scope for the diaspora to contribute.

Such contributions (in the case of the NHT) could boost the amounts that people on low incomes can borrow as well as providing contributions for unemployed persons not in a position to contribute. Other possible schemes could include joint government and private sector initiatives in education and health which could include tax breaks and interest rate incentives for certain savings instruments in these areas. Schemes such as those described could also be an avenue for addressing the high cost of remittances exacted by remittance agencies and would ensure that remittances are channelled into productive uses. These would avoid the weaknesses inherent in diaspora bonds and similar initiatives directed at harnessing resources from the diaspora, namely lack of confidence in government and the diverse personal motivations of diaspora contributors. The government could also improve its engagement with the diaspora by recognising their varied interests and experiences in the home country and the differing ways in which they engage with home. Put another way, engagement with the diaspora should not be a one-sided affair; the government should also take account of the challenges some sections of the diaspora experience in their adopted country and seek ways to intervene on their behalf.

7.4.2 Conclusion

Migration is a normal aspect of human existence, particularly for citizens of relatively poor countries. Jamaica's history of migration and the strong social networks established in the prime destination countries, along with its closeness to the USA, raise aspirations for wage levels, promotion and experience, which serve as powerful pull factors for potential migrants. Improving conditions at home will stem migration but not end it altogether. Some people will move anyway, regardless of the conditions at home, and this is not necessarily a bad thing. The challenge for government is to create the conditions at home that would allow the majority, who wish to make a comfortable life without migrating, to do so.

Addressing push factors is necessary but not simple. They are related to structural issues in the economy and society that constrain economic growth, which are, in turn, aggravated by migration. Unfortunately, policy approaches to address these constraints, particularly conditions attending the new IMF agreement, may well contribute to new waves of skills migration, especially if they deflate wages and increase unemployment, as foreseen. These may well work against the structures that the government is putting in place, with the help of international organisations, to manage migration and so minimise its negative consequences and maximise its development potential.

Notes

- 1 We wish to thank the following for their assistance in this project: Christine McLean, Planning and Research, Ministry of Labour and Social Security, for compiling data on overseas migration programmes and Tony-Shae Freckleton, Acting Manager of the Population and Health Unit, Social Policy, Planning and Research Division of the Planning Institute of Jamaica, for providing data on Jamaican migration. We also wish to thank the following students from the Department of Economics, University of the West Indies, Mona, for their contributions as research assistants on the project: Alex Robinson and Troy Taylor (MSc Economics programme), Sheree Anderson and Donya Brown (BSc Economics programme) and Lateisha Ledgister (BSc Banking and Finance programme). We also wish to thank Marsha Grey (MSc Social Policy) for her assistance in creating Figure 7.2.
- 2 The Caribbean here refers largely to the island Caribbean and includes the former British and Dutch colonies.
- 3 The All American Institute of Medical Sciences advertises clinical rotations in Canada, Jamaica and India as well.
- 4 There is also unofficial short-term circulatory migration for employment purposes based on informal networks (see Thomas-Hope et al. 2012: 4).
- 5 Reference has also been made to a Guantánamo Bay Programme but this does not appear on the Ministry of Labour and Social Security's website, nor does it appear to be included or disaggregated in its overseas employment data. See Jamaica Information Service (2010).
- 6 See: www.migration4development.org/content/about-jmdi (accessed 17 October 2014).
- 7 The AVR, a programme of the UK Home Office administered by the IMO, provides support for irregular immigrants who decide to voluntarily return to their home country. These include two initiatives: the Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme (VARRP), which is directed at asylum seekers; and Assisted Voluntary Return for Irregular Migrants (AVRIM), which addresses illegal migrants. In 2008, Jamaica was one of the top 10 countries for migrants leaving the UK under the AVR programme – some 80 Jamaicans. See Poppleton and Rice (2009).
- 8 The report emerges out of the 2000 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA), which reflects the US government's concern with what it viewed as modern-day slavery, and is mandatory under the Act.
- 9 It is surpassed by Guyana and shares this dubious distinction with Grenada.

- 10 UNECLAC Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean (2012) has net enrolment in 2010 at 82 per cent primary, down from 92.5 per cent in 2000; and 83.6 per cent secondary, up from 77.6 per cent in 2000. Gross enrolment in tertiary education was put at 26 per cent, up from 15.4 per cent in 2000. See tables 1.3.1 to 1.3.5.
- 11 While access to sanitation shows clear improvement over the 91 per cent recorded in the period 1985–87, the percentage of the population with access to safe water has declined from the 96 per cent reported for that period (UNDP 1990: 131).
- 12 This figure includes persons already living in the USA.
- 13 Elderly and adult potential immigrants must show they require long-term care that can be provided only by the relative living in the UK (UK Border Agency 2012).
- 14 It applies to persons no older than 30 who came to the USA before the age of 16. This measure is temporary, awaiting the approval of the DREAM (Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors) Act, which is yet to be passed by Congress. If it passes, it will provide a legal pathway to citizenship for this group.
- 15 Jamaica defines residents as persons who remain in the country for six months or longer (PIOJ 2012: 20.9).
- 16 Historically, Jamaica has benefitted from a supply of skilled persons from the CARICOM region who have trained at the University of the West Indies, Jamaica, and have chosen to remain in Jamaica. In addition, the number of skills certificates issued does not indicate how many of these persons have actually taken up residency in Jamaica, nor does it indicate when they have left.
- 17 In 2011, over 50 per cent of persons arrested for major crimes were between the ages of 16 and 25 (see PIOJ 2011: 24.4).
- 18 This includes those who indicated no occupation.
- 19 Thomas-Hope et al. (2009a) note that this shift occurred as far back as the 1960s.
- 20 Kindergarten and preparatory schools are privately owned and funded schools that are much better resourced than the government funded public schools.
- 21 Note that exams in these two subjects are compulsory and the government underwrites the examination fees.
- 22 Thirty-one Registered Nurses were interviewed.
- 23 Some 128 nurses were interviewed.
- 24 The PIOJ's Vision 2030 (PIOJ 2009: 46) describes the public health system as underequipped and understaffed, with ailing infrastructure. These challenges have been aggravated since the abolition of user fees.
- 25 The data showed a positive correlation between these factors but the sample size was too small to establish statistical significance (see World Bank 2009: 23).
- 26 Note that the problem is access to good-quality education. Issues of quality in the public sector have led to a strong fee-paying private sector providing high-quality education, resulting in a unequal two-tier structure exacerbating the deep social cleavages that characterise Jamaican society.
- 27 This has been a controversial move, as opponents charge that the government can ill afford to provide free secondary education given the country's weak economy and limited ability to fund high-quality secondary education.
- 28 These are the Regional Nursing Body, the Caribbean Nurses Organisation, the General Nursing Council, the University of the West Indies and ministries of health in St Kitts and Nevis and in Trinidad and Tobago (PAHO/CPC 2003).
- 29 The Caribbean here refers largely to the island Caribbean and includes the former British and Dutch dependencies.
- 30 The All American Institute of Medical Sciences advertises clinical rotations in Canada, Jamaica and India as well.
- 31 Specialisations include health services; environmental health; health law; epidemiology and biostatistics; and health behaviour, health promotion and disease prevention. See: www.aaims.edu.jm/admissions.html?sec=3 (accessed 17 October 2014).
- 32 The accreditation body is the Caribbean Accreditation Authority for Education in Medicine, which is located at the Ministry of Education, Jamaica.
- 33 For a more detailed treatment of such schemes in the region see Headley (2012).

- 34 Thomas-Hope et al. (2012: 4) note that there is also unofficial short-term circulatory migration for employment based on informal networks.
- 35 Reference has also been made to a Guantánamo Bay Programme, but this does not appear on the Ministry of Labour and Social Security's website, nor does it appear to be included or disaggregated in its overseas employment data. See Jamaica Information Service (2010).
- 36 The countries included in this scheme are Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago (GoC 2014a).
- 37 Canada's Temporary Foreign Workers Programme, under which the scheme falls, was revised in 2014 to ensure that it did not displace eligible Canadians from accessing these jobs (GoC 2014b).
- 38 This is an estimate. There are no firm data on the size of the Jamaican diaspora in the USA.
- 39 For a summary of the literature on return migration to the Caribbean and some of the challenges affecting the re-integration of migrants into their home country, see Plaza and Henry (2009).
- 40 The first conference, held 16 to 17 June 2004, attracted some 400 delegates from North America, the UK and Jamaica (see Franklyn 2010: 10, 11).
- 41 The third conference was to have been held from 22 May to 7 June 2010, but was postponed because of instability in western Kingston.
- 42 Mullings's observations were informed by her participation in a number of diaspora conferences.
- 43 Criticisms, as identified by Beverley Mullings (2009: 11), include 'charges of elitism, unaccountability and lack of transparency'.
- 44 For a discussion of these tensions, see David Mullings (2011). David Mullings is the Future Leaders representative for the USA on the Jamaican Diaspora Advisory Board.
- 45 See: www.migration4development.org/content/about-jmndi (accessed 17 October 2014).
- 46 The AVR, a programme of the UK Home Office which is administered by the IMO, provides support for irregular immigrants who decide to return voluntarily to their home country. These include two initiatives: the Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme (VARRP), which is directed at asylum seekers; and the Assisted Voluntary Return for Irregular Migrants (AVRIM), which addresses illegal migrants. In 2008, Jamaica was one of the top 10 countries for migrants leaving the UK under the AVR programme – some 80 Jamaicans. See Poppleton and Rice (2009).
- 47 See: www.migration4development.org/content/mitigating-negative-impact-migration-multi-generational-household-jamaica (accessed 29 September 2014).
- 48 See: www.migration4development.org/content/knowledge-networks-connecting-jamaica-and-its-diaspora (accessed 29 September 2014).
- 49 See: www.migration4development.org/content/supporting-jamaican-deported-migrants-and-their-families (accessed 29 September 2014).
- 50 The report arises from the 2000 Victims of Trafficking Protection Act, which reflects the US government's concern with what it viewed as modern-day slavery, and is mandatory under this Act.
- 51 Tier 1 countries are deemed to be fully compliant with the TVPA; Tier 2 countries are not fully compliant but are making significant efforts to meet standards of compliance; Tier 2 watch list countries satisfy the conditions of Tier 2 but show evidence of increases in the absolute number of victims and have taken no additional steps to address the problem over the last reference period; Tier 3 countries are not fully compliant with the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to be so. This category of countries, as of 2012, is subject to sanctions from the USA, the IMF and the World Bank in the form of the withdrawal of assistance. Jamaica, which was demoted from Tier 2 to the Tier 2 watch list in 2012, was at the time of writing in danger of being demoted to Tier 3 status under a 2008 amendment to the TVPA, which allows for the automatic demotion of countries that have been on the Tier 2 watch list for two consecutive years if they would otherwise be placed on that list for a third year. See US Department of State (2011) and (2012). Between the 2011 and 2012 reports, Jamaica had identified only one victim of trafficking and had no convictions for trafficking offences.
- 52 Conversely, one can argue that the distance of the diaspora from the day-to-day thrusts of Jamaican politics could help to undermine the partisan divisions of local politics.
- 53 Ratha's arguments are summed up in the article 'Diaspora bonds: Milking migrants' (*The Economist* 2011).

54 Instances of this are longer working hours than the eight-hour day which is the norm in Jamaica, and shorter lunch breaks – a half-hour lunch as opposed to the hour-long break which is the norm in Jamaica.

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