

MODELS OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT

As stated in the text, policy analysis and development management frameworks by themselves alone are no panacea to the solutions of management problems. They are only a facilitator or catalyst to the successful development and management of policy. They are simply a structured way of thinking about choices before deciding on a particular choice of action. They constitute an instrument or mechanism by which policy can be analysed, developed and managed. Since they are a product, or ought to be a product of each country, they vary in different proportions to the interest, culture and experiences of the individuals and organisations.

The following models are provided here as examples only.

BOTSWANA

The Botswana Public Service has 72,000 posts (excluding the army) in a population of 1.3 million. It is based firmly on the British system from which it continues to draw in the context of public service reform in general and such new innovations as "Work Improvement Teams" and "Productivity Improvement Committees". The Botswana Public Service has always sustained a level of improvement and efficiency in its delivery system, thanks to both the availability of growing economic and financial resources in this very rich country, and a determined commitment to training and development. The relative smallness of the government itself, the closeness and near homogeneity of the Botswana community itself, and a leadership that has thrived on a commendable regard for the values and norms of a good public service – all these have made the Botswana Public Service in particular, and the Government of the Republic of Botswana in general, the best possible model in the context of the problems that are attendant to the post-colonial state in Africa.

With respect to Botswana's experience in co-ordination and collaboration at the level of government, this centres on the relationship between the Ministries of Finance and Public Service, the structure of the Cabinet and its Committees, the role of the President himself, and the Committees that facilitate close liaison in policy matters within and between key sectors of the government system.²⁶ The Botswana Cabinet meets weekly, a contributory factor to co-ordination and collaboration. However, this is enhanced by the system of preparatory work that is considered a necessary precondition for cabinet discussions on new policies. If any ministry wants to come up with a policy, it is circulated in the form of a memorandum which is submitted to a Business Committee comprising the Permanent Secretary to the President and Cabinet, the Attorney General and the Permanent Secretary for Finance. If the policy issue has obvious financial and personnel implications, the Ministries of Finance and Public Service will have to have consultations and make the necessary

recommendations to the Business Committee. These two ministries have a good working relationship and have been able to institute "manpower sub-committees" in all ministries, enhancing the level of collaboration between the two ministries on such issues as the downsizing or right-sizing of the public service. Likewise, such committees as the "Work Improvement Team" are devoted to the development of human resources and to encouraging respective departments towards resolving their own problems. There is also a "Productivity Improvement Committee" for the civil service as a whole.

The Ministries of Finance and Public Service, therefore, constitute the two key strategic resource departments for the public service. They work together in policy-making, since policy has to be integrated into the budget development process. The budget itself has to be aligned with the strategic focus of government. The two ministries have to collaborate in measuring performance, progress and impact. They must indicate objectives, strategies and resources. Donor funding will have to be in accordance with strategic planning and goals; and unlike in other Southern African countries in which donors appear to be calling the shots and causing distortions in policy direction, Botswana has been able to decline such aid as it considers inimical to the strategies and goals of its public service and government. There are determined attempts at reducing reliance on donors. Equally important, the two departments also have outward linkages; they link with the provinces and districts without necessarily seeking to control them.

Botswana's "philosophy of development" is contained and reflected in the National Development Plan, as the indicator of the direction which the government has chosen, and as an outcome of the broadest consultation possible within the society. The budget itself is guided by the Development Plan, and the latter underpins the budget with the "philosophy". This is an outstanding achievement for Botswana in a sub-region – and in a continent – in which Development Plans have all but disappeared in recent years. By the 1980s, they had become meaningless. This was in large measure due to the growing dominance of donors who are now demanding matching funds, often at the expense of the entire capital budget of a given country. The social deficit becomes too large and therefore difficult to prioritise. In effect, the donor has become the planner. As has already been explained, the extent to which most African countries now have no Development Plans is a reflection of a post-colonial state under siege, with fewer and fewer options, increasingly dependent on the *external*, and struggling to survive.

Some concluding remarks on the "Botswana model" which will need further elaboration in the form of a workshop on the subject. The first refers to the role of the Business Committee consisting of the Permanent Secretary to the President and Cabinet, the Attorney General and the Permanent Secretary for Finance. As has already been mentioned, this Committee serves as an important "clearing house" for policy initiatives, ensures co-ordination and collaboration in the exercise of policy formulation and evaluation, and constitutes a vital link between the civil servants as an integral component in policy-making, and the President and Cabinet as the

executive authority of government. The model is not only a screening system; it is a more "scientific" system of getting things to Cabinet. The circulation of memoranda ensures that all ministries contribute some ideas irrespective of the subject.

There is, therefore, a lively relationship between the key sectors of government.

The second refers to the role of the President himself and how this enhances the content of co-ordination and collaboration, breaking down artificial barriers that often accompany bureaucratic structures and procedures, and keeping the Head of State in touch with reality. In Botswana, the Permanent Secretaries meet with the President once a month. Unlike in other countries in the region where the executive loses touch with problems on the ground, the meeting between the President and his Permanent Secretaries also gives the latter a sense of confidence while keeping them on their toes.

Thirdly, there is also a level of decentralisation of functions: recruitment is done at ministry level and then approved by a "Manpower Sub-Committee". A rural development council, chaired by the Vice President, co-ordinates rural affairs and incorporates local government, traditional leaders and structure. There is a central Joint Staff Consultative Council to oversee employer/employee relations, including policy initiatives. Ministers tour the whole country in order to explain policy initiatives and the budget allocation system to the people.

Lastly, there is also in Botswana a Directorate on Corruption and Economic crime being set up. This Directorate has a centre at headquarters where anyone may report. This is an important institution which, if effectively put in place, can contain the growing threat of corruption in most African countries, enhance confidence in the conduct and integrity of public officials, and improve the moral fabric of society.

ZAMBIA

The Zambian model was conceptualised and designed after experiencing many problems relating to the management of policy. The following were the major problems and concerns experienced by both public servants and politicians as shown by the case study on Policy Change.²⁷

1. After the fall of copper prices, the government continued to spend more than it generated, resulting in rising budget deficits and growing overseas debt. By the early 1990s, the country's economy was on the verge of collapse. Government stores, for example, were sparsely stocked and basic government services such as education and health care had all but disintegrated.
2. In addition to the lack of public accountability during Kaunda's term of office, were poor formal systems for making and implementing policy.

Rather than benefiting from the perspective and analysis of technical experts, policy formulation and decision-making were centralised in the office of the President and ruling party headquarters (UNIP) where decisions were based more on socialist dogma than a careful analysis of problems or objectives and possible actions to address them.

3. The civil servants in ministries had become increasingly marginalised from the policy processes. They began to avoid risk and conflict with politicians and consequently deferred even the most routine decisions upwards. As they were not involved in the decision-making processes, they developed little ownership, understanding and commitment to the implementation or follow-up of government policy decisions.
4. The morale of civil servants was very low as they could be fired and transferred at short notice and sometimes without alternatives to appeal against such arbitrary decisions. At the national elections, Kaunda's party lost and in came the new government of Chiluba. The new government inherited the old civil servants and their machineries. The new government, eager to make meaningful contribution to the development of national policies, soon experienced problems in formulating and implementing government policy decisions. The following managerial problems were experienced.
 - A major constraint was that new ministers lacked experience. Because ministers' roles and functions were not clearly defined or agreed upon, confusion over the authority of Cabinet ministers to formulate policy or publicly comment on government policies created the image of a government in disarray. It was not uncommon for ministers to make conflicting policy statements publicly.
 - Because Cabinet itself did not require well-thought-out policy proposals, there was no impetus for those in line ministries to devote time or effort to developing them. Few ministries possessed career civil servants well versed in even the rudiments of policy analysis.
 - Further hindering sound policy formulation was the fact that few ministries maintained data bases for their functional areas of responsibility. This meant that no tradition of monitoring the performance of programmes and policies existed.
 - The lack of clarity about roles, responsibilities and authority created tension within the ministries. Particularly difficult to sort out were the lines of authority and relationship between ministers and their permanent secretaries. Thus, rather than constituting

balanced teams comprising a mix of players versed in both the technical and political aspects of policy development and implementation, the climate in ministries often resembled turf wars or silent struggles dedicated to testing who had the authority to tell whom what to do.²⁸

In some cases policy proposals were drafted by foreign technical experts on behalf of the sponsoring ministry, but these often lacked the necessary political, contextual or technical perspective to make implementation possible. The process of developing and managing a policy is reflected in Figure one. The framework, as can be seen, had serious flaws in its design and capacity to analyse and manage efficiently a policy that is formulated. Because of the inherent constraints exhibited by the system, ministries were able to implement about 25% of Cabinet decisions. The remaining decisions were either not implemented or were only partially implemented.

Clearly, the system could not sustain any structural changes or reforms of the state machinery in order to address the growing demand from citizens for better quality of service, productivity and promotion of good governance, the ticket under which the present government was elected into power. The support of an emerging democratic process and institutions was lacking and exacerbated by the inability to co-ordinate the formulation of policy and the absence of well-trained public servants in policy management. On realising and identifying the problems in policy formulation and management and the limitations of administrative structures to sustain the implementation of policy, the government hired a team of consultants whose objectives were:

- to develop a system of analysing policy proposals submitted to Cabinet by ministries and to assess their consistency with government policy;
- to suggest ways of improving the co-ordination and implementation of policy;
- to monitor the decisions of Cabinet.

These objectives were discussed at a number of workshops held in the country. Different workshops were held for top officials in government, permanent secretaries and cabinet ministers. All the workshops concluded that there was a need to improve the framework for policy formulation, decision-making, policy implementation and policy monitoring or evaluation.

Out of these workshops and discussions, the Policy Analysis and Co-ordination Division was established in the Cabinet office. The division was established following the merger of the then two existing divisions in Cabinet office namely, the Economics and Finance and Cabinet Affairs. Further workshops were held in order to implement the new framework which would improve the effectiveness of

government by providing the Cabinet with high quality advice and assisting the Cabinet to co-ordinate and implement policies. Two conclusions were drawn from the workshops. The first was that the Policy Analysis and Co-ordination (PAC) Division would act as a facilitator or broker in the policy process without controlling powers. Obviously, the role would require skills not only in policy analysis but also in facilitation and systems development.

The second conclusion reached was that improving policy-making and implementation within the Zambian context required commitment at the top. Specifically, far-reaching changes would not come about simply because PAC will them to be so. High-level support was also needed. Only Cabinet possessed the power to push the policy process a level higher by demanding higher quality policy proposals and implementation from ministries.

The new policy process as shown in figure 2 is clearly a framework or model designed by the Zambians themselves through the interactions of various stakeholders. The framework reflects the ownership by the Zambians who understand how it should operate.


The following are a few lessons which have been learnt from establishing the PAC and from its implementation during its first few years in existence. These include:

1. **A complete national policy process is needed (capabilities and systems for formulating, deciding on, implementing, and monitoring/evaluating the impact of policy).** Policy formulation/analysis requires reliable data and the ability to interpret that data (monitoring and evaluation skills and systems). Sound policy decision-making depends on good analysis and a straightforward presentation to decision-makers of the policy alternatives and their probable outcomes. And the foundation upon which the implementation of policy is built is well-founded, clearly-articulated decisions and their communication to those responsible for implementation. Because each stage of the policy process depends on the others, it is necessary to devote time to identifying and then addressing weaknesses in the process, whether they occur in the formulation, decision-making, implementation or monitoring/evaluation stages.
2. **As much attention needs to be given to policy implementation as is customarily given to “the decision”.** The process of formulating policy and gaining support for policy proposals consumes so much effort that often there appears to be little energy left to deal with the implementation of the policy decision, let alone assess the impact of past policy decisions. Old habits die hard, but training in monitoring and evaluation has been a useful means of focusing attention on these important, post-decision activities. That phenomenon is hardly limited to developing country governments.

3. **Co-ordinating a policy process requires the existence of both systems and skills.** Systems are required to ensure that each policy conceived is the product of a thorough and inclusive analytical process. Routines must also be established for putting policy decisions into action and assessing their impact. Among the necessary skills needed in a co-ordinating agency such as PAC are analytic skills, such as policy analysis and monitoring/evaluation techniques. Less obvious, but equally necessary, are skills in dealing effectively with a variety of actors at a number of levels of rank or seniority; building commitment to change; and assessing inefficiencies or weaknesses in the national policy system.
4. **The implementation of new policies often requires organisations to behave differently.** If organisations are expected to behave differently, so too must the people who staff them – this is often the biggest challenge. Systems are relatively easy to change. Changing the attitudes and behaviour of those within the organisations is much more difficult to accomplish. “Attitudes and behaviour” in this context refers to methods of interacting with others of both higher and lower rank within the organisation; interacting with representatives of other organisations or groups; and making decisions setting organisational priorities, recognising excellence, settling disputes, etc.
5. **The implementation of even simple policies often requires the co-ordination and co-operation of multiple organisations.** Since many organisations are not accustomed to collaborating or co-ordinating their actions with other organisations, this behaviour needs to become part of organisations’ normal operating routine and culture of the organisations.
6. **Strengthening a “co-ordinating agency,” such as PAC, may be necessary to improve the performance of a national policy process, but it is not sufficient if the agencies that hold primary responsibility for policy formulation and implementation are weak.** There is an obvious difference in the potential contribution of an agency, like PAC, that co-ordinates the implementation of well-founded policy and one that doggedly works to implement poorly-conceived policies. It is on these grounds that considerable work has been done to improve ministries’ capabilities to produce quality policy proposals, and at least a portion of training resources under this project have been programmed towards strengthening the policy analytical skills of select individuals in each ministry.
7. **It is important for co-ordinating agencies to understand their stakeholders.** Part of the challenge for PAC in designing improvements to Zambia’s policy process has been creating systems that both demonstrate an appreciation of the interests of PAC’s major stakeholders (the Cabinet ministers and the civil servants in the ministries) and gently


challenge these stakeholders to a higher level of performance. With Cabinet ministers, this meant creating a system through which Cabinet received better information upon which to base its decisions. In “exchange” for this, it is the expectation that ministers will abide by the new rules that they themselves endorsed (i.e. not seek special exceptions to excuse themselves and their policy proposals from proper co-ordination and policy analysis). For their part, the new system gives civil servants a greater and more meaningful role in the development and implementation of government policy; but at the same time, it places upon them the burden of conducting thorough analysis and co-ordination to support their policy recommendations. Rather than being responsible for merely submitting papers to Cabinet for consideration, they are expected to produce results.

8. **Senior civil servants need to be trained in organisational management.** For example, permanent secretaries of ministries often achieve their position by virtue of either their tenure in the civil service, their knowledge of “the system,” and/or their sectoral knowledge. While some people can become good managers without the benefit of formal management training, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect across-the-board improvements in the civil service to take place without some attention being given to training in how to manage an effective organisation and how to lead a change process. Management and leadership skills are acquired and not necessarily innate.
9. **The sequencing and timing of project events is important.** It is sometimes tempting to go for the “big event” early in a project. For example, the first workshop held for permanent secretaries of ministries was held according to the terms of the contract – some six months into the contract and four months after PAC was established. Despite this, the consensus is that this workshop may have occurred prematurely. The difficulties encountered at the PS workshop were mostly due to PAC “going public” before gaining a firm grounding in what needed to be said and decided. In addition, very little time preceding the permanent secretary workshop was built into the project for the technical assistance staff to conduct detailed systems analysis and diagnostics. In contrast, the workshop for Cabinet ministers was held at an appropriate juncture in the project (over a year after the project commenced). Proper research had been conducted. Issues were identified that required attention and decision. Solid proposals were ready for presentation and discussion.
10. **The principles of strategic management are useful in both policy development and implementation.** Having said that, stating objectives, assessing stakeholder interests, evaluating organisational capacities, developing strategies etc. are not actions that public sector managers may automatically turn to – even if these concepts have been presented and



NEW GRZ POLICY PROCESS

Figure 2



discussed. At least in the PAC context, strategic management seems to be more of a practice skill. Creating the strategic management “state of mind” in public managers (making its application second nature or automatic) requires successive rounds of introduction to and practice in these principles.

It is clear from the discussion that the conceptualisation, formulation and design of the policy analysis instrument, the implementation and evaluation process were owned and led by the Zambians themselves. While they needed external catalysts in funding and development of the system, they controlled and directed the process. In essence, the process was dictated by the need to address a policy management problem and by the desire to promote good governance, public accountability, efficiency, effectiveness and above all to improve the delivery of better quality services to the majority of the population. The Zambian model appeared to have succeeded because of the promotion of policy debate, improving trust between and among stakeholders, clarity of role definition and the management of the political and administrative interface which strengthened the co-ordinating relationship in the policy development and management process. An innovation in the Zambian model is the publication of the Cabinet Handbook which informs new ministers and permanent secretaries how government operates, and which delineates the roles, functions and responsibilities of each official.

ZIMBABWE

As will be emphasised in the following sub-section to this chapter, the main agency through which African states – including those of Southern Africa – can hope to confront the historical and economic problems that have also been magnified and compounded by the spectre of globalisation, is regional co-operation and integration, from the sub-regional level to the continental level, as represented by the proposed African Economic Community. In the meantime, the exchange of information and experiences in the field of public service reform and management is already showing commendable results in Southern Africa. Such initiatives as those undertaken through the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies (SARIPS) of the SAPES Trust AAPAM, and Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI) have been important contributions in this regard. Not surprisingly, there has been some relationship between the Southern African Initiative for Development (SAID), an institution influenced by the Malaysian and South East Asian experiences in "smart partnership" between the state, labour and other sectors of the private sector, and key consultative fora being established in such countries as Zimbabwe. These fora should assist the process of linking the state with the broader society as a pre-condition of tackling globalisation while also developing a national consensus and strategy on the economic front.

Recently established in Zimbabwe has been the National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF)²⁹ whose objectives are:

- i. to create a "smart partnership" amongst key economic players, namely: government, private sector, labour and other stakeholders, in order to enhance the economic development process of the nation;
- ii. to provide a broad participatory framework in the formation of national economic policy through an interchange of ideas and experiences amongst government, private sector, labour, academia and civil society; and
- iii. to facilitate the co-ordination, monitoring and evaluation of national economic policy implementation.

These objectives are based on some aspects of the economic and political context of Zimbabwe which influence policy formulation and management processes. The Government decided to form the National Economic Consultative Forum, having identified some contradictory factors such as:

- the government's commitment to social equity, countered by the failure of economic growth, the fall in disposable income and growing social unrest.
- its ideological propensity to state intervention, countered by an inability to maintain public sector investment and strong pressures to liberalisation under a structural adjustment programme. The Government, often under pressure from donors as well as from internal forces for change, had to rethink its service provision roles as well as its policy development processes. The formation of the Forum constitutes an important component of the changing practice of public sector management in Zimbabwe.

The whole issue of smart partnership is based on the principle that any economy is an integral whole with the general infrastructure, businesses process and social responsibilities all feeding one into the other. It is about creating limitless opportunities and wealth that is shared, sustainable and that allows the participants to function in the global economy. Its successful functioning depends on a win-win and prosper-the-neighbour relationship among partners. All the partners, whether they be political leaders, civil servants, entrepreneurs, corporate leaders, management, labour, academia and civic society in general, play different roles according to their different circumstances, but all operating from the same set of principles.

The National Economic Consultative Process, therefore, has embraced the principles of smart partnership such that it forms the local interface with similar regional and international initiatives. It facilitates a fast-track relationship between policy (state), business, labour, academia and civil society. This ensures the effectiveness and timeliness of implementation of national development policies and programmes as agreed by government and all stakeholders through a direct co-ordinated process involving regular consultation, feedback, accountability and contribution by all, and amongst key players, on a mutual win-win, cross-fertilisation relationship.

The structural framework for the Forum was worked out by the Steering Committee of the Forum which was made up of senior government officials, private sector, labour, civic society and academia. This steering committee, which was chaired by the Office of the President and Cabinet, held thirty-two meetings prior to the establishment of the NECF and the First Retreat of the NECF held on the 22 January, 1998 was attended by over five hundred participants from all sectors of the economy. The President has attended and participated in two of the three Executive Core Group Meetings of the Forum and two retreats.

The Forum itself is made up of a hundred and eighty individuals who have been chosen on the basis of their contribution to the national economy broadly representing Government, private sector, labour, academia and civic society. It has to be pointed out that labour has been involved in the establishment of the consultative process since its inception. Up to this point, the slot for labour is still available should the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) decide to join the consultative process.

The national consultative process does not seek to replace the usual consultation process that takes place between line ministries and their different constituencies, e.g. the tripartite consultations between the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare; the ZCTU and Employers Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ); Ministry of Lands and Agriculture with farming organisations; Ministry of Industry and Commerce with the Chamber of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI); Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC); and the Consumer Council. The Forum deals with issues on a national basis rather than on a sectoral basis.

The Executive Core Group, which has already been selected, except for the labour representation, is made up of forty members. It is the Executive Arm of the Forum and is assisted by a Nucleus Think Tank to research into issues that come up from time to time from the deliberations of the NECF.

The Nucleus Research Think Tank, which has also been appointed, comprises experts in various fields who will undertake research on specific topics and come up with recommendations on the way forward. Each of the topics researched should result in various policy options and their likely impact on the economy. The Nucleus Research Think Tank will co-opt other researchers as the need arises and will report to the chairpersons of the task forces, who in turn will report to the co-chairpersons of the Executive Core Group.

The Secretariat, to be headed by an Executive Secretary, will carry out the day-to-day activities of the Forum and co-ordinate the various task forces and committees that will be set up from time to time.

The initial funding of the activities of the National Economic Consultative Forum will come from donors for two years while mechanisms are being worked out for it to be self-sustaining. It is envisaged that the activities of the Forum will be financed

through contributions from the private sector, labour unions and from a regular budget from government. The Forum will also carry out various fund-raising activities such as workshops, seminars, publications etc.

The Executive Core Group has so far held three meetings. The first meeting discussed the stabilisation of food prices, whose recommendations assisted the work of the Ministerial Task Force on the stabilisation of food prices. The second meeting discussed plans on the way forward for the Forum, especially the formation of task forces to deal with issues of immediate concern to the nation. The third meeting appointed task forces and also discussed the problem of unemployment and strategies to tackle the problem.

The task forces that have been formed are to deal with the immediate issues of concern to the nation. The following task forces have been set up:

- Incomes and Pricing Policy task force;
- Macro-economic Policy task force;
- Industrial Policy task force;
- Indigenisation task force; and
- National Land Reform Programme task force.

These task forces comprise members of the Executive Core Group and will utilise the Research Think Tank for research into various issues. It should be noted that the task forces are not permanent. After completing their tasks, they will be replaced by other task forces. All the work programmes will be time-framed with specific deadlines set, and projects are to be completed as per the agreed recommendations and time-frame. The emphasis will be on practical solutions to deal with pressing issues that are facing the country.

It is expected that the NECF will also interface with regional and international initiatives of the "Smart Partnership" such as the Langkawi International Dialogue and the Southern African International Dialogue. The NECF will also be a vehicle for the promotion of investment programmes locally and overseas.