

The Independence Constitution\* provides for a President, and a Parliament consisting of a Senate and a House of Assembly. The President was to be elected by the two Houses sitting together as an electoral college. The Senate was to be chosen by elections involving members of the House of Assembly and the Council of Chiefs, and augmented by members appointed by the President. The election with which we were concerned was for the House of Assembly. The House comprised 100 elected members, 20 elected on a White Roll and 80 on a Common (or Black) Roll.

Polling for the six contested white seats (in 14, Rhodesia Front candidates were returned unopposed) took place on 14 February 1980, and Common Roll polling on 27, 28 and 29 February. The expression "Common Roll" is used in this report to adopt the language of the Electoral Act; in fact, as agreed at Lancaster House, there was no roll for African (black) voters.

The Electoral Act 1979, under which the elections were held was broadly based on its British counterpart but modified to accommodate the party list system of proportional representation in respect of the elections on the Common Roll. There were no special features in the legislation which call for comment and are not mentioned in other parts of our report. The laws were the subject of close scrutiny by the British Election Commissioner and his staff, and several minor amendments were made in the light of this. We also studied the electoral law and satisfied ourselves independently that its provisions were such as to facilitate the holding of free and fair elections.

For the White Roll election, the country was divided into 20 constituencies. Voters' rolls had been prepared for these constituencies and contained the names of those registered as voters on the White Roll as at 31 December 1979. The White Roll included the Coloured and the Asian voters, and the Common Roll only the African. The 20 White constituency members were chosen by preferential voting, by which a voter could indicate his order of preference of the candidates presented to him.

#### COMMON ROLL ELECTION

By contrast, for the election of the 80 Common Roll members there were on this occasion to be no constituencies, no registration of voters, and therefore no roll. Instead, a party list system was used. Under this, every participating political party submitted a list of candidates Province-wise. Variations in the lists were allowed during the campaign. The ballot papers contained only the names of the political parties and their symbols, and each voter indicated his choice of party. The number of seats was then distributed between the competing parties based on the proportion of the votes they received in each Province in relation to the total votes cast.

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\*Zimbabwe Independence Order 1979 (S.I. 1600 of 1979)

The eight existing administrative Provinces were treated as the eight electoral districts for the Common Roll election, and the 80 seats distributed among them in proportion to their estimated population, were as follows:-

Manicaland	11 seats
Mashonaland Central	6 seats
Mashonaland East	16 seats
Mashonaland West	8 seats
Matabeleland North	10 seats
Matabeleland South	6 seats
Midlands	12 seats
Victoria	11 seats

We heard no serious criticism of the distribution of seats, although it was apparent that there were no fully reliable statistics of population on which to base such assessments.

In each Province, an Electoral District Returning Officer (generally the Provincial Commissioner) was responsible for the overall conduct of the election in his Province. Each Province is for administrative purposes divided into several Administrative Districts under a District Commissioner. For the elections, each District Commissioner was appointed an Administrative District Returning Officer and charged with responsibility for conducting the election within his District. The officials, including Returning Officers, Polling Officers and Counting Officers, were in the main civil servants, black and white, who have been charged by law for many years not to be involved in political activity. They were augmented by a number of persons on call-up duty.

Those entitled to vote were persons aged 18 years and above who were black citizens of Rhodesia under the Independence Constitution, or were black non-citizens who had been temporarily resident in Rhodesia for a continuous period of two years before the date of the election. As there was to be no registration of voters, we noted that the question of the determination of eligibility would have to be given special attention by us over the period of the poll.

There were both static polling stations (i.e. at fixed places and open during all 3 days of the poll) and mobile (which were moved from place to place to provide facilities for voters in locations which did not warrant the provision of a static polling station). Their disposition Province by Province is shown in Annex 29.

#### **VOTING PROCEDURES**

A voter presenting himself at a polling station had to identify himself as being eligible to vote to the satisfaction of the presiding officer. An initial check was made by a polling clerk and where he was in doubt he referred the matter to his presiding officer. Where evidence was lacking or unacceptable, it was open for a would-be voter to return later with a document to prove his eligibility or a member of the community who could vouch for him.

Where documentary evidence was not accepted the presiding officer was

expected to perforate the documents with the ballot paper perforator so as to indicate this fact to any other polling stations the voter might attempt to visit. Where the evidence was accepted, it was not to be perforated.

Once accepted as eligible, the voter entered the polling station and placed his hands inside an ultra-violet lightbox where they were inspected by a clerk. If he had voted before, his fingertips would show a white glow. Having passed this test, he then placed the tips of the fingers of both hands in a basin containing a plastic pad moist with a colourless solution whose dye, invisible to the naked eye, would show up under ultra-violet light in the lightbox were he to attempt to vote again.

The voter was then issued with a ballot paper (Annex 30), which was first validated by a 25-pronged perforator specially imported from Britain. The ballot papers were in pads of 200, and had no counterfoils to avoid an opportunity for names being noted. For reconciliation purposes, the ballot papers were numbered, but the effect of the perforator was, by making a 5 x 5 box of small holes, to obliterate most of the figures.

The voter then took his ballot paper to one of the polling booths where, in private, he placed a cross against the square opposite the name and symbol of the party of his choice. The voter then folded his paper so that the perforated corner, showing that the ballot paper had been validated, remained visible. This was shown to a clerk standing by the ballot box, but not in a way which involved the clerk either in handling the ballot paper or being able to see how the ballot paper had been marked, before the voter dropped the ballot paper into the ballot box.

Before polling commenced on the first day, or where a subsequent ballot box needed to be used, the box was shown to party agents so that they could satisfy themselves as to its being empty before the lid was sealed and the box securely locked. At the end of each polling day the slot in each ballot box was to be closed and sealed in the presence of party agents, who could place their own signatures and their own seals on the boxes. Where there were no party agents, the process was witnessed by an Assistant Supervisor or other independent persons. Before polling began on subsequent occasions, each box was examined by party agents and others to ensure that the seals were still intact, then the seal over the slot in the ballot box was opened. The seals used were made in Britain, as was a specially-embossed adhesive tape. The string used was similarly of British manufacture, and not available in Rhodesia. In addition, the rooms where the ballot boxes were stored overnight were sealed in the presence of party agents.

At the start and at the end of each day's polling, and of polling at each location in the case of the mobile polling stations, a record was kept of the number of ballot papers used, and those remaining unused. In this way, party agents could satisfy themselves as to the number used throughout the day and that no ballot papers had been removed overnight. Party agents were also informed of the numerals of each pad of ballot papers when one pad was exhausted and another started.

At the conclusion of voting on the final day of the poll, the boxes

were again sealed before being transported in the presence of the parties to the Administrative District Returning Officer. Once they had all reached him, the Administrative District Returning Officer, in the presence of the party agents, examined the seals before opening the boxes and tipping the ballot papers out. They were then unfolded and placed face downwards in bundles of 100 to enable a reconciliation to take place between the number of ballot papers issued to the polling station in question, the number used, and the number returned unused.

Once these reconciliations had taken place the ballot papers were packed in ballot boxes which were then sealed in the same manner as before. They were then transported, again in the presence of party agents, to provincial centres, where the votes were counted in the presence of party representatives under the authority of the Electoral District Returning Officer. Counting began throughout the country on Monday, 3 March 1980. As soon as the count was completed, each Electoral District Returning Officer notified the number of votes cast for each party to the Election Commissioner in Salisbury.

A British Assistant Election Commissioner then applied the formula provided for by law to establish the number of seats to be allocated to each party as contained in Sections 175 and 176 of the Electoral Act 1979 (Annex 31).

It was arranged for the ballot papers to be packed after the count and airfreighted to Britain on 6 March 1980 where they are to be stored for six months, pending any order by the High Court for their production during the hearing of any election petitions, before being burnt. The removal of the ballot papers in this manner was designed to provide a further safeguard for the secrecy of the ballot, and received considerable publicity.

The final form of instructions to polling staff appears as Annex 32.

A summary of the rights and duties of party agents, prepared by the Election Commissioner's office, appears as Annex 33.

#### **NATIONAL ELECTION DIRECTORATE**

The National Election Directorate under the Registrar of Elections is an ad hoc body first established to organise the April 1979 elections. It had three roles - the organisation of arrangements for the elections, publicity and resource management. The Directorate considered that the election process in April 1979 had been adjudged fair and beyond criticism, whatever might have been said about the Constitution under which the elections were held. They proposed therefore to organise the independence elections on the same lines, as described above. There were some differences, for example, the use of a perforator instead of a rubber stamp to validate ballot papers, and the elimination of counterfoils on pads of ballot papers. Some minor changes were made to the election laws to increase credibility in the election process.

Members of the Directorate, and all those involved in organising the elections, including polling clerks, were civil servants who were charged as a condition of their employment to be non-political. The Directorate saw it

as its task to ensure that all voters understood that they had a right to vote, knew how to vote, and appreciated that they could vote without fear because of the secrecy of the ballot. They saw a need to encourage women to vote, as women were not generally very active in village affairs. To achieve these ends, a massive publicity campaign was mounted, through radio, television and newspaper advertisements, and the distribution of pamphlets and posters. All three major languages - English, Shona and Ndebele - were used. Examples of the publicity material form Annex 34.

In addition, the Directorate showed a film entitled "How to Vote", made in both Shona and Ndebele. We were informed that the film was widely shown and seen by a large number of people. An English translation of the soundtrack appears as Annex 35. The film was originally prepared for the April 1979 elections, and so could not reflect amendments to the procedures made subsequently. A prologue had been added to explain why another election was necessary so soon after the last.

#### BRITISH SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS

The elections were conducted under the authority and supervision of the British Government, but using the local administration in accordance with the Lancaster House Agreement. Responsibility for British supervision devolved on the Election Commissioner, assisted by his Deputy Election Commissioner and his Assistant Election Commissioners. The establishment of these posts, and their investiture with formal legal powers, was provided for in Ordinances enacted by the Governor, as previously noted. The effect of these changes to the law were to place the Election Commissioner in a position superior to that of the Registrar General of Elections. The Election Commissioner was assisted by an Election Council, a consultative body on which all the parties participating in the elections were represented.

Supervision paralleled the structure of the Rhodesian administration. As a counterpart to the National Election Directorate there was the Election Commissioner and his office. Below that, were two British Provincial Supervisors for each election district (counterparts to the Rhodesian Provincial Commissioners), and one or two British District Supervisors as counterparts to the District Commissioners in each district. In all, the team of British Supervisors numbered 89. To this were added some 571 British policemen as Assistant Election Supervisors, who flew to Rhodesia a week before the elections and were deployed in polling stations throughout the country, and predominantly in rural areas (their instructions appear as Annex 36). The Provincial Supervisors were in place some seven weeks and the District Supervisors some three weeks before the elections. A summary of the duties of Election Supervisors appears as Annex 37.

A high proportion of Supervisors had experience of administration and of elections in the Commonwealth countries of Africa. The rest were officials with experience of elections in Britain. Their task was to liaise with Rhodesian officials at provincial and district level; to make wide contacts within their areas and reinforce the message of secrecy; to satisfy themselves that the election facilities were adequate and would permit the population to vote freely and fairly; to monitor the campaigns of the parties; to visit all polling stations at least once during the polling; and to attend and supervise the count. In addition, they kept an eye on every matter within their area of

responsibility which might impinge on the elections.

They were particularly concerned to ensure that polling stations were located in appropriate places, that people had ready access to them without having to travel overly long distances, and that polling stations were not located in inappropriate places, such as police camps and the like.

#### **ELECTION COUNCIL**

The Election Council proved a most useful forum. Under skilful chairmanship, and with each party represented by two senior officials, the meetings demonstrated an encouraging ability on the part of all the parties to work together, and to achieve reasoned decisions in a very short time. Arrangements were made for us to be at its meetings, and we greatly benefited from our regular attendance.

The Election Council was consulted on a wide variety of matters concerning all aspects of the elections. Discussions were brief and to the point, and little time was devoted to the scoring of political points. In addition, it provided a vehicle through which complaints could be made, and frequently were, concerning aspects of the election arrangements and the election campaign which were troubling individual parties.

#### **LITERACY AND THE POLL**

We were concerned that the level of illiteracy could affect the capacity of voters to mark their ballot papers. Research statistics made available to us suggested that 33 per cent of adult African males and 41 per cent of adult females had never attended school. We decided to pay attention during polling to the ability of voters to mark their papers, especially as the cross with which they were to indicate the party of their choice has for some people a negative, rather than positive, connotation. In this respect it was encouraging that all the parties, in almost all their publications and posters, featured their symbol with a cross beside it, in order, inter alia, to educate the electorate in how to vote.

#### **COMMENTS ON ELECTION ARRANGEMENTS**

There has been no census in Zimbabwe since 1969. The population was officially estimated to be 7.22 million, and to have 3.08 million potential voters. Of these, 2.883 million were potential voters for the Common Roll elections. The war has caused dramatic shifts in population, and the organisers had no reliable data for assessing the numbers likely to use particular polling stations or even the total number likely to vote. The problem was compounded by the fact that any black voter could vote anywhere in the country, regardless of place of residence. Bussing of voters by parties across electoral boundaries was declared illegal. However, there was nothing to prevent substantial numbers from crossing electoral boundaries on their own to cast their votes in other Provinces.

These factors made it necessary for the Administration to print considerably more ballot papers than could ever have been used - namely six

million. The number printed for each Province was as follows:-

	Number printed	Number used
Manicaland	800,000	301 673
Mashonaland Central	400,000	185 237
Mashonaland East	1,600,000	638 935
Mashonaland West	600,000	295 858
Matabeleland North	800,000	403 162
Matabeleland South	400,000	178 007
Midlands	1,000,000	347 588
Victoria	800,000	348 990

We were satisfied that this was unavoidable if the risk of large numbers of persons being effectively disenfranchised by a shortage of ballot papers at particular polling stations was to be avoided. However, the presence of such a large number of excess ballot papers created a fear in the minds of at least some of the public that they might find their way into the ballot boxes improperly. We therefore regarded the question of the reconciliation of ballot papers and observation of their handling as matters calling for particular attention before, during and after the days of the poll.

We inspected the arrangements for printing ballot papers and the security measures designed by Her Majesty's Stationery Office (U.K.), and watched some of the printing. The ballot papers were printed on a locally-produced buff-coloured newsprint, which we understand, has not been exported. For technical printing reasons, we were satisfied that any attempt to forge ballot papers would be detected. In fact, one pad of 200 papers for Manicaland was stolen from the Government Printer, but the theft was promptly revealed by the elaborate system of cross-checks developed by HMSO, which had one of its staff supervising the printing. Although the theft could not have affected the ballot, the Election Commissioner arranged for a new set of ballot papers to be produced for Manicaland printed on a green paper and the old ones destroyed.

We tested the invisible dye used to identify those who had voted, using a range of sophisticated cleansers and barrier creams, including one imported for the purpose. These tests satisfied us that there was no foundation for any fear, as expressed in respect of the April 1979 election, that party supporters might be bussed from polling station to polling station to vote repeatedly, detection having been made impossible by the use of a barrier cream or some such aid to prevent the dye staining their fingertips.

There were two sizes of ballot box, of sturdy wooden construction. Rumours still circulated from the April 1979 elections that it was possible to introduce additional ballot papers to sealed ballot boxes by removing the wooden handles from their sides. Our investigations revealed that this would be quite impossible. The handles were not set into the wooden sides of the boxes, but fixed on to the outside by means of two screws. Were a handle to be removed (and as the screw was placed through from the inside of the boxes this would itself present difficulties) one would simply be confronted with two small screw holes through which it would be exceedingly difficult to introduce a ballot paper. We were satisfied with the construction of the boxes.

We also inspected the tape and the seals to be used for sealing the boxes. We were satisfied that these were not capable of being counterfeited, and that the provisions for signatures on the adhesive seals of officials and party agents would be adequate safeguards. We were aware of fears that ballot boxes might be tampered with when stored overnight in polling stations or in District Commissioners' offices, and that some parties wished to have their agents stay overnight with the ballot boxes. In view of the satisfactory arrangements for the sealing of the boxes and the storage rooms, and the parties' participation in this, we were inclined to agree with the decision that to have party agents stay overnight with the ballot boxes could have created more problems than it would have solved. We were encouraged, too, by the suggestion made by the Election Commissioner that the British policemen who acted as Assistant Supervisors should endeavour to stay overnight with the boxes.

The fact that the election was held on a party list system rendered the election process a good deal more secure than it would otherwise have been. Unlike an election based on constituencies, where even a few votes can decide the outcome, under the party list system as used for this election, to achieve even one additional seat in a particular electoral district a party would have needed to secure an average of an additional 28,750 votes. This ensured that any unlawful interference with the mechanisms of the elections or the exertion of undue influence would need to be carried out on a truly large scale, with its concomitant risks of detection.

We closely scrutinised the manner in which British Election Supervisors discharged their duties. The great majority were seen by us as discharging their duties with dedication, and at times, great flair. Some energetically persuaded local administrations to vary arrangements which had been made with a disregard for population distribution or for the fact that the elections were taking place during a cease-fire, not, as in April 1979, in a state of war. They also played a creative role in encouraging the political parties, some of whom had little or no experience of organising party machinery, so that the parties would be alive to their rights, and understand the opportunities they had to satisfy themselves as to the integrity of the election process. In our view the British Supervisors made an important contribution to the impartiality of the election process.

The National Election Directorate co-operated with the Election Commissioner, and organised the elections in a commendable fashion. Its publicity campaign contributed to the large turn-out of voters essential to the democratic process.

We saw some evidence of a lack of penetration of the Directorate's pamphlets and posters into some of the more remote and less densely populated areas, and in some instances observed an absence of effort in distributing them at the local level. Further, we found ourselves on occasions being asked to explain the voting procedures by Africans in the Tribal Trust Lands, this notwithstanding the fact that the parties themselves almost invariably featured representations as to how to vote both in their posters and in newspaper advertisements (for examples, see Annex 38). However we are satisfied that on the whole an acceptable effort was made to educate people as to how to vote, and as to the secrecy of the ballot.

When we viewed the Directorate's "How to Vote" film we noticed some errors, but did not consider these to be of any real consequence. The basic messages of secrecy of the ballot and of the process as a whole came across well.

Having studied the arrangements for the elections, we prepared instructions, questionnaires and checklists for completion by all of our teams visiting polling stations during the polling period

#### **PARTICIPATION OF THE PARTIES IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS**

A feature of the electoral process, as in other Commonwealth countries, was the participation of party agents at all stages. Each party was entitled to appoint a polling agent for each polling station in each Province in which it was contesting. Each party could also appoint one election agent and one counting agent for each Province.

Each agent was entitled to witness the ballot box as being empty at the commencement of the poll, and to witness the padlocking of the boxes. At designated polling stations in the urban areas of Salisbury and Bulawayo, the agent was permitted access to the polling station to observe the polling. In other areas he remained outside, but available to witness any exercise of discretion by the Presiding Officer, and to verify the manifest of ballot papers as entries were made. He also witnessed the sealing of the boxes and the storage rooms each evening, and inspected the box at the start of each day's polling to satisfy himself that the storage room and the ballot box had not been tampered with overnight. On each occasion when the ballot box was sealed he was entitled to witness the sealing, sign the paper seals to increase security, and also to affix his own seal. At the end of each day's polling, two of the polling agents were entitled to accompany the ballot boxes to their place of storage overnight, and to return with the ballot box the following morning. Similarly, two polling agents from different parties were entitled to accompany the ballot boxes on their journey to the place at which the reconciliation of the ballot paper count took place, and in the absence of the election agent or the counting agent of his party, the polling agent appointed for the purpose by his party was entitled to witness the reconciliation at Administrative District level. In similar circumstances he was entitled to witness the actual count.

The polling agents were subject to the lawful instructions of Returning Officers and Presiding Officers. They were not permitted to interfere with voters, nor to speak to them unless first spoken to. In accordance with the declarations of secrecy they made, they were not permitted to communicate information obtained in a polling station nor to attempt to ascertain any number on any ballot paper or communicate any information obtained at the count as to the candidate for whom any particular ballot paper was cast. They were obliged to help maintain the secrecy of the voting, and were not permitted to wear party labels etc. inside or outside the polling station.

#### **COMMENT ON PARTICIPATION BY PARTY POLLING AGENTS**

The polling agents had an important role to play both in ensuring the validity of the electoral process, and in assuring their own confidence in the result. When we arrived, the law as it stood enabled polling agents to

be present within the polling stations during the voting. This was in line with the practice in a number of Commonwealth countries, although in Britain the practice has grown up whereby parties merely have their representatives outside the polling stations. In our view it would have been highly desirable, in the special circumstances of these elections, to permit polling agents to be present during the voting. We appreciate that it might have been difficult to accommodate agents of all nine parties in a particular polling station, and that Presiding Officers would have had to have some discretion as to the total numbers they might permit at any one time. The matter was the subject of considerable discussion during the run-up to the elections; at one stage the proposal was to exclude polling agents altogether, except at the beginning and end of polling each day.

The Lancaster House Agreement provided that each party would be entitled to have one representative at each polling station "to observe the polling", and it was a question of interpretation whether this meant inside a polling station or simply at one. The point was also made that the presence of some particular persons as polling agents might have had an intimidating effect on some voters, and their presence, particularly in smaller, rural polling stations, might have eroded belief in the secrecy of the ballot. On these twin grounds a final decision was taken after consultation with the Election Council to permit polling agents in polling stations during the voting only in certain polling stations in the Salisbury and Bulawayo areas (Annex 39). Had it not been for the fact that in virtually every rural polling station there was to be a British policeman present as an Assistant Election Supervisor, we would have felt some misgivings about the exclusion of the parties. As it happened, and perhaps as a result of the decision to have British policemen, there was little substantial objection from the parties to the decision. Copies of our correspondence with the Election Commissioner appear as Annex 40.

#### COMMENTS ON THE WHITE ROLL POLL

The election on the White Roll took place on 14 February. Only six of the 20 white seats were contested, and in all six contests the Rhodesia Front candidates were returned. The size of the poll varied between 50 and 60 per cent. We visited polling stations in each of the constituencies, and observed an uneventful poll.

We were made aware of dissatisfaction among people of Asian and Coloured (mixed race) origin that they had been included on the White Roll without consultation or consent. Their inclusion in the White Roll was a provision in the Lancaster House Agreement, and nothing could be done to alter it at this stage. We noted a widespread feeling among white Rhodesians that their future was going to be decided not by the White Roll election but by the Common Roll election in which they could not take part. The only real complaint came from an independent candidate, who said a policy decision had been taken by ZRBC on 13 February to deny eve of poll coverage to the independent candidates because they were not "a party".

As noted earlier, the White Roll election differed in major respects from the Common Roll election. It was conducted on a roll of voters, constituencies had been delimited, and a form of preferential voting was adopted.

## MODE OF OBSERVATION OF THE COMMON ROLL POLL

As noted, we deployed our strength to ensure a comprehensive coverage of the country. In visiting polling stations, our role was to observe. We did not see it as desirable to become embroiled in any disputes, or to take sides in any arguments. We saw our presence as a benign one, and endeavoured to act with discretion at all times. It was for us to be impartial, objective and even-handed. On the few occasions when we were concerned about an aspect of the procedures, wherever possible we drew the attention of a British Supervisor or an Assistant Supervisor to it, and some times directly to a Presiding Officer.

Members of the Group were only able to visit polling stations in some remote areas by travelling in vehicles with the British Supervisors. We saw no objection to this, as included in our mandate was observation of the manner in which the elections were supervised.

On the first day of polling, as many of the Group as possible were present at polling stations before polling commenced, to inspect the empty ballot boxes and to witness the sealing of the lids.

Similarly, each evening, we were present at polling stations when they closed, to inspect the sealing of the boxes for transportation, and to satisfy ourselves that voters within the precincts of the polling stations were permitted to vote before they closed. On as many occasions as possible, members of the Group travelled with the sealed ballot boxes between polling stations and the places of overnight storage. On the mornings of the second and third days of polling, members of the Group witnessed the inspection of the seals by the party polling agents, and the re-opening of the slot in the boxes.

Each of us carried checklists (Annex 41) which we completed in respect of each visit we made to a polling station. As we approached polling stations we first satisfied ourselves that people were not being obstructed in their efforts to go and vote, and on arrival we spoke to those waiting to vote to ascertain e.g. how far they had had to walk, for how long they had been waiting, and whether anything untoward had taken place. We also took careful note of the security arrangements to see if they were unduly conspicuous, and might be regarded as having a coercive effect on voters. We noted, too, the degree of orderliness in the area surrounding polling stations. We ascertained which of the parties were represented by polling agents, and spoke to these agents to see if they had anything they wished to tell us. We then observed the conduct of the eligibility procedures before entering the polling stations to check if the voting procedures were being scrupulously followed. There we spoke to any British Election Supervisor or Assistant Supervisor who was present, and also to the Presiding Officer. We paid special attention to the layout of the polling station to satisfy ourselves that the booths were so placed as to enable voters to mark their ballot papers in complete confidence that their vote was secret. We also checked the seal on the ballot box. On occasions we looked through the viewer in the lightbox to examine the hands of voters chosen at random to satisfy ourselves that they had not previously voted.

On leaving a polling station we made a point of speaking to some of

those who had cast their votes to determine whether they were satisfied with the arrangements and with the secrecy of the ballot. We also took note of the manner in which voters had been transported to polling stations. Where a polling station was sited near a protected village, we tried to visit the village to assure ourselves that the people there felt free to leave to vote. We also endeavoured to be present at busy polling stations at the end of each day's polling, where intending voters might be turned away. In some cases, as urban polling stations closed later than rural polling stations it was possible for one member of the Group to witness the conclusion of the day's polling in two different places. The checklists we completed in respect of each polling station noted the time of arrival and the time of departure and the approximate number of voters processed in the interim. This enabled us to build up a picture of the adequacy of the facilities and the speed of processing in different parts of the country.

At the conclusion of the polling on the third and final day, members of the Group travelled with the ballot boxes to the place of storage and onwards to the Administrative District Centre where verification of the used and unused ballot papers took place. This we observed in 42 of the 55 districts. Those members of the Group then observed the repacking and the resealing of the ballot boxes, and travelled on with them to the Provincial Centre for the count. Similarly, we were represented at each of the eight provincial counts. Because of rumours of the possibility of ballot box substitution, the transportation and storage of the boxes received our close attention. We further checked the spoilt ballot papers at the count to see if there was any pattern to these, particularly as we had seen a pamphlet which had been distributed in Mashonaland East which suggested that as both Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo needed the support of voters, supporters of the Patriotic Front alliance should mark their ballot papers in favour of both the PF and ZANU(PF). During the count we observed a good number of ballot papers which had been marked in this way in this Province, but otherwise there appeared to be no general pattern to the ballot papers which were disallowed.

In working out our itineraries for each day, we were conscious of the need to strike a balance between the number of polling stations we covered, and the amount of time we spent in them. Schedules that would have had us spending most of the day travelling and relatively small periods of time at polling stations were, wherever possible, avoided.

At the end of each day, each member of the Group completed a daily questionnaire (Annex 42) to provide an overview of what had been observed that day. Each evening the information was collated at provincial offices and telephoned to Salisbury so that the Chairman and Observers in Salisbury had a picture of the situation across the country, and were able to keep each Provincial Centre informed of the pattern of events in other areas. At the conclusion of the poll, a debriefing questionnaire was similarly completed (Annex 43).

In view of the large excess of ballot papers printed, we paid special attention to security arrangements for the ballot papers, and to the manner in which they were handled administratively up to the point where they were entrusted to Presiding Officers and the verification procedures became effective.

## CONCLUSIONS ON THE COMMON ROLL POLL

Over the course of the three days of polling for the Common Roll seats, members of the Group visited 437 polling stations in 54 Administrative Districts (Annex 44). A large number of stations in the urban areas were visited several times. For accommodation purposes our Assistants and supporting staff were located around the country in 30 centres. We were determined to visit as many different polling stations as we reasonably could, even though this could involve spending more time travelling than witnessing the poll.

After the close of the poll, Assistants and supporting staff travelled with a large number of ballot boxes to 42 District Centres, where they observed the reconciliation between used and unused ballot papers. From these centres, they travelled with an even larger number of ballot boxes to Provincial Centres to observe the count for each Provincial District.

The account of the polling arrangements indicates particular areas where we felt vigilance was required. These were the adequacy and siting of polling stations in relation to the estimate of voters in each area and the distances voters would have to travel; the determination of eligibility; the effectiveness of the dye to prevent multiple voting; the conduct of polling staff; the facilities provided for polling agents; and the environment in which polling took place. We comment on these in turn. Before doing so we would note that over the period of the poll we spoke to many thousands of voters, and in so doing we took the opportunity to canvass all the matters which had concerned us over the period of the campaign. In particular we were anxious to determine whether the voters felt under duress or any other form of intimidation, and whether they believed in the secrecy of the ballot. These discussions confirmed us in the view we have come to.

### Adequacy of polling facilities

During our discussions with party leaders, some expressed their concern that the number of polling stations would not be adequate. They felt that planning had been based on arrangements for the 1979 elections, and as they had campaigned for abstention, with a considerable degree of success in the eastern region of the country, these did not provide a reliable basis. We took up the matter with the Election Commissioner. However, final polling arrangements were not made until very late in the day, and were often influenced by available transport facilities. This left insufficient time for us to offer constructive suggestions, as it was already too late for changes to be made.

There seemed to us to be grounds for concern, particularly as in Manicaland, where only some 46.7 per cent voted in 1979, the number of polling stations was marginally reduced, from 76 to 67. At the same time, although the overall number of polling stations was reduced from 1979, the number of mobile stations throughout the country was substantially increased - from 244 to 321. This meant that a higher emphasis was placed on mobility. A number of mobiles were held in reserve so as to be able to reinforce polling stations which were under particular pressure.

While we would have wished to see more polling stations provided in some

areas, we are nonetheless satisfied that polling facilities were acceptable. A less highly motivated electorate might not have found them so, but voters were prepared, where it became necessary, to walk very long distances to exercise their franchise. The turn-out on the first day was unexpectedly high and most polling stations were able to cope though, at some, several thousand voters had to be asked to return the next day. In some places, too, extra polling booths had to be added, mobile stations brought in to relieve congestion at static polling stations, and schedules for mobiles rearranged. Such steps were taken at our suggestion on several occasions, and underscored the recognised need for flexibility. For example, when one of us arrived at Jichedza in Ndanga District we found about 7,000 people waiting to vote at a mobile scheduled to stay for only a further four hours. In many parts of the country, mobiles fell well behind schedule in this way owing to underestimation of the numbers who would be voting. The progress of mobiles on days two and three was hindered by wet weather, and a small number failed to reach all of their scheduled polling places. Voters who had to wait in long queues, often in hot sun or rain, generally did so in good humour. The size of the turn-out confirmed our impression, gained from observations in all parts of the country, that the combination of static and mobile polling stations in the event adequately served the electorate, although there were some instances where, because of a combination of flooded rivers and similar hazards, a number of people never had the opportunity to vote.

#### **Eligibility**

The procedures for determining eligibility worked well on the whole. There seemed little difficulty over nationality and residence, but some problems arose over age, the limit being 18 years. Documentary proof was sought, and we have no reason to doubt that some incorrect decisions were made, both to allow and not to allow persons to vote. We do not think that such decisions involved sufficient voters to have any material effect.

Some would-be voters who were clearly under age were turned away, one on no fewer than three separate occasions as he twice returned wearing different shirts. Women carrying babies seemed in some areas to be automatically accepted as being over 18, and party polling agents occasionally helped at times of difficulty. Contrary to what had been indicated to us, police reservists in some districts did carry out a preliminary screening of voters who were obviously under age, especially on the first day of polling when the pressure of numbers was particularly acute. None of the polling agents objected to this except for a ZANU(PF) representative at Dangambura, and in most areas police and police reservists were careful not to become involved in the procedures. The practice was stopped in Karoi, at our suggestion. One Presiding Officer in Gwanda found it necessary to inspect the teeth of those of whose age he was uncertain. Another in Que Que, found bust measurements to be of assistance. We also observed a number of Coloureds being turned away in accordance with the law.

#### **Search procedures**

Presiding Officers had the discretion to request the Security Forces or the police to search persons before they entered polling stations. Where this was carried out, it was done with a minimum of inconvenience and in an acceptable manner. We observed instances where wives of police officers were searching women voters, as there were apparently insufficient women police for this purpose. This did not appear to give rise to any problems.

## Multiple voting

The practice of having a voter dip the fingers of both hands in an invisible dye which showed up under ultra-violet light to prevent multiple voting similarly worked well. Some difficulty was experienced with those who handled paints and chemicals in the course of their employment. Their cases were fairly handled. We saw such voters being asked to wash their hands well, and being almost invariably allowed to vote on their return. It was also quite clear when a person had got the dye on his hands from shaking hands with a person who had recently voted. Mango juice also reacted to the ultra-violet light. At one polling station in Charter District we witnessed a test being carried out which established this, and also that those who had eaten mangoes recently could be distinguished from those who had voted.

We have already referred to the tests we ourselves made with various cleansers and barrier creams to satisfy ourselves that the dye test was proof against malpractice. On the second day of polling, there were strong rumours in Salisbury that some persons had been able to vote more than once after washing off the dye with Coca-Cola. It was reported that one local journalist had himself been able to obtain a second ballot paper. We promptly arranged a further series of tests, and invited the journalist to take part. It demonstrated that the soft drink did not remove the dye. The journalist accepted that the reason for his success in getting a second ballot paper could not have been due to any special property of the soft drink.

We issued a press release (Annex 45) on the result of our test, and we are glad that our action helped to defuse a potential crisis of confidence in the voting process. The Election Commissioner was able to use our test to allay the doubts of journalists and thereby the doubts of the public at a crowded press conference that evening. Some of the journalists also tested the solvent qualities of Coca-Cola on the following day, and confirmed our result.

There were other rumours, too. One was to the effect that a busload of supporters of one party had been arrested after they had each voted a number of times. Another, that a particular brand of Russian toothpaste could remove the dye; a third, in Belingwe, that sheep's urine was effective. We are satisfied that none of these rumours had any basis in fact.

The invisible dye gets in the crevices of the fingernail, and under the cuticle. Even if a solvent had some effect on this dye, it would have to be very carefully used to eradicate all traces, and even small traces showed under the lightbox. Because of this, had a substantial number attempted to vote more than once, detections would have been very much more numerous than they were. The dye is invisible other than under ultra-violet light, and a person would not normally be able to know if all traces had been removed.

We witnessed several arrests on charges of attempted dual voting, and in Salisbury a group of 6 was taken into custody. In Bulawayo on 29 February some 67 charges out of 183 were heard relating to allegations of multiple voting, and 33 of the defendants were found not to have voted when their hands were examined in court in a lightbox. Thirty-three people were convicted of the offence in Harare. In all there were 236 arrests made and by 11 March 93 convictions had been entered. This tends to confirm our

impression that the persons in charge of the lightboxes were on the whole scrupulously careful and turned away voters about whom they had any doubt. There is, of course, the possibility of human error. Polling staff who had been less careful in scrutinising hands in the lightboxes may have let some voters vote again. All the evidence points to this having occurred very infrequently, and not on such a scale as to influence the outcome of the poll. There was also no credible evidence that the multiple voters who were detected were from any particular party.

Further, had voters been successful in circumventing the dye test on a substantial scale, it should have led to higher voting figures on successive days. It is a matter of record that this did not happen. Instead the figures progressively fell. A very large poll on the first day (1,375,468) was followed by only about two-thirds as many voting on the second day (905,678); on the third day the numbers were less than half as many as on the second day (418,304). We also note that no formal complaint was made to us by any party that the dye test was circumvented.

In some areas we noted that the batteries which powered the lightboxes went flat much more quickly than had been anticipated, but though the light was somewhat weak at times we did not encounter any shortage of batteries.

#### **Attitude of polling staff**

We observed that polling staff, drawn from both communities, generally carried out their functions ably and without partiality. Many Presiding Officers took pride in the arrangements they had made and polling stations afforded the required degree of secrecy. Some officials even went beyond the stipulated requirements when it came to sealing ballot boxes, e.g. by adding additional seals. Most polling staff were patient and helpful with voters, and some gave thoughtful preference to the elderly and the handicapped.

We came across only a few exceptions to the general pattern, e.g. of officious staff who made voting needlessly difficult. When we drew attention to such behaviour, official action was invariably taken to redress the position. There were also some officials who ran their stations without sufficient regard for the proper procedures, but these were very small in number.

On two occasions, in Makoni District, illiterate voters complained to us that their ballot papers had been marked by an official as being for a party other than the one they wished to vote for. Both involved the same Presiding Officer, and action was initiated by us to remedy the position. In one district, Bindura, three polling officers had been dismissed shortly before we arrived, for urging voters to vote for a particular party, and staff were also dismissed at Centenary (3), Chibi (1) and Wedza (1).

The deployment of British policemen, unarmed and wearing their distinctive helmets as Assistant Supervisors, at most rural polling stations achieved a psychological breakthrough in reassuring the electorate of the secrecy of the ballot and the impartiality of polling staff. They played a valuable role, just by their presence, but most were active in useful ways helping voting to

proceed smoothly. Above all their presence inside the polling stations had a calming influence. We would like to add our own tribute to the British authorities who conceived the idea, as well as to the policemen who saw it through so splendidly.

We were treated with courtesy and with due regard for our role on our many visits to polling stations, though on occasion we encountered Presiding Officers who thought that we should remain at least 100 metres away from polling stations. We did not. If we record a single exception, we do so underlining the fact that it was exceptional. At one station the Presiding Officer commented that he was 'sick and tired' both of the Commonwealth Observers and of having to "assist all these illiterate blacks who are going to take over the country".

### **Party representatives**

The polling agents of the major parties were present at most polling stations, and took an active interest in proceedings. We made a special point of speaking to them, and eliciting their views as to how the arrangements were working. In the urban areas where they were allowed inside polling stations, the rotation of agents from different parties worked well. With the one exception we note below, polling agents at all the stations we visited expressed satisfaction with the arrangements. They had participated in the handling and sealing of the ballot boxes, and were satisfied that no tampering with the boxes had taken place. They were confident in the sealing arrangements, and had signed the paper seals. They had inspected the manifest of ballot papers, and the ballot papers themselves. They were generally kept informed when pads of ballot papers were exhausted and new pads were introduced. Where they were advised, they carefully noted the numbers of the ballot papers used. However, in both Sipolilo and Makoni Districts, some Presiding Officers refused to disclose to polling agents the closing ballot paper number at the end of each day's polling.

We were also encouraged to observe the friendly spirit between rival parties. They chatted together, joked together, shared transport, and on occasions lunched together. The same ability to work together that we had witnessed at leadership level at the Election Council seemed to us to extend down to the party workers at the grass roots. Nor did the rival groups of party supporters, who were permitted to gather at a distance of 100 metres from polling stations, show signs of hostility.

At many rural stations, Presiding Officers misunderstood the law and required party representatives to remain 100 metres away from the polling stations. Where this happened it underscored a feeling on the part of some party workers that they were being excluded from the process by not being admitted to polling stations. We drew attention to this misunderstanding wherever we encountered it, and some Presiding Officers then permitted the polling agents to be present immediately outside their polling stations.

### **Environment**

This same spirit was reflected in the queues at polling stations. With the exception of a very few stations, the voters appeared to us to be relaxed. At times they faced wet weather and long walks with good humour. We took special note of the atmosphere in areas reputed to be dominated by particular parties. We must say that, although some of the electorate may have felt

under pressure, our impression was that the voters were voting freely and in a spirit of optimism about the future. We were surprised, too, to see voters as they left polling booths begin to sing and dance on their way home.

Dancing, singing and political activity was banned within 100 metres of a polling station. Beyond that point, groups frequently gathered to demonstrate their allegiances. Again, this was done in a relaxed and tolerant manner. The wearing of party T-shirts to polling stations, too, was not permitted in some areas, and on occasions women voters went behind trees to discreetly turn their T-shirts inside out. But in places persons were permitted to vote while wearing party T-shirts and, in a few, carrying party posters.

The call-up had resulted in a large presence of Security Forces and police. The point was made to us that the mere presence of the Security Forces in such large numbers could itself be intimidatory. On the other hand, the Administration considered it preferable to be overprepared to deal with any contingency and it is true that a few polling stations were fired on, though this did not prevent the polling from continuing. Nor did the Security Forces appear to have obstructed voters from getting to the polls. One air mobile was so full of security personnel that its Captain rejected the carrying of party representatives. In Bikita District, voters told us that they were afraid of the Security Force Auxiliaries who were on duty outside the polling station, but that this would not affect the way in which they intended to vote. In general our impression was that the Auxiliaries were little in evidence over the period of the poll.

In various areas we observed people canvassing the queues. The canvassers were not confined to one party, and though we paid special attention to this we did not find any evidence that this exceeded permissible bounds. At Cambara in Chilimanzi District, a Presiding Officer wore a UANC badge.

#### **Assistance to voters**

The number of persons who asked for assistance in marking their ballot papers varied quite markedly from area to area. Whenever this occurred in our presence we observed the proceedings closely and frequently asked voters once they had left the polling station whether they were satisfied with what had taken place. Almost invariably they were although at one polling station in Makoni District, as we have noted, two voters complained to us that the Presiding Officer had incorrectly marked their papers.

Those most in need of assistance were older women and labourers on the commercial farms. At one polling station the Presiding Officer refused to assist anyone, as being a breach of secrecy, but when we pointed this out to a British Supervisor the position was corrected.

We would emphasise that the language barrier at times made it difficult for us to assess the position inside the polling stations, but we used our interpreters to speak with voters as they left to ascertain whether or not they were satisfied.

### **Storage of ballot boxes**

We paid special attention to the ballot boxes, at all stages of the proceedings. Members of the Group observed them when empty at the start of the poll, witnessed the initial sealing of the lid, witnessed the sealing of the slot each day, and travelled with as many boxes as possible both to places of overnight storage and, ultimately, to the places where the counts took place. We also made a point of discussing with party agents the question of security of the ballot boxes, and none expressed any serious concern. They all had a lively appreciation of the role they themselves could play in assuring that nothing untoward took place. In Gwelo, there was an instance of rain beating through a window and spoiling the paper tapes which sealed the lid. There was no suggestion that any ballot papers had been worked into the box through the crack, since the sticking paper was, in any event, not the principal means by which the boxes were sealed, this being by means of lock, string, hasp and sealing wax.

Overnight security was similarly sound. Polling agents could not actually sleep with the ballot boxes but in Wedza District, four polling agents from different parties bedded together outside the door of the District Commissioner's office all night.

### **Other discrepancies**

It is important to place the deficiencies observed into a correct perspective. As our observations of the poll were carried out on a very wide scale, it was inevitable that some would be detected. In recording a sample of these, we would not wish it to convey the impression that they were such as to detract in any way from our general conclusions.

In several Provinces we observed small numbers of misprinted ballot papers - some contained voting details but no numbers, others were blank except for a number. These were marked as spoilt ballots.

In Victoria Province a senior administration official was so convinced that widespread intimidation was taking place that he wanted a particular party proscribed for the third day of the poll. A concerted and energetic attempt followed to collect affidavits throughout the Province in order to substantiate a case for consideration by the Governor. In one instance we were told by a British Election Supervisor that a duplicated form of affidavit about intimidatory practices of ZANU(PF) had been provided to the District Commissioner in Zaka to which the name and signature of the complainant needed only to be added. Nothing we observed in the Province justified the Provincial Commissioner doing this. One hundred and eighty three affidavits were submitted to the Governor, who took no action. In the Midlands, a helicopter hovered over a prison, broadcasting a message exhorting detainees how to vote, while they were actually voting, and in several areas the same party showered the environs of polling stations with party leaflets.

Some voters were worried that their crosses could be seen through the paper and be detected after they had folded their papers, though generally voters seemed quite relaxed about this.

On the commercial farms, visited by mobiles, the employer sometimes seemed to be too close to where his employees were voting, and on occasions entered the polling station, but there was nothing noted that was untoward where employers had transported their workers to static polling stations.

It was plain that even before the count began, some politicians were preparing the ground in advance to repudiate the election results. We carefully considered the various allegations they made, in respect of multiple voting, under-age voting, bussing, intimidation and the like, and in the light of our observations satisfied ourselves that they were without substance.

The percentage of the electorate who voted was estimated at 93.6 per cent, but we would caution that the figure for the total number of eligible voters was based on estimates in which there was a substantial margin for error.

### **Secrecy**

As the question of secrecy was of prime importance as a counter to intimidation, we were careful in observing the layout inside polling stations and the conduct of polling staff in this regard. In all the polling stations we visited, the polling booths were so located and of such a design as to ensure that voters could mark their papers in complete privacy.

Although ballot papers were, at our suggestion, often pre-folded by polling staff, voters did not always refold them in the same way so as to leave the validating perforation visible. This, coupled with the narrow slot which could not accommodate ballot papers which had been folded over several times, meant that in practice officials standing near ballot boxes in many cases did, in fact, handle ballot papers and refold them. This was irregular, but we observed it being done in a manner designed to prevent the official from seeing how particular voters had marked their papers.

The fact that the papers would be taken to Britain for destruction had impressed itself on one voter to the extent that she asked whether, before placing it in the ballot box, she should affix a postage stamp.

### **Verification and count**

We attended the verifications in 42 districts, and observed a very high degree of correlation between used and unused ballot papers. For a variety of reasons, not the least of which being that on occasions voters do not place their ballot paper in the box but in their pockets and take them away with them, there is in any election a disparity between the number of ballot papers issued and those found in the ballot boxes. We have had experience of elections in many parts of the Commonwealth, and can say with confidence that the verifications witnessed demonstrated as high a degree of reconciliation as we could have hoped for. This also suggested that voting procedures had worked well over the period of the poll.

We were also present throughout the count at each of the counting places. British Supervisors were also present, and we observed them as they discharged their duties. We were satisfied that the count was conducted in an

orderly and proper manner. Where ballot papers were disallowed as failing to give an adequate indication of the voter's preference, polling agents were given an opportunity to express a view. In the overwhelming number of instances we observed, we would have endorsed the final decision made by the Returning Officer. As previously noted, apart from instances of voters marking their ballots in favour of both members of the Patriotic Front alliance in Mashonaland East, there appeared to be no discernible pattern to the votes that were disallowed. The total of spoiled ballot papers, 52,746 out of a total poll of over 2.7 million, represented the very low level of 1.95 per cent. This included a large number of ballot papers that had been placed in ballot boxes unmarked, and a number were marked on the reverse.

#### **Interim Report by British Election Commissioner**

In the Interim Report to the Governor dated 2 March 1980, the Election Commissioner, Sir John Boynton, dealt with a number of aspects of the elections. His general conclusion was as follows :

"9.1 My general conclusion is that, in the Rhodesian context earlier described, the elections were in general a reflection of the wishes of the people, though in no sense free from intimidation and pressure. However my view is that in the country as a whole the degree of intimidation and pressure was not so great as to invalidate the overall results of the poll.

9.2 I have however doubts whether this general judgement can fairly be applied to certain areas in three provinces - Victoria, Manicaland and the Midlands.

9.3 In the majority of Victoria Province, (particularly in Gutu District), in Buhera in Manicaland, and in Belingwe and the TTLs in Charter, Chilimanzi, Selukwe and Shabani in the Midlands Province, the high level of intimidation and the pressures upon voters to vote for a particular party are likely in my view to have distorted the pattern of voting. In saying this, I have taken into account that there was a high degree of commitment to one political party. My conclusion is that in these areas the result of the elections will have been affected by intimidation.

9.4 However, notwithstanding the distortion of voting in certain areas, I think my general conclusion must stand, that in the Rhodesian context the overall result of the elections will broadly reflect the wishes of the people of Rhodesia."

We were ourselves represented in all of the districts mentioned in the Report but did not observe an appreciable level of intimidation or pressure over the period of the poll. There were examples of party supporters soliciting the support of persons waiting to vote by walking up and down the queues, and while we considered this undesirable we did not get any impression of threats. A number of those waiting, too, signalled their support for their party by flapping their elbows and making a crowing sound. This was done by supporters of ZANU(PF) whose symbol was the cockerel. We did not consider these to be threatening, but rather to be further evidence of the good humour which generally marked events on polling days.

In his Interim Report the Election Commissioner also says that many voters by-passed nearer polling stations in obedience to party instructions, to swamp other more distant polling stations "where no doubt their party

discipline and control was more rigid."

We did encounter instances of voters by-passing polling stations, particularly where they resided in districts which had been threatened with disenfranchisement by the Governor. It was our impression that instructions had gone out from their party in anticipation of this occurring, urging them (quite lawfully) to walk into a neighbouring district not under such threat so as to vote there. It seemed to us that there had not been time to countermand this exhortation, and that the voters who passed polling stations generally thought they ran the risk of not having their vote counted if they voted there. However we also encountered instances where some voters had walked considerable distances and passed polling stations in order to vote at a polling station, for example close to the Echo assembly point in Invanga District. We also witnessed a small number of voters who made little attempt to prevent others present from seeing how they had marked their ballot papers.

The Election Commissioner also says that in Victoria Province and in parts of Manicaland and the Midlands the massive turnout on the first day was "largely achieved by aggressive 'herding' of voters by party supporters". It is a matter of record that the massive turnout on the first day was common throughout the country when nearly half the possible number of voters cast their ballots. Certainly ZANU(PF) had made an effort to encourage its supporters to vote early, and this undoubtedly succeeded. However, although as noted we paid particular attention to the freedom with which voters came to the polling places, we saw no direct evidence of any "aggressive herding".

In the light of our observations in the Districts and Provinces referred to by the Election Commissioner, we can affirm that our coverage was such as to persuade us that any of the malpractices to which he referred were not carried out on any wide scale. As to his conclusions that in these areas the result of the election was affected by intimidation, we can only point to the fact that these results were in line with the country-wide trend. Moreover the result of the count for Salisbury, which as only part of Mashonaland East was not announced separately, persuades us that on the whole the elections were comparatively free of intimidation. It is a significant fact that while at no stage was any serious allegation of intimidation received from any quarter concerning the urban district of Salisbury, yet it too, voted overwhelmingly for ZANU(PF).

Thus while we have reservations as to the extent of the distortion of voting suggested by the Interim Report of the Election Commissioner, we would endorse his general conclusion that the result of the election broadly reflected the wishes of the people of Rhodesia.

#### **THE RESULT**

The detailed results of the Common Roll election appear as Annex 46. The successful parties were ZANU(PF) (57 seats), the PF (20 seats) and the UANC (3 seats).