

# Southern Rhodesia Elections

February, 1980

The Report of the Commonwealth  
Observer Group on elections leading  
to independent Zimbabwe



Commonwealth Secretariat

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
8 March 1980

Dear Secretary-General,

Pursuant to the Lusaka Accord and the Lancaster House Agreement, we were invited to observe the recent elections in Southern Rhodesia. We sent you an Interim Report on 1 March, before the count had commenced, and now have pleasure in forwarding our Final Report for transmission to Commonwealth Heads of Government.

May we say how privileged we feel to have been of service to the Commonwealth and to the people of Zimbabwe.

Yours sincerely,




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
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
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
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
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# SOUTHERN RHODESIA

150 Kilometres



## LEGEND

- Principal towns
- 1 MASHONALAND WEST
- 2 MASHONALAND CENTRAL
- 3 MASHONALAND EAST
- 4 MATABELELAND NORTH
- 5 MATABELELAND SOUTH
- 6 MIDLANDS
- 7 MANICALAND
- 8 VICTORIA


MAP 1

Reference map showing Electoral District boundaries and principal centres.

# SOUTHERN RHODESIA

150 Kilometres

○ Principal towns



## LEGEND

- Assembly Place
- △ Lieut.Colonel and Teams with Rhodesian Forces
- Multiple Monitor Team
- ◇ Single Monitor Team
- ◊ Airfield Monitor Team
- Lieut.Colonel with Patriotic Front Forces

MAP 2

Map showing Assembly Places and monitoring arrangements for Rhodesian Security Forces and the guerrilla armies.

# SOUTHERN RHODESIA


150 Kilometres

Z A M B I A

M O Z A M B I Q U E

B O T S W A N A

S O U T H A F R I C A



**LEGEND**

- Principal towns
- ▲ Single Observer
- ② Observer team (numbers as shown)

**MAP 3**  
Disposition of Commonwealth Observer Group over period of Poll.

## INTRODUCTION

---

An integral feature of the Accord reached by Commonwealth Heads of Government at Lusaka in August 1979, and the ensuing Lancaster House Agreement was the decision to hold free and fair elections in Southern Rhodesia, properly supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth Observers.

Accordingly, our Group was constituted by the Commonwealth Secretary-General to observe the elections, and we were given the following Terms of Reference:-

"The Observer Group will observe and report to Commonwealth Heads of Government on all relevant aspects of the organisation and conduct of the elections in Southern Rhodesia held pursuant to the agreement at the Lancaster House Conference. Their function will be to ascertain in their impartial judgement, whether, in the context of the Lusaka accord and the Lancaster House Conference, the elections were free and fair. In furtherance of this objective, it will be competent for the Group to bring to the attention of the administering authorities from time to time such matters as they consider pertinent."\*

We came to our task deeply conscious of the importance that Commonwealth Heads of Government attached to it. At their meeting in Lusaka they had laid the basis for the Lancaster House Conference that was to agree on arrangements to bring Southern Rhodesia to freedom as Zimbabwe. We were called upon to determine whether the election, which was a critical part of those arrangements, was, indeed, conducted and supervised freely and fairly. A special trust therefore devolved on us.

Our mandate gave us no executive or supervisory role. We were to observe, and arrive at a decision on the basis of our observations. We were aware, however, that the spirit of the discussions at Lusaka and of subsequent consultations among Commonwealth Governments did not enjoin on us a passive attitude. The proper discharge of our responsibilities required us to share fully in the Commonwealth commitment to ensure that the election we were to observe would be so organised and conducted as to pave the way for Rhodesia's emergence to freedom in peace. This obliged us to use our good offices, where possible, towards the attainment of the objective of a free and fair election, while remaining true to our status as Observers.

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\* Relevant excerpts from the paper containing our Terms of Reference, agreed by the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa on 14 December 1979, appear as Annex 1. The Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa, established by Heads of Government several years ago, met regularly throughout the Lancaster House Conference and on two occasions while the Group was in Rhodesia, on 15 and 21 February, 1980.

Southern Rhodesia has no parallel in the annals of decolonisation, within the Commonwealth or outside it. We were conscious, therefore, of the unique chapter of history it was our duty to witness.

When Commonwealth leaders met in Lusaka in August 1979 they did so against the sombre background of an escalating civil war which was threatening to become an international flash-point and which the internal settlement of 3 March 1978 had failed to end. Their accord on measures to bring Rhodesia to independence on the basis of majority rule was a high water mark in Commonwealth diplomacy, and a significant vindication of the value of Commonwealth summit conferences. Lusaka set in train the processes that brought the major protagonists in the Rhodesian conflict to Lancaster House where they engaged in what was perhaps the longest unbroken conference on the constitutional future of a country. Within Rhodesia, the war continued to be waged with ferocity, even as the belligerents joined Britain in signing the agreement that the conference ultimately produced. The agreement covered the terms of an independence constitution, a cease-fire, and pre-independence arrangements leading up to the election (the pre-independence arrangements and the Cease-fire Agreement appear as Annex 2).

Elections preceding independence had been the pattern for the evolution of many colonies to nationhood. But the circumstances attending this election were vastly different from those with which the world is familiar. It was taking place in the immediate aftermath of a bitter civil war which had deeply scarred the country. It was to be held within eight weeks of a cease-fire between armies that had been fighting each other for seven years. The armies had not been disarmed; nor had their suspicion and mistrust of each other been dispelled. Not surprisingly, the cease-fire was to prove somewhat fragile. Martial law continued to be in force, and normality was far from being restored. In many parts of the country, the writ of government had ceased to run.

The psychological legacy of years of war was as palpable as some of its physical consequences were visible. More than half a million people had been uprooted from their homes and were living behind barbed wire in "protected villages". An even larger number, estimated at about 750,000 had left their villages to seek sanctuary in shanty towns on the outskirts of cities. Another 228,000, or about the same number as the white community as a whole, were refugees in neighbouring countries. Almost all adult whites had acquired arms, and many, including women, went about their daily lives carrying them. Hotels offered safe storage for guns more frequently than for valuables.

Two of the main political parties contesting the election had just become legitimate after years of proscription. Most of their leaders had only shortly before returned to the country after long years of enforced exile. The country's media had only recently been permitted to mention their names, and censorship continued to apply to anything which was deemed, even remotely, to affect security.

Britain had just resumed responsibility as the colonial power, signifying an end to the state of rebellion. This was marked by the arrival of the Governor, Lord Soames, and his installation in Government House in Salisbury. But the British presence was minimal; its power rested on the compliance of an undisturbed administrative and security structure dominated by whites who had

loyally served the previous regime. The Ministers who had been in authority had agreed not to exercise their ministerial functions; they continued to use their official designations, draw their pay, occupy official houses and enjoy perquisites of office even as they took to the hustings.

Such was the setting for the election we were to observe. It was clear from the outset that in measuring the extent to which it was a valid test of the people's choice, there were no ready-made yardsticks and it would be unrealistic to apply criteria appropriate for elections elsewhere in conditions of peace, stability and orderly political behaviour.

We functioned on behalf of all Commonwealth Governments but did not represent any of them. We served in our personal capacities and were drawn from eleven countries and from four continents. We came from diverse backgrounds and assembled a variety of experience, including experience of the organisation and conduct of elections. We were accompanied to Rhodesia by 22 Assistants. After protracted negotiations with Government House, we were joined by 30 additional Assistants for the period of the poll, instead of the 55 we had sought (Relevant correspondence appears as Annex 3). Observers and Assistants alike enjoyed the same high level of access and facilities for the proper observation of the electoral process and the poll itself. The Commonwealth Secretariat provided a multinational team to assist the mission.

The election in Rhodesia drew perhaps the largest number of international observers present at any election in the world. We were by far the largest group and spent the longest time in the country. We were independent of other observers, though we were happy that many of them sought us out to share their observations with us. Our mandate came from the Heads of Government of the 42 Commonwealth member states, and our genesis lay in their collective decision at Lusaka.

What impressed us most profoundly soon after our arrival in Salisbury was the deep desire for peace on the part of people in all walks of life. This impression, gained in our first few days, was reinforced throughout our stay. The desire for peace transcended racial and political divisions, acute as these were. We felt this was a good augury for the election whose successful completion could be expected to lead the people of Rhodesia to independence.

In London, en route to Rhodesia, we met the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr. Shridath Ramphal, whose remarks to us are at Annex 4. We also took the opportunity of meeting Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Relations, Lord Carrington, who had chaired the Lancaster House Conference. In welcoming us, he emphasised the paramount importance of our work, and assured us of the co-operation of the British administration in Rhodesia.

The Group and its first complement of 22 Assistants reached Salisbury on 24 January. We began our work with discussions with the Governor and senior officials both British and Rhodesian. We also addressed letters to the leaders of all political parties asking to meet them (Annex 5), and were able to have detailed discussions with Mr. Joshua Nkomo (Patriotic Front), Mr. Robert Mugabe (ZANU - PF), Mr. James Chikerema (Zimbabwe Democratic Party), the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole (ZANU), Mr. George Kluckow (Rhodesian Front) and Mr. Henry Chihota (National Democratic Union). All of them welcomed our presence, and we kept in touch with them or their representatives throughout our stay.

We regret that Bishop Abel Muzorewa, President of the United African National Council, was unable to see us. The letters exchanged with him are at Annex 6. Some of us were, however, able to talk to him informally and a few others met senior UANC members in the provinces. Most of us also met prominent members of the other parties during our travels including Chief Ndiweni (UNFP) and Dr. Bertrand (UPAM) in Bulawayo.

In addition, we met representatives of relevant non-governmental agencies, including church organisations, social workers and influential members of the public.

We maintained frequent contact with the Governor, Lord Soames, as well as with the British Election Commissioner, Sir John Boynton, and their respective staffs. Among the more important Rhodesian officials we met were Lieutenant-General Peter Walls, Commander of Combined Operations, and the Police Commissioner, Mr. Peter Allum. We also kept in touch with the National Election Directorate, the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Salisbury and in the field, the offices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

We were conscious from the outset of the need to get the broadest view of developments, and to canvass opinion, both urban and rural, as widely as possible. We therefore decided to spend a substantial part of our time away from Salisbury, and much of it visiting rural areas. We were the only group of observers to set up offices in four provincial centres - Bulawayo, Fort Victoria, Gwelo and Umtali - besides our headquarters in Salisbury. These

were manned for the entire period of our stay, and enabled us to cover the country comprehensively. We made our presence and role known through newspaper and radio advertisements, as a result of which many people sought us out to talk to us. These efforts greatly widened the range of information available to us.

From our second week, we travelled extensively, in small groups that based themselves in each provincial office by turn. To underline the collective nature of our responsibilities and to neutralise any possible suggestion that particular national tendencies might have affected the process of our observation, each group was so mixed as to consist of not less than four and at times as many as eight different nationalities. This helped each of us impartially to observe the election campaign and assess the mood of the public in different parts of the country. Periodically we assembled in Salisbury to exchange observations as a group. Our programme was kept flexible, allowing us to concentrate attention on areas which required special investigation from time to time. The decentralisation of our operations made possible a great deal of independent travel, and was vital for the effective coverage of polling stations at the time of the elections.

We went to a large number of the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) in which one fourth of the African population of Rhodesia lives. We visited urban areas, African townships, protected villages, government offices, cease-fire assembly places, army and Auxiliary force bases, police camps, refugee centres, national crossing points, schools, hospitals, missions, prisons and detention centres, and major concentrations of employees at factories, mines and commercial farms. We talked to people on urban streets and by rural roadsides, in bars, shops and market places. We visited each of the country's 55 administrative districts, many several times.

Of necessity, we obtained much information from official quarters, but always tried to crosscheck it with other sources. The contacts we developed with a widening cross-section of the community, both European and African, helped us to do so.

In order to safeguard our independence as Observers, as well as to be seen to be acting independently, we travelled without official accompaniment whenever practicable given the circumstances in the country. This helped to encourage frankness and confidence on the part of those with whom we wished to talk. There were, of course, occasions when the need to observe the functioning of government in relation to the electoral process required us to travel with officials. When we needed interpreters, we tried not to depend on official assistance. We worked away from the glare of publicity and as a general rule declined to permit the press to accompany us in order to gain the trust of those with whom we were speaking.

By rotation, some of our members were always present in Salisbury to keep in touch with developments and with the main political parties and governmental agencies. We attached particular importance to attending meetings of the Election Council, in which every party took part.

As the dates for the polling for the Common Roll seats approached, designated Observers assumed responsibility for our coverage of the poll in

each of the eight provinces. Our second complement of 30 Assistants arrived a week before polling began. Careful preparations were made for the most effective dispersal of Observers, Assistants and Secretariat staff for observing activity at polling stations in 54 of the 55 administrative districts in the country. (Mudzi District, where administration had collapsed and which only had three polling stations, so sparse was its population, proved impossible to cover). While some worked from centres where we had offices, others took up residence in other provincial towns, several going to remoter places went equipped with camp beds and ration packs. We also augmented our coverage by making judicious use of the facility trips provided by the Election Commission. (Our disposition throughout the country is shown in Annex 7).

Between us, we spent 2,646 man-days in Rhodesia. We covered a total of 72,000 kilometres by road and 97,600 kilometres by air within the country. We made considerable use of mine-protected vehicles in areas unsafe for motor cars, and sometimes travelled in areas which we had been officially advised not to enter on grounds of security. No mishap befell us.

Over the period of the poll we visited 267 static and 170 mobile polling stations out of a total of 335 static and 322 mobile stations. Checklists were used at each station. When the votes had been counted, all Assistants and Secretariat officials in the provinces joined us in Salisbury to be available for discussions and debriefing.

At the conclusion of the poll, and before counting began, we issued an Interim Report setting out our findings in general terms. This appears as Annex 8.

We concluded our observations at the announcement of the results of the poll. At this stage the most difficult part of the exercise had been completed. The President and members of the Senate were to be elected by members of the House of Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Our Terms of Reference related to the elections insofar as they involved the people of Zimbabwe, and required us to judge whether these were conducted in an acceptable fashion. We therefore understood our task as being complete on the announcement of the result.

# 2

## THE PARTIES

---

Nine parties contested the election for the Common Roll seats; a tenth, the Zimbabwe United Peoples Organisation, which had registered, having dropped out.

The following were the parties and their leaders:

- (a) The National Democratic Union (NDU) led by Mr. Henry Chihota;
- (b) The National Front of Zimbabwe (NFZ) led by Mr. Peter Mandaza;
- (c) The Patriotic Front (PF)\* led by Mr. Joshua Nkomo;
- (d) The United African National Council (UANC) led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa;
- (e) The United National Federation Party (UNFP) led by Chief Kayisa Ndiweni;
- (f) The United Peoples Association of Matabeleland (UPAM) led by Dr. Frank Bertrand;
- (g) The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole;
- (h) The Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) - ZANU (PF) led by Mr. Robert Mugabe; and
- (i) The Zimbabwe Democratic Party (ZDP) led by Mr. James Chikerema.

The two constituents of the Patriotic Front alliance which had prosecuted the armed struggle - Mr. Nkomo's ZAPU and Mr. Mugabe's ZANU - fought the elections separately. Mr. Nkomo registered his party under the name Patriotic Front, while Mr. Mugabe fought under the banner of ZANU (PF). Mr. Chikerema and Mr. Sithole had served in the transitional government set up in March 1978 under Bishop Muzorewa.

The UNFP and the UPAM had their headquarters in Bulawayo, and the others in Salisbury. The UNFP did not contest in Manicaland, Mashonaland West or Victoria. The UPAM contested only in Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South. The other parties put up candidates in each of the eight provinces.

The party list system, operated on a provincial basis, and the distribution of seats, by Province, are discussed in Chapter 5.

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\*Hereafter the expression "PF" is used to indicate the political party led by Mr. Nkomo, and the expression "Patriotic Front" to refer to the alliance between the PF and ZANU (PF).

The policies of the different parties were not of concern to us; we comment here briefly on some aspects of their campaigns. Extensive advertising in the newspapers, besides the permitted scale of advertising on radio and television, was a feature of the campaign. Posters were much in evidence, as were T-shirts specially printed with party symbols particularly among young people.

Each party held rallies; some of them drew the largest ever crowds seen in the country. They generally took place without serious incidents. There were smaller meetings throughout the country.

Of the major contenders for the African vote, the UANC had been legal for a much longer period than the other two, and had a campaign machine tested in the April 1979 election. The PF and ZANU (PF) had to start their organisation virtually from scratch though they had extensive networks of supporters.

These two parties did not hide their displeasure that Ministers of the previous regime retained their titles and other appurtenances of office. They were also resentful that official agencies continued to use the expression Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, coined by and associated with that administration. Its frequent use by the broadcasting service caused particular irritation. Objection was also taken to the use by public agencies of the flag of the former government. That these matters caused annoyance was not surprising, but they were not transgressions of the Lancaster House Agreement, and in any event we did not see them as likely to have much impact on electoral preference.

There was no limit on party expenses nor any obligation to disclose them. The Governor had power to make regulations regarding disclosure, but at the Election Council all the parties expressed the view that these were, in the circumstances, neither necessary nor appropriate. The UANC seemed to dispose of the most resources, but there was no evidence that the other parties were circumscribed by lack of funds.

# 3

## THE CAMPAIGN

---

The central feature of the Lancaster House Agreement was the commitment of all parties to settle their differences by political means, through free and fair elections. The resumption of British authority in Rhodesia was designed to provide them with an opportunity to do so on an equal basis, with the Governor being required to ensure that his authority, duly accepted by all parties, was effectively and impartially exercised. It was specifically provided that -

- "- the administration of the elections will be fair and impartial as between all the political parties taking part;
- peaceful political activity will be freely conducted by all the parties to the election;
- there will be freedom of movement, assembly and expression during the election campaign;
- all parties will conduct their political activities within the law;
- all the parties will have free and uncensored access to the public media to put their case to the people of Rhodesia, and there will be freedom to advertise and to publish political views in the press;
- appropriate measures will be taken to ensure the security of all parties taking part in the election campaign."\*

Our comments on the election campaign are offered against this background.

### THE ENVIRONMENT

The Lancaster House Agreement required a series of acts of faith by its signatories. In this sense, it was charting a wholly unprecedented course in attempting to resolve a major conflict. Much had gone unexpectedly well. More than 22,000 Patriotic Front forces had assembled with their arms, disregarding fears that by so doing they would become vulnerable to attack and decimation. The Commonwealth Monitoring Force was well established and universally praised. The cease-fire, though imperfect, was holding well, and the level of violence had dramatically declined.

Despite these achievements, the atmosphere on our arrival was one of tension and mutual recrimination. Charges and counter-charges abounded. Each party questioned the bona fides of the other; each wondered whether its separate acts of faith in terms of the Lancaster House Agreement had been misplaced; each cast doubts on various important aspects of the electoral process. On the official side it was alleged that a significant number of Patriotic Front forces (said in the case of ZANLA, the military wing of ZANU(PF), to amount to 4,000) had deliberately stayed outside the assembly places in order to terrorise the countryside and intimidate voters. On the

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\* See Annex 2.

side of the two Patriotic Front parties it was alleged that the Rhodesian Security Forces had never disengaged as envisaged in the Lancaster House Agreement; that Security Force Auxiliaries, who had moved into the Tribal Trust Lands vacated by Patriotic Front forces, were brutalising the people; that the continued presence of South African forces in the country was a direct violation of the Lancaster House Agreement; and that the whole weight of the official machinery, and of laws designed for other purposes, were being directed towards neutralising their political campaigns.

After making allowance for the suspicions and mistrust after so many years of armed conflict, it was nevertheless evident that a crisis of confidence was building up, which, if not defused, could jeopardise the holding of free and fair elections. We now turn to its various elements in relation to the election campaign.

#### THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Lord Soames assumed his duties as Governor on 12 December 1979, on which day Rhodesia was restored to legality and arrangements commenced which were to culminate in elections leading to independence. Among his first acts was the Proclamation of the Amnesty Ordinance 1979 (Annex 9). The effect of this Ordinance was to absolve from criminal responsibility those involved in acts of treason against the Crown as well as those who had breached the laws of the Rhodesian Administration by waging war. As provided for under the Lancaster House Agreement, existing legislation was accorded full force and effect as law. He also made provision by orders for interim constitutional arrangements, and, by the Election Commissioner and Election Council Ordinance 1979, established the Office of Election Commissioner and the Election Council to advise him. Modifications and adaptations to the Electoral Act 1979 were made so as to enable the Commissioner to exercise general supervision and control over the functions, other than the judicial functions, vested under the Act in the Registrar General of Elections and in other persons.

A number of amendments to the law were made, most, but not all, being germane to the elections. The Law and Order Maintenance Act (Amendment) Ordinance 1979 permitted the holding of public meetings on Sundays, and elections procedure was the subject of three separate Ordinances. Steps taken by way of statutory instrument reduced from seven to two the number of days notice required when applying for a permit to hold a public meeting; revoked orders banning the three pro-African newspapers, Moto, Zimbabwe Times, and Umbowo; and lifted proclamations declaring ZAPU and "ZANU (Mugabe)" to be unlawful organisations. By agreement, the Special Courts Martial whose activities had been the subject of criticism ceased to function from the time of the Governor's arrival.

In the course of the election campaign, two Ordinances were enacted which empowered the Governor to limit campaigning by individuals and parties in designated areas, and to disenfranchise voters, where he considered there to have been disruptive activity. The prospect of these Ordinances being invoked caused us continued anxiety and is a matter to which we return later.

Other measures included an Ordinance which empowered the Registrar-General to accept an application to contest the elections received outside the hours specified by law, an amendment rendered necessary by the failure to

tender the application to register the PF party in time. A second effectively stayed court procedures which had been commenced by the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole against Mr. Mugabe over the use of the name ZANU. This step, although criticised by Mr. Sithole, appeared to us sensible as time would not have permitted the orderly disposition of these proceedings without the risk of seriously disrupting arrangements for the elections. In our view no confusion between the two parties resulted from this decision.

The only other Ordinance we would mention was enacted on 29 January 1980 and enabled amendments to the lists of candidates to be made. This had become necessary because when the lists were published, a number of persons not wishing to contest the elections had found their names among the candidates.

On 25 January 1980, to facilitate day-to-day administration during a period when Ministers of the former Administration were not exercising their powers, the unusual step was taken of conferring a range of ministerial powers on the Secretaries of certain departments. We were informed that two principles were applied in determining the range of powers to be delegated: first, no powers usually exercised by the President were so delegated; and second, where ministerial power was to grant permission for something to happen rather than to prevent it, the power tended to be delegated. Powers in sensitive areas were retained. For example, the Secretary of the Ministry of Law and Order was denied the power to consent to prisoners being extradited to South Africa. Similarly, although no changes were made to the laws concerning censorship and control of the media, jurisdiction under Section 45 (7) of the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations 1977 which concerned the publication of statements made by restricted or detained persons was withheld from the Secretary.

Underlying all these changes was the principle implicit in the Lancaster House Agreement, namely that the Governor's Administration was essentially a caretaker administration and that in general only such changes to the corpus of the law be effected as were seen to be necessary for the conduct of the elections (but no death sentences were carried out).

#### EMERGENCY POWERS

Although the Lancaster House Agreement envisaged the lifting of martial law before the elections took place, this did not occur and as a result elections were held under a state of martial law. This had been in force since 1978. From a legal point of view, however, it is at least arguable that a state of de facto martial law had existed in the country ever since the Indemnity and Compensation Act 1975 came into force on 3 October 1975. The main objects of this Act were to indemnify members of the Security Forces in respect of any acts done "in good faith" for the "suppression of terrorism" and to enable members of the public to obtain compensation in respect of such acts without waiting for the end of hostilities.

The common law position in Rhodesia regarding martial law was unchanged since it was summarised by G. Feltoe, writing in (1975) Rhodesian Law Journal 167, as follows:-

- (i) When a state of war or of insurrection, riot or rebellion amounting to war exists (a Government) may use the amount of force necessary in the circumstances to restore order. This use of force is sometimes

termed 'martial law'. A formal proclamation of martial law does not have to be made for martial law to exist.

The right to administer force against force in actual war does not depend upon the proclamation of martial law at all. It depends on the question whether there is war or not. A proclamation of martial law is merely a notification to all concerned that the right in question is about to be exercised and along certain lines. It is merely an indication to all civilians, so far as they may have been in any doubt, as to what condition does in fact prevail.

(ii) When a state of actual war exists the civil courts have no authority to call in question the actions of the military authorities, but it is for the courts to decide, if their jurisdiction is invoked, whether a state of war exists which justifies the application of martial law.

(iii) The powers, such as they are, of the military authorities cease and those of the civil courts are resumed ipso facto with the termination of the state of war, and, in the absence of an Act of Indemnity, the civil courts may inquire into the legality of anything done during the state of war. Even if there is an Act of Indemnity couched in the usual terms, malicious acts will not be permitted.

By placing the armed forces outside the control of the courts in the way it did, the Administration had already created a de facto state of martial law, so that the imposition of de jure martial law added no new powers to the defence forces' arsenal other than the constitution of courts martial. Nor by the same token was the passing of the Indemnity and Compensation Act a major point of change, as the powers of detention were already such that access to the courts by persons aggrieved by the activities of the Security Forces had fallen into disuse. Power was laid on power so that little change would have been effected by the lifting of martial law.

The country had also been under a State of Emergency since before UDI. This had never been lifted, and was in fact extended by the Governor for a further six months, from 26 January 1980.

Central to the State of Emergency had been the Law and Order Maintenance Act 1960. When this was first passed, it was described by one legal writer as marking "the climax to a hectic decade of security legislation in Southern Rhodesia. It repealed the Subversive Activities Act, the Public Order Act and the Sedition Act, and yet, in its scope and consequences, it was more drastic than the former three Acts put together." The Act was seen as being so extreme that the then-Federal Chief Justice, the late Sir Robert Tredgold, resigned in protest before it became law and observed that if the Act was needed it was time for Europeans to pack their bags and leave the country.

The Act was extensively amended over the years, particularly since UDI, and a wide range of security regulations was passed under it. To begin with, the thrust of the legislation was to prevent violent political disorder in urban areas. Subsequently, with the advent of the guerrilla campaign, a host of new security provisions, coupled with greatly increased penalties for existing offences, was used to bolster military action against the activities of the guerrillas.

The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act (Cap. 65) provided for strict control over public processions, gatherings and meetings; it empowered the Administration to ban newspapers etc., and imposed restrictions on a wide variety of activities, to the extent of even penalising persons who undermined "lawful authority". Section 41 reads:-

- (1) Any person who, without lawful excuse the proof whereof lies on him, utters any words or does any act or thing whatsoever which is likely -
  - (a) to undermine or impair the authority of any public officer or class of public officer; or
  - (b) to engender feelings of hostility towards any public officer or class of public officer; or
  - (c) to expose any public officer or class of public officer to contempt, ridicule or disesteem;

shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year.

- (2) For the purposes of subsection (1) - "public officer" means -
  - (a) a person employed by the State;
  - (b) the holder of a paid office in the service of a local authority;
  - (c) a chief, headman or head of kraal;but does not include a police officer.

Section 44 imposed severe penalties of up to five years' imprisonment on persons who, by any means, made "subversive statements", the definition of which included:-

- "(e) to engender or promote feelings of hostility to or expose to contempt, ridicule or disesteem any group, section or class in or of the community of a particular race, religion or colour."

Any possibility of non-violent civil disobedience bringing about social change had been effectively outlawed by the Preservation of Constitutional Government Act 1963 which prescribed a maximum penalty of twenty years' imprisonment for any such behaviour.

The legal machinery to control meetings, to outlaw dissent and to restrict the flow of information was further buttressed by the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations 1977. These Regulations, made under Section 3 of the Emergency Powers Act (Cap. 83), inter alia empowered the Minister of Law and Order where it appeared to be "expedient in the interests of public safety and public order" arbitrarily to order a person to be detained indefinitely. A person so detained by Ministerial Order had the right to apply to a Review Tribunal. We were informed that at the time of arrival of the Governor there were 81 such persons so held, and that these were subsequently released, before the elections. Curfews, too, were provided for.

The same Regulations empowered a police officer (which expression, by reason of the integration of the police with the Security Forces, in effect meant any member of the Security Forces) without warrant to arrest and detain any person he had reason to believe could be detained under Ministerial Order

or if he was not satisfied as to the identity of a person being questioned. A person so arbitrarily detained could be held for up to thirty days, a period which contrasts with three days (capable of extension to seven days) in Northern Ireland. Sir James Haughton, the Governor's Police Adviser, expressed the view to us that in his experience this was an unusually lengthy period for law enforcement officers to be able to detain persons without charging them with any offence. Such detentions were not the subject of review.

#### APPLICATION OF THE LAWS

From what we have said it will be seen that the elections were held under a system designed to enable the Administration to control every facet of political activity. Freedom of expression was liable to marked restriction; freedom of assembly was the subject of licence and control; freedom of movement was subject to restraint through arbitrary detention, and in many parts of the country movement was restricted by curfews. It was therefore necessary for us to examine very carefully the ways in which these laws were enforced as they seemed to us to have the potential seriously to erode the essential democratic elements of the elections.

The law governing meetings was complex, and required the permission of the local police, the provision of a list of speakers and at least 48 hours' notice, among other things. Any unauthorised speaker committed an offence. On one occasion a missionary was arrested for having unlawfully addressed a meeting after he had opened the meeting with a prayer. We were told that the missionary had said something in addition to the prayer, although accounts differed, but the arrest of such a person for such an apparently trivial misdemeanour is an indication of the severity with which these laws could be and occasionally were enforced. We were also told of difficulty in obtaining police permits, but on the whole there was little evidence of selectivity on the part of the police.

It was also a fact that under the law it was very easy to be quite inadvertently a member of an "unlawful gathering", which could comprise as few as three people under Section 15 of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act or even of a "public gathering", which meant a gathering of only twelve or more persons in a public place. Public gatherings were the subject of regulations, and as we moved around the country we must have infringed the law in this respect on numerous occasions as people came to us. The laws could even be used against people meeting in private houses. While there was some evidence of the police handling this situation insofar as it affected the parties with a good deal of common sense, there were also occasions when this was lacking.

However it was also apparent that difficulties experienced with meetings by both the PF and ZANU (PF) on at least some occasions had their origins in a lack of familiarity with the law brought about by the fact that those organising them had either been out of the country for some time or had been inside the country but effectively proscribed by law from organising political meetings.

All the major parties experienced difficulties in holding meetings on one count or another, but in our view these laws created many more difficulties for PF and ZANU (PF) than they did for the others. The leaders of both these parties made persistent complaints to us on this score. For all this it

should be noted that there was a high level of political activity throughout the country, and the selective enforcement of the laws relating to the holding of meetings in the event did not appear to us to have any major overall impact on the ability of the PF and ZANU (PF) to campaign. Indeed, in at least some areas we gained the impression that unsympathetic handling by the Authorities may have been of positive benefit to these parties and attracted popular support to them.

Similarly, the censorship laws did not seem to us to have any significant impact, by virtue, as we note elsewhere, of the fact that the public media and the newspapers had lost much of their credibility during the period of the war.

What did concern us however, was the exercise of the right arbitrarily to detain persons without charge and without court appearance. Following protests by Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo, we learnt to our considerable surprise from Government House that there was no central record kept of the names of persons who had been deprived of their liberty in this peremptory fashion. Our surprise was compounded when we found that even at district level no attempt was made to keep track of the names or even the number of those so detained. It was only by making inquiries of every single police station in the country that it was possible to compile any overall figures at all. As these persons were denied access to courts and to their families, and as the International Red Cross similarly had no access to them, there was no way of verifying the information with which we were provided. Given such a state of affairs, we were astonished to find that the Police Adviser to the Governor, Sir James Houghton, had not been able to institute any system by which Government House would be notified on a regular basis of at least the numbers held in arbitrary detention.

As at 25 February 1980, Sir James informed us that there was a total of 705 people arbitrarily held throughout the country under the 30-day power of detention. Their party affiliations, he said, were not known but 12 polling agents were among them, all from Bindura District. In addition there were 1240 males and 40 females then held under martial law, figures which had marginally increased (to 1283 and 41 respectively) by 3 March 1980. On 17 December 1979 the martial law figure had been "about 5,400" (Government House was unable to provide an exact figure).

It was explained to us that of those who lost their liberty in this fashion few were held for anything approaching thirty days, and most were either charged formally and passed over to the ordinary criminal law system, or released, within a few days. We were, notwithstanding, deeply concerned at the possibility of abuse of this power in the run-up to the elections, for it, too, could have marred the freedom of the election. Our concern was compounded when we were told by a police reservist called up for duty over the period of the poll, that he had been briefed by senior officers to use his powers in such a way as to ensure an acceptable outcome to the election. He was, however, not prepared to permit us to disclose his identity to the Authorities (see Annex 10).

We received a large number of complaints from the PF and ZANU (PF). It was alleged that on occasions the police had broken up their meetings, sometimes using tear gas, and that a large number of party workers were arbitrarily detained, including some candidates. A list of supporters alleged to have

been thus detained provided to us by the ZANU (PF) office in the Midlands region appears as Annex 11. We endeavoured to persuade the authorities concerned that a party worker, and more particularly a candidate, should as a matter of principle only be the subject of deprivation of liberty where there were serious grounds for belief that he had committed a major offence. However, this approach did not appear to find favour with the Authorities, and complaints continued to be received. These had begun almost as we arrived in Salisbury, and continued right up to the eve of the elections when we learnt of certificated polling agents being arbitrarily detained only hours before the elections began. Because of the central role played by polling agents in the electoral process, we immediately brought this matter to the attention of the Office of the Election Commissioner.

Mr. Nkomo assured us that the attitude of the Authorities in this, as in other areas, was no worse than his party had expected. Mr. Mugabe, while not unduly worried that these actions would erode his support, was nonetheless deeply concerned about the underlying motives and the personal plight of those of his party workers and supporters who had been detained. He asked us to intercede with the Governor, as he believed at the time we saw him on 13 February 1980 that as many as 2,500 had been taken into custody,\* and when we raised the matter it transpired that the Governor had not been informed of any increase in the number of detentions as the election approached. In Rusape, for example, ten persons, comprising the whole leadership of the ZANU (PF) office, were taken into custody just five days before polling began on suspicion of assisting terrorists, yet were released without charge immediately after the election. The Governor informed us that he wanted to avoid giving detailed instructions to the police, and had expected them to perform their duties properly and evenhandedly. However, it was apparent to us that he lacked an information system through which to satisfy himself that they were in fact doing so. Although we were constantly assured that the powers of arrest and detention were being used sparingly and only in serious cases to counter terrorism and intimidation, the summary arrest and subsequent release of Mr. Garfield Todd exemplified that this was not so.

We have no doubt that there was at least some abuse of powers of detention which was politically motivated. However here again, obstruction by the Authorities may have had a counter-balancing effect on the opinions of at least part of the electorate, and in our view the overall effect of this abuse of power on the election process was not as grave as at first sight it appeared to be.

The continuance of curfews, too, restricted freedom of movement, but it affected all parties equally. As much of the intimidation took place by night, it is probable that the enforcement of curfews played a positive part in reducing its incidence.

As far as restrictions on freedom of speech were concerned, it was our impression that the law was in the main reasonably applied, and generally only those who advocated violence from public platforms fell foul of it.

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\* Mr. Mugabe subsequently alleged that 5,000 of his supporters had been arrested by 22 February 1980, as part of an officially-sponsored campaign of harassment against his party. This was denied by the Governor and did not accord with the figures he gave us as noted above.

The election laws as they affected the campaign call for no comment and seemed to have been enforced reasonably. Minor transgressions concerning the appearance of the publisher's name on posters, etc. were overlooked, and Section 111 of the Electoral Act, which outlawed "treating", was given a liberal interpretation so that it did not prevent food and shelter being provided by parties to supporters who had at times travelled long distances to attend rallies.

#### DETAINEES AND POLITICAL OFFENDERS

There were no fewer than five ways in which a person could be deprived of his liberty:-

- (a) under the ordinary criminal law;
- (b) by virtue of conviction by a Special Court Martial (from the time of the Governor's arrival these ceased to sit);
- (c) arbitrarily, by Ministerial Order (this power was not invoked after the Governor arrived, and the 81 detained in this manner were all released);
- (d) arbitrarily, under martial law; and
- (e) arbitrarily, by a member of the police or the Security Forces, for up to 30 days.

Only in the case of those detained under the ordinary criminal law, were persons entitled as of right to legal representation. Of the other categories, only those detained by Ministerial Order were entitled to have their cases considered by a Review Board. What we would regard as political detainees could be dealt with under any of these five procedures, depending on the whim of the Authorities. The ordinary criminal law was used, as has been noted, as a weapon in the war against the guerrillas. Thus heavy sentences had been imposed for such offences as feeding guerrillas, or failing to report their presence. Any gestures of support for the guerrillas attracted swingeing sentences. Thus we would have thought that a significant number of those in prison on our arrival were, by definition, political detainees. Yet there was no general release of prisoners simply by reference to the Sections under which they had been convicted, but each case was in the process of being reviewed individually as we describe below. This process weighed against the PF and ZANU (PF), as almost to a man those imprisoned were their supporters. Their continued detention seemed contrary to the spirit of the Governor's Amnesty Ordinance, and as the criminal law had been used by the former Administration, only those who had opposed it had felt its edge. In view of our limited resources we were unable to devote as much time as we would have wished to this category of detainee. We established, however, that the British Administration did not consider anyone convicted under the ordinary criminal law as being imprisoned for a political offence. In its view, only those detained by Ministerial Order could be regarded as being political prisoners, and these had all been released.

Convicted prisoners held under the criminal law did not come within the scope of the Governor's Amnesty, but those convicted before the Governor's arrival of offences which would have qualified for an amnesty had a prosecution subsequently been brought, were to be released. A case-by-case review was commenced on the basis that some of those imprisoned might nonetheless need to be kept in detention to preserve public order, or on security

grounds.\* The alternative would have been to go through the motions of releasing a prisoner, and then immediately detain him again, but under discretionary powers.

This review was begun under the aegis of the Ministry of Justice, and cases were considered by the Prisoners' Release Board. The Ministry itself subsequently suggested that this was not appropriate, because the Board could only release prisoners on licence. Accordingly an ad hoc advisory board was established to advise the Governor. The Board comprised the Secretary for Law and Order, the Secretary for Justice and the Attorney-General. It was required to recommend remission of sentence where it considered this appropriate and to draw attention to cases that were on the border line. It was also to report on those on which its members could not agree, and where there were security reasons why particular prisoners should be kept confined notwithstanding the amnesty.

We were told that instructions had been given by the Director of Prisons to officers in charge of prisons, asking them to inform each prisoner who might fall within the spirit of the amnesty, and that the number of releases applied for suggested that they had all complied. At the time of our departure, according to the Ministry of Law and Order, 1910 persons had been considered and released, a further 740 had been recommended for release and 700 more had their cases with the Governor or were in the course of release. We were not able to ascertain whether any had been refused release on the grounds of security or public order, though one official said he believed that none had been declined for this reason.

#### THE CIVIL SERVICE AND ITS ATTITUDE TO THE PARTIES

It was contemplated by the Lancaster House Agreement that the Governor would exercise his authority and organise the elections through the existing Rhodesian Administration. The conduct of the Administration therefore had an important bearing on the environment in which the election campaign and the poll took place. It had within its power so to conduct the day-to-day business of government as to try and influence the manner in which votes would be cast. Further, as civil servants had charge of the election arrangements, much rested on their impartiality and lack of political involvement.

Very few Africans are in posts of seniority in the Rhodesian civil service, and no appreciable number of African graduates have entered it. The service therefore continues to be dominated by the white community, with Africans serving in the lower grades. In 1961 steps were taken to introduce a less discriminatory recruiting policy based on merit, but since 1965 the paramount consideration applied by the Public Service Commission has been that of "security", with the exclusion of many African applicants as the inevitable consequence. Recently, however, an attempt has been made to increase the ratio of African, Coloured and Asian entrants to the service, and figures we examined show that a start has been made.

In discussions with the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, we expressed our concern that civil servants might have been involved in the

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\* We were told that a prisoner's behaviour in prison was relevant to the question of whether or not he should be released.

distribution of political propaganda. The Chairman conceded the possibility, and expressed deep concern. We also mentioned the production by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a "brief" on the current political situation in the country, which had been circulated widely. In this "brief" comment was made on the political campaigns and speculation indulged in as to possible coalition building after the elections, including forecasts of election results. This struck us as being beyond the normal bounds of a civil service. (The "brief" appears as Annex 12.)

We also raised with the Chairman the question of "closed meetings" between the civil service and political parties as we had seen one advertised with the Rhodesian Front. The Chairman informed us, and this was confirmed from our independent inquiries, that there has been a longstanding rule within the public service (which is similar to that found, for example, in paragraph 47 of the Schedule to the Police Act 1965) prohibiting members of the civil service from actively participating in politics, including the asking of questions from the floor at a political meeting. Both the civil service terms of employment, and, for example, the Police Act, provide that meetings at which questions may be asked may be held with permission provided the audience consisted only of persons in the employment of the State. We established that a large number of these meetings were taking place throughout the country, and that the PF appeared to have been the most assiduous in seeking permission for such meetings. We did not hear of any applications for such meetings being refused. A form of approval for one meeting appears as Annex 13, and Circular 107/2 issued by the Public Service Commission on 21 November 1979 appears as Annex 14.

Because the country has for almost twenty years been governed virtually as a one-party state, with the civil service becoming closely identified with the Rhodesian Front, we were alive to the possibility of problems inherent in the election arrangements being charged to the civil service. In the course of our extensive visits to the districts we were satisfied that earlier attitudes were on the whole not coming in the way of these arrangements being made effectively, and that the presence of a large number of British election supervisors was a safeguard.

There was widespread concern on the part of many civil servants as to their future, and that of their pensions, under an independent majority rule government. The prospect of Africanisation,\* and of possible repudiation of pension rights, was an understandable and genuine anxiety. This matter engaged our attention because of the central role of the civil servants in organising the poll. We followed their negotiations with the Governor as they endeavoured to obtain an assurance from Britain as to their pensions. Some assurances were given by the Governor, but these fell short of an outright guarantee. Thus at least some of the civil servants went into the elections with a sense of unease and personal insecurity.

Our observations of the civil service led us to conclude overall that, like civil services the world over, there was a blend of the good and the not-so-good. Some of the civil servants impressed us as energetic professionals with a keen wish to discharge their duties to the best of their ability.

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\* The word is used in its conventional sense. We appreciate that many white Rhodesians are fourth generation or more and so regard themselves as white Africans.

Some others were less energetic, less able and less interested. Some made strenuous efforts to ensure the proper education of would-be voters, and others did little or nothing in that regard.

The Administration had been intimately involved in operations during the war, and the military command structure even incorporated members of the Administration down to the level of District Commissioner. They had therefore been conditioned over a period of years to think in terms of the PF and ZANU (PF) in a particular way. The attitudes built up over seven years of war clearly could not be put aside overnight, and there was a tendency to treat with considerable suspicion any person who supported or worked for either of these parties. In Victoria Province, for example, a number of senior officials in the Administration still had on their walls a poster which began "VICTORY for the counter-insurgent is the destruction in a given area of the Communist Trained Terrorists and their political organisations PLUS the permanent isolation of the CITs from the population . . .". When questioned as to its appropriateness during the election period, they said it continued to be their guiding principle.

When we arrived we found that the provision of telephones for the election offices both of the PF and ZANU (PF) had been the subject of protracted delay, which continued for a considerable time after our arrival and, in the case of ZANU (PF), the connections were not made until two weeks before polling day. Similarly, goods were held up in customs, and the PF and ZANU (PF) even encountered difficulty in obtaining maps, apparently on the grounds of "national security"! We are prepared to accept that in some instances at least, these parties had contributed to their difficulties by a lack of familiarity with the procedures laid down, but our impression was that at times the Administration was lethargic to the point of being obstructive. That it should have been so in comparatively minor matters lent credence to allegations of more serious bias.

## REFUGEES

The return of refugees was germane to our inquiries as it had been agreed at Lancaster House that it was desirable that as many of them as possible should return to exercise their franchise. An estimated 228,000 Rhodesian Africans were in three countries - Mozambique (160,000), Zambia (45,000) and Botswana (23,000).

It was known that many refugees would have lost contact with their families or relatives, many of whom would have moved, or been forced to move, out of their villages. Some would have no homes to which they could return. Repatriation would need to be phased to match the country's capacity to re-settle them.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees co-ordinated repatriation arrangements, while the Rhodesian Administration controlled the entry of refugees. The hope was that, given resettlement and logistic considerations, 60,000 to 70,000 refugees would be able to return before the polls.

Repatriation from Botswana caused no problems. The process started on 21 January 1980 and was completed by 15 February, with the return of 18,200

persons under UNHCR arrangements and 1,705 independently. From each of the other two countries, with more refugees, repatriation was on a smaller scale. There appeared to be three main reasons for this: administrative delays in establishing crossing points and reception centres as a result of which repatriation did not commence until 4 February; numerical limitations imposed by the Rhodesian Authorities on the ground that military personnel were returning as civilians; and fear caused by reports that the police had ill-treated refugees returning from Zambia.

Mr. Nkomo made us aware of his deep disquiet both over the pace and manner of repatriation from Zambia. He did not want children to interrupt their schooling to return before the election, but this still left about 23,000 refugees to be brought back.

Members of the Group paid several visits to the repatriation centres to talk to UNHCR and Rhodesian officials to ascertain the position for themselves. It became clear that larger numbers of refugees could have been handled; the limiting factor was the policy adopted by the Rhodesian Authorities.

The Lancaster House Agreement provided that all movement by Patriotic Front forces should cease on 21 December, with only civilians being allowed to enter the country after that date. This was interpreted as requiring rigorous screening of any male of military age seeking to return.

Mr. Nkomo pointed out to us that it was part of the reality of a guerrilla war that adult males in refugee camps would have received some form of military training. This did not, in his view, make them military personnel in the terms of the Agreement. He also said that, as he had told the Governor, all white males in Rhodesia had received military training and had weapons, but suffered no restrictions, much less detention. He felt strongly that the Administration was deliberately obstructing the return of refugees before the election in contravention of the Agreement.

By mid-February, when repatriation from Botswana had been completed, the flow from Zambia had virtually stopped after only some 4,200 persons had come back. Reports that some refugees had been detained and ill-treated, even tortured, allegedly to make them confess to being guerrillas, had spread alarm among refugees still in Zambia. We heard that on one day 300 refugees had turned back after reaching the crossing point. Statements by some refugees who had been detained had included claims that they had been subjected to electric shocks.

Repatriation from Mozambique had reached 7,300 by mid-February. The centre set up for them could handle up to 1,000 persons a day, but was admitting less than half that number on average, and turning back many people. Social Service Department officials at the centre informed us they were powerless as the local police controlled the number to be admitted on instructions from Salisbury.

On 18 February, we conveyed our concern to the Governor on the substantial delay in starting repatriation from both Zambia and Mozambique, the effect of the detentions on those still in Zambia, and on the arbitrary daily limit set

for men of military age returning from Mozambique. We stressed the importance which the Lancaster House Agreement had attached to the question of the return of refugees in the context of free and fair elections, and inquired what action the British Government had taken, as promised, to assist the process. We urged that necessary steps be taken to increase the flow in the next few days before the elections and also suggested that refugees be given the right of temporary return, solely to vote, at polling stations which could be set up near the crossing points. The Governor in his reply, said that the Cease-fire Agreement had made it quite clear that military personnel would not be allowed into Rhodesia after the agreed date. Repatriation from Zambia had been complicated by the inclusion of such personnel among the refugees. As for repatriation from Mozambique, the return of males of military age had been limited to 400 per day, because of evidence that some refugees allowed in had joined ZANLA groups outside the Assembly Places. He had asked the Mozambican Government to send a higher proportion of women and children. His Police Adviser had found no evidence so far to substantiate charges of ill-treatment of refugees. The Governor did not find it practicable to allow refugees a right of temporary return as we had suggested. He added that well over 30,000 refugees would have returned by 25 February and this would be a considerable achievement. Correspondence with the Governor appears as Annex 15.

By 25 February when repatriation was suspended, 33,430 refugees had returned (detailed figures are at Annex 16). We are conscious that Rhodesian resources were strained, but believe nevertheless that, with a more positive approach, a larger number of refugees could have voted, thus reflecting a higher resolve to implement the Lancaster House Agreement more fully.

On the whole, we find it difficult to discount the suggestions that the political loyalties of the refugees to the two Patriotic Front parties was a factor which influenced official attitudes and action though we accept that this did not have any significant electoral impact in the end.

#### LITERACY

We were aware that the level of literacy could have a bearing on the voters' ability to receive information. Research undertaken for us (Annex 17) suggested that a minimum of 44 per cent and a maximum of 67 per cent of adult Africans of voting age were functionally illiterate. However, we do not believe that voters were denied information because of their illiteracy.

For one thing, extensive use was made of the radio both for official information on the elections and for party political broadcasts.

For another, news travelled fast by word of mouth, and several of us heard of major events in discussions with people in advance of media coverage, especially when these concerned the activities of the Security Forces or were delayed by censorship. Further, there was a pattern of African urban dwellers returning to their villages regularly at weekends, taking back news and frequently reading newspapers and pamphlets out loud to those who were unable to do so. This pattern was of considerable significance in helping the various parties to project their programmes, even when their leaders were unable personally to campaign, as well as in spreading the message of secrecy of the ballot.

## SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES

The presence of South African troops in Rhodesia had been a major stumbling block during the Lancaster House negotiations. The cease-fire proposals were accepted by the Patriotic Front on 5 December 1979 only after a specific assurance from Lord Carrington that "there will be no external involvement in Rhodesia under the British Governor. The position has been made clear to all Governments concerned, including South Africa".

On 6 January 1980, after the cease-fire had come into effect, the Governor admitted that South African forces had been allowed to remain on the Rhodesian side of the Beit Bridge, with his consent. The Beit Bridge straddles the Limpopo River, which separates the two countries, and is the principal road and rail link between them.

This admission aroused the most deep-seated fears among the two Patriotic Front parties regarding British good faith and intentions, and inflamed the political atmosphere in the country at the very outset of the election campaign. We had raised this matter with Lord Carrington when we met him in London. On 26 January 1980, two days after our arrival in Salisbury, it was announced that South African forces would be withdrawn from the Beit Bridge, though no specific deadline was set. We considered it important, therefore, at our first meeting with the Governor, to urge that South African forces be removed from the Beit Bridge as early as possible. However small their number or limited the nature of their duties, it was clear to us that their continued presence would have grave political and psychological implications for the election campaign.

The actual withdrawal of South African forces from the Beit Bridge took place on 30 January 1980. One of our members subsequently visited the area and satisfied himself that this was in fact so.

Mr. Mugabe also complained to us of the presence in Rhodesia of additional units of South African troops in violation of the Lancaster House Agreement, but our enquiries always met with bland denials. We were told a certain number were there as volunteers, but that no regular units of the South African forces were operating in the country.

## THE CEASE-FIRE

Central to the implementation of the Cease-fire Agreement was the presence of a Cease-fire Monitoring Force. Its size fluctuated, but at one stage reached some 1500 men. In our view this number was quite inadequate to perform the functions expected of it. It might have been sufficient had the Rhodesian Security Forces been confined to their company bases, but in fact they were not. Indeed, throughout the campaign, we witnessed a high level of activity by the Security Forces in many parts of the country, and more often than not there were no members of the Cease-fire Monitoring Force in sight. Numerous camps were monitored only on an occasional basis, and the monitoring did not extend to the activities of Security Forces while on duty away from their bases.

Having said that, we would make it clear that we have no criticism of the way in which the Monitoring Force carried out its duties. Rather, we would express our admiration of the way in which it tackled a task that must surely be without precedent in military history. With tact and patience they won the

trust and respect of vast numbers of guerrillas, and had they not been able to achieve this we have no doubt that a much lower number of guerrillas would have assembled. At the Assembly Places, too, they retained this relationship under the most trying of circumstances.

Within operational areas, Commonwealth Monitors were permanently attached to regular army units, and each Auxiliaries' base was liable to be visited as and when the Monitors were able to do so. However the widespread deployment of regular army units, and the multiplicity of Auxiliary camps made monitoring a formidable task.

Under the Cease-fire Agreement, primary responsibility for dealing with breaches rested with the Commanders of the forces through the mechanism of the Cease-fire Commission and with the assistance of liaison officers. The extent to which breaches were precipitated by the activities of the Security Forces is a matter we are not competent to judge, but we are confident in asserting that at least some of the breaches occurred in this way.

Under the Cease-fire Agreement, the forces which had assembled and accepted the Governor's authority were acting lawfully. Equality between them and the Rhodesian Security Forces was the cornerstone of the Agreement. In the event of general or sustained breaches of the cease-fire which could not be dealt with by the Commanders on both sides through the mechanism of the Cease-fire Commission, the Governor would "have to decide what action to take to deal with them with the forces which have accepted his authority" (para 13). It was envisaged that should there be difficulties with unlawful elements which had not assembled, all the lawful forces would be used to take appropriate action against them, whether jointly or separately. Although a few joint patrols were mounted with ZIPRA, the military wing of the PF, for the overwhelming part the Governor elected to use only the forces of one side for this purpose. Both Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe voiced their unhappiness and made it known that their armies were ready and willing to do their duty in this regard. However, for reasons of which we are not aware their offers were not taken up. The effect of this decision, with its apparent partiality, on the guerrillas who had not assembled in time can only be a matter for speculation, but it certainly generated considerable mistrust. Had the decision been taken to use all of the forces, as we had also urged upon the British Administration, it is likely that the cease-fire would have been seen as being much more meaningful, at least some of the defaulting guerrillas would have been encouraged to enter the Assembly Places and others would have been discouraged from indulging in unlawful activity.

We were, however, encouraged by subsequent steps taken to commence the integration of the armies. These came late in the day, on the very eve of the poll, but had a healthy psychological effect on both the guerrilla armies and the electorate at large.

As noted, the Agreement provided the establishment of a Cease-fire Commission to adjudicate upon alleged breaches of the cease-fire. The Commission comprised Major General Acland, as Chairman, and Brigadier Gurdon (the Governor's Military Adviser and the Military Adviser's Chief of Staff respectively) together with two senior representatives of the Rhodesian Security Forces, and one senior representative each of ZANLA and ZIPRA. The Commission had as its functions:-

- (a) ensuring compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of the forces;
- (b) the investigation of actual or threatened breaches of the cease-fire; and
- (c) such other tasks as may be assigned to it by the Governor in the interests of maintaining the cease-fire.

The Commission met regularly, and as at 26 February 1980 had considered 207 alleged breaches of the cease-fire, ascribing responsibility as follows:-

Rhodesian Security Forces	2 breaches
ZIPRA	24 breaches
ZIPRA old area of operations	12 breaches
ZANLA	99 breaches
ZANLA old area of operations	35 breaches
Ex-PF bandits	17 breaches
Unattributable	18 breaches

A breach of the cease-fire was considered by the Commission to be a belligerent action by an armed man, or group of men, against either civilians or armed personnel. It will be seen from the list that some acts of banditry were referred to the Commission, and were found to have occurred. It is understood that a high proportion of the acts by armed men which occurred in the country would have been notified to the Cease-fire Commission, and were the subject of investigation by the Commonwealth Monitoring Force and by the relevant parties.

The Commission met in private, and although we made a request to Government House we were, much to our regret, not permitted to attend any of its meetings. We were informed that, as in the Election Council, the various representatives demonstrated a readiness to work together, and that decisions were reached expeditiously. All decisions of the Commission were required to be unanimous.

Some of the breaches could not be attributed to ZIPRA or ZANLA, but had taken place in areas in which one or the other had been in operation. Thus attributions were based on a number of features, of which the type of arms used and the place of occurrence were only two.

As polling began, the Cease-fire Commission, at its meeting on 27 February 1980, moved into a less adjudicative and more creative phase of its operations. It was agreed that its focus should not be on determining responsibility for cease-fire breaches, but that in future it should concentrate more on fostering conditions in which unification of the various armies could be effected. A number of incidents were left unresolved, including the attack on a bus which took place in the Rusape/Headlands area, on the Salisbury to Untali Road, on 3 February 1980.

On behalf of all members of the Commission, the Chairman had voiced the strongest condemnation of the incident, in which a bus full of innocent civilians had been ambushed.

Complaints to the Cease-fire Commission came from four sources - the Rhodesian Security Forces, ZANLA, ZIPRA, and the Commonwealth Monitoring Force. The very great majority of complaints were submitted by the Rhodesian Security Forces.

The findings of the Cease-fire Commission provided one indicator of the level of violence in the community, and its origins, during the run-up to the elections. They also suggest that the cease-fire was successful to a remarkable degree. In a matter of days, a state of full-scale war was diminished to the point where political parties could, by and large, campaign in safety in almost all parts of the country.

#### INTIMIDATION AND THE ELECTION

The question of intimidation dominated the election, but was too often viewed in isolation from the society in which it was taking place. We were concerned to place it in perspective because the phenomenon appeared to us to be much more complex than the authorities were either prepared to accept or admit. We felt it was necessary to try to understand the changes brought about by the war in the traditional power structure in the extensive rural areas that had come to be dominated by the guerrillas. No ready reference works are available on the subject, and the tentative picture we present has been pieced together from conversations we were able to have with academics, social workers, missionaries and other informed individuals, many of whom had first-hand knowledge of the subject.

#### The Effect of the War

Immediately prior to the cease-fire, the writ of the Government did not run in large areas of the country. Rather there was a situation in which the guerrillas had permeated most of the country, with the Rhodesian Security Forces maintaining a high degree of mobility and moving quickly in and out of more sensitive regions. As part of their campaign, and to demonstrate the inability of the Salisbury Administration to control the country, the guerrillas had brought about a state of affairs in which the role of government organs had become tenuous and in certain areas non-existent, over 1,000 schools had closed, and cattle dips, an important feature of economic life in rural Rhodesia, had almost entirely ceased to operate.

Before the war, authority in the rural areas had been exercised by the tribal chiefs and headmen, the traditional leaders of the people. It was they who allocated land, settled disputes according to customary law, ascertained the will of the tribal spirits, and took all major decisions affecting life in the villages. In the battle for the hearts and minds of the people, chiefs and headmen who refused to co-operate with the guerrilla forces were frequently targets for attack. Some were killed and others took refuge in the towns. Those who remained in the Tribal Trust Lands suffered serious erosion of their authority, as did other people of influence, such as teachers and ministers of religion.

The extent to which this happened varied from one area to another, and sometimes even within a single tribal area, depending on the intensity of the war and the number of protected villages. The impact varied too, depending on whether the area was dominated by ZANLA or ZIPRA forces.

In areas outside the protected villages that were dominated by the guerrillas, traditional power and authority were heavily eroded and there developed a parallel, but more compelling, source of administrative and judicial authority which bore no resemblance to the traditional structure. A new line of command was established, with the guerrillas at the top, the district committee in between and the kraal committees at the bottom. This phenomenon was especially prevalent in the eastern districts and in other areas under ZANLA control and influence, though its precise extent is difficult to determine. It was apparently less common in Matabeleland and other areas where ZIPRA was operating.

There was a committee at each kraal level comprising local civilians and each had one member sitting on the district committee. There were two main reasons why these committees emerged. First, some traditional authorities had become so unpopular as a result of their association with the government that they no longer commanded the respect of their people. Second, it became apparent that certain mujibhas (the predominantly youthful assistants to the guerrilla armies) were misusing their power by labelling personal enemies but quite innocent civilians as "sell-outs", so that the guerrillas would mete out "instant justice" in the form of death or a heavy beating

The functions of the committees varied, ranging from hearing cases involving marriage, divorce, and witchcraft, to assessing the truth of allegations levelled against people regarding their involvement with the government. They also handled demands by the guerrillas for food and clothing, instead of mujibhas and guerrillas directly approaching individuals for aid. After receiving demands, the committees would inform their people and request contributions.

As a result of the development of these "people's tribunals" the traditional courts came to deal only with cases of a petty nature and chose to refer difficult cases to the committees. Some traditional leaders were co-opted into the new structures, depending on their popularity with the people and the guerrillas. In those cases, there was a partial merging of, and close association and liaison between, the traditional leaders and the committees.

Above the kraal committees was the district committee which acted as a court of appeal, while the guerrillas were the final court of appeal. Neither committee had any power to pass a death sentence, as this was the prerogative of the guerrilla courts. However, the committees could hear complaints about mujibhas and guerrillas, and report them to their commanders.

The most fundamental feature of the new structure was that while pre-war traditional authorities had comprised old and seasoned members of the community, the new authorities, by and large, were headed by young men. These wielded almost absolute power, and to this extent the traditional structure of power and influence had been stood on its head.

The situation in the protected villages, where over half a million people lived, was somewhat different. There, the influence of the guerrillas, though considerable, was not as penetrative. Contact between villagers and the guerrillas was restricted to daylight hours when the villagers would leave the villages to work their land. Communication between the groups was partially or completely cut during the night.

In the protected villages, a different erosive force also helped weaken traditional authority. A quasi-military atmosphere prevailed, with many activities both regimented and centralised. The government's command structure demanded maximum co-operation from the chiefs, headmen and kraal heads, who had little real alternative but to comply with most official requests. By submitting to the Security Force personnel in this way, the traditional leaders rapidly lost their popularity and grip on the people.

Without going into other related aspects, such as the erosion of parental authority and the diminished influence of teachers and churchmen, the significance of these developments needs to be underscored. The people in these areas had been politicised to a high degree. Their loyalties were further strengthened by the direct link between the armed struggle and nationalist sentiment. The chiefs, headmen, and kraal heads had, in many areas, ceased to command respect, and a parallel power structure had developed over the years. Indeed, it is inconceivable that the successes enjoyed by the guerrillas during the war would have been possible without some kind of organisational endeavour within the communities to which they looked for support. This serves to explain why other parties should have felt uncertain about attempting to campaign there. It underscores, too, the problems that were implicit in the decision to send the Auxiliaries into the rural areas to help maintain law and order, particularly when they began to make their own attempts to politicise the population in a different direction. Some degree of violence was inherent in the situation.

With the advent of the cease-fire and the withdrawal to Assembly Places of most, if not all, of the guerrillas on whose authority the new order was based, a degree of anarchy was inevitable. A valuable restraining element on the mujibhas had been lost, and when the Rhodesian Security Forces and their Auxiliaries moved back into the areas in an attempt to reassert their authority, the conflict that ensued could have been anticipated. To some extent at least, the problem of intimidation must be viewed against this background.

Further, by no means all of the violence during the campaign was politically motivated, or designed to influence the elections. Sometimes it was the product of social dislocation in the wake of war to which there are parallels in other parts of the world.

It was also the case that in the immediate aftermath of a guerrilla war many sections of the population had ready access to firearms, with the result that the ordinary incidence of violence in the community tended to be higher than it would otherwise have been. Such incidents, too, were at times wrongly accorded a political significance.

#### ZANLA and ZIPRA

A major departure from the Lancaster House Agreement was the failure by the Rhodesian Security Forces to disengage to the degree contemplated. It was explained to us that this was necessitated by the security situation caused by the failure of all the Patriotic Front forces to assemble. However we noted a dramatic drop in reported casualties, with these running at only about 10 per cent of the level immediately before the cease-fire - 290 people died between the end of December and the end of February, whereas without the cease-fire it would probably have exceeded 3,500.

We accept that a number of ZANLA, and a lesser number of ZIPRA guerrillas had remained outside the Assembly Places. We discussed this with both Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo. Mr. Mugabe said this was not part of a deliberate strategy, but the period of the cease-fire had been too short, and many of his men had been difficult to contact. According to him their number was far less than the official estimate of 4,000. It should be noted, too, that this estimate included an unquantified number of dissident elements who had simply turned bandit. He had argued at Lancaster House in favour of a longer cease-fire period, but this had been rejected. Mr. Nkomo assured us that strenuous efforts had been made to ensure that as many ZIPRA guerrillas as possible assembled. Both appealed publicly for those remaining outside to assemble, and denied any suggestion of a policy designed to hold men out to cover contingencies.

We experienced difficulty in assessing the validity of the many allegations that were made concerning the part played during the election campaign by the guerrilla forces who remained outside the Assembly Places. It was plain that acts of simple banditry which had no political significance were being attributed to ZIPRA, and even more to ZANLA. There were numerous acts of violence which we were satisfied had little or no political motive. It is, we believe, significant that COMOPS Communiques in the post-election period suggested continuing contacts between the Security Forces and unlawful but unspecified armed elements. In the wake of the ZANU (PF) victory, it was obvious that these had nothing to do with politics or political parties. There was, too, a tendency on the part of the media immediately to attribute acts of violence to ZANLA, even when there was little or no evidence to support it. For example, on the first day of polling, the lead vehicle in a mobile polling station convoy on which one of our Group was travelling came under fire; the press was told this in unambiguous terms, yet both the newspapers and the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation (ZRBC) reported us as stating that the attack was made by ZANLA, although the attackers had not been identified.

Elsewhere in our Report we deal at some length with the Security Forces, and are conscious of our difficulty in so dealing with allegations made against ZIPRA and ZANLA. The Governor promised to provide us with affidavits regarding their intimidatory activities, but in the event never sent them. We encountered only a handful of complaints concerning these groups from members of the public, but were frequently told of their misbehaviour in the course of extensive briefings from Provincial and District Commissioners. These tended to lack specifics, and as with the complaints against the Auxiliaries (which we discuss later), it seemed to us that those against ZIPRA and ZANLA were similarly the subject of exaggeration. This view was borne out by members of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in different Provinces, with whom we spoke, by some British Election Supervisors, and also by a number of missionaries, amongst others.

Perhaps here, as in some other areas of controversy, the whole truth may never be known. We do not seek to minimise the blame attaching to ZANLA and, to a lesser degree, ZIPRA. That some of their members were guilty of acts of intimidation is incontrovertible. Nevertheless, it is our view that intimidation by the guerrillas was by no means as widespread or as brutal as official spokesmen claimed. It was also hard to judge where the line was being drawn between political activism and intimidatory behaviour. It is also our view that the one-sided picture projected by the Authorities, and reflected by the media, which attempted to attribute blame for intimidation solely to ZANLA and ZIPRA and their political allies, was grossly misleading and must be corrected.

We noted the Administration's view that abstention from the Assembly Places was part of a deliberate policy. We were told by members of the Commonwealth Cease-fire Monitoring Force that the bulk of ZANLA outside the assembly points were in fact unarmed and living among the people with their weapons cached. It was also suggested to us by ZANU (PF) that those who had remained outside the Assembly Places and were armed had been deterred from responding to repeated calls to assemble by their commanders by needlessly aggressive acts by the Security Forces after the cease-fire had come into effect. One example of this is an incident in which a misunderstanding over the surrender of arms led to a number of ZIPRA guerrillas being gunned down while in a bus en route to an Assembly Place. On another occasion, in Shabani, 119 ZANLA guerrillas had surfaced in response to appeals to assemble. Their leader apparently received highly unorthodox treatment, with pressure being brought to bear on him to switch sides, and he eventually escaped from a luxury Salisbury hotel. The remainder disappeared and court proceedings failed to determine their fate. They were alleged to have been murdered by the Security Forces, but we were informed by the Police Commissioner that 96 of them had in fact joined the Security Force Auxiliaries. This was told to us in the context of describing the techniques used by the Security Forces to recruit Auxiliaries.

Further, in Victoria Province we were told that after the cease-fire the Security Forces had deliberately interposed themselves between areas with known concentrations of guerrillas and the Assembly Places, thus deterring them from coming forward. The Cease-fire Monitoring Force told us that they had taken up the matter with the local Joint Operational Command, but to no avail. We learned from Monitors and Patriotic Front liaison officers that messages of guerrillas coming forward for late assembly being transmitted to liaison officers were being intercepted by the regular Security Forces. They then pre-empted the role of the liaison officers by deploying into the areas in question, unnecessarily provoking armed contact.

We are therefore inclined to accept that such actions by the Security Forces would not have encouraged members of ZANLA or ZIPRA to come forward in response to their commanders' orders, after they had once failed to meet the deadline set by the Lancaster House Agreement. Despite this, according to the Governor's spokesman, their leaders' appeal had some effect in the post-cess-fire period.

It was also claimed that large numbers of guerrillas were leaving Assembly Places and perpetrating outrages against the civilian population as part of a campaign to intimidate the electorate. From our observations, and from our discussions with numerous members of the Commonwealth Cease-fire Monitoring Force, we were satisfied that these stories were largely without foundation although there was a small degree of movement in and out of the Assembly Places. The Assembly Places were generally well-ordered and well-organised, and as we note elsewhere, the relationship between the Monitoring Force and the guerrillas was remarkably good and a credit to all concerned. In this area, too, a relatively small number of incidents was magnified out of proportion.

Nor was the atmosphere helped by the Communiques issued by Combined Operations Headquarters. Couched in language inappropriate for the cease-fire, the Communiques received prominence in news broadcasts and appeared on the front pages of newspapers. We urged the Governor to have the practice

discontinued, and though the Communiques continued to appear we met with some success towards the end of the campaign in the toning down of their language and less prominent publicity by the media.

### The Security Force Auxiliaries

We now turn to the vexed question of the Security Forces and their Auxiliaries. The Auxiliaries were constituted, after the internal settlement of 3 March 1978, as political armies. Both the UANC and ZANU (Sithole) recruited a type of "home-guard", and regular members of the Security Forces with whom we spoke described them as being gangs of political henchmen. This unfavourable view was confirmed by Mr. Chikerema who had been involved in their recruitment while he was a member of the Muzorewa Government. The Police Commissioner, Mr. Allum, described how the Auxiliaries had been formed to fight "terrorists" by using their own tactics against them. He told of a deliberate policy of recruiting as many captured guerrillas as possible into the Auxiliaries, and of a need to motivate the group to a high degree so that it would be prepared to serve the Muzorewa "Government of National Unity". Subsequently, it was realised that recruitment of security forces through the medium of political parties was undesirable, and this had been transferred to a government agency, and the Auxiliaries merged with the regular Security Forces. In mid-1979 a group of Auxiliaries loyal to ZANU (Sithole) had declined to submit to the central authority with the result that they had been attacked by the Security Forces and over 180 of them killed. (Some of their members, too, were very young, being only 13 or 14 years of age, and their extreme youth and blatant lack of rudimentary training were further grounds for concern.)

In brief, the Auxiliaries could be viewed as an armed home-guard, with minimal training, which had been politicised in favour of an administration led by Bishop Muzorewa, and included at least some of the original political recruits as well as significant numbers of former guerrillas who could not have viewed dispassionately the prospect of a PF or ZANU (PF) government. Indeed, one such Auxiliary expressed his fear that should such a government come to power, the Auxiliaries would all be shot. He himself had been trained in Mozambique.

It was not surprising, therefore, that on our arrival we found considerable controversy raging as the result of a decision to use these Auxiliaries to augment police efforts in maintaining law and order. Allegations of political activity, of coercion and of intimidation made against the Auxiliaries abounded. We were satisfied that, as with allegations against ZANLA, the activities of the Auxiliaries were not as bad as the charges against them claimed. At the same time their activities were very much worse than government spokesmen were ever prepared to admit.

The performance of the Auxiliaries varied across the country, but they were generally at their most active in the eastern regions. By contrast, in Matabeleland North and South their presence appeared to have been relatively benign, and the same could be said of Auxiliaries in several other parts of the country, especially those who had been recruited in late 1979 and early in 1980.

In defence of the Auxiliaries it was repeatedly claimed that they had been engaged in constructive activity and public work throughout the Tribal

Trust Lands. As a counter-insurgency measure the Administration had latterly adopted a policy based on what was in some areas called the "green areas" concept. Its underlying objective was to expand the Administration's area of control by the extensive deployment of Auxiliaries into the TTLs. Within the "green areas" the Auxiliaries would perform a "home-guard" role, securing the area from guerrilla operations and facilitating the reopening of stores, schools and cattle-dips, either by local civilians or by the Auxiliaries themselves, and the resumption of cattle sales. We found that the "green areas" concept was most developed in the Victoria Province where senior government officials were confident of its ultimate success in reducing the influence of ZANLA forces.

As we have noted, the guerrillas had waged a concerted campaign to demonstrate the collapse of the Salisbury Administration. It was thus a political gesture of considerable significance for Security Force Auxiliaries to enter sensitive areas left by the guerrillas as they went to Assembly Places, some of which had been dominated by Patriotic Front forces for some years, and to be seen there as asserting the authority of the Salisbury Administration. Undoubtedly this caused considerable resentment, not to say apprehension. We accepted the necessity to get the cattle-dips back into working order, and cattle disease under control, as quickly as possible. We also recognised the paramount need to resume the interrupted schooling of children without delay. However, in all the circumstances, we doubted the wisdom of choosing these particular men to bring such a situation about. We noted, too, that in some districts these works of reconstruction and repair had been achieved by local people, and that residents there were positively opposed to the presence of Auxiliaries.

Not only were the Auxiliaries involved in quasi-political acts of this nature, but it was clear that they saw themselves as having a duty to educate the electorate as to the evils of "Marxism", to the point of conducting forced meetings, and at times perpetrating acts of violence. The complaints on this score were persistent and widespread, and we found from our observations that at least some of them were true. As Annex 18 we reproduce a number of letters written by Headmasters in the Midlands area. In all our travels, too, we ourselves seldom saw the Auxiliaries actually engaged in constructive work, which was surprising in the light of the emphasis on this placed by Provincial and District Commissioners in their briefings to us.

It was apparent to us that Auxiliaries were actively campaigning for the UANC in many parts of the country, and whether or not stories of widespread brutality are to be believed, the evidence was overwhelming that at least some such acts occurred (as evidenced by court convictions), that these armed men were travelling widely, that they were not capable of being adequately monitored, and that in one way or another they were a source of concern to sections of the population, whether by their acts or their reputation. For example, in addition to the regular Security Forces who maintained a high level of activity and their responsibilities at Echo, Foxtrot and Gulf Assembly Places (where some 9,500 guerrillas had assembled), the Monitoring Force in Manicaland was charged with monitoring some 3,000 Auxiliaries in more than 50 bases spread over an area half the size of England. This was an impossible task. The Monitors therefore quite properly concentrated their resources on those bases about which they had received complaints. Even there, visits were only possible about once a week: elsewhere they were even more infrequent. Early in the campaign, as a result of the Monitors' activities, one Auxiliary Commander in the Province was replaced, and another charged with rape.

Although, as elsewhere, we received a large volume of complaints about the Auxiliaries' activities in Manicaland, no further arrests of Auxiliaries in Manicaland were reported to us, but in other areas a significant number of Auxiliaries were appearing before the courts on serious charges. We saw for ourselves a high level of political activity on the part of the Auxiliaries with UANC flags and posters on their vehicles, and one commander in our presence even saluted and exclaimed "God bless Bishop Muzorewa!".

Although we were assured that the Auxiliaries were non-political, and indeed there were units in some districts which were not political, it was noticeable that any reference to the unlawful activities of the Auxiliaries provoked a most hostile reaction from the UANC and the local administration. Had they in fact all been non-political (as was consistently claimed), we cannot see why there should have been such a strident reaction from these quarters. At no stage were we aware of the UANC disowning them.

On several occasions we voiced our concern to the Governor, and on 12 February 1980 he issued written directions to all Auxiliary personnel (Annex 19) neither to help nor to hinder any political party. Quite apart from their activities, we saw their presence as a continuing provocation to many people in the Tribal Trust Lands and to the guerrillas both within and without the Assembly Places. As the Auxiliaries were ostensibly under the authority of the Governor, it would, in our view, have been more politic for him to attempt to break the vicious circle by confining the Auxiliaries to their camps and abandoning their use for the maintenance of "law and order". They were clearly identified in the public mind as a political army, as much as the assembled guerrillas. We are persuaded that the failure to control the Auxiliaries was a major factor in the ensuing level of intimidation. Annex 20 is the text of a "T.V. Eye" television programme which in our view correctly reflected the position in the country at the time it was made, in early February 1980.

There was, too, the fact that many of the Auxiliaries were equipped with weapons captured from the guerrilla forces. Indeed, stock-piles of such weapons had been accumulated by all wings of the Security Forces. There was a tendency in Combined Operations' Communiques and the media to attempt to attribute blame for incidents by "unknown factions" by making reference to the fact that (e.g.) "communist-made weapons" were used. We found such a description not only unhelpful in a search for the truth, but at times misleading since arms of varying origin were used by all sides.

#### **The Security Forces**

The regular Security Forces were not the subject of criticism as being a political army. However, the high profile they maintained in many parts of the country may have provoked at least some breaches of the Agreement. At times the curfews were enforced in a needlessly aggressive manner. In the JOC Grapple area, Monitors made representations, to some effect, expressing their concern at the number of civilians being killed in this way.

We were also disturbed by the way in which a particularly serious matter was handled. On the night of 14 February 1980, three large bombs exploded in Salisbury, and a fourth was found unexploded in the Roman Catholic Cathedral. Two churches and a hotel in which some of us were staying were damaged

by two of the explosions, and the third bomb exploded in a car owned and driven by members of the Selous Scouts (a part of the Security Forces) in circumstances which suggested that they might have been on their way to a further church. First reports attempted to attribute blame to anti-church political activists, and only subsequently because bystanders had found identity documents, was it made public that the two who died in the car were in fact members of the Security Forces, although it was also added that a short time before they had telephoned to say that they were following suspected terrorists. The entire manner in which this matter was handled left us with an uneasy feeling that the whole truth would never be revealed.

Further, on 10 February 1980 an attempt had been made to assassinate Mr. Mugabe, near Fort Victoria, by detonation of a remote controlled landmine. Members of the Group who were in Fort Victoria at the time were puzzled at the inability of the Security Forces to track down those responsible, as there was both a police camp and a Security Force base close by the scene of the crime, and a number of helicopters etc. were immediately available. Moreover the incident took place in open country, with very thin cover. No suspect had been identified up to the time we left Rhodesia.

We came to know that in many parts of the country members of the Security Forces were distributing unattributed and crude anti-marxist literature (e.g. Annex 21) along with official publications of the National Election Directorate. The Rhodesian Air Force, too, seemed to be involved; we witnessed a grey Dakota dropping them by air across Tribal Trust Lands, and were subsequently informed that there were no Dakotas in private ownership. We immediately raised the matter with the Governor (see Annex 10) and were informed that these acts were not approved of by those in charge of the Security Forces and that immediate orders had been given that the practice be discontinued. Unfortunately the order was not fully complied with. This also served to confirm our suspicions that orders were not always acted upon expeditiously, and that at times those in charge of the Security Forces did not have a firm grip on all sections of their command.

It was suggested to us, too, by a police reservist that members of the police might have been involved in distributing a pirate edition of Moto, a popular African nationalist newspaper sponsored by the Catholic Church which appeared on 23 February 1980. At our behest, this allegation was investigated, and our correspondence and a copy of the resulting report appears at Annex 22. The issue was put together by taking a previous issue of Moto and changing the front page so that a newspaper which had been supportive of the Patriotic Front alliance (and had been banned for some years) suddenly appeared to be indulging in a gratuitous character assassination of Mr. Mugabe. The issue was a most professional piece of forgery, and had a fatal sequel. On the evening of the day on which the pirate issue appeared, a massive explosion wrecked the printing room and offices of the publishing house in Gwelo where the authentic Moto was produced. Investigations into this outrage had not concluded at the time of our departure, but it was widely believed that the two persons who died in the explosion had been involved in planting the bomb, and that one of them was white.

A further matter of concern was the fact that three persons were arrested for taking part in an armed attack on Mr. Mugabe's home on 6 February 1980, yet at no time were either the identities or the political allegiances of

them disclosed. When we asked the Police Commissioner about this he declined to tell us on the grounds that the case was sub judice. In the light of the way in which other offences were readily attributed to ZANLA and ZIPRA, we were left with no alternative but to draw our own conclusions.

In view of these activities, we could appreciate that persons aggrieved by the actions of various arms of the Security Forces might well have felt that making complaints about them was both a waste of time and could involve the risk of reprisal. Our observations also confirmed the remarks to us by a former Prime Minister, that the Rhodesian system had over many years perfected the art of concealing misdeeds by its members.

There were instances, too, of police units travelling amongst the people in the TTLs, "explaining" the voting procedures. This was done, we were told, on instructions from Salisbury. It seemed to us quite wrong for the police to have been used in such a way, and complaints were received that the instruction on occasions extended to lectures on the evils of communism, advice as to which party to vote for, and the distribution of party propaganda.

A fourth armed group operating within the community was the militia of the Department of Home Affairs. These we found were generally accepted by the populace at large as being fair and non-political. However a group of kraal heads in Madziwa TTL complained to us that the militia who guarded their protected village had threatened, if ZANU (PF) were to win the elections, to lock the gates, shoot the inhabitants, bomb the assembly areas and behead the party leader. Such threats allegedly emanating from armed men equipped and in a position to execute them were grave indeed. Another armed group comprised farm militia, organised by the large commercial farms to protect their interests but trained and equipped by the state.

We readily appreciate that some members of all arms of the Security Forces and of the Department of Home Affairs militia must have felt their future to be at stake, a worry aggravated by the high rate of unemployment in the country and by the relatively generous salaries they were receiving. While we can understand their wish to see a government likely to be favourably disposed towards them, we cannot condone some of their actions.

#### **The Ordinances**

Overall the pursuit of our inquiries left us with the uncomfortable feeling that the highest authorities were not being made fully aware of the true parameters of the problem of intimidation, and that the sources of information on which they appeared to rely did not present as frank and complete a picture as was necessary. The local administration, preoccupied with security and the war, had become distant from the African population as a whole and was often quite out of touch with the pulse of the communities they served. This was exemplified both by the way in which British Election Supervisors, coming fresh to the scene, frequently read the situation quite differently from local officials and also the confidential eve of poll prediction by the Ministry of Home Affairs to Bishop Muzorewa - UANC 34 seats, ZANU (PF) 26 seats and PF 20 seats. This inability to comprehend the popular mood led to a number of official statements which caused considerable disquiet and gave rise to allegations, however ill-founded, of bias.

Within days of our arrival it was apparent to us that a joint appeal to eschew violence made by the leaders of all the political parties might be helpful in lowering the temperature of the campaign. We pursued this idea in our first round of meetings with political leaders, all of whom responded positively, and thereafter with the Governor. The matter was then taken up formally by the Election Council and the leader of each party signed a statement in identical terms (Annex 23). Mr. Mugabe, Mr. Nkomo and their Commanders also made public appeals to their supporters.

While these efforts were being made the Governor, by two Ordinances, the Elections (Prevention of Disruptive Activities) (No. 1) Ordinance 1980 (No. 7 of 1980) on 5 February 1980 and the Elections (Prevention of Disruptive Activities) (No. 2) Ordinance 1980 (No. 8 of 1980) on 12 February 1980 (Annexes 24 and 25), equipped himself with a variety of enabling powers to counter disruptive activities by political parties and their supporters. These ranged in severity from the suspension of a person from taking part in the election campaign to the effective disenfranchising of voters resident in areas which the Governor considered had been seriously affected by disruptive activity.

The Governor told us that he hoped he would not have to exercise these powers, but would not hesitate to do so if it became necessary. They were intended as an admonition and a warning. He could not countenance a situation where parties could opt out of the election or repudiate its results on the grounds that he had failed to take positive steps to curb intimidation.

We were provided by the Governor with a map and a list (Annex 26), indicating the areas in which, according to his information, intimidation was at unacceptably high levels. We found this information disturbing, as we were already familiar with the position in a good number of these areas, and in several our personal observations of the situation on the ground was sharply at variance with the view being expressed at Government House. Moreover, it was plain that a number of the British Supervisors in the field shared our view of the position. We made a point of intensifying our investigations in areas where intimidation was claimed to be rife. We visited Election Supervisors, Provincial and District Commissioners, party offices, police and army posts, hospitals, schools, farms, churches and other centres of community activity, and talked to a wide cross-section of people.

One District we visited was Darwin, which was marked in red on the map provided by the Governor to denote severe intimidation preventing rival political parties from campaigning. According to the District Commissioner, there were 150 guerrillas active in the Tribal Trust Lands there. To counter their activities, he had at his disposal 400 Security Force Auxiliaries and 700 District Assistants (i.e. members of the militia of the Ministry of Home Affairs). The response to our question to the British Election Supervisor in Darwin District attracted international publicity, so firmly did he deny that intimidation was taking place on any significant scale. Not only was the tone of the political campaign moderate, but no fewer than 37 meetings had taken place in the district in the first 19 days of February; 11 of these had been held by ZANU (Sithole), 17 by UANC, 8 by ZANU (PF) and one by ZDP.

In Beitbridge District, shaded blue to indicate heavy intimidation, a member of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force himself confirmed evidence gathered

by the Group from other sources that intimidation was not a problem. Indeed, he laughed at the suggestion.

In parts of Victoria Province, both UANC and ZDP campaign vehicles were seen by us, moving around freely in a Tribal Trust Land falling within a "blue" area. Some residents of one TTL complained that intimidation there took the form of Auxiliaries rounding up people for forced attendance at political meetings. At their suggestion, some ZANU (PF) officials took us into Bikita District, an area shaded red on the map and which was reputed to be a "no go" area. In that area, at dusk, we saw a number of people wearing UANC badges although both the Provincial Commissioner and his Security Officer had claimed that only ZANLA forces were permitted to operate. On another occasion, Observers accompanied by ZANU (PF) officials drove into the Zimutu TTL, a "blue" area (a Roman Catholic priest and catechist had both been beaten to death there the previous week). The Observers nevertheless moved about freely amongst the different groups they encountered by the roadside, in kraals, commercial areas and schools, who were discussing the elections and the political situation. Whilst there were few signs of political activity by political parties in the area, they found that the tribespeople were fully aware of the political issues involved in the election and spoke of representatives from various parties actively canvassing in the area for attendance at political meetings.

Other districts we concentrated upon in the light of their being at risk under the Ordinances included Madziwa, a "blue" area, which was observed to be another in which there was a variety of party posters, and where party T-shirts could be openly worn without any sign of apprehension.

A pattern thus emerged which in some areas was contrary to the official view.

We also reported to the Governor that we had received information from some political parties, but not the UANC, that they were meeting great difficulties in gaining access to workers on white-owned farms and some protected villages.

We also found that some of the areas mentioned did, indeed, have a serious problem, but as we have indicated, the problem was not as extensive as the map and the list suggested. There was certainly a deep-seated fear on the part of some to venture into a number of areas, and what would have happened had they tried remains problematical, but we learned of a few instances where attempts were made with tragic results. In the Victoria Province for example areas such as Nyajena, Maranda and Matibi No. 1, long regarded as areas liberated by ZANLA, were strictly "no go" areas for the Administration, and consequently for other political parties. The Triangle and Hippo Valley areas in the Chiredzi District, however, were throughout the election campaign open to electioneering by all parties - though no doubt subject to intimidation by various interest groups. The map adopted the same classification for all these areas - etching them "red" to indicate "severely affected by intimidation".

We also made known to the Governor our apprehension about the impact of any action he might take to penalise a particular party using the new powers he had acquired. We conveyed to him the great disquiet already created by wide

arrests of party workers including several candidates of one party, the attempts on the life of its leader, several bomb explosions in the capital and strong suspicions of the involvement of security personnel in some of these acts of violence. We stressed the danger of further exacerbating tensions in a fragile situation, and cautioned him against over-reliance on information reaching him from the security establishment. We had reason to suspect that there was a tendency on its part to highlight infringements by certain parties, and not by others.

We found particularly unacceptable the concept that segments of the population should be liable under law to be arbitrarily and peremptorily disenfranchised. Any action that had to be taken should be directed towards guilty parties in an even-handed manner, and there should have been no question of any part of the electorate being disqualified from voting on the grounds that the Governor felt that one or more of the political parties had indulged in disruptive activities in their region. Any such action would have been a negation of "one man, one vote", and an abrogation of the Lancaster House Agreement. Our fears were heightened by the expectations and hopes of sections of the official establishment that the Ordinances would be invoked, and Mr. Mugabe's unequivocal statement to us that he would no longer consider himself bound by the Lancaster House Agreement if any of these major disqualifications was applied. Mr. Nkomo was also strongly opposed to any use of the Ordinances.

On 15 February 1980, the Governor suspended the Treasurer of ZANU (PF), Mr. Enos Nkala, from campaigning. He had allegedly made a speech in which he referred to the war continuing should his party fail to win. However, we had noted that comments in similar vein by two prominent members of the Rhodesia Front, threatening to invoke South African assistance in the event of a particular outcome to the election, went without attracting any such penalty.

Three days later, on 18 February 1980, ZANU (PF) was prohibited from holding meetings in certain parts of Chiredzi District, namely the Hippo Valley Estates, the Triangle Estates and the area of Triangle Village, in Victoria Province. The Governor's decision was interesting, insofar as the areas prescribed did not in our view (nor, incidentally, in the view of the British Election Supervisors) constitute the areas of greatest threat to a free and fair poll in the Provinces.

Had this been the intention, action would presumably have been taken to open the TTLs virtually closed to political activity by parties other than ZANU (PF) such as Nyaguna, Maranda and Matibi No. 1. We could only interpret the Governor's decision as on the one hand a gesture to those who had protested against the intimidatory tactics of ZANU (PF) supporters, signalling that he was prepared to recognise the validity of their allegations, and on the other hand, as a warning to ZANU (PF), and hence all parties, of his readiness to take whatever measures were necessary against intimidatory tactics. The end result of his actions in respect of Triangle and Hippo Valley was to afford greater electioneering opportunities to all the other parties in a predominantly ZANU (PF) area.

We had several opportunities to impress on the Governor the strength of feeling within the Group against any use of the Ordinances, and were

heartened to find that other observer groups both shared and voiced similar concern. It is now a matter of record that no further action was taken under the Ordinances, although the possibility of action did not abate until polling actually began.

In the course of our examination, it became apparent to us that many of the parties who were complaining of an inability to campaign in certain areas had simply not tried to do so. Others had pleaded intimidation as the cause for people failing to attend their meetings rather than concede that they had no following there. Intimidation had become the catch-cry of the campaign, and it was echoed time and again.

Throughout the campaign the fear persisted that the Security Forces might, in certain circumstances, repudiate the outcome of the election, and that the call-up was designed to enable them to encircle the Assembly Places and neutralise any possible opposition. We considered it important, therefore, to meet General Peter Walls, Commander of Combined Operations. He gave us a solemn assurance that the guerrillas in the Assembly Places had nothing to fear from his forces, who would continue to be loyal to the constitutional authority and accept the outcome of free and fair elections. He also expressed in no uncertain terms his rejection of any outside interference in the domestic affairs of Rhodesia, from whatever quarter.

Our assessment that the level of intimidation had been substantially exaggerated was fortified by figures provided by the police (Annex 27) after we had published our Interim Report. These show the number of interfactional incidents reported to the police between 9 December 1979 and 25 February 1980, of which there were only 20 in Victoria and 20 in Manicaland, both areas where intimidation was said to have been particularly bad. This we found surprising, even after allowance had been made for the fact that there were a number of "no go" areas in these Provinces where such incidents by definition could not occur.

#### **Effect of Intimidation**

Intimidation was undoubtedly a factor in the elections particularly in some TTLs, and may over a few areas have contributed to the high turnout. We now look at its effect on the voters' freedom of choice, against the extremely high level of political consciousness we found among the African population.

In assessing the effects of intimidation we felt bound to take note of the African population's proven record in resisting official blandishments and pressures in the past. The unofficial referendum of 1961, organised by the National Democratic Party led by Mr. Nkomo, convincingly rejected the proposed constitution which would have extended the franchise to only a small number of Africans. Again, in 1971-1972, the African community as a whole, led by Bishop Muzorewa, showed both courage and fortitude in their rejection of the Smith-Home agreement when its acceptability was tested by the Pearce Commission, despite evidence of pressure and intimidation being brought to bear by the Authorities. The Commission reported that the whole country was "alive with political activity at the grass roots" and noted the presence of "many politically minded and intelligent persons living in and visiting the Tribal Trust Lands who could stimulate discussion and carry news and views

far into the countryside." The long years of the war, too, had since further heightened political awareness, and had done so in the most remote parts of the country.

We have noted earlier the politicisation of the people in the areas dominated by ZANLA and ZIPRA forces. Not only was the electorate highly politicised and of proven independence of mind, but there was the additional factor of belief in the secrecy of the ballot. A major educational campaign had been mounted by the National Election Directorate in preparation for the 1979 elections, and this was reinforced by a similar campaign for this election.

Pictures of locked ballot boxes were published and a special point was made of the fact that the ballot papers would all be taken to Britain and eventually be destroyed there. This fact was very widely publicised to reassure voters. "No one will ever know how you vote" was also stressed in radio advertisements. A personal "guarantee" was given in newspaper advertisements featuring the Governor.

The reconciliation of used and unused ballot papers took place on a district, not polling station, level and the count at provincial level so that no idea could be gleaned as to the way in which particular areas or communities had tended to vote. This was public knowledge, and seemed to be well understood.

British Election Supervisors also saw it as part of their duties to promote the message of secrecy in the many meetings they addressed up and down the country. Their very presence, too, along with that of an unprecedented number of international observers, further enhanced belief in the integrity of the process. Moreover, the parties themselves were seen as publicly stressing the element of secrecy.

As we travelled round the country we made a special point of testing people's belief on this point, and our clear impression was that the message had been received and understood in the wider electorate. This was further reinforced by discussions with people during the days of the poll. At a meeting of senior party officials in Victoria Province, too, the view was expressed a week before the poll that the message of secrecy had got through. There might still have been some people in remote areas who were susceptible to suggestions that the way they voted could be determined from looking into their eyes, or that satellites would be watching from the skies, but we were satisfied that they constituted an insignificant proportion of the total electorate.

It was also the position that the party list system of proportional representation afforded a safeguard against intimidation distorting the results, as on average some 28,750 or so votes were needed to gain even one additional seat.

The final question which must be answered is whether the parties had an adequate opportunity to take their case to the people.

Although the campaign was short, it featured an intense burst of political activity. Each party made extensive use of advertising, both in the newspapers and on radio and television, as well as of free radio and television time for party broadcasts. Posters proliferated throughout the land, and many that were torn down were quickly replaced. A great quantity of leaflets was distributed, most of a constructive nature but some quite scurrilous. T-shirts and party headgear were very much in evidence, in every colour and with a variety of party motifs. Indeed both the T-shirts and the posters on occasions proved useful indicators of the range of political activity in particular areas. The subject of the elections dominated every conversation, and everywhere we went we found a real and a lively interest being taken. This interest, too, was reflected in the massive turn-out.

It is true that there were a few occasions when leaders were unable to campaign personally, but we did not see this as seriously impairing their ability to present their case. The country has a strong oral tradition, and the extent to which parties were handicapped in this way was largely overcome by the use of radio broadcasts.

As it happened a number of factors seemed to combine to steady the course of the campaign. Perhaps a fear, generated by the bombings, that the Agreement was about to fall apart; perhaps the unexpected success which attended the courage to campaign in hitherto closed areas; perhaps a series of appeals for calm by party leaders; perhaps a realisation that the facts of political life were not as bad as reputation had them; perhaps the threat posed by the two Ordinances. Whatever the reasons, the temperature dropped sharply in the last week of the campaign. It was thus in a much more relaxed and confident frame of mind that the parties completed their campaigns.

It will be evident from what we have said that the election campaign was characterised by a number of aberrations from the conditions envisaged by the Lancaster House Agreement. The most serious in our view was the failure of the Administration to treat the parties on an equal footing, but while it clearly at times found great difficulty in adjusting to a radically changed situation, the extent to which it succeeded should also be acknowledged. In the circumstances the degree to which the other conditions were fulfilled was gratifying. Overall, there was a very substantial level of peaceful political activity by all the parties, and sufficient freedom of movement, assembly and expression to enable the parties to put their case to the electorate. We were satisfied that the people would be going to the polls with an appreciation of the positions of the various parties, confident for the most part in the secrecy of the ballot, and thus capable of making an informed choice according to their best judgement.

Our concern with the freedom of expression in the election campaign led us to take a close interest in the performance of the media.

We interviewed editors and executives of the press, radio and television in Salisbury. In other towns, such as Bulawayo, Gwelo, Fort Victoria and Umtali, members of the Group made contact with local editors and journalists. The Group's Media Adviser was in close touch with the press, radio and TV throughout the period.

The Lancaster House Agreement provided for the parties to have "free and unfettered access to the public media." The importance of this provision can best be understood by a brief description of the role of the privately-owned media, namely the press. The main newspapers in Rhodesia are all owned by The Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company Limited. Approximately 55 per cent of the shares of the company are held by people living in Rhodesia and 40 per cent by Argus Newspapers of South Africa. It publishes two dailies, The Herald in Salisbury and the Bulawayo Chronicle, as well as The Sunday Mail in Salisbury, The Sunday News in Bulawayo, a weekly in Umtali and the National Observer, a weekly newspaper published in Salisbury and mainly aimed at the African market. Circulations are approximately as follows:-

<u>The Herald</u>	80,000
<u>Sunday Mail</u>	108,000
<u>Bulawayo Chronicle</u>	35,000
<u>Sunday News</u>	29,000
<u>National Observer</u>	30,000

Nearly all Rhodesia's newspapers are in English. Attempts to produce papers in African languages in the past have failed, partly because literacy in English was higher than in most African countries but also because Africans have tended to view attempts by European publishers to produce newspapers in their own language as paternalistic.

Two newspapers aimed at African readership and publishing four days a week appeared during the election campaign - The Times of Zimbabwe and The Drums of Zimbabwe. The Times had been launched on 15 April 1977, but was banned on 2 October 1978. Its editor, Mr. Munangatire, recommenced publication on 12 February 1980 in the last weeks of the election campaign, during which it broadly supported the PF and ZANU(PF).

Another weekly paper of significance which was allowed to recommence publication was Moto, produced in Gwelo by the Mambo Press, a Roman Catholic publishing organisation. Moto had been banned in 1974. Its editor then was a well-known African journalist, Mr. Nyoka, who became publicity secretary to

ZANU(PF). A week before the election the offices of Moto were destroyed by a bomb and the paper silenced after seven issues.

Drums, a party paper run by UANC, switched to daily publication for the election period and intended to revert to a weekly after the election. The remainder of Rhodesia's press consists of a number of party weeklies and small magazines, none of them of much political significance.

The Zimbabwe Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation (ZRBC) is the sole broadcasting authority in the country. It runs a nightly television service, which has a small and mainly European audience, and radio services in English, Shona and Ndebele. The ZRBC has a constitution similar to that of the British Broadcasting Corporation. Under the Broadcasting Act (Cap. 248) it has a Board of Governors appointed by the President. At the time of the election there were nine members - four European and four African, plus a European Chairman. The senior executives were all European.

#### CENSORSHIP

The Rhodesian press has long been self-contained, since almost no foreign publications came into the country during the 15 years of UDI. Copies of the London Financial Times, Time Magazine, The Economist and one or two other papers appeared on sale during the election campaign, but the Rhodesian public generally remained without access to outside publications. The official explanation was that this had been done to conserve foreign exchange, but its reality was to keep Rhodesians insulated from outside news and views.

The Smith regime was largely successful in achieving this objective. Sometimes newspapers were shut down; always they were censored. This was often carried to absurd lengths so that for long periods the names of Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo could not appear; when they had to be mentioned they were referred to as "a terrorist leader based in Maputo" or "a terrorist leader based in Lusaka."

The Herald, formerly The Rhodesia Herald, and other papers of the Group, after a brief period following UDI when they preferred to publish blank spaces rather than submit to the censorship, accommodated themselves to the rules of the game. Rhodesian journalists had thus long been accustomed to working within a stringent system of censorship. As well as having to comply with the law they had exercised a considerable amount of self-censorship which dates back even before UDI.

The censorship regulations had two main purposes - to cover the security situation and so prevent publication of the movements of the Security Forces, facts and figures about the armed services, police and Special Branch, etc., and to prevent any information appearing about the methods by which Rhodesia was circumventing sanctions. Censorship was also strict in such matters as the detention of nationalist leaders, their political activities and all military developments.

When the Governor assumed office, sanctions were lifted and the Patriotic Front parties became legal. As a result, censorship of the press was diminished but not ended.

The Emergency Powers Regulations (Maintenance of Law and Order) 1977 imposed penalties on persons who made statements likely to "cause alarm or despondency among the inhabitants of Rhodesia or some of them" (Section 42), and effectively placed the control of all information concerning the Security Forces (which included the police) under the control of the Minister of Information. As interpreted, the following provision had a widespread effect on the ability of newspapers to report current events in Rhodesia throughout the campaign, and the holding of the elections. This meant that in some important respects we had to rely on newspaper reports published abroad, as they were effectively banned in Rhodesia. The key section reads as follows:

"42A(1) No person shall, for the purpose of publishing news by radio, television or writing, communicate, publish or disseminate, whether within or outside Rhodesia, any information which relates or purports to relate directly or indirectly to -

(a) any measure or act of any description whatsoever of the Security Forces or the Government for the purpose of combating or suppressing terrorism or reducing the incidence thereof within Rhodesia:

(b) the commission of any act of terrorism or sabotage."

An additional form of censorship, provided in the Censorship and Entertainment Control Act (Cap. 78) prohibited any trade in publications etc. declared by the Censorship Board to be "undesirable." The definition of "undesirable", as well as the more conventional meanings, included "to bring any member or section of the public into contempt; or harm relations between any sections of the public; or be contrary to the interests of public safety or public order."

The Censorship Board often banned scholarly and serious writings on southern Africa. At the behest of staff members of Government House, bans on a significant number of works were lifted before the elections. Some idea of the scope of the banned publications is given by the Schedule of banned publications whose bans were lifted in several Gazette Notices in the weeks preceding the election (an example is at Annex 28).

A "D" Notice system was provided for in the Emergency Powers ("D" Notices) Regulations 1976. These regulations imposed controls, inter alia, "for the prevention of alarm or despondency", and for the purpose of dealing with any circumstances which had arisen or were likely to arise and would interfere with" peace, order and good government in Rhodesia." (Section 5(1)(c) and (d)).

The "D" Notices procedure was suspended on the arrival of the Governor but under Section 42A the appearance in the Rhodesian press two weeks before the election of news and pictures of newly-introduced joint ZIPRA/police patrols at assembly points was prevented, although the story was published abroad. A report that Britain had referred to these patrols in a United Nations debate on Rhodesia was carried in the Bulawayo Chronicle, thus challenging the continuing validity of the procedure. Later the ZRBC quoted the Chronicle. News of the joint patrols had also reached the country by way of the 1600 hours GMT BBC World Service News, relayed daily by ZRBC since shortly after the Governor's arrival.

Nevertheless, this episode showed that notwithstanding the advent of

the Governor, restrictive legislation developed over a long period of years was kept intact and was available to the police, the Security Forces and the local administration to enforce as they saw fit throughout the election campaign. Copy which editors considered came under Section 42A still had to be submitted to the Ministry of Information, and on security matters Combined Operations (known as COMOPS) decided what should appear.

#### **THE PUBLIC MEDIA**

Against this background we were particularly concerned about the role of the public media - radio and television - during the election campaign.

The British Administration, in line with its general policy of leaving the government infrastructure intact, sought to persuade rather than direct the Ministry of Information and ZRBC into better ways. An information office in Government House monitored the media, and privately expressed its displeasure from time to time in matters of news balance and censorship. Often the Governor's office suggested, in its defence, that pressures on the Rhodesian Administration had to be applied on important matters that had greater priority than those connected with censorship and the media.

Within days of the Governor taking over, the BBC World Service news bulletin began to be transmitted through ZRBC once a day. It was the first time Rhodesians had heard the BBC on their own radio services since UDI. Other BBC items including many on Rhodesia were also used in ZRBC's newsreel programmes.

A South African news broadcast continued to be transmitted daily on ZRBC. It went out at 8.00 a.m. - a "white housewives" peak listening time rather than an African peak time - and, unlike the BBC news, was broadcast on only one programme. It was argued in defence of the continued South African broadcasts that Zambia and Mozambique beamed into Rhodesia special programmes that could be heard widely all over the country, both propagating the views of the Patriotic Front partners.

Our own view is that while there was a limit to pressures that could be exerted on the press, being privately owned, some more positive action could have been taken in regard to ZRBC. The introduction into the editorial department of ZRBC of two or three outside journalists from one of the Commonwealth radio corporations could have rectified the news imbalance in a matter of days and we believe such a step would have been of inestimable help in enlarging the freedom of expression during the election period.

We did not regard the television service as having much influence on the mass of African voters, but the radio did concern us since many Africans in the villages, townships and TTLs have their own transistor sets, and radio is heard in beerhalls and other public places.

Each of the political parties was offered equal free time on radio and television. From 28 January to 1 February 1980, each had a free, six minute "start of campaign" broadcast on all channels, and a "close of campaign" six minute broadcast during the period 18 to 22 February. In addition, on 26 February each party had a two minute "eve of poll" broadcast on all channels.

The order of broadcasts was determined by lot, and in the African services each party was free to choose its language. Programmes were pre-recorded so that no party could reply. Scripts were vetted by ZRBC's legal advisers and some amendments were asked for; we heard no complaints on this score.

Additionally, each party was free to purchase time for television and radio advertisements, up to a fixed maximum value over the whole span of the campaign. The apportionment of time was strictly equal, and no complaints were received from any party. If a party did not take up its full allocation of paid for time, the "spots" were not made available to anyone else. There was no control over newspaper advertisements. All the major parties advertised extensively. In our view, these arrangements worked satisfactorily.

#### PERFORMANCE OF THE MEDIA

On radio and TV there was even less investigative journalism than there was in the press, and statements by the administration were invariably accepted at face value. When we first arrived in the country the Communiques of Combined Operations (COMOPS) were often read out word for word as the first item of the news bulletins. As these Communiques were written in political terms - and their content was not always accepted as accurate by members of the Monitoring Force - we were particularly concerned at the effect of such broadcasts on the ZIPRA and ZANLA forces in the assembly places. We were told that sometimes members of the Monitoring Force had to go round the areas calming the soldiers after Communiques had upset them.

We made this point to the Director-General of the ZRBC and also expressed our concern at the balance of many news broadcasts, which did not seem to be giving the political parties equality of treatment. In our interview about two weeks before the election, he told us that he had given instructions that the COMOPS Communiques should in future be treated on their news merit and that if they contained little of importance they need not be mentioned. The Editor of The Herald said he had given similar instructions to his staff. In both cases there did seem to be a reduction in the prominence given to the COMOPS Communiques in the last two weeks before the elections. We regret this development took place so late in the day.

In fact, there appeared to be a marked improvement in the balance of coverage in both the daily press and broadcasting in the last days of the campaign, and especially during the three polling days. When the ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrilla forces moved into training with the security forces, the event received full coverage. Earlier reluctance to inform the country about similar developments, i.e. in the matter of the joint patrols, now seemed to have disappeared. This situation, as in so many other matters, changed from day to day, usually for the better.

What emerged in our observations on the media in Rhodesia was the fact that nearly 20 years of a fettered press had blunted the journalists' cutting edge. It had become the habit to accept statements without question and to publish what officialdom chose to say and to leave out what it ordained should not be said. This had led to a situation where the media had suffered a loss of credibility, especially among the African population. Indeed, tribespeople in Manyika District were delighted to meet us as they had previously thought that the Commonwealth Observer Group itself did not exist but was a figment of official propaganda.

In our talks with representatives of the media, with one exception, there was a noticeable incapacity to look at both sides of an argument and to accept that misbehaviour might not always take place on the African nationalist side and that the authorities might also be capable of misdemeanours. This emerged particularly clearly when on the night of 14 February the three bombs exploded in Salisbury, two in churches, and a fourth was planted in the Roman Catholic Cathedral. Though it was plain that there was at least considerable doubt as to who was responsible for these acts, the media scarcely conveyed this doubt. It suggested anti-Christian elements were the culprits. We found this kind of journalism in the middle of the election campaign to be calculated to mislead the voters.

Much that happened during the election campaign arose out of an irrational fear harboured over many years by one group of the population towards another. We believe the public media should have attempted to allay these fears instead of heightening them further. If the election was itself a step towards reconciliation the media should have seen itself as an integral part of the process. We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the official view that the performance of the media was not an issue in this election. Quite apart from professional questions of balance, an important national opportunity was lost.

The Independence Constitution\* provides for a President, and a Parliament consisting of a Senate and a House of Assembly. The President was to be elected by the two Houses sitting together as an electoral college. The Senate was to be chosen by elections involving members of the House of Assembly and the Council of Chiefs, and augmented by members appointed by the President. The election with which we were concerned was for the House of Assembly. The House comprised 100 elected members, 20 elected on a White Roll and 80 on a Common (or Black) Roll.

Polling for the six contested white seats (in 14, Rhodesia Front candidates were returned unopposed) took place on 14 February 1980, and Common Roll polling on 27, 28 and 29 February. The expression "Common Roll" is used in this report to adopt the language of the Electoral Act; in fact, as agreed at Lancaster House, there was no roll for African (black) voters.

The Electoral Act 1979, under which the elections were held was broadly based on its British counterpart but modified to accommodate the party list system of proportional representation in respect of the elections on the Common Roll. There were no special features in the legislation which call for comment and are not mentioned in other parts of our report. The laws were the subject of close scrutiny by the British Election Commissioner and his staff, and several minor amendments were made in the light of this. We also studied the electoral law and satisfied ourselves independently that its provisions were such as to facilitate the holding of free and fair elections.

For the White Roll election, the country was divided into 20 constituencies. Voters' rolls had been prepared for these constituencies and contained the names of those registered as voters on the White Roll as at 31 December 1979. The White Roll included the Coloured and the Asian voters, and the Common Roll only the African. The 20 White constituency members were chosen by preferential voting, by which a voter could indicate his order of preference of the candidates presented to him.

#### COMMON ROLL ELECTION

By contrast, for the election of the 80 Common Roll members there were on this occasion to be no constituencies, no registration of voters, and therefore no roll. Instead, a party list system was used. Under this, every participating political party submitted a list of candidates Province-wise. Variations in the lists were allowed during the campaign. The ballot papers contained only the names of the political parties and their symbols, and each voter indicated his choice of party. The number of seats was then distributed between the competing parties based on the proportion of the votes they received in each Province in relation to the total votes cast.

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\*Zimbabwe Independence Order 1979 (S.1. 1600 of 1979)

The eight existing administrative Provinces were treated as the eight electoral districts for the Common Roll election, and the 80 seats distributed among them in proportion to their estimated population, were as follows:-

Manicaland	11 seats
Mashonaland Central	6 seats
Mashonaland East	16 seats
Mashonaland West	8 seats
Matabeleland North	10 seats
Matabeleland South	6 seats
Midlands	12 seats
Victoria	11 seats

We heard no serious criticism of the distribution of seats, although it was apparent that there were no fully reliable statistics of population on which to base such assessments.

In each Province, an Electoral District Returning Officer (generally the Provincial Commissioner) was responsible for the overall conduct of the election in his Province. Each Province is for administrative purposes divided into several Administrative Districts under a District Commissioner. For the elections, each District Commissioner was appointed an Administrative District Returning Officer and charged with responsibility for conducting the election within his District. The officials, including Returning Officers, Polling Officers and Counting Officers, were in the main civil servants, black and white, who have been charged by law for many years not to be involved in political activity. They were augmented by a number of persons on call-up duty.

Those entitled to vote were persons aged 18 years and above who were black citizens of Rhodesia under the Independence Constitution, or were black non-citizens who had been temporarily resident in Rhodesia for a continuous period of two years before the date of the election. As there was to be no registration of voters, we noted that the question of the determination of eligibility would have to be given special attention by us over the period of the poll.

There were both static polling stations (i.e. at fixed places and open during all 3 days of the poll) and mobile (which were moved from place to place to provide facilities for voters in locations which did not warrant the provision of a static polling station). Their disposition Province by Province is shown in Annex 29.

#### **VOTING PROCEDURES**

A voter presenting himself at a polling station had to identify himself as being eligible to vote to the satisfaction of the presiding officer. An initial check was made by a polling clerk and where he was in doubt he referred the matter to his presiding officer. Where evidence was lacking or unacceptable, it was open for a would-be voter to return later with a document to prove his eligibility or a member of the community who could vouch for him.

Where documentary evidence was not accepted the presiding officer was

expected to perforate the documents with the ballot paper perforator so as to indicate this fact to any other polling stations the voter might attempt to visit. Where the evidence was accepted, it was not to be perforated.

Once accepted as eligible, the voter entered the polling station and placed his hands inside an ultra-violet lightbox where they were inspected by a clerk. If he had voted before, his fingertips would show a white glow. Having passed this test, he then placed the tips of the fingers of both hands in a basin containing a plastic pad moist with a colourless solution whose dye, invisible to the naked eye, would show up under ultra-violet light in the lightbox were he to attempt to vote again.

The voter was then issued with a ballot paper (Annex 30), which was first validated by a 25-pronged perforator specially imported from Britain. The ballot papers were in pads of 200, and had no counterfoils to avoid an opportunity for names being noted. For reconciliation purposes, the ballot papers were numbered, but the effect of the perforator was, by making a 5 x 5 box of small holes, to obliterate most of the figures.

The voter then took his ballot paper to one of the polling booths where, in private, he placed a cross against the square opposite the name and symbol of the party of his choice. The voter then folded his paper so that the perforated corner, showing that the ballot paper had been validated, remained visible. This was shown to a clerk standing by the ballot box, but not in a way which involved the clerk either in handling the ballot paper or being able to see how the ballot paper had been marked, before the voter dropped the ballot paper into the ballot box.

Before polling commenced on the first day, or where a subsequent ballot box needed to be used, the box was shown to party agents so that they could satisfy themselves as to its being empty before the lid was sealed and the box securely locked. At the end of each polling day the slot in each ballot box was to be closed and sealed in the presence of party agents, who could place their own signatures and their own seals on the boxes. Where there were no party agents, the process was witnessed by an Assistant Supervisor or other independent persons. Before polling began on subsequent occasions, each box was examined by party agents and others to ensure that the seals were still intact, then the seal over the slot in the ballot box was opened. The seals used were made in Britain, as was a specially-embossed adhesive tape. The string used was similarly of British manufacture, and not available in Rhodesia. In addition, the rooms where the ballot boxes were stored overnight were sealed in the presence of party agents.

At the start and at the end of each day's polling, and of polling at each location in the case of the mobile polling stations, a record was kept of the number of ballot papers used, and those remaining unused. In this way, party agents could satisfy themselves as to the number used throughout the day and that no ballot papers had been removed overnight. Party agents were also informed of the numerals of each pad of ballot papers when one pad was exhausted and another started.

At the conclusion of voting on the final day of the poll, the boxes

were again sealed before being transported in the presence of the parties to the Administrative District Returning Officer. Once they had all reached him, the Administrative District Returning Officer, in the presence of the party agents, examined the seals before opening the boxes and tipping the ballot papers out. They were then unfolded and placed face downwards in bundles of 100 to enable a reconciliation to take place between the number of ballot papers issued to the polling station in question, the number used, and the number returned unused.

Once these reconciliations had taken place the ballot papers were packed in ballot boxes which were then sealed in the same manner as before. They were then transported, again in the presence of party agents, to provincial centres, where the votes were counted in the presence of party representatives under the authority of the Electoral District Returning Officer. Counting began throughout the country on Monday, 3 March 1980. As soon as the count was completed, each Electoral District Returning Officer notified the number of votes cast for each party to the Election Commissioner in Salisbury.

A British Assistant Election Commissioner then applied the formula provided for by law to establish the number of seats to be allocated to each party as contained in Sections 175 and 176 of the Electoral Act 1979 (Annex 31).

It was arranged for the ballot papers to be packed after the count and airfreighted to Britain on 6 March 1980 where they are to be stored for six months, pending any order by the High Court for their production during the hearing of any election petitions, before being burnt. The removal of the ballot papers in this manner was designed to provide a further safeguard for the secrecy of the ballot, and received considerable publicity.

The final form of instructions to polling staff appears as Annex 32.

A summary of the rights and duties of party agents, prepared by the Election Commissioner's office, appears as Annex 33.

#### **NATIONAL ELECTION DIRECTORATE**

The National Election Directorate under the Registrar of Elections is an ad hoc body first established to organise the April 1979 elections. It had three roles - the organisation of arrangements for the elections, publicity and resource management. The Directorate considered that the election process in April 1979 had been adjudged fair and beyond criticism, whatever might have been said about the Constitution under which the elections were held. They proposed therefore to organise the independence elections on the same lines, as described above. There were some differences, for example, the use of a perforator instead of a rubber stamp to validate ballot papers, and the elimination of counterfoils on pads of ballot papers. Some minor changes were made to the election laws to increase credibility in the election process.

Members of the Directorate, and all those involved in organising the elections, including polling clerks, were civil servants who were charged as a condition of their employment to be non-political. The Directorate saw it

as its task to ensure that all voters understood that they had a right to vote, knew how to vote, and appreciated that they could vote without fear because of the secrecy of the ballot. They saw a need to encourage women to vote, as women were not generally very active in village affairs. To achieve these ends, a massive publicity campaign was mounted, through radio, television and newspaper advertisements, and the distribution of pamphlets and posters. All three major languages - English, Shona and Ndebele - were used. Examples of the publicity material form Annex 34.

In addition, the Directorate showed a film entitled "How to Vote", made in both Shona and Ndebele. We were informed that the film was widely shown and seen by a large number of people. An English translation of the soundtrack appears as Annex 35. The film was originally prepared for the April 1979 elections, and so could not reflect amendments to the procedures made subsequently. A prologue had been added to explain why another election was necessary so soon after the last.

#### BRITISH SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS

The elections were conducted under the authority and supervision of the British Government, but using the local administration in accordance with the Lancaster House Agreement. Responsibility for British supervision devolved on the Election Commissioner, assisted by his Deputy Election Commissioner and his Assistant Election Commissioners. The establishment of these posts, and their investiture with formal legal powers, was provided for in Ordinances enacted by the Governor, as previously noted. The effect of these changes to the law were to place the Election Commissioner in a position superior to that of the Registrar General of Elections. The Election Commissioner was assisted by an Election Council, a consultative body on which all the parties participating in the elections were represented.

Supervision paralleled the structure of the Rhodesian administration. As a counterpart to the National Election Directorate there was the Election Commissioner and his office. Below that, were two British Provincial Supervisors for each election district (counterparts to the Rhodesian Provincial Commissioners), and one or two British District Supervisors as counterparts to the District Commissioners in each district. In all, the team of British Supervisors numbered 89. To this were added some 571 British policemen as Assistant Election Supervisors, who flew to Rhodesia a week before the elections and were deployed in polling stations throughout the country, and predominantly in rural areas (their instructions appear as Annex 36). The Provincial Supervisors were in place some seven weeks and the District Supervisors some three weeks before the elections. A summary of the duties of Election Supervisors appears as Annex 37.

A high proportion of Supervisors had experience of administration and of elections in the Commonwealth countries of Africa. The rest were officials with experience of elections in Britain. Their task was to liaise with Rhodesian officials at provincial and district level; to make wide contacts within their areas and reinforce the message of secrecy; to satisfy themselves that the election facilities were adequate and would permit the population to vote freely and fairly; to monitor the campaigns of the parties; to visit all polling stations at least once during the polling; and to attend and supervise the count. In addition, they kept an eye on every matter within their area of

responsibility which might impinge on the elections.

They were particularly concerned to ensure that polling stations were located in appropriate places, that people had ready access to them without having to travel overly long distances, and that polling stations were not located in inappropriate places, such as police camps and the like.

#### **ELECTION COUNCIL**

The Election Council proved a most useful forum. Under skilful chairmanship, and with each party represented by two senior officials, the meetings demonstrated an encouraging ability on the part of all the parties to work together, and to achieve reasoned decisions in a very short time. Arrangements were made for us to be at its meetings, and we greatly benefited from our regular attendance.

The Election Council was consulted on a wide variety of matters concerning all aspects of the elections. Discussions were brief and to the point, and little time was devoted to the scoring of political points. In addition, it provided a vehicle through which complaints could be made, and frequently were, concerning aspects of the election arrangements and the election campaign which were troubling individual parties.

#### **LITERACY AND THE POLL**

We were concerned that the level of illiteracy could affect the capacity of voters to mark their ballot papers. Research statistics made available to us suggested that 33 per cent of adult African males and 41 per cent of adult females had never attended school. We decided to pay attention during polling to the ability of voters to mark their papers, especially as the cross with which they were to indicate the party of their choice has for some people a negative, rather than positive, connotation. In this respect it was encouraging that all the parties, in almost all their publications and posters, featured their symbol with a cross beside it, in order, inter alia, to educate the electorate in how to vote.

#### **COMMENTS ON ELECTION ARRANGEMENTS**

There has been no census in Zimbabwe since 1969. The population was officially estimated to be 7.22 million, and to have 3.08 million potential voters. Of these, 2.883 million were potential voters for the Common Roll elections. The war has caused dramatic shifts in population, and the organisers had no reliable data for assessing the numbers likely to use particular polling stations or even the total number likely to vote. The problem was compounded by the fact that any black voter could vote anywhere in the country, regardless of place of residence. Bussing of voters by parties across electoral boundaries was declared illegal. However, there was nothing to prevent substantial numbers from crossing electoral boundaries on their own to cast their votes in other Provinces.

These factors made it necessary for the Administration to print considerably more ballot papers than could ever have been used - namely six

million. The number printed for each Province was as follows:-

	Number printed	Number used
Manicaland	800,000	301 673
Mashonaland Central	400,000	185 237
Mashonaland East	1,600,000	638 935
Mashonaland West	600,000	295 858
Matabeleland North	800,000	403 162
Matabeleland South	400,000	178 007
Midlands	1,000,000	347 588
Victoria	800,000	348 990

We were satisfied that this was unavoidable if the risk of large numbers of persons being effectively disenfranchised by a shortage of ballot papers at particular polling stations was to be avoided. However, the presence of such a large number of excess ballot papers created a fear in the minds of at least some of the public that they might find their way into the ballot boxes improperly. We therefore regarded the question of the reconciliation of ballot papers and observation of their handling as matters calling for particular attention before, during and after the days of the poll.

We inspected the arrangements for printing ballot papers and the security measures designed by Her Majesty's Stationery Office (U.K.), and watched some of the printing. The ballot papers were printed on a locally-produced buff-coloured newsprint, which we understand, has not been exported. For technical printing reasons, we were satisfied that any attempt to forge ballot papers would be detected. In fact, one pad of 200 papers for Manicaland was stolen from the Government Printer, but the theft was promptly revealed by the elaborate system of cross-checks developed by HMSO, which had one of its staff supervising the printing. Although the theft could not have affected the ballot, the Election Commissioner arranged for a new set of ballot papers to be produced for Manicaland printed on a green paper and the old ones destroyed.

We tested the invisible dye used to identify those who had voted, using a range of sophisticated cleansers and barrier creams, including one imported for the purpose. These tests satisfied us that there was no foundation for any fear, as expressed in respect of the April 1979 election, that party supporters might be bussed from polling station to polling station to vote repeatedly, detection having been made impossible by the use of a barrier cream or some such aid to prevent the dye staining their fingertips.

There were two sizes of ballot box, of sturdy wooden construction. Rumours still circulated from the April 1979 elections that it was possible to introduce additional ballot papers to sealed ballot boxes by removing the wooden handles from their sides. Our investigations revealed that this would be quite impossible. The handles were not set into the wooden sides of the boxes, but fixed on to the outside by means of two screws. Were a handle to be removed (and as the screw was placed through from the inside of the boxes this would itself present difficulties) one would simply be confronted with two small screw holes through which it would be exceedingly difficult to introduce a ballot paper. We were satisfied with the construction of the boxes.

We also inspected the tape and the seals to be used for sealing the boxes. We were satisfied that these were not capable of being counterfeited, and that the provisions for signatures on the adhesive seals of officials and party agents would be adequate safeguards. We were aware of fears that ballot boxes might be tampered with when stored overnight in polling stations or in District Commissioners' offices, and that some parties wished to have their agents stay overnight with the ballot boxes. In view of the satisfactory arrangements for the sealing of the boxes and the storage rooms, and the parties' participation in this, we were inclined to agree with the decision that to have party agents stay overnight with the ballot boxes could have created more problems than it would have solved. We were encouraged, too, by the suggestion made by the Election Commissioner that the British policemen who acted as Assistant Supervisors should endeavour to stay overnight with the boxes.

The fact that the election was held on a party list system rendered the election process a good deal more secure than it would otherwise have been. Unlike an election based on constituencies, where even a few votes can decide the outcome, under the party list system as used for this election, to achieve even one additional seat in a particular electoral district a party would have needed to secure an average of an additional 28,750 votes. This ensured that any unlawful interference with the mechanisms of the elections or the exertion of undue influence would need to be carried out on a truly large scale, with its concomitant risks of detection.

We closely scrutinised the manner in which British Election Supervisors discharged their duties. The great majority were seen by us as discharging their duties with dedication, and at times, great flair. Some energetically persuaded local administrations to vary arrangements which had been made with a disregard for population distribution or for the fact that the elections were taking place during a cease-fire, not, as in April 1979, in a state of war. They also played a creative role in encouraging the political parties, some of whom had little or no experience of organising party machinery, so that the parties would be alive to their rights, and understand the opportunities they had to satisfy themselves as to the integrity of the election process. In our view the British Supervisors made an important contribution to the impartiality of the election process.

The National Election Directorate co-operated with the Election Commissioner, and organised the elections in a commendable fashion. Its publicity campaign contributed to the large turn-out of voters essential to the democratic process.

We saw some evidence of a lack of penetration of the Directorate's pamphlets and posters into some of the more remote and less densely populated areas, and in some instances observed an absence of effort in distributing them at the local level. Further, we found ourselves on occasions being asked to explain the voting procedures by Africans in the Tribal Trust Lands, this notwithstanding the fact that the parties themselves almost invariably featured representations as to how to vote both in their posters and in newspaper advertisements (for examples, see Annex 38). However we are satisfied that on the whole an acceptable effort was made to educate people as to how to vote, and as to the secrecy of the ballot.

When we viewed the Directorate's "How to Vote" film we noticed some errors, but did not consider these to be of any real consequence. The basic messages of secrecy of the ballot and of the process as a whole came across well.

Having studied the arrangements for the elections, we prepared instructions, questionnaires and checklists for completion by all of our teams visiting polling stations during the polling period

#### **PARTICIPATION OF THE PARTIES IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS**

A feature of the electoral process, as in other Commonwealth countries, was the participation of party agents at all stages. Each party was entitled to appoint a polling agent for each polling station in each Province in which it was contesting. Each party could also appoint one election agent and one counting agent for each Province.

Each agent was entitled to witness the ballot box as being empty at the commencement of the poll, and to witness the padlocking of the boxes. At designated polling stations in the urban areas of Salisbury and Bulawayo, the agent was permitted access to the polling station to observe the polling. In other areas he remained outside, but available to witness any exercise of discretion by the Presiding Officer, and to verify the manifest of ballot papers as entries were made. He also witnessed the sealing of the boxes and the storage rooms each evening, and inspected the box at the start of each day's polling to satisfy himself that the storage room and the ballot box had not been tampered with overnight. On each occasion when the ballot box was sealed he was entitled to witness the sealing, sign the paper seals to increase security, and also to affix his own seal. At the end of each day's polling, two of the polling agents were entitled to accompany the ballot boxes to their place of storage overnight, and to return with the ballot box the following morning. Similarly, two polling agents from different parties were entitled to accompany the ballot boxes on their journey to the place at which the reconciliation of the ballot paper count took place, and in the absence of the election agent or the counting agent of his party, the polling agent appointed for the purpose by his party was entitled to witness the reconciliation at Administrative District level. In similar circumstances he was entitled to witness the actual count.

The polling agents were subject to the lawful instructions of Returning Officers and Presiding Officers. They were not permitted to interfere with voters, nor to speak to them unless first spoken to. In accordance with the declarations of secrecy they made, they were not permitted to communicate information obtained in a polling station nor to attempt to ascertain any number on any ballot paper or communicate any information obtained at the count as to the candidate for whom any particular ballot paper was cast. They were obliged to help maintain the secrecy of the voting, and were not permitted to wear party labels etc. inside or outside the polling station.

#### **COMMENT ON PARTICIPATION BY PARTY POLLING AGENTS**

The polling agents had an important role to play both in ensuring the validity of the electoral process, and in assuring their own confidence in the result. When we arrived, the law as it stood enabled polling agents to

be present within the polling stations during the voting. This was in line with the practice in a number of Commonwealth countries, although in Britain the practice has grown up whereby parties merely have their representatives outside the polling stations. In our view it would have been highly desirable, in the special circumstances of these elections, to permit polling agents to be present during the voting. We appreciate that it might have been difficult to accommodate agents of all nine parties in a particular polling station, and that Presiding Officers would have had to have some discretion as to the total numbers they might permit at any one time. The matter was the subject of considerable discussion during the run-up to the elections; at one stage the proposal was to exclude polling agents altogether, except at the beginning and end of polling each day.

The Lancaster House Agreement provided that each party would be entitled to have one representative at each polling station "to observe the polling", and it was a question of interpretation whether this meant inside a polling station or simply at one. The point was also made that the presence of some particular persons as polling agents might have had an intimidating effect on some voters, and their presence, particularly in smaller, rural polling stations, might have eroded belief in the secrecy of the ballot. On these twin grounds a final decision was taken after consultation with the Election Council to permit polling agents in polling stations during the voting only in certain polling stations in the Salisbury and Bulawayo areas (Annex 39). Had it not been for the fact that in virtually every rural polling station there was to be a British policeman present as an Assistant Election Supervisor, we would have felt some misgivings about the exclusion of the parties. As it happened, and perhaps as a result of the decision to have British policemen, there was little substantial objection from the parties to the decision. Copies of our correspondence with the Election Commissioner appear as Annex 40.

#### COMMENTS ON THE WHITE ROLL POLL

The election on the White Roll took place on 14 February. Only six of the 20 white seats were contested, and in all six contests the Rhodesia Front candidates were returned. The size of the poll varied between 50 and 60 per cent. We visited polling stations in each of the constituencies, and observed an uneventful poll.

We were made aware of dissatisfaction among people of Asian and Coloured (mixed race) origin that they had been included on the White Roll without consultation or consent. Their inclusion in the White Roll was a provision in the Lancaster House Agreement, and nothing could be done to alter it at this stage. We noted a widespread feeling among white Rhodesians that their future was going to be decided not by the White Roll election but by the Common Roll election in which they could not take part. The only real complaint came from an independent candidate, who said a policy decision had been taken by ZRBC on 13 February to deny eve of poll coverage to the independent candidates because they were not "a party".

As noted earlier, the White Roll election differed in major respects from the Common Roll election. It was conducted on a roll of voters, constituencies had been delimited, and a form of preferential voting was adopted.

## MODE OF OBSERVATION OF THE COMMON ROLL POLL

As noted, we deployed our strength to ensure a comprehensive coverage of the country. In visiting polling stations, our role was to observe. We did not see it as desirable to become embroiled in any disputes, or to take sides in any arguments. We saw our presence as a benign one, and endeavoured to act with discretion at all times. It was for us to be impartial, objective and even-handed. On the few occasions when we were concerned about an aspect of the procedures, wherever possible we drew the attention of a British Supervisor or an Assistant Supervisor to it, and some times directly to a Presiding Officer.

Members of the Group were only able to visit polling stations in some remote areas by travelling in vehicles with the British Supervisors. We saw no objection to this, as included in our mandate was observation of the manner in which the elections were supervised.

On the first day of polling, as many of the Group as possible were present at polling stations before polling commenced, to inspect the empty ballot boxes and to witness the sealing of the lids.

Similarly, each evening, we were present at polling stations when they closed, to inspect the sealing of the boxes for transportation, and to satisfy ourselves that voters within the precincts of the polling stations were permitted to vote before they closed. On as many occasions as possible, members of the Group travelled with the sealed ballot boxes between polling stations and the places of overnight storage. On the mornings of the second and third days of polling, members of the Group witnessed the inspection of the seals by the party polling agents, and the re-opening of the slot in the boxes.

Each of us carried checklists (Annex 41) which we completed in respect of each visit we made to a polling station. As we approached polling stations we first satisfied ourselves that people were not being obstructed in their efforts to go and vote, and on arrival we spoke to those waiting to vote to ascertain e.g. how far they had had to walk, for how long they had been waiting, and whether anything untoward had taken place. We also took careful note of the security arrangements to see if they were unduly conspicuous, and might be regarded as having a coercive effect on voters. We noted, too, the degree of orderliness in the area surrounding polling stations. We ascertained which of the parties were represented by polling agents, and spoke to these agents to see if they had anything they wished to tell us. We then observed the conduct of the eligibility procedures before entering the polling stations to check if the voting procedures were being scrupulously followed. There we spoke to any British Election Supervisor or Assistant Supervisor who was present, and also to the Presiding Officer. We paid special attention to the layout of the polling station to satisfy ourselves that the booths were so placed as to enable voters to mark their ballot papers in complete confidence that their vote was secret. We also checked the seal on the ballot box. On occasions we looked through the viewer in the lightbox to examine the hands of voters chosen at random to satisfy ourselves that they had not previously voted.

On leaving a polling station we made a point of speaking to some of

those who had cast their votes to determine whether they were satisfied with the arrangements and with the secrecy of the ballot. We also took note of the manner in which voters had been transported to polling stations. Where a polling station was sited near a protected village, we tried to visit the village to assure ourselves that the people there felt free to leave to vote. We also endeavoured to be present at busy polling stations at the end of each day's polling, where intending voters might be turned away. In some cases, as urban polling stations closed later than rural polling stations it was possible for one member of the Group to witness the conclusion of the day's polling in two different places. The checklists we completed in respect of each polling station noted the time of arrival and the time of departure and the approximate number of voters processed in the interim. This enabled us to build up a picture of the adequacy of the facilities and the speed of processing in different parts of the country.

At the conclusion of the polling on the third and final day, members of the Group travelled with the ballot boxes to the place of storage and onwards to the Administrative District Centre where verification of the used and unused ballot papers took place. This we observed in 42 of the 55 districts. Those members of the Group then observed the repacking and the resealing of the ballot boxes, and travelled on with them to the Provincial Centre for the count. Similarly, we were represented at each of the eight provincial counts. Because of rumours of the possibility of ballot box substitution, the transportation and storage of the boxes received our close attention. We further checked the spoilt ballot papers at the count to see if there was any pattern to these, particularly as we had seen a pamphlet which had been distributed in Mashonaland East which suggested that as both Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo needed the support of voters, supporters of the Patriotic Front alliance should mark their ballot papers in favour of both the PF and ZANU(PF). During the count we observed a good number of ballot papers which had been marked in this way in this Province, but otherwise there appeared to be no general pattern to the ballot papers which were disallowed.

In working out our itineraries for each day, we were conscious of the need to strike a balance between the number of polling stations we covered, and the amount of time we spent in them. Schedules that would have had us spending most of the day travelling and relatively small periods of time at polling stations were, wherever possible, avoided.

At the end of each day, each member of the Group completed a daily questionnaire (Annex 42) to provide an overview of what had been observed that day. Each evening the information was collated at provincial offices and telephoned to Salisbury so that the Chairman and Observers in Salisbury had a picture of the situation across the country, and were able to keep each Provincial Centre informed of the pattern of events in other areas. At the conclusion of the poll, a debriefing questionnaire was similarly completed (Annex 43).

In view of the large excess of ballot papers printed, we paid special attention to security arrangements for the ballot papers, and to the manner in which they were handled administratively up to the point where they were entrusted to Presiding Officers and the verification procedures became effective.

## CONCLUSIONS ON THE COMMON ROLL POLL

Over the course of the three days of polling for the Common Roll seats, members of the Group visited 437 polling stations in 54 Administrative Districts (Annex 44). A large number of stations in the urban areas were visited several times. For accommodation purposes our Assistants and supporting staff were located around the country in 30 centres. We were determined to visit as many different polling stations as we reasonably could, even though this could involve spending more time travelling than witnessing the poll.

After the close of the poll, Assistants and supporting staff travelled with a large number of ballot boxes to 42 District Centres, where they observed the reconciliation between used and unused ballot papers. From these centres, they travelled with an even larger number of ballot boxes to Provincial Centres to observe the count for each Provincial District.

The account of the polling arrangements indicates particular areas where we felt vigilance was required. These were the adequacy and siting of polling stations in relation to the estimate of voters in each area and the distances voters would have to travel; the determination of eligibility; the effectiveness of the dye to prevent multiple voting; the conduct of polling staff; the facilities provided for polling agents; and the environment in which polling took place. We comment on these in turn. Before doing so we would note that over the period of the poll we spoke to many thousands of voters, and in so doing we took the opportunity to canvass all the matters which had concerned us over the period of the campaign. In particular we were anxious to determine whether the voters felt under duress or any other form of intimidation, and whether they believed in the secrecy of the ballot. These discussions confirmed us in the view we have come to.

### Adequacy of polling facilities

During our discussions with party leaders, some expressed their concern that the number of polling stations would not be adequate. They felt that planning had been based on arrangements for the 1979 elections, and as they had campaigned for abstention, with a considerable degree of success in the eastern region of the country, these did not provide a reliable basis. We took up the matter with the Election Commissioner. However, final polling arrangements were not made until very late in the day, and were often influenced by available transport facilities. This left insufficient time for us to offer constructive suggestions, as it was already too late for changes to be made.

There seemed to us to be grounds for concern, particularly as in Manicaland, where only some 46.7 per cent voted in 1979, the number of polling stations was marginally reduced, from 76 to 67. At the same time, although the overall number of polling stations was reduced from 1979, the number of mobile stations throughout the country was substantially increased - from 244 to 321. This meant that a higher emphasis was placed on mobility. A number of mobiles were held in reserve so as to be able to reinforce polling stations which were under particular pressure.

While we would have wished to see more polling stations provided in some

areas, we are nonetheless satisfied that polling facilities were acceptable. A less highly motivated electorate might not have found them so, but voters were prepared, where it became necessary, to walk very long distances to exercise their franchise. The turn-out on the first day was unexpectedly high and most polling stations were able to cope though, at some, several thousand voters had to be asked to return the next day. In some places, too, extra polling booths had to be added, mobile stations brought in to relieve congestion at static polling stations, and schedules for mobiles rearranged. Such steps were taken at our suggestion on several occasions, and underscored the recognised need for flexibility. For example, when one of us arrived at Jichedza in Ndanga District we found about 7,000 people waiting to vote at a mobile scheduled to stay for only a further four hours. In many parts of the country, mobiles fell well behind schedule in this way owing to underestimation of the numbers who would be voting. The progress of mobiles on days two and three was hindered by wet weather, and a small number failed to reach all of their scheduled polling places. Voters who had to wait in long queues, often in hot sun or rain, generally did so in good humour. The size of the turn-out confirmed our impression, gained from observations in all parts of the country, that the combination of static and mobile polling stations in the event adequately served the electorate, although there were some instances where, because of a combination of flooded rivers and similar hazards, a number of people never had the opportunity to vote.

#### **Eligibility**

The procedures for determining eligibility worked well on the whole. There seemed little difficulty over nationality and residence, but some problems arose over age, the limit being 18 years. Documentary proof was sought, and we have no reason to doubt that some incorrect decisions were made, both to allow and not to allow persons to vote. We do not think that such decisions involved sufficient voters to have any material effect.

Some would-be voters who were clearly under age were turned away, one on no fewer than three separate occasions as he twice returned wearing different shirts. Women carrying babies seemed in some areas to be automatically accepted as being over 18, and party polling agents occasionally helped at times of difficulty. Contrary to what had been indicated to us, police reservists in some districts did carry out a preliminary screening of voters who were obviously under age, especially on the first day of polling when the pressure of numbers was particularly acute. None of the polling agents objected to this except for a ZANU(PF) representative at Dangambura, and in most areas police and police reservists were careful not to become involved in the procedures. The practice was stopped in Karoi, at our suggestion. One Presiding Officer in Gwanda found it necessary to inspect the teeth of those of whose age he was uncertain. Another in Que Que, found bust measurements to be of assistance. We also observed a number of Coloureds being turned away in accordance with the law.

#### **Search procedures**

Presiding Officers had the discretion to request the Security Forces or the police to search persons before they entered polling stations. Where this was carried out, it was done with a minimum of inconvenience and in an acceptable manner. We observed instances where wives of police officers were searching women voters, as there were apparently insufficient women police for this purpose. This did not appear to give rise to any problems.

## Multiple voting

The practice of having a voter dip the fingers of both hands in an invisible dye which showed up under ultra-violet light to prevent multiple voting similarly worked well. Some difficulty was experienced with those who handled paints and chemicals in the course of their employment. Their cases were fairly handled. We saw such voters being asked to wash their hands well, and being almost invariably allowed to vote on their return. It was also quite clear when a person had got the dye on his hands from shaking hands with a person who had recently voted. Mango juice also reacted to the ultra-violet light. At one polling station in Charter District we witnessed a test being carried out which established this, and also that those who had eaten mangoes recently could be distinguished from those who had voted.

We have already referred to the tests we ourselves made with various cleansers and barrier creams to satisfy ourselves that the dye test was proof against malpractice. On the second day of polling, there were strong rumours in Salisbury that some persons had been able to vote more than once after washing off the dye with Coca-Cola. It was reported that one local journalist had himself been able to obtain a second ballot paper. We promptly arranged a further series of tests, and invited the journalist to take part. It demonstrated that the soft drink did not remove the dye. The journalist accepted that the reason for his success in getting a second ballot paper could not have been due to any special property of the soft drink.

We issued a press release (Annex 45) on the result of our test, and we are glad that our action helped to defuse a potential crisis of confidence in the voting process. The Election Commissioner was able to use our test to allay the doubts of journalists and thereby the doubts of the public at a crowded press conference that evening. Some of the journalists also tested the solvent qualities of Coca-Cola on the following day, and confirmed our result.

There were other rumours, too. One was to the effect that a busload of supporters of one party had been arrested after they had each voted a number of times. Another, that a particular brand of Russian toothpaste could remove the dye; a third, in Belingwe, that sheep's urine was effective. We are satisfied that none of these rumours had any basis in fact.

The invisible dye gets in the crevices of the fingernail, and under the cuticle. Even if a solvent had some effect on this dye, it would have to be very carefully used to eradicate all traces, and even small traces showed under the lightbox. Because of this, had a substantial number attempted to vote more than once, detections would have been very much more numerous than they were. The dye is invisible other than under ultra-violet light, and a person would not normally be able to know if all traces had been removed.

We witnessed several arrests on charges of attempted dual voting, and in Salisbury a group of 6 was taken into custody. In Bulawayo on 29 February some 67 charges out of 183 were heard relating to allegations of multiple voting, and 33 of the defendants were found not to have voted when their hands were examined in court in a lightbox. Thirty-three people were convicted of the offence in Harare. In all there were 236 arrests made and by 11 March 93 convictions had been entered. This tends to confirm our

impression that the persons in charge of the lightboxes were on the whole scrupulously careful and turned away voters about whom they had any doubt. There is, of course, the possibility of human error. Polling staff who had been less careful in scrutinising hands in the lightboxes may have let some voters vote again. All the evidence points to this having occurred very infrequently, and not on such a scale as to influence the outcome of the poll. There was also no credible evidence that the multiple voters who were detected were from any particular party.

Further, had voters been successful in circumventing the dye test on a substantial scale, it should have led to higher voting figures on successive days. It is a matter of record that this did not happen. Instead the figures progressively fell. A very large poll on the first day (1,375,468) was followed by only about two-thirds as many voting on the second day (905,678); on the third day the numbers were less than half as many as on the second day (418,304). We also note that no formal complaint was made to us by any party that the dye test was circumvented.

In some areas we noted that the batteries which powered the lightboxes went flat much more quickly than had been anticipated, but though the light was somewhat weak at times we did not encounter any shortage of batteries.

#### **Attitude of polling staff**

We observed that polling staff, drawn from both communities, generally carried out their functions ably and without partiality. Many Presiding Officers took pride in the arrangements they had made and polling stations afforded the required degree of secrecy. Some officials even went beyond the stipulated requirements when it came to sealing ballot boxes, e.g. by adding additional seals. Most polling staff were patient and helpful with voters, and some gave thoughtful preference to the elderly and the handicapped.

We came across only a few exceptions to the general pattern, e.g. of officious staff who made voting needlessly difficult. When we drew attention to such behaviour, official action was invariably taken to redress the position. There were also some officials who ran their stations without sufficient regard for the proper procedures, but these were very small in number.

On two occasions, in Makoni District, illiterate voters complained to us that their ballot papers had been marked by an official as being for a party other than the one they wished to vote for. Both involved the same Presiding Officer, and action was initiated by us to remedy the position. In one district, Bindura, three polling officers had been dismissed shortly before we arrived, for urging voters to vote for a particular party, and staff were also dismissed at Centenary (3), Chibi (1) and Wedza (1).

The deployment of British policemen, unarmed and wearing their distinctive helmets as Assistant Supervisors, at most rural polling stations achieved a psychological breakthrough in reassuring the electorate of the secrecy of the ballot and the impartiality of polling staff. They played a valuable role, just by their presence, but most were active in useful ways helping voting to

proceed smoothly. Above all their presence inside the polling stations had a calming influence. We would like to add our own tribute to the British authorities who conceived the idea, as well as to the policemen who saw it through so splendidly.

We were treated with courtesy and with due regard for our role on our many visits to polling stations, though on occasion we encountered Presiding Officers who thought that we should remain at least 100 metres away from polling stations. We did not. If we record a single exception, we do so underlining the fact that it was exceptional. At one station the Presiding Officer commented that he was 'sick and tired' both of the Commonwealth Observers and of having to "assist all these illiterate blacks who are going to take over the country".

### **Party representatives**

The polling agents of the major parties were present at most polling stations, and took an active interest in proceedings. We made a special point of speaking to them, and eliciting their views as to how the arrangements were working. In the urban areas where they were allowed inside polling stations, the rotation of agents from different parties worked well. With the one exception we note below, polling agents at all the stations we visited expressed satisfaction with the arrangements. They had participated in the handling and sealing of the ballot boxes, and were satisfied that no tampering with the boxes had taken place. They were confident in the sealing arrangements, and had signed the paper seals. They had inspected the manifest of ballot papers, and the ballot papers themselves. They were generally kept informed when pads of ballot papers were exhausted and new pads were introduced. Where they were advised, they carefully noted the numbers of the ballot papers used. However, in both Sipolilo and Makoni Districts, some Presiding Officers refused to disclose to polling agents the closing ballot paper number at the end of each day's polling.

We were also encouraged to observe the friendly spirit between rival parties. They chatted together, joked together, shared transport, and on occasions lunched together. The same ability to work together that we had witnessed at leadership level at the Election Council seemed to us to extend down to the party workers at the grass roots. Nor did the rival groups of party supporters, who were permitted to gather at a distance of 100 metres from polling stations, show signs of hostility.

At many rural stations, Presiding Officers misunderstood the law and required party representatives to remain 100 metres away from the polling stations. Where this happened it underscored a feeling on the part of some party workers that they were being excluded from the process by not being admitted to polling stations. We drew attention to this misunderstanding wherever we encountered it, and some Presiding Officers then permitted the polling agents to be present immediately outside their polling stations.

### **Environment**

This same spirit was reflected in the queues at polling stations. With the exception of a very few stations, the voters appeared to us to be relaxed. At times they faced wet weather and long walks with good humour. We took special note of the atmosphere in areas reputed to be dominated by particular parties. We must say that, although some of the electorate may have felt

under pressure, our impression was that the voters were voting freely and in a spirit of optimism about the future. We were surprised, too, to see voters as they left polling booths begin to sing and dance on their way home.

Dancing, singing and political activity was banned within 100 metres of a polling station. Beyond that point, groups frequently gathered to demonstrate their allegiances. Again, this was done in a relaxed and tolerant manner. The wearing of party T-shirts to polling stations, too, was not permitted in some areas, and on occasions women voters went behind trees to discreetly turn their T-shirts inside out. But in places persons were permitted to vote while wearing party T-shirts and, in a few, carrying party posters.

The call-up had resulted in a large presence of Security Forces and police. The point was made to us that the mere presence of the Security Forces in such large numbers could itself be intimidatory. On the other hand, the Administration considered it preferable to be overprepared to deal with any contingency and it is true that a few polling stations were fired on, though this did not prevent the polling from continuing. Nor did the Security Forces appear to have obstructed voters from getting to the polls. One air mobile was so full of security personnel that its Captain rejected the carrying of party representatives. In Bikita District, voters told us that they were afraid of the Security Force Auxiliaries who were on duty outside the polling station, but that this would not affect the way in which they intended to vote. In general our impression was that the Auxiliaries were little in evidence over the period of the poll.

In various areas we observed people canvassing the queues. The canvassers were not confined to one party, and though we paid special attention to this we did not find any evidence that this exceeded permissible bounds. At Cambara in Chilimanzi District, a Presiding Officer wore a UANC badge.

#### **Assistance to voters**

The number of persons who asked for assistance in marking their ballot papers varied quite markedly from area to area. Whenever this occurred in our presence we observed the proceedings closely and frequently asked voters once they had left the polling station whether they were satisfied with what had taken place. Almost invariably they were although at one polling station in Makoni District, as we have noted, two voters complained to us that the Presiding Officer had incorrectly marked their papers.

Those most in need of assistance were older women and labourers on the commercial farms. At one polling station the Presiding Officer refused to assist anyone, as being a breach of secrecy, but when we pointed this out to a British Supervisor the position was corrected.

We would emphasise that the language barrier at times made it difficult for us to assess the position inside the polling stations, but we used our interpreters to speak with voters as they left to ascertain whether or not they were satisfied.

### **Storage of ballot boxes**

We paid special attention to the ballot boxes, at all stages of the proceedings. Members of the Group observed them when empty at the start of the poll, witnessed the initial sealing of the lid, witnessed the sealing of the slot each day, and travelled with as many boxes as possible both to places of overnight storage and, ultimately, to the places where the counts took place. We also made a point of discussing with party agents the question of security of the ballot boxes, and none expressed any serious concern. They all had a lively appreciation of the role they themselves could play in assuring that nothing untoward took place. In Gwelo, there was an instance of rain beating through a window and spoiling the paper tapes which sealed the lid. There was no suggestion that any ballot papers had been worked into the box through the crack, since the sticking paper was, in any event, not the principal means by which the boxes were sealed, this being by means of lock, string, hasp and sealing wax.

Overnight security was similarly sound. Polling agents could not actually sleep with the ballot boxes but in Wedza District, four polling agents from different parties bedded together outside the door of the District Commissioner's office all night.

### **Other discrepancies**

It is important to place the deficiencies observed into a correct perspective. As our observations of the poll were carried out on a very wide scale, it was inevitable that some would be detected. In recording a sample of these, we would not wish it to convey the impression that they were such as to detract in any way from our general conclusions.

In several Provinces we observed small numbers of misprinted ballot papers - some contained voting details but no numbers, others were blank except for a number. These were marked as spoilt ballots.

In Victoria Province a senior administration official was so convinced that widespread intimidation was taking place that he wanted a particular party proscribed for the third day of the poll. A concerted and energetic attempt followed to collect affidavits throughout the Province in order to substantiate a case for consideration by the Governor. In one instance we were told by a British Election Supervisor that a duplicated form of affidavit about intimidatory practices of ZANU(PF) had been provided to the District Commissioner in Zaka to which the name and signature of the complainant needed only to be added. Nothing we observed in the Province justified the Provincial Commissioner doing this. One hundred and eighty three affidavits were submitted to the Governor, who took no action. In the Midlands, a helicopter hovered over a prison, broadcasting a message exhorting detainees how to vote, while they were actually voting, and in several areas the same party showered the environs of polling stations with party leaflets.

Some voters were worried that their crosses could be seen through the paper and be detected after they had folded their papers, though generally voters seemed quite relaxed about this.

On the commercial farms, visited by mobiles, the employer sometimes seemed to be too close to where his employees were voting, and on occasions entered the polling station, but there was nothing noted that was untoward where employers had transported their workers to static polling stations.

It was plain that even before the count began, some politicians were preparing the ground in advance to repudiate the election results. We carefully considered the various allegations they made, in respect of multiple voting, under-age voting, bussing, intimidation and the like, and in the light of our observations satisfied ourselves that they were without substance.

The percentage of the electorate who voted was estimated at 93.6 per cent, but we would caution that the figure for the total number of eligible voters was based on estimates in which there was a substantial margin for error.

### **Secrecy**

As the question of secrecy was of prime importance as a counter to intimidation, we were careful in observing the layout inside polling stations and the conduct of polling staff in this regard. In all the polling stations we visited, the polling booths were so located and of such a design as to ensure that voters could mark their papers in complete privacy.

Although ballot papers were, at our suggestion, often pre-folded by polling staff, voters did not always refold them in the same way so as to leave the validating perforation visible. This, coupled with the narrow slot which could not accommodate ballot papers which had been folded over several times, meant that in practice officials standing near ballot boxes in many cases did, in fact, handle ballot papers and refold them. This was irregular, but we observed it being done in a manner designed to prevent the official from seeing how particular voters had marked their papers.

The fact that the papers would be taken to Britain for destruction had impressed itself on one voter to the extent that she asked whether, before placing it in the ballot box, she should affix a postage stamp.

### **Verification and count**

We attended the verifications in 42 districts, and observed a very high degree of correlation between used and unused ballot papers. For a variety of reasons, not the least of which being that on occasions voters do not place their ballot paper in the box but in their pockets and take them away with them, there is in any election a disparity between the number of ballot papers issued and those found in the ballot boxes. We have had experience of elections in many parts of the Commonwealth, and can say with confidence that the verifications witnessed demonstrated as high a degree of reconciliation as we could have hoped for. This also suggested that voting procedures had worked well over the period of the poll.

We were also present throughout the count at each of the counting places. British Supervisors were also present, and we observed them as they discharged their duties. We were satisfied that the count was conducted in an

orderly and proper manner. Where ballot papers were disallowed as failing to give an adequate indication of the voter's preference, polling agents were given an opportunity to express a view. In the overwhelming number of instances we observed, we would have endorsed the final decision made by the Returning Officer. As previously noted, apart from instances of voters marking their ballots in favour of both members of the Patriotic Front alliance in Mashonaland East, there appeared to be no discernible pattern to the votes that were disallowed. The total of spoiled ballot papers, 52,746 out of a total poll of over 2.7 million, represented the very low level of 1.95 per cent. This included a large number of ballot papers that had been placed in ballot boxes unmarked, and a number were marked on the reverse.

#### **Interim Report by British Election Commissioner**

In the Interim Report to the Governor dated 2 March 1980, the Election Commissioner, Sir John Boynton, dealt with a number of aspects of the elections. His general conclusion was as follows :

"9.1 My general conclusion is that, in the Rhodesian context earlier described, the elections were in general a reflection of the wishes of the people, though in no sense free from intimidation and pressure. However my view is that in the country as a whole the degree of intimidation and pressure was not so great as to invalidate the overall results of the poll.

9.2 I have however doubts whether this general judgement can fairly be applied to certain areas in three provinces - Victoria, Manicaland and the Midlands.

9.3 In the majority of Victoria Province, (particularly in Gutu District), in Buhera in Manicaland, and in Belingwe and the TTLs in Charter, Chilimanzi, Selukwe and Shabani in the Midlands Province, the high level of intimidation and the pressures upon voters to vote for a particular party are likely in my view to have distorted the pattern of voting. In saying this, I have taken into account that there was a high degree of commitment to one political party. My conclusion is that in these areas the result of the elections will have been affected by intimidation.

9.4 However, notwithstanding the distortion of voting in certain areas, I think my general conclusion must stand, that in the Rhodesian context the overall result of the elections will broadly reflect the wishes of the people of Rhodesia."

We were ourselves represented in all of the districts mentioned in the Report but did not observe an appreciable level of intimidation or pressure over the period of the poll. There were examples of party supporters soliciting the support of persons waiting to vote by walking up and down the queues, and while we considered this undesirable we did not get any impression of threats. A number of those waiting, too, signalled their support for their party by flapping their elbows and making a crowing sound. This was done by supporters of ZANU(PF) whose symbol was the cockerel. We did not consider these to be threatening, but rather to be further evidence of the good humour which generally marked events on polling days.

In his Interim Report the Election Commissioner also says that many voters by-passed nearer polling stations in obedience to party instructions, to swamp other more distant polling stations "where no doubt their party

discipline and control was more rigid."

We did encounter instances of voters by-passing polling stations, particularly where they resided in districts which had been threatened with disenfranchisement by the Governor. It was our impression that instructions had gone out from their party in anticipation of this occurring, urging them (quite lawfully) to walk into a neighbouring district not under such threat so as to vote there. It seemed to us that there had not been time to countermand this exhortation, and that the voters who passed polling stations generally thought they ran the risk of not having their vote counted if they voted there. However we also encountered instances where some voters had walked considerable distances and passed polling stations in order to vote at a polling station, for example close to the Echo assembly point in Invanga District. We also witnessed a small number of voters who made little attempt to prevent others present from seeing how they had marked their ballot papers.

The Election Commissioner also says that in Victoria Province and in parts of Manicaland and the Midlands the massive turnout on the first day was "largely achieved by aggressive 'herding' of voters by party supporters". It is a matter of record that the massive turnout on the first day was common throughout the country when nearly half the possible number of voters cast their ballots. Certainly ZANU(PF) had made an effort to encourage its supporters to vote early, and this undoubtedly succeeded. However, although as noted we paid particular attention to the freedom with which voters came to the polling places, we saw no direct evidence of any "aggressive herding".

In the light of our observations in the Districts and Provinces referred to by the Election Commissioner, we can affirm that our coverage was such as to persuade us that any of the malpractices to which he referred were not carried out on any wide scale. As to his conclusions that in these areas the result of the election was affected by intimidation, we can only point to the fact that these results were in line with the country-wide trend. Moreover the result of the count for Salisbury, which as only part of Mashonaland East was not announced separately, persuades us that on the whole the elections were comparatively free of intimidation. It is a significant fact that while at no stage was any serious allegation of intimidation received from any quarter concerning the urban district of Salisbury, yet it too, voted overwhelmingly for ZANU(PF).

Thus while we have reservations as to the extent of the distortion of voting suggested by the Interim Report of the Election Commissioner, we would endorse his general conclusion that the result of the election broadly reflected the wishes of the people of Rhodesia.

#### **THE RESULT**

The detailed results of the Common Roll election appear as Annex 46. The successful parties were ZANU(PF) (57 seats), the PF (20 seats) and the UANC (3 seats).

# 6

## CONCLUSIONS

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Peace has been restored to Southern Rhodesia by means of a democratic exercise without historical precedent. Never before have elections been held at a time of tenuous cease-fire, without agreed battle lines, and with rival armies uneasily apart. That this proved possible redounds to the credit of all those involved.

In the extraordinary circumstances in which the elections were held, we could hardly have expected to find the levels of administrative propriety and public rectitude associated with the concept of free and fair elections at their ideal best, a level not always or everywhere achieved even in stable societies with long experience of democratic institutions. In the event, the degree to which they approached those levels was praiseworthy indeed.

We were able to observe the conduct of the campaign from its very early days until its culmination in the announcement of the results. We were also able to make intensive observations in all parts of the country. Our conclusions are therefore based on a thorough study of the totality of the process that allowed the people of Rhodesia to choose the government that will take their country to sovereign independence as Zimbabwe.

Inevitably, there were imperfections. In varying degree, the parties which sought the favour of the voters did face limitations on their freedom to campaign but not always to the extent suggested by official pronouncements or by aggrieved politicians. Curbs were sometimes imposed by party activists with or without the approval of their leaders. Sometimes they were the result of official action such as the arrest of candidates and party workers, restrictions on their electoral activity, and a selective application of emergency regulations. Sometimes they flowed from a less than impartial functioning of the principal agencies of government or an unwillingness to respond to higher authority.

The overall impact of these limitations on the ability of the parties to take their message to the voters was mitigated by the access which all parties enjoyed to make party political broadcasts and to advertise through the publicly owned broadcasting services, as well as being free to advertise in the privately owned press. None of the major parties seemed to suffer from a shortage of resources for the latter.

There were also some attempts to limit the freedom of choice of voters through various forms of intimidation. That there was a certain degree of violence and fear is incontestable. But the extent of intimidation was often exaggerated either for political purposes or as the result of incorrect or slanted information. Blame was not confined to any one quarter. Nevertheless, we firmly believe that its impact on the voters' freedom of choice was strongly countered, if not frustrated, by the widespread belief in the secrecy of the ballot.

The pattern of voting too, offers evidence in support of our assessment of the extent of intimidation. There had been no charges of any significant intimidation in Salisbury itself, yet the proportion of voters supporting ZANU(PF) in urban Salisbury was broadly the same as in those rural districts where intimidation on its behalf was alleged to have been at its most severe.

The system of proportional representation based on party lists further diminished the electoral impact of intimidation. Under this system, a massive shift in voter preference was required to make a significant difference in the number of seats gained by any one party at the polls.

We are completely satisfied with the integrity of the conduct of the poll in all its aspects, including the security of ballot boxes and the accuracy of the count.

Taken as a whole, it is our considered and unanimous view that the election offered an adequate opportunity to the parties to seek the favour of the electorate and sufficient freedom to the voters to exercise their franchise according to their convictions. We therefore reaffirm the conclusion of our interim report that the election was a valid and democratic expression of the wishes of the people of Zimbabwe.

That this proved possible in the circumstances of Rhodesia is to the credit of all: the Governor, the administration, the political parties, and above all to the people. We believe that the desire for peace and stability was the most potent factor in ensuring that progress continued without major setbacks along the course charted at Lancaster House.

We have in various parts of our Report commented adversely on aspects of the conduct of the Rhodesian administration. We are aware of the traumatic changes which the Lancaster House Agreement brought into prospect for those officials who found difficulty in making the mental adjustment it required. Our wide observations gave us the impression, however, that a large body of public servants preserved their professional integrity and demonstrated a high level of ability.

We have also been critical of some aspects of the administration of the Governor who had ultimate authority in the period of transition. We are conscious, however, of the very delicate role he was called upon to play in overseeing Rhodesia's passage to independence through democratic elections held during a necessarily imperfect cease-fire after a seven years' war. He had supreme authority but few instruments of his own. His dependence on the local administration was decreed by the Lancaster House Agreement itself. His capacity to control developments rested on a fragile balance of forces. Throughout he had to act with the awareness that this equilibrium could be easily upset, and with disastrous consequences. When we were apprehensive of the consequences of some actions, either taken or in contemplation, we did not hesitate to convey our concerns to him. We believe that on certain matters we were able to offer timely counsel based on our own independent perception of events. The strong commitment of the parties to the Lancaster House Agreement and to the achievement of peace through elections, was a potent factor in keeping the process on course. It was the Governor's achievement that he was able to sustain their involvement in it through a

most testing period.

It has been our privilege to observe Rhodesia's election on behalf of the Commonwealth, and to have been able to serve the country as it took decisive steps towards its long deferred and cherished goal of independence. We concluded our work having seen the foundation for that independence firmly laid in fulfilment of the wishes of its people and the hopes of the entire Commonwealth.

We close our Report by paying our own tribute, which we believe will be widely echoed throughout the Commonwealth and beyond, to all those who, in different ways and at different times, contributed to Rhodesia's emergence as an independent Zimbabwe. Countless individuals and many countries have been touched by the tragedy of the past 15 years. In the end, the essential triumph has been that of the people of Zimbabwe themselves. Transmuting their suffering, their faith in the processes of peace has exceeded their courage in war.

# 7

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Never before has the Commonwealth undertaken such a mission or mounted such a major operation in the field. Consultation has been the lifeblood of the Commonwealth, but on this occasion it was translated into action and finally brought to fruition. Although each of us came to this mission as a stranger to his colleagues, a spirit of harmony informed our work throughout.

We wish to pay a warm tribute to the devoted and untiring labours of the Commonwealth Secretariat team, both in the Provinces and in Salisbury. They worked efficiently and with a high sense of purpose in very difficult circumstances, and made it possible for us to function independently of the official machine. Their assistance was invaluable in helping us to discharge our responsibilities in all their aspects. In expressing our indebtedness and deep appreciation to all of them, we would like, in particular, to highlight the special contribution to our work of Mr. Moni Malhoutra, the leader of the Secretariat team; Mr. Peter Snelson, its co-Director; Mr. Jeremy Pope, the Group's Secretary; and Mr. Derek Ingram, its Media Adviser. Our thanks are due to Mr. Fred Grante and Mr. Peter Dunne for the excellence of the administrative and logistical arrangements, and to Mr. Joe de Souza, Miss Anne Mittelholzer and Mrs. Carole Costa for the cheerfulness with which they discharged their heavy secretarial responsibilities.

We would also like to thank the Election Commissioner and his staff, as well as the many Rhodesian officials throughout the country, for the help and co-operation which we received from them.

Our final words of thanks must be to the political leaders and people of Zimbabwe. They saw our very presence in their country as a reassurance. Their confidence and trust will be a cherished and life-long memory.

Salisbury

8 March 1980

**OBSERVERS**

The eleven Observers were:

Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal (India) (Chairman)

Former Foreign Secretary, Government of India; Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations; Ambassador to France, Yugoslavia; High Commissioner to Pakistan; Special Representative of U.N. Secretary General and Head of U.N. Mission in the Congo (1960-61); Member, U.N. Observation Group in Lebanon (1958); First Chairman and Member, U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (1969-79); etc.

Mr. Keith Charles Owen Shann, C.B.E. (Australia)

Former Chairman, Public Service Board; Ambassador to Japan, Indonesia and the Philippines.

Justice A.K.M. Nurul Islam (Bangladesh)

Judge of the Dacca High Court from 1968; Chief Election Commissioner of Bangladesh since 1977.

Sir Carlisle Burton Kt., O.B.E. (Barbados)

Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister and Head of the Civil Service.

Mr. Robert Gordon Fairweather O.C., Q.C. (Canada)

First Chief Commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission; for 15 years a Member of the House of Commons; former Attorney-General of the Province of New Brunswick and member of the province's Legislative Assembly.

The Hon. Mr. Justice V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe C.V. (Ghana)

Justice of the Supreme Court of Ghana; former Electoral Commissioner; Chairman, Constituent Assembly (1978-79)

Mr. Ivo de Souza (Jamaica)

Former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Defence; High Commissioner to Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Guyana; Ambassador to Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia.

Mr. Samuel Goomsu Ikoku (Nigeria)

National Secretary of the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), Nigeria; former Aide to President Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) from 1962-66; Senior Lecturer in Development Economics, University of Lagos.

The Hon. Oscar Tammur, M.P. (Papua New Guinea)

Minister for Labour and Employment

The Hon. Mr. Justice Sheku M.F. Kutubu (Sierra Leone)

Justice of the Court of Appeal for Sierra Leone; former Judicial Adviser, Sierra Leone; Member, Special International Commission established by the O.A.U. to investigate the death of Herbert Wilshire Chitepo, Chairman of ZANU, in 1975.

Mr. J.W. Subasinghe (Sri Lanka)

Attorney-at-Law; Chairman, Sri Lanka Press Council and Chairman of Presidential Committees on the Police and on the Armed Services; former Crown Counsel, Attorney-General's Department and Registrar of the Supreme Court.

**ASSISTANTS**

Australia:	Mr. W.D. Bowtell Mr. L.A. Rowe
Bangladesh:	Mr. Abu Md. Basharat Ali Lt. Col. Syed Badruzzaman
Barbados:	Mr. Sydney Harris Mr. Louis Sealy
Canada:	Mr. J.E. Forrester Mr. M.B. Phillips
Ghana:	Mr. K. Asilijoe Mr. T.O. Lindsay
India:	Mr. K.N. Daruwala Mr. Girish Mehra
Jamaica:	Senator Princess Lawes Senator Hopeton Caven/Mr. R.D. Pickersgill
Nigeria:	Dr. O.O. Fafowora Colonel A.B. Maman
Papua New Guinea:	Mr. Moi Kanat Colonel Tom Nauna
Sierra Leone:	Mr. Francis Karemo Mr. David Sheku

Sri Lanka: Mr. W. Jayamaha  
Mr. R.P.E. Jayasinghe

**ADDITIONAL ASSISTANTS FOR PERIOD OF THE POLL**

Australia: Mr. A.C. Kevin  
Mr. G.R. Landswehr  
Mr. W.E. Lang  
Ms. J. Norwood

Canada: Mr. W.R. Bailie  
Mr. A. Macfarlane  
Ms. J. Pearce  
Mr. A. Robinson

Ghana: Mr. Agyei-Sakyi  
Mr. Agyenin-Boateng  
Mr. K. Duku  
Mr. S. Okudzeto

India: Mr. S.R. Arya  
Mr. B. Rai  
Mr. S.C. Sharma  
Mr. S.R. Sharma

Jamaica: Mr. T.B. Dixon  
Mr. K.D. Knight  
Mr. L.E.A. Moyston  
Ms. Norma Segre

Nigeria: Mr. E.A. Aina  
Mr. A. Ashimolowo

Papua New Guinea: Mr. A. Jonathan  
Mr. R. Kaiulo  
Mr. M. Warpulu

Sierra Leone: Mr. H.V. Abu  
Mr. J. Harris  
Mr. S. Koroma

Sri Lanka: Mr. B. Kulatunga  
Mr. D.C. Perera  
Mr. G.K.G. Perera  
Mr. W.O.L. Perera

## COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP SECRETARIAT

Director and Head: Mr. M. Malhoutra (India)  
Co-Director: Mr. P.D. Snelson (Britain)  
Secretary and Legal Adviser: Mr. J.D. Pope (New Zealand)  
Media Adviser: Mr. D. Ingram (Britain)  
Editorial Adviser: Mr. C.A. Gunawardena (Sri Lanka)\*  
Security Adviser: Chief Superintendent J.H. Carroll (Canada)  
Assistant Directors: Mr. A.V. Hayday (Britain)\*  
Mr. M.N.F. Robinson (Britain)

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Fort Victoria Office: Mr. N.H. Craft (Australia)  
Mr. I.E. Amerasinghe (Sri Lanka)

Gwelo Office: Mr. R.G. Gomez (Sri Lanka)  
Mr. D. Sankey (Britain)

Umtali Office: Mr. J. Macpherson (Britain)  
Mr. P. Ramgulam (Mauritius)

Bulawayo Office: Mr. E. Apea (Ghana)  
Mr. S. Chan (New Zealand)

---

Finance and Administration: Mr. F.E. Grante (The Gambia)  
Mr. W. Peter Dunne (Britain)  
Mr. M.L. Sardana (India)\*

Secretaries: Mr. J.A. de Souza (Britain)  
Miss A.S. Mittelholzer (Guyana)  
Mrs. C.J. Costa (Sri Lanka)

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\*Messrs. Hayday and Sardana paid a reconnaissance visit between 17 and 22 December; Mr. Hayday returned to Salisbury from 17 to 26 January; Mr. Gunawardena was in Salisbury from 23 February.

# ANNEXES

CSA(79)4

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICAZIMBABWE ELECTIONSCOMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS : OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTSMembership of the Group

1. Drawn from eleven countries.
2. Members of the Group will serve in their individual capacity, not as representatives of their Governments. The Group will have a Chairman, as well as its own Secretary.

Mode of Appointment

3. The Group will be appointed by the Commonwealth Secretary-General after the necessary consultations with Commonwealth Governments.

Terms of Reference

4. In accordance with earlier precedents, the Group will be given terms of reference. The following is suggested:

"The Observer Group will observe and report to Commonwealth Heads of Government on all relevant aspects of the organisation and conduct of the elections in Southern Rhodesia held pursuant to the agreement at the Lancaster House Conference. Their function will be to ascertain in their impartial judgement, whether, in the context of the Lusaka accord and the Lancaster House Conference, the elections were free and fair. In furtherance of this objective, it will be competent for the Group to bring to the attention of the administering authorities from time to time such matters as they consider pertinent."

5. In discharging these terms of reference the observers will have no executive role. Their duty will be to form a judgement within their terms of reference.

## Reporting

6. The Group will report to Commonwealth Heads of Government through the Commonwealth Secretary-General.

## Functions

### 7. (a) Prior to Polling Day

- (i) The Group will observe every aspect of the electoral campaign. They will have a duty to examine the process within the terms of the agreement reached at Lancaster House and to assess how the electoral laws and regulations are being implemented.
- (ii) They will need to consider such important issues as freedom of expression, assembly, association and movement (consistent with the terms of cease-fire agreed by the parties) with a view to ascertaining whether parties and individuals contesting the elections are unfettered in their ability to do so. This may involve special consideration being given to the position of political prisoners and refugees.
- (iii) It will be their duty to take note of the general administration of government in so far as it bears on the elections and to keep under scrutiny particular areas of governmental activity such as the functioning of the police and the Department of Home Affairs, the governmental information services including broadcasting and television and government publications generally. Similarly, the Group will need to keep a watchful eye on the conduct of all those who may be in a position to exercise undue influence on voters.

### (b) Functions During and After Polling

The Group will observe the conduct of the poll in all its aspects with right of access to all polling stations and

supervising officers. In the absence of registration, critical questions of eligibility (determination of age, citizenship or residence as the case may be) will necessarily arise at polling stations throughout the country. The Observer Group must be able to satisfy themselves that these matters are fairly dealt with. The Group will also need to satisfy themselves about other relevant matters, such as the handling of ballot boxes and the counting of the votes after polling.

### Procedures

8. (a) In order to carry out their functions, the Observer Group will have complete freedom of movement and access to all parts of the country and the right of inquiry into every aspect of the electoral process.
- (b) The Group and supporting staff will need to have complete immunity from civil and criminal process and inviolability for their premises and archives.
- (c) The Group should be free to receive representations from individuals, political parties and organisations about the electoral process and to bring any relevant matter to the attention of the appropriate authorities. This will necessitate adequate publicity so that the public is aware of the presence of the Observer Group and their functions.
- (d) The Group will need to maintain close liaison with the Governor, the Election Commissioner, the Election Council, the Cease-fire Commission and the Cease-fire Monitoring Force as well as with all the political parties.
- (e) It is expected that the Governor and his administration will wish to co-operate to the full with the Group.

### Phasing

9. It will be the aim that the Observer Group should be in position as soon as practicable after cease-fire day, along with their immediate staff.

10. A larger number of staff would be required to observe the actual poll. It is envisaged that they will need to be in Salisbury at least 10 days before polling in order to permit time for briefing, familiarization and travel to their allocated destinations within the country.

11. If the Group feels that some of the supporting staff should arrive earlier, their judgement in the matter will be accepted. The organisational structure will be flexible to permit deployment or redeployment to meet the needs of the situation as it evolves.

12. Having regard to the wide-ranging nature of the work of the Group prior to polling day as indicated in para 7(a), each observer will be invited to bring with him two assistants.

### Operational Structure

13. While it will be for the Group to decide how it will organise its work, provision will be made for a Headquarters Unit in Salisbury under the direct authority of the Chairman with, if necessary, sub-units in other electoral districts.

### Headquarters Unit

14. The Headquarters Unit will include specialist and administrative staff and will be co-ordinated by one of their members provided by the Commonwealth Secretariat who will serve as Secretary to the Group. Specialist staff will include a legal, an electoral, a media and a security adviser. Administrative staff will handle transportation, accommodation, travel and communication needs of the Group in liaison with the local authorities. The Group will require the services of secretarial and other staff including interpreters, who will, where appropriate, be locally engaged. It will be the intention to organise the Headquarters Unit as well as field units of the Observer Group as far as practicable on a pan-Commonwealth basis.

Supporting Staff

15. To discharge its functions the Group will require adequate supporting staff and, in particular, a sufficient number of suitably qualified persons to observe effectively the conduct of the poll throughout the country. It is difficult to estimate the number of supporting staff with any precision. Even after allowing for the fact that polling will be spread over 3 consecutive days and that it should be possible, especially in the urban areas, for one person to cover several polling stations, the needs of a country the size of Southern Rhodesia will impose their own demands. Its total area is 150,000 square miles; which would give, if there are eight electoral districts, an average size of 18,750 square miles, i.e. two-fifths the area of England for each district.

16. It is expected that the staff in each of the electoral districts will need to be augmented by an average of 8, if polling is to be observed effectively.

Summary of Time-Table

17. In summary, this memorandum envisages the observers and their staff arriving in two groups, as follows:

(a) Soon after cease-fire day - 11 observers each with		
2 staff	=	33
Additional Headquarters		
staff (4 advisers as		
enumerated in para 14 +		
an administrative unit		
of about 8)	=	12
		<hr/>
		45
(b) 10 days before polling remaining supporting staff		
(8 x 8), unless some are required earlier by the		
Observer Group	=	64
		<hr/>
		109
		===

### Secretariat Support

18. Apart from the Secretary to the Group and a small number of Secretariat officials to assist in the planning, co-ordination, and ground arrangements for the whole exercise, and to render such other substantive assistance as the Chairman and observers may from time to time require, it is envisaged that supporting staff, like the Observer Group itself, will be drawn from member countries.

### Logistical Support

19. Effective logistical support will be essential if the Group and its support staff are to carry out their functions effectively. This includes:

Suitable ground and air transport

Radios for two-way communication

Accommodation facilities

Office equipment

International Affairs Division  
Commonwealth Secretariat  
Marlborough House  
Pall Mall  
London SW1

13 December 1979

PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS AND  
CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT - EXTRACTS FROM  
THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT

## ANNEX D

## THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS

1. The British Government puts forward the following proposals for implementing the Independence Constitution.
2. Rhodesia continues to be part of Her Majesty's dominions. The Government and Parliament of the United Kingdom have responsibility and jurisdiction for and in respect of it. It is for the British Parliament to grant legal independence to Rhodesia.
3. An Independence Constitution has been agreed by the parties, subject to agreement on the arrangements for implementing it. The Constitution gives full effect to the principle of genuine majority rule and will give the government of independent Zimbabwe the powers it needs to carry out the policies on the basis of which it is elected.
4. The question of majority rule, which gave rise to the war, has therefore been resolved. The question now at issue is who is to form the future independence government. The British Government's position is that this must be decided by the people of Zimbabwe, in free and fair elections in which all parties will be able to take part on equal terms. The British Government will transfer power to whatever leaders are chosen by the people of Rhodesia in elections held under these conditions and supervised under the British Government's authority. The British Government will not be prepared to transfer power to any party which has not won it in elections. The elections will be held on the basis of the Independence Constitution and all parties will be expected to abide by it. All parties taking part in the elections will also be expected to commit themselves to abide by the outcome. Such a commitment will be essential if Zimbabwe is to come to independence in peace and with a prospect of stability and prosperity for all its people.
5. The proposals put to the Conference by the Salisbury delegation and the Patriotic Front showed that there was a wide divergence of views on how to create the conditions in which fair elections can be held.
6. The Salisbury delegation maintained that they had been elected to govern Rhodesia; that most of their members had nothing to do with the illegal declaration of independence; that they had a mandate to govern Rhodesia, and that they should do so during the interim period. Elections should be supervised by the British Government, but they would continue to administer the country.
7. The Patriotic Front's position was set out in the paper on transitional arrangements which they circulated early in the course of this Conference and later amplified. Their proposals

called for complex power-sharing arrangements in the interim and re-structuring of the police and security forces in advance of the election.

8. Against this background, the British Government has reached certain conclusions. In the first place, the purpose of the pre-independence arrangements is to allow the parties to put their case to the people under fair conditions. The pre-independence period should not be concerned with the remodelling of the institutions of Government. This will be a matter for the independence government elected by the people of Rhodesia. The essential requirement is that all parties should be free to put their policies to the people and should commit themselves to abide by the people's choice. The purpose of the interim period should be peaceful competition for power.

9. Secondly, the British Government proposes that the administration of Rhodesia during the election should be entrusted to the authority of the British Government, while the leaders of all parties explain their case to the people.

10. Thirdly, the British Government has concluded that, against the background of a war and the certain difficulties of a cease-fire, an interim period must not be excessively protracted, but must allow all the political parties adequate time to put their case to the people of Rhodesia. The longer the interim period lasts before the people of Rhodesia are given the chance to decide their political future for themselves, the greater will be the period of political uncertainty and the greater the risk of a break-down of the cease-fire. It is in the interests of the people of Zimbabwe that they should be enabled to choose their future leaders as soon as is reasonably possible.

11. Finally, it is clear to the British Government that whatever arrangements are proposed for the interim will be effective only if there is a genuine commitment by both sides to make them work. It is in the interests of all the parties to this Conference that there should be an end to the fighting and free and fair elections. The British Government is prepared to ensure the conditions under which those objectives can be achieved. But it can do so only if both sides accept its authority and its determination to ensure the impartiality of the election process.

#### The Machinery of Government

12. The British Government believes that it is only through a direct British involvement that conditions for elections, acceptable to both sides, can be created. To set in train the process which will enable free and fair elections to be supervised under its authority, as was agreed at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting at Lusaka, the British Government will appoint a Governor for Rhodesia, who will be British. The Governor's instructions will require him to do all things necessary to secure compliance with the conditions for free and fair elections.

13. The Governor will be established under an Order in Council which will confer on him executive and legislative authority. He will act according to the instructions given to him, for the fulfilment of his tasks, by the British Government. The Governor will have powers to make laws by Ordinance for the peace, order and good governance of the country. Legislative authority will not be exercised by any other body. Executive authority will be vested in the Governor and all public officers and authorities in Rhodesia, including the civil service, the police and the defence forces, will be required to comply with the Governor's directions. The Patriotic Front's forces will also be required to comply with the directions of the Governor.

14. There will be a Deputy Governor who will be British. The Governor will also have a Military Adviser, Police Adviser, Legal Adviser and Political Adviser and such other supporting staff as the British Government may decide are necessary to enable him to discharge his functions effectively, all of whom will be British. In the day-to-day administration of the country, the Governor will, however, work through the existing public service. The British Government see no practical alternative to this. It will be for the Governor to ensure that his authority is effectively and impartially exercised.

15. The Order in Council providing for the establishment of the office of Governor will serve as the interim Constitution of Rhodesia. Provision will be made to carry forward existing laws. It will be for the Parliament to be chosen in free elections to decide which laws shall be continued and which shall be changed. It will be the Governor's duty to ensure that powers conferred by existing laws on public officers and authorities are not used in an arbitrary manner, or in such a way as to affect the conditions for free and fair elections. Allegations of improper activity by any public authority or any political party or its representative in the election campaign may be brought to the attention of the Governor or his Deputy, who will cause them to be dealt with.

16. All persons detained arbitrarily and on political grounds by any party will be released. The Governor will order a review of any such cases within his jurisdiction. The British Government will require to be satisfied that similar procedures will apply in the case of persons detained outside Rhodesia.

17. Once the Governor has arrived and his authority has been accepted in Rhodesia, Rhodesia will have returned to lawful government as a part of Her Majesty's dominions.

18. The Governor will proceed to Rhodesia as soon as possible after the conclusion of the Constitutional Conference. He will assume responsibility for the government of Rhodesia. All the political leaders will commit themselves to the election campaign. Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues will not exercise ministerial functions during this period. The Governor will be responsible for the administration of the country on a caretaker

basis. Heads of Ministries will report to him.

#### The Return of Citizens Living Outside Rhodesia

19. Many thousands of Rhodesian citizens are at present living outside the country. Most of them wish to return and it will be desirable that as many as possible should do so in order to vote in the election. The return of all refugees will be a task requiring careful organisation. But a start should be made in enabling the refugees to return to their homes as soon as possible; and the British Government will be ready to assist with the process. The task of effecting the return of all refugees will need to be completed by the independence government in co-operation with the governments of the neighbouring countries.

#### Law and Order

20. In the event of an effective cease-fire, the necessity for martial law will disappear. The task of maintaining law and order in the pre-independence period will be the responsibility of the civil police. The police will act under the Governor's supervision, exercised through the Police Adviser and other British police officers. Special arrangements will be made by the Governor in consultation with the parties to ensure the protection of the political leaders in this period.

#### Defence

21. The negotiation of a cease-fire will be the next task of the Conference as soon as there is agreement on the arrangements for holding elections and on the administration of the country in the interim period. Subject to this, the role of the military forces of both sides in the interim period will be to maintain the cease-fire. The commanders on both sides will be responsible to the Governor for this. The British Government proposes to establish machinery on which the military commanders on both sides will be represented, to ensure compliance with the terms of the cease-fire. The success of the arrangements proposed for the administration of Rhodesia in the period before independence will require all parties to commit themselves to accept the Governor's authority.

#### Legislative Procedures

22. The authority of the United Kingdom Parliament will be sought for the appointment of the Governor, the making of the Independence Constitution and the holding of elections under it. Legislation will be submitted to Parliament as a matter of urgency so that the Governor may, without loss of time after his arrival, take the steps necessary to allow elections to be held.

23. A Bill will subsequently be introduced to provide for Rhodesia to become independent, following the holding of elections supervised by the British Government and held under the

British Government's authority, and the establishment of a government of Zimbabwe on the basis of the Independence Constitution.

## The Elections

24. The administrative arrangements described in this paper will be implemented in such a manner as to ensure that the elections will be held under the following conditions:-

- the administration of the elections will be fair and impartial as between all the political parties taking part;
- peaceful political activity will be freely conducted by all the parties to the election;
- there will be freedom of movement, assembly and expression during the election campaign;
- all parties will conduct their political activities within the law;
- all the parties will have free and uncensored access to the public media to put their case to the people of Rhodesia, and there will be freedom to advertise and to publish political views in the press;
- appropriate measures will be taken to ensure the security of all parties taking part in the election campaign.

25. There will be an Election Council, chaired by the Election Commissioner or his nominated deputy, who will be British. The Election Commissioner will invite each party taking part in the elections to be represented on the Council. The Council will have a general consultative function. Its individual members will be able to make representations to the Election Commissioner on any matter concerning the elections. The Election Commissioner and his staff will ensure that allegations of unfair practices are properly investigated and remedied.

26. Commonwealth Governments will be invited to send observers to the elections. Their role will be to observe that the elections are genuinely free and fair and that the British Government is carrying out its responsibility to supervise them. No restrictions will be placed upon their movements, and every effort will be made to facilitate their task.

27. All political parties which register for elections will be free to take part in the elections. Any order banning or restricting a political party will be revoked.

28. The election will be held on dates to be decided by the Governor as soon as possible after he takes up office and his

authority is accepted. Three consecutive days will be set aside for polling to take place.

29. The British Government will take the legislative action necessary to bring into force those parts of the Independence Constitution required for elections to be held and for Parliament to be constituted in the terms of the Independence Constitution. Relevant provisions of the Electoral Law currently adopted in Rhodesia will be applied at the Governor's discretion.

30. The Governor will be responsible for all aspects of the conduct of the elections. There will be an Election Commissioner with appropriate staff appointed by the British Government who will be responsible for supervising the elections to the full extent necessary to ensure that they are free and fair as between the parties participating in them. He and his assistants will keep themselves fully informed of all matters relating to the elections and will enquire as necessary into any aspect of the conduct of the elections.

31. Elections for the Common Roll seats will be held on a party list basis. The most practical procedure may be to divide the country into districts, each of which could be allocated a number of seats in proportion to its population. The election on the white roll will take place on the basis of existing constituencies.

32. The Governor will fix a date not less than four and not more than six weeks before the elections on which political parties wishing to contest the elections should apply for registration, name each electoral district for which they wish to be registered and provide a list of the candidates whom they wish to nominate for each electoral district.

33. The qualifications for voters and for candidates for election as Senators and members of the House of Assembly will be as provided in the Independence Constitution, except that, in view of the special circumstances prevailing at present, residence qualifications will not apply.

34. Registration of voters will not be required. But voters will be required as necessary to produce evidence of identity and eligibility to vote. Steps will be taken to prevent fraudulent and multiple voting.

35. The Election Commissioner will supervise the printing and distribution of ballot papers.

36. There will be freedom to campaign, hold political meetings and carry out canvassing. Appropriate measures will be taken by the Governor in consultation with the parties to ensure the physical security of all political leaders during the campaign.

37. Appropriate provision will be made for the conduct of the poll, the counting of votes and the declaration of results.

Every voter will be free to cast his or her vote for the party of his or her choice.

38. Each party presenting candidates will be entitled to have one representative at each polling station in the district concerned to observe the polling. The Election Commissioner and his staff will make sample checks on polling stations throughout the country.

39. It will be the responsibility of the Governor to ensure adequate security at polling stations and the security of the ballot boxes.

40. The Governor, on the advice of the Election Commissioner will take appropriate steps regarding disclosure of election expenses, the definition of corrupt and illegal practices, and election petitions.

#### Conclusion

41. The British Government is confident that if these arrangements are accepted by the parties, it will be possible for them to resolve their differences by political means, thereby enabling the people of Zimbabwe to decide for themselves their future government and enabling them and the people of the neighbouring countries to live at peace. The British Government urges the parties to take this opportunity to achieve these aims.

#### ANNEX E

#### RHODESIA: CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

The Parties to this cease-fire agreement have agreed as follows:

1. With effect from 2400 hours on 21 December 1979, all movement by personnel of the Patriotic Front armed forces into Rhodesia and all cross-border military activity by the Rhodesian forces will cease. This agreement will take effect on a basis of strict reciprocity. The British Government will request the governments of countries bordering on Rhodesia to make arrangements to ensure that externally based forces do not enter Rhodesia. Provision will be made to permit the return of civilian personnel to Rhodesia in order to vote or engage in other peaceful political activity. Border-crossing points will be established, under the supervision of the monitoring force, for this purpose;
2. With effect from 2400 hours on 28 December 1979, all hostilities in Rhodesia will cease. The Commanders will issue instructions to the forces under their command to ensure that all contact between the respective forces is

avoided. A Cease-fire Commission will be established in Salisbury. The Chairman of the Commission will be the Governor's Military Adviser. The Commission will consist of equal numbers of the representatives of the Military Commanders of both sides. The Commission will meet as required throughout the cease-fire. Its functions will include:

- (a) ensuring compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of the forces;
- (b) the investigation of actual or threatened breaches of the cease-fire; and
- (c) such other tasks as may be assigned to it by the Governor in the interests of maintaining the cease-fire.

The Commission will be independent of existing command structures and the Governor may at his discretion communicate direct with the Commanders of the Rhodesian forces and the Patriotic Front forces concerning the exercise of their respective functions. Any member of the Commission may invite it to discuss any questions which appear to him to be relevant to its functions.

3. The British Government will be responsible for the establishment of a monitoring force under the command of the Governor's Military Adviser. This force will assess and monitor impartially all stages of the inception and maintenance of the cease-fire by the forces and assist the Cease-fire Commission in its tasks. The Commanders of the Rhodesian forces and of the Patriotic Front forces undertake to co-operate fully with the monitoring force and to provide it with whatever facilities are necessary to assist it to discharge its functions.
4. Elements of the monitoring force will be assigned:
  - (a) to maintain contact with the command structures of the Rhodesian forces and Patriotic Front forces throughout Rhodesia;
  - (b) to monitor and observe the maintenance of the cease-fire by the respective forces; and
  - (c) to monitor agreed border-crossing points and the use made of them in accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed in the context of the cease-fire.
5. Members of the monitoring force will carry weapons for their personal protection only and will be provided with vehicles and aircraft carrying a distinctive marking. The force will be equipped with an independent radio

communications network.

6. The parties recognise that disengagement of the forces will be essential to an effective cease-fire and the deployment of the monitoring force. At 2400 hours on 28 December 1979, the Rhodesian armed forces, under the directions of the Governor, will therefore disengage to enable the Patriotic Front forces inside Rhodesia to begin the process of assembly. Elements of the monitoring force will be deployed to the command structure and bases of the Rhodesian forces and to assembly places and rendezvous positions designated for the Patriotic Front forces.
7. The Patriotic Front forces at present in Rhodesia will report with their arms and equipment to rendezvous positions (RPs) and will proceed thereafter to assembly places as indicated in the Appendix to this agreement. The process of assembly will take place under the direction of the Commanders of the Patriotic Front forces and under the auspices of the monitoring force.
8. Movement to assembly places will be completed by 2400 hours on 4 January 1980. The process of assembly will take place with the assistance of the monitoring force. Arrangements will be made for the accommodation, security and other agreed requirements of the Patriotic Front forces.
9. The Rhodesian armed forces will comply with the directions of the Governor. There will be reciprocal disengagement by the Rhodesian forces, in relation to the successful accomplishment of the assembly process by the Patriotic Front forces.
10. With effect from cease-fire day, all forces will comply with the cease-fire and with the directions of the Governor. Any forces which fail to comply with the cease-fire or with the directions of the Governor will be deemed to be acting unlawfully.
11. The primary responsibility for dealing with breaches of the cease-fire will rest with the Commanders of the forces through the mechanism of the Cease-fire Commission and with the assistance of liaison officers of the monitoring force. The Commanders will ensure, with the assistance of the monitoring force, that breaches of the cease-fire are contained and dealt with. In the event of more general or sustained breaches of the cease-fire the Governor will decide what action to take to deal with them with the forces which have accepted his authority.
12. The parties undertake to issue clear and precise instructions to all units and personnel under their command to comply scrupulously with the arrangements for bringing the cease-fire into effect. They will make announcements, immediately following the conclusion of his agreement, which will be broadcast regularly through all appropriate

channels to assist in ensuring that instructions to maintain the cease-fire reach all forces under their command and are understood by the public in general.

13. The parties to this agreement renounce the use of force for political objectives. They undertake to accept the outcome of the elections, to comply with the directions of the Governor and to resolve peacefully any questions relating to the future composition of the armed forces and the training and resettlement of military and civilian personnel.

Signed at Lancaster House, London  
this twenty-first day of December 1979

.....  
Bishop A T Muzorewa

.....  
Mr R G Mugabe

.....  
Dr S C Mundawarara

.....  
Mr J M Nkomo

APPENDIX TO CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

The following is a schedule (with grid references) of the assembly places and rendezvous positions referred to in paragraph 7 of the agreement.

Where no associated rendezvous positions are shown, Patriotic Front forces will make their way direct to the assembly place in question.

Serial (a)	Assembly Place (b)	Associated Rendezvous Positions (c)
A	HOYA (US 1893)	
A1		BUKASSA STORE (TS 5383)
A2		MADOMBWE MISSION (TS 9525)
B	MAGADZE (US 6328)	
B1		MASEMIBURA SCHOOL (UR 1473)
C	MARYMOUNT (VS 3957)	
D	DENDERA (VS 7027)	
D1		MUCHINTIKI SCHOOL (UR 6663)
E	ELIM MISSION (VR 7654)	
F	DZAPASI (UP 8050)	
F1		ST MICHAELS SCHOOL (TQ 5546)
F2		MAHUZEKWA (UQ 0875)
F3		ST ANNES (VQ 7728)
F4		ST BARBARA'S SCHOOL (VQ 4555)

Serial (a)	Assembly Place (b)	Associated Rendezvous Positions (c)
G	MUTANDAWHE (VM 1577)	
G1		PAMUSHANA MISSION (UN 4387)
G2		RUSITU MISSION (VN 8482)
G3		CHIKORE MISSION (VN 4640)
H	MAKAMBE (UM 3320)	
H1		LOWER GWELO (QJ 6455)
H2		HANKE MISSION (TP 0325)
H3		CHIBI (TN 4549)
J	ZEZANI (QG 5808)	
J1		MTSHABEZI (PH 9609)
J2		MASASE MISSION (QG 7779)
J3		CAPFUSE SCHOOL (TL 0961)
K	BRUNAPEG (PG 0659)	
L	MADHLAMBUDZI (NH 4570)	
M	ST PAULS (PK 1716)	
M1		BETHESDA MISSION (LK 9398)
M2		LUBIMBI (NK 3357)
M3		JOMBE (QK 5331)
M4		KAMBO STORE (PK 7192)
N	SIABUWA (PL 1271)	
P	RUKOMECHI (QN 5614)	
P1		MORORORO (QM 5132)
P2		SHAMROCK MINE (SS 8081)
Q	KARIYANGWE (NL 5613)	

Serial (a)	Assembly Place (b)	Associated Rendezvous Positions (c)
R	MAGUREKURE SCHOOL (QL 8839)	

The disposition of the Rhodesian forces, under the Governor's authority, will be as set out in the Chairman's statement to the Conference on 11 December.

The Chairman's statement to the Conference on 11 December and the cease-fire arrangements agreed earlier by the parties are attached, together with the Chairman's concluding statement to the Conference on 15 December.

ATTACHMENT TO CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

RHODESIA: CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN ON 11 DECEMBER 1979

1. The substance of the British Government's proposals for a cease-fire has been set out in the Cease-fire Agreement circulated to the Conference. This is in accordance with the cease-fire proposals which have already been agreed. It remains to reach conclusions on matters of practical detail, so that the cease-fire can be implemented.

2. It has been agreed that the purpose of the cease-fire is to bring an immediate end to hostilities and to establish peaceful conditions which will allow elections to take place, the people of Rhodesia to choose their future government and Zimbabwe to become independent on the terms which have been agreed at this Conference. The British Government has accepted direct responsibility for the administration of Rhodesia during the pre-independence period, through the appointment of a Governor with executive and legislative powers. It will be the Governor's duty to administer the country so that free and fair elections can be held under his authority. It is essential therefore that the British Government should state the arrangements which it is prepared to make in connection with a cease-fire, as in connection with all the other matters concerning the pre-independence period on which it has made its position clear and on which all parties to the Conference are now agreed. Both sides have agreed to resolve their political differences through elections held under British authority on the basis of a democratic constitution which all have accepted. In these circumstances there can be no justification for any party to continue the war.

3. In further refining our cease-fire proposals I would like to make it clear from the outset that there can be no question of surrender by either side. All the forces which comply with the agreement, which accept the Governor's authority and comply with his directions will retain their arms and equipment, will be treated honourably, and will be lawful. Neither side will threaten the security of the other. A fully effective cease-fire, respected by all the forces, will foster an atmosphere of confidence in which the future Government will be able to resolve post-war military problems and decide the future of all the forces at its disposal.

4. It is impossible for any external authority or force to guarantee that a cease-fire will be effective. Only the parties themselves can ensure this. The purpose of the British Government's proposals is to help the forces to initiate and maintain a cease-fire through arrangements by which they can be separated

from their present inter-locked positions; infringements can be avoided so far as possible and contained where they have taken place; and there can be effective monitoring of each side's conduct. The task of a monitoring force is not and cannot be to compel either side to maintain a cease-fire, or in any sense to guard the forces of one side or the other. Its task is to observe and report on the manner in which the forces maintain the cease-fire agreement and thus give them an assurance that it will not be possible for any force to conduct activities in breach of the cease-fire in disregard of the Governor's instructions.

5. A conflict is at present taking place in which the armed forces of both sides are inter-locked over a wide area of the country. A substantial proportion of the armed forces of one side is also located in positions outside the country. It is necessary to establish the peaceful conditions for elections through an effective cease-fire and the separation of the forces. It follows that steps must be taken which will ensure as far as possible that during the pre-independence period:

- (a) There is a cessation of cross-border military activity by both sides;
- (b) the forces inside the country cease hostilities and are separated;
- (c) all forces which are prepared to cease fire and to accept the Governor's authority are identified and comply with his directions; and
- (d) forces which do not accept the Governor's authority are unlawful.

6. The first step to be taken to secure these objectives is for the commanders of the forces on both sides in the conflict simultaneously and reciprocally to instruct their forces to desist from all cross-border movement and operations. Compliance with such instructions can be verified and the British Government has already called on the parties to the Conference to reach an agreement on this question without delay.

7. It is crucial to the achievement of a cease-fire within Rhodesia that the Commanders of the forces at present in the country should accept the authority of the Governor and be responsible to him for the maintenance of the cease-fire by all the forces under their command. It is only in this way that the leaders of the political parties and the people as a whole can be assured that the opposing forces have been brought under lawful authority.

8. In the circumstances prevailing in Rhodesia it will not be sufficient for the Governor to instruct the forces which have accepted his authority simply to cease firing and remain in their present positions. A cease-fire in these circumstances would

have no chance of being preserved and a monitoring force could not be deployed. Nor would any machinery exist through which disputes could be resolved. The British Government's proposals are designed to create the condition for an effective cease-fire by the establishment of such machinery and the disengagement of the forces.

#### The Cease-fire Commission

9. The British Government has proposed the establishment of a Cease-fire Commission on which the commanders of the Rhodesian forces and of the Patriotic Front forces will be represented and which will meet under the chairmanship of the Governor's Military Adviser. The Commission will meet as often as necessary throughout the cease-fire. It will be established on cease-fire day and will remain in operation until independence day. It will provide a forum in which each side can seek assurance that the cease-fire agreement is being complied with. It will be able to call for reports on breaches of the cease-fire and discuss measures to contain them and to prevent their recurrence. Any member of the Commission will be able to raise any question which he believes to be relevant to the maintenance of the cease-fire. The Commission will not give directions to the forces on either side - that will be a matter for the Governor - but will be free to make recommendations to the Governor.

#### The Monitoring Force

10. The Cease-fire Commission will be assisted by a substantial monitoring force, under the command of the Governor's Military Adviser. The monitoring force will be under United Kingdom auspices, with the participation of contingents from Australia, New Zealand, Kenya and Fiji. I would like to pay tribute to the Governments concerned for their contribution to the process of bringing a settlement into effect. The force is on stand-by and can be deployed to Rhodesia within the next few days.

11. The force will number some 1,200 men. It will be equipped with its own vehicles, helicopters and C130 aircraft. It will have an independent and secure radio communications network. Members of the force will carry personal weapons for their own self-defence. Their uniforms, vehicles and aircraft will carry distinctive insignia which will make them easily recognisable by the forces and by the general public.

12. When fully deployed, the monitoring force will be in contact with the command structures of the Patriotic Front forces and the Rhodesian forces throughout the country. It will monitor and observe the maintenance of the cease-fire by all the forces. It will also monitor border crossing points and the use made of them in accordance with the cease-fire agreement.

13. Senior officers of the monitoring force will be attached to each of the Joint Operations Commands (JOCs) of the Rhodesian forces. Each of these officers will command a series of

monitoring teams which will be attached to the sub-JOCs and company bases of the Rhodesian forces within each JOC's operational area.

14. This organisation will be paralleled in relation to the Patriotic Front forces. A senior officer will be located with a representative of the Patriotic Front forces responsible for each group of assembly places allocated to the Patriotic Front. Under each such officer's command there will be a series of monitoring teams attached to the forces of the Patriotic Front in their places of assembly.

15. We have next had to consider the arrangements under which the forces will disengage and the monitoring force will be deployed. We cannot arrange for the simultaneous deployment of monitoring teams to both sides, because the Patriotic Front forces are diffused and will not, at the outset of the process, be identified to the monitoring force. The Rhodesian forces will make the first move by (a) accepting the Governor's authority and agreeing to comply with his directions; (b) the monitoring teams allocated to the Rhodesian forces will then be deployed through their command structure down to company base level; (c) on cease-fire day the Rhodesian forces will disengage from the Patriotic Front forces by moving into the close vicinity of bases to permit the Patriotic Front to assemble their forces.

16. It will then be for the Patriotic Front to assemble their forces via rendezvous points to assembly places at which they can be monitored. The process of assembly will be continuous. For this purpose, it will be necessary for the Patriotic Front, under the auspices of the monitoring force, to send representatives to each of the rendezvous points. The Patriotic Front forces will make their way with their arms and equipment to the rendezvous points, where they will be under the authority of their own Commanders. From there they will move to their assembly places in transport which will be provided for them, with their arms and equipment and under their own command. This movement will take place under the auspices of the monitoring force, who will be in direct communication with the teams attached to the Rhodesian forces so that each side can be informed of the other's movements and there can be no misunderstanding of each other's intentions.

17. Monitoring teams will also be established from the outset at the assembly places themselves and will meet the Patriotic Front forces as they arrive. In their assembly places the Patriotic Front forces will retain their arms and equipment and will remain under their own commanders. They will be responsible for the organisation and discipline of their forces.

18. The Patriotic Front delegation have expressed concern about the ability of their commanders to transmit cease-fire orders to their men in the field. But the British Government stands ready, in conjunction with the monitoring force, to arrange whatever facilities the Patriotic Front commanders require to ensure that

their orders reach their men in the field. We are prepared to help with this in terms of broadcasting and other radio facilities- transport, etc.

19. By the time the assembly process is complete we shall have reached a point at which the forces which have accepted the Governor's authority are known and identified; the opposing forces have been separated from each other; and monitoring teams are located with the forces of both sides so that their maintenance of the cease-fire can be observed. If any force does not comply with the cease-fire agreement and with the Governor's directions it will be acting unlawfully. The commanders on both sides will be answerable to the Governor for the maintenance of the cease-fire by their respective forces. If there are breaches of the cease-fire, it will be for the Commanders to deal with these, through the machinery of the Cease-fire Commission and with the assistance of the monitoring force. If there are repeated and sustained breaches of the cease-fire, the Governor will have to decide what action to take to deal with these with the forces which have accepted his authority.

20. Our proposals are designed to bring about reciprocal disengagement. The Rhodesian forces will be monitored to the level of their sub-JOCs and company bases from the first day of the cease-fire. These arrangements will apply to the Patriotic Front once they have identified and assembled their forces at places from which they too can be monitored and be in contact with the Cease-fire Commission. It is in their interests that they should do so to enable the arrangements for their security, accommodation and other agreed requirements to be adequately provided for.

21. The assembly places allocated to the Patriotic Front have been chosen in relation to their operational areas and to the requirement that they must not be in close proximity to Rhodesian bases. They must contain certain indispensable facilities, including road access and an airstrip for the re-supply of the Patriotic Front forces and the monitoring teams. We have made a selection of assembly places which meet these criteria, particularly the question of the security of the Patriotic Front forces, about which the Patriotic Front delegation have expressed concern. I would like to make it quite clear that the British Government cannot accept that Patriotic Front forces which assemble under the auspices of the monitoring force and which accept the Governor's authority and comply with his directions will be in any danger of attack from other forces. There could, in these circumstances, be no danger to their security. I am conscious of the concern expressed by the Patriotic Front that their assembly places should not be in close proximity to Rhodesian bases and that they should not be "encircled." There has never been any question of the Patriotic Front forces being encircled. They will be under the authority of their own commanders; and other forces will not be in close proximity to them.

22. Our intention is to circulate to the Conference later today maps prepared by our military experts which will show where the monitoring force will be located in relation to the forces both during the process of assembly and after it has been completed. In doing this, we have taken account of the information which the delegations have given us about their force levels. The Salisbury delegation have declared to us their force levels. These will be rendered public as soon as the Patriotic Front have put forward their own force levels. The Rhodesian force levels include all the forces mentioned by the Patriotic Front leaders, including the guard force and auxiliaries. These force levels correspond to our own independent estimates, and we believe them to be realistic.

23. In the absence of any information from the Patriotic Front about their force levels inside Rhodesia, we have been obliged to proceed on the basis of our own independent estimates of those force levels. These estimates reveal an important disparity in numbers between the size of the Rhodesian forces and of the Patriotic Front forces. The arrangements we are proposing for disengagement have to take account of this disparity in numbers as well as of other factors, including the need to make use of logistic and other facilities. We have therefore proposed that the Patriotic Front should report to rendezvous points which are spread throughout the country and which are in close proximity to all their forces; and that they should then assemble in places which are situated in their operational areas; which are not in close proximity to Rhodesian bases and which are in locations which take account of the need to enable the Patriotic Front personnel assembled in them to feel secure. We have similarly proposed that the Rhodesian forces should be monitored down to the level of their company bases.

24. I cannot stress too strongly the importance of our having accurate knowledge of the respective force levels. Both the other delegations at this Conference have expressed concern that the other side may have forces inside Rhodesia or may bring forces into Rhodesia which will not be monitored and will not comply with the cease-fire. We have proposed comprehensive arrangements for the monitoring of the Rhodesian forces from cease-fire day. It will not be possible to make similar arrangements for the Patriotic Front forces unless and until they assemble their forces and give us firm assurances that they will not move forces outside the country into Rhodesia.

25. The Patriotic Front delegation have asked on several occasions in this Conference about the dispositions of the Rhodesian forces. The maps which we shall be circulating this afternoon will show that, given the balance of the forces at present inside the country, the monitoring force will be deployed to the forces on both sides in proportions which are related to their respective strengths. The Rhodesian forces will, as I have already said, have dis-engaged to the close vicinity of their bases to allow the Patriotic Front forces to assemble. What happens in the next phase will depend crucially on what

happens in the assembly phase. If Patriotic Front forces remain in the field or continue to be introduced from outside the country, those forces will be unlawful. If, however, all Patriotic Front forces inside Rhodesia assemble with their arms and there is no further movement by externally-based Patriotic Front forces into Rhodesia, there would be no need in those circumstances for the Governor to ask the Rhodesian forces to deploy from their company bases.

26. Finally, I am conscious of the concern on both sides about the situation which might arise after the elections. I made it clear that if this is the general wish the monitoring force would stay in Rhodesia until the independence government is formed and independence is granted; and would try to help in overcoming any problems which might arise in this period. It will be for the independence government to request whatever assistance it requires in the future training or re-settlement of the forces.

27. Once our maps have been distributed to the delegations this afternoon, we shall have given the Conference the fullest possible exposition of our plans. This is therefore the full presentation of the British Government's cease-fire proposals. The monitoring force is standing by and is ready to go to Rhodesia in the next few days. I have no doubt that, on this basis, it will be possible to bring a cease-fire into effect and to begin the assembly process within the next few days. I hope that when you have studied these papers, this document and the maps, you will be able to give us your earliest possible response.

## ATTACHMENT TO CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

### RHODESIA: CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS

1. The British Government puts forward the following amplified proposals for the establishment and maintenance of a comprehensive monitored cease-fire agreement.

#### Basis of the Cease-fire

2. The purpose of the cease-fire is to bring an immediate end to hostilities and to establish peaceful conditions which will allow elections to take place, the people of Zimbabwe to choose their future government and Zimbabwe to become independent on the terms which have been agreed at this Conference. Given a commitment by all the parties to abide by the results of the elections, it will also provide a basis on which post-war military problems can be resolved by agreement and a lasting peace can be established.

#### Responsibility for the Cease-fire

3. The Commanders of the forces involved will be directly responsible to the Governor for the maintenance of the cease-fire by all the forces under their command.

4. The Governor will be assisted by a British Military Adviser of the rank of Major-General. The Rhodesian security forces and the Patriotic Front will nominate equal numbers of military representatives to a Cease-fire Commission which will be established in Salisbury from the beginning of the cease-fire. The Chairman of the Commission will be the Governor's Military Adviser. The Commission will meet as required throughout the cease-fire. Its functions will include:

- (a) ensuring compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of the forces;
- (b) the investigation of actual or threatened breaches of the cease-fire; and
- (c) such other tasks as may be assigned to it by the Governor in the interests of maintaining the cease-fire.

The Commission will be independent of existing command structures and the Governor may at his discretion communicate with any commander concerning the exercise of their functions. Any member of the Commission may invite it to discuss any question which appears to him to be relevant to its functions.

#### Monitoring the Cease-fire

5. The British Government will be responsible for the

establishment of a monitoring force which will assess and monitor impartially all stages of the inception and maintenance of the cease-fire by the forces and assist the Cease-fire Commission in its tasks. The organisations will operate under the authority of the Governor and the command of his Military Adviser. The Commanders of the Rhodesian security forces and of the Patriotic Front forces will be required to undertake to co-operate fully with the monitoring force and to provide it with whatever facilities are necessary to assist it to discharge its functions.

6. Elements of the monitoring force will be assigned:

- (a) to maintain contact with the Rhodesian security forces and Patriotic Front forces command structures throughout Rhodesia;
- (b) to monitor and observe the maintenance of the cease-fire by the respective forces; and
- (c) to monitor agreed border-crossing points and the use made of them in accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed in the context of the cease-fire.

7. For this purpose liaison and monitoring teams will be established as follows:

- (a) five liaison teams, each led by a senior officer (i.e. of the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel) will be assigned to maintain contact with each of the security forces Joint Operations Commands (JOCs);
- (b) a number of teams of equivalent rank will be assigned to maintain contact with the Patriotic Front forces command structure;
- (c) fifteen teams, each led by a junior officer (i.e. Captain or Lieutenant) will be located with the security forces at sub-JOC level;
- (d) a number of teams led by a Lieutenant or Senior NCO will be located at security forces company base level;
- (e) up to fifteen teams, each led by an officer, will be located at places designated for assembly of Patriotic Front forces;
- (f) up to twelve teams, each led by an officer, will be located at border crossing points; and
- (g) two teams, each commanded by an officer of the rank of Flight Lieutenant or Squadron Leader, will be located at military airfields.

8. The force will be organised under British auspices; and the majority of its personnel will be British. The Australian, New Zealand, Kenyan and Fijian governments have agreed to participate in the monitoring force. Members of the force will carry weapons for their personal protection only and will be provided with vehicles and helicopters carrying a distinctive marking. The force will be equipped with an independent radio communication network.

#### Dispositions of the Forces

9. Disengagement of the forces will be essential to an effective cease-fire and the deployment of the monitoring force. The activities of the security forces and their maintenance of the cease-fire will be monitored from their existing bases. In the case of the Patriotic Front forces at present inside Rhodesia, it will be essential that they should assemble at pre-determined places so that their maintenance of the cease-fire can be similarly monitored and arrangements can be made for their security, accommodation and other agreed requirements.

10. Up to fifteen such places will be designated for this purpose. In addition, a larger number of intermediate collection points will be designated to which Patriotic Front personnel will report with their arms and equipment during the initial phase of the cease-fire and from which they will make their way by agreed safe-routes to their assembly places. A Patriotic Front representative and a monitoring team will be present at each intermediate collection point during this phase. The police and defence forces will not be involved in the assembly process and will not be present at the collection points. Patriotic Front personnel will be guaranteed safe passage from the collection points to their assembly places.

#### Cross-Border Activity

11. A major objective of the cease-fire arrangements must be to secure a cessation of all movement by the security forces into neighbouring countries and by the Patriotic Front forces into Rhodesia. The Governor will be responsible for ensuring compliance with this requirement by the forces inside Rhodesia. The governments of Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique will be invited to agree on effective cross-border liaison arrangements to ensure compliance with this requirement for forces based outside Rhodesia and to prevent cross-border movements by such forces. This will involve the establishment of liaison officers outside Rhodesia. At the same time, provision must be made to permit the return of civilian personnel to Rhodesia during the cease-fire in order to vote or engage in other peaceful political activity. Up to twelve border crossing points will be established, under the supervision of the monitoring force, for this purpose.

## The Time Scale

12. A fully effective cease-fire cannot come into operation immediately. Time will be required for the transmission of orders to subordinate commanders in the field and for the implementation of the agreed arrangements for the separation of the opposing forces. But it is essential that the cease-fire should be brought into operation quickly if it is to be effective. It is therefore proposed that as soon as agreement has been reached on the cease-fire:-

- (a) All parties should issue instructions forthwith for its implementation on a given date. All cross-border military activity will cease. Elements of the monitoring force will be despatched to Rhodesia;
- (b) On cease-fire day the Cease-fire Commission will be established. The monitoring force will deploy to the collection points and assembly places for the Patriotic Front forces. All hostilities within Rhodesia will cease. The process of assembly of the forces will begin immediately and should take not more than seven days. The completion of the deployment of the monitoring force will have taken place by then.

13. During the cease-fire the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order will rest with the police, acting under the Governor's authority and supervision. All forces which have assembled and accepted the Governor's authority and continue to comply with his directions will be acting lawfully. Any forces which fail to assemble, and fail to accept the Governor's authority and abide by the cease-fire agreement, will be acting unlawfully. The primary responsibility for dealing with breaches of the cease-fire will rest with the Commanders on both sides, through the mechanism of the Cease-fire Commission and with the assistance of the liaison teams operating with the forces at area level. It will be for the Commanders to ensure, with the assistance of the monitoring force, that breaches of the cease-fire are contained and dealt with. In the event of more general or sustained breaches of the cease-fire, the Governor will have to decide what action to take to deal with them with the forces which have accepted his authority.

## Instructions to Military Personnel

14. The leaders on each side will ensure that clear and precise instructions are issued to all units and personnel under their command to comply scrupulously with the agreed arrangements for bringing the cease-fire into effect. The leaders of the delegations at the Conference will make announcements, immediately following the conclusion of the cease-fire agreement, which will be broadcast regularly through all appropriate channels to assist in ensuring that instructions to maintain the cease-fire

reach all the forces under their command and are understood by the public in general.

#### The Longer Term

15. An effective cease-fire during the pre-independence period, a peaceful election campaign and an election the result of which is accepted and respected by all parties will bring about a permanent end to the war. Many of those at present under arms will wish to return to civilian life. Others will wish to continue to pursue a military career. Decisions on post-war military planning will be a matter for the government which will be constituted following the elections and under which Zimbabwe will become independent. The British Government will be ready to assist with the re-training and resettlement of those elements of the forces which wish to pursue a civil career.

22 November 1979

ATTACHMENT TO CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

RHODESIA: CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS  
STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN ON 15 DECEMBER 1979

1. I would like to open this session by reminding delegations of the achievements of this Conference; and achievements there have been. Agreement has been reached on an Independence Constitution providing for genuine majority rule and thereby removing the fundamental cause of the war. That was what it was about. Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues agreed to hand over authority to a British Governor who is now in Salisbury. The Governor's task is to organise elections in which all parties can participate freely. Agreement has also been reached on our cease-fire proposals. We have now set out their detailed implementation.

2. In order to meet various concerns expressed by the Patriotic Front and to explain our basic proposals, I made a statement on 28 November which was designed to help the Patriotic Front to agree to the cease-fire proposals; and I am very glad that this helped them to do so. In order to meet further concerns expressed by the Patriotic Front and to explain fully our detailed proposals I made a full statement on 11 December and circulated maps to the other delegations to the Conference. My statement of 11 December is incorporated in the final Conference documents.

3. The Patriotic Front have expressed concern about the number of assembly places allocated to them in relation to the size of their forces. Equally strongly felt anxieties have been expressed by the Salisbury delegation as to whether there will be an effective assembly and a cessation of cross-border movement. I can assure the Patriotic Front, however, that if the Patriotic Front forces at present in Rhodesia assemble with their arms and equipment in numbers greater than can be dealt with at the assembly places designated in the cease-fire agreement, the Governor will assess the need for additional sites in relation to the successful accomplishment of the assembly process by the Patriotic Front forces and in relation to the dispositions of their forces.

4. This Conference has now been in session for fourteen weeks. All the issues have been exhaustively discussed. With agreement on the Independence Constitution, a return to legality and free elections, in which all parties can participate there can be no reason for anyone to continue the war. The whole purpose of our proposals is to offer everyone an alternative to continuing the war. We cannot oblige any party to accept that alternative; but we do not believe that others will readily understand a decision by any party to continue the war against a lawful authority established to enable elections to be held in which all parties can participate. It will be a matter of very grave disappointment to everybody if it is not possible to reach overall agreement at the Conference after all we have achieved.

5. I hope that both delegations will be able to agree to the documents we circulated to the Conference on 13 December and to agree to initial them. Signature could then follow very quickly indeed. A cease-fire will then come into effect bringing peace to the people of Rhodesia and the neighbouring countries.

6. I cannot emphasise too strongly that it is my profound conviction that to deny the people of Rhodesia this opportunity to resolve their problems by peaceful means would be unforgivable. Immense benefits would flow from the signature of these agreements for them and for the people of the other countries who have suffered so much from the war. In other words a peaceful settlement is now, after 14 weeks, today within your grasp.

7. I cannot oblige anyone to take the decisions necessary to enable such a settlement to be put into effect. But I hope that everyone will reflect very seriously on the consequences and the responsibility for a failure to agree to a cease-fire, the essential purpose of which is to enable all the parties to campaign freely throughout the country in elections held under our authority. I ask therefore whether the other delegations are prepared to initial the documents.

9 February 1980

CORRESPONDENCE WITH GOVERNOR  
CONCERNING ADDITIONAL ASSISTANTS

FROM THE GOVERNOR

My dear Ambassador,

I was most grateful for our useful meeting on Wednesday, and hope we can repeat it from time to time. Your group has an important role, and it is helpful to me to be able to keep in touch.

I have been considering your suggestion that the number of observers be increased by 55. I am of course anxious that your group should be able to form as comprehensive a view as possible of the elections. But your proposal raises many problems. First, I think that the intention to have one observer for every district so closely parallels the structure of the Election Commission's supervision that there will inevitably be some confusion of roles, in which the observer may well be thought to have a supervising function duplicating that of the British staff. Some of the practical difficulties which I deal with would only accentuate the parallels between the two. I am also worried that the sort of person that you envisage seems unlikely to have the experience of elections, the eminent status or the maturity of judgement normally expected in an observer. This could contrast unfavourably with the other international observers, and with the expertise and experience of the supervisors. If the report of the group of Commonwealth

/observers was seen

observers was seen to have relied heavily on the opinions of these young people, rather than on the observers' personal observations, it would detract seriously from its credibility - and indeed, it seems to me that the role of the 11 Commonwealth observers and their 22 assistants would become cloudier and less prominent if their responsibility to observe was diluted. Too much parochial detail could obscure their national overview of the election as a whole.

There are also several practical difficulties to which I must draw attention.

(a) Accommodation is just not available in many districts. Many of the Election Commission supervisors are living in rough conditions in rest camps and District Commissioners' guest houses where food is difficult and where they have only one room, and very sparse furnishings which could not be shared by others. In some of the districts there is no accommodation at all and the supervisors have to commute from shared accommodation in adjacent centres.

(b) Transport in most of the districts is limited to the mine-protected vehicles of the District Commissioners who already have to coordinate their programmes carefully with the supervisors. It is unreasonable to ask them to make arrangements for more visitors, since this would inevitably detract from the efficiency of the election operation. Assuming that accommodation could be found, a local observer could not therefore travel independently but would be forced to share vehicles with the supervisor. Apart from adding to confusion over their respective roles, this would severely limit the observer's effectiveness.

(c) Security is still a problem in many areas as you will know from recent reports. But all available security personnel will be required to guard the polling stations and escort ballot boxes. There will be no-one free for the protection of one itinerant observer.

(d) Interpreters will be necessary in rural areas if the

observer is to do an effective job. Good ones are not readily available and random local recruitment would offer no guarantee of the honesty of the translations on which the observer would be basing his opinions.

(e) Briefing by the Election Commission and other speakers, which I think is vital for good background understanding of the election, the administrative structure and the circumstances in which they are all set will have been completed by the time these extra observers could get here and with the polling about to take place the Election Commission will not have time to provide a separate service.

Apart from these problems, I am not sure that the circumstances on the ground actually justify the figure of 55 that you have suggested. It is true that there are 55 districts, but at least 15 are within easy reach of the major urban centres (Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali, Gwelo and Fort Victoria) where your group have already established offices. It seems to me therefore that the staff that you already have at your disposal would be sufficient to cover a large number of districts and still have manpower in reserve to visit the remoter areas through the official observer programme. If you think it would be helpful, therefore, I would be prepared to consider granting official observer status to the 22 assistants. This would give your group 33 individual observers, which should be enough for sufficient field work to enable the group to justify their conclusions about the elections. I think this would be possible, but I cannot absolutely guarantee it until I know the total number of observers from other governments to whom we have issued invitations, <sup>not</sup> all of whom have yet given us definite answers.

We covered a lot of other ground in our meeting and I will be in touch again on the other matters. Let us keep in contact and meet from time to time so that we can exchange views.

Ambassador Rajeshwar  
Dayal

Yours sincerely,  
Christopher James

# Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat

First Floor,  
36, Jameson Avenue,  
Salisbury.  
Telephone: 793281/2.

10 February 1980

*My dear Governor,*

Thank you for your letter of 9 February which I have been able to discuss with my colleagues most of whom returned yesterday from various parts of the country.

May I say at once how appreciative we all are of the assistance we have received so far, and how impressed we have been by the dedication of the Election Commissioner's office and the many British supervisors we have met.

We fully appreciate the logistical and security problems to which you refer. It was in deference to these factors that the Group reluctantly decided, after deep consideration, that the number of additional Assistants to be emplaced a few days prior to the poll should be reduced from the 96 originally envisaged to 55. In the course of their extensive travels during the last week, the Observers paid particular attention to various aspects of the deployment of these additional Assistants and on the basis of their local enquiries are confident that basic transport and accommodation facilities would not present an insurmountable problem.

At the heart of the matter lie two considerations. The Lusaka Accord, the Lancaster House Agreement (as amplified by the various explanatory statements made by the British Government while negotiations were in progress) and the proceedings of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa make it abundantly clear, as you yourself so readily acknowledge, that the role of the Commonwealth Observer Group is as integral to the process of free and fair elections as the British supervision of them. In this view of the matter, Lord Carrington assured us when we met him in London of the transcending importance of our report in relation to those emanating from any other observers. While acknowledging the many demands that will be made by the observer corps as a whole on your resources, we feel we are entitled to a high measure of priority compatible with our unique status. The second consideration is the overwhelming importance attached by Commonwealth Governments to our findings. In order for them to be credible, our report must be soundly

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H.E. The Rt.Hon. The Lord Soames, GCMG, GCVO, CBE,  
Governor,  
Southern Rhodesia,  
Government House,  
Salisbury.

based on an intensive and widespread sampling of polling throughout the country. We have come to the conclusion that on the basis of our existing strength we would not be in a position to arrive at definitive conclusions on the conduct of the elections, and would thus be unable to discharge satisfactorily our terms of reference in the manner expected by Commonwealth Governments.

In response to the various points in your letter, it is perhaps necessary to clarify the position as we see it. The additional Assistants will simply be our eyes and ears; it will not be their function to come to any judgements, but to report to us in a strictly factual manner on the actual conduct of the poll. It will be for my colleagues and me to sift the evidence and come to a collective judgement. Although on average younger than the Observers, the additional Assistants will be of high calibre and proven experience. For example, the additional Assistants from India, who have been identified and are standing by, belong to the Indian Administrative Service and have held charge of districts with populations greater than whole provinces in this country. They have also held responsible offices in connection with national and state elections. Their factual observations, far from diluting or clouding our own role, will immeasurably enhance the depth of our report.

We fully recognise that there is no question whatsoever of the Commonwealth Observer Group appearing to have a function beyond that of observation. This is clearly understood by all of us, and will be impressed upon the additional Assistants when they arrive.

Given such a clear understanding both by our own members and by the British supervisors, we cannot see how any confusion could arise over their respective roles, particularly if a Supervisor and an Assistant were travelling together. Indeed, such an arrangement would be wholly consonant with the Lancaster House Agreement and Lord Carrington's assurance that our function is not merely to observe the elections but also the manner in which they are supervised by the British authorities. It would also serve to overcome certain problems regarding security.

So far as numbers are concerned, we understand that the British supervisors in the districts will only have the capacity to make spot checks of polling stations, even though in some of the larger districts there will be more than one of them. Having regard to the nature of the electoral arrangements, and the fact that ballot boxes will be opened at each district headquarters for the purpose of reconciliation of used and unused ballot papers and then repacked for despatch to the provincial centres, we feel that we could not, in all conscience, make do with less than one Assistant per district, primarily to cover the rural areas. Our existing personnel will for the most part be deployed in the large urban centres with their heavy concentrations of voters and polling stations.

. . . -/3

Finally, it was always understood during the discussions in London that all the Assistants would have the same right of access to polling stations as the Observers themselves. At no stage was it suggested by the British representative on the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa that this would not be the case. It would be odd indeed if our Group as a whole were not accorded rights of access which are being granted to non-Commonwealth observers.

As time is now very short, I hope I can tell the Secretary-General by tomorrow that the necessary movement from various Commonwealth capitals where the additional Assistants are standing by ready for departure can be initiated immediately.

May I add how useful I have found my talks with you, and I can assure you that I am always at your disposal to discuss matters of interest and concern to us. I have had a long conference with my colleagues just returned after a week's intensive observation in the provinces, and I would greatly appreciate the opportunity of informing you of their impressions and exchanging views about them.

*Yours sincerely,*

*Rajeshwar Dayal*

Rajeshwar Dayal  
CHAIRMAN

FROM THE GOVERNOR

12 February 1980

*My dear Ambassador,*

I want to thank you for your letter of 10 February and, in particular, for your encouraging remarks about the dedication of the Election Commission and its Supervisors in the field. Indeed, I am hopeful that, under their supervision, the conduct of the electoral processes will attain a standard deserving of praise by some and acceptance by all.

I have, of course, given renewed consideration to your suggestion that the Commonwealth Group be increased by a further 55 Observers but, for the protracted reasons I have already explained, I regret that I cannot accept any more observers. The reasons for this were made abundantly clear to the Secretary-General when he saw Lord Carrington on 4 January last and I am assured that he noted them. I understand that Lord Carrington reminded Mr Ramphal that we could not provide facilities for additional observers as recently as 8 February.

You are, I know, well aware of the fact that I support and applaud the intention of your Group to observe every stage and all aspects of the forthcoming election and, to this end, permit me to remind you that comprehensive facilities are at your disposal. Indeed, I am confident that the existing group of 33 (all of whom will now be accredited as full Observers, together with the three senior staff members, Messrs Malhoutra, Snelson and Robinson) will be able to make thorough observations

/in each

in each administrative District. It means you will have 1 Observer to 3 Supervisors. The facilities to which I refer are extensive and I suggest that your Observers use them in addition to their current tours of the Provinces. In particular, the trips envisaged for the three-day Polling period will provide them with an excellent opportunity to see many of the Polling Stations at work throughout the country.

I shall look forward to maintaining contact with you on other matters and, although I am unfortunately unable to meet your request for the 55 additional observers, I hope you will be able to agree that your team of experienced and competent observers will be able to undertake their very important task in the trying days ahead.

Yours sincerely,  
Christopher Paine

Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal

REMARKS TO GROUP MADE BY COMMONWEALTH  
SECRETARY-GENERAL, H.E. MR. SHRIDATH RAMPHAL

It is perhaps desirable that I say a few words to you all collectively before you go out to Southern Rhodesia.

First, it must be a word of gratitude on behalf of the Commonwealth. You are all persons of great eminence and experience in your own countries - most of them far from Southern Africa. That you have accepted this novel assignment at such short notice and with such a sense of commitment is a great symbol of hope for the Commonwealth.

We have tried, in the background and supplementary material, to give you all you may need. What we can't impart (and must not try to) is judgment. That is yours; and it is because you are who you are that the Commonwealth places so much reliance on your collective judgment - and I believe more than just the Commonwealth. I stress that it is your judgment because in this matter you are as independent of the Secretariat as you are of your own Governments. A few of our officers and some independent experts are there to serve and advise you. But it is your judgment alone that matters. It will be my task, at the end of your work, to convey its results as your collective judgment to all Commonwealth Heads of Government.

What you should know - what some of your Governments may already have conveyed to you - is that your role is a very important element of the agreement reached by Commonwealth Heads of Government at the Lusaka Meeting which made all this possible. This role of Commonwealth Observers bringing a dispassionate collective judgement to bear on the question whether the elections in Southern Rhodesia are 'free and fair' is not a supplementary, but a crucial part, of the whole dramatic movement from armed struggle to democratic elections. Without agreement upon it there would likely have been no agreement on anything - no Lusaka Accord by Heads of Government on the future of Zimbabwe. You have a right to be in Southern Rhodesia on behalf of the Commonwealth. It is important that you should understand the basis of your presence and your work.

It is equally important, however, that you understand and respect the limits of your role. I know you do; I repeat it only for emphasis. You do not conduct or supervise the elections; you have no executive roles in relation to it. You are to observe and to report - to see, to hear, to get the feel of what is going on; and, having done so, to say whether, taken all in all, the results can be said to be a free and fair election by the people of Zimbabwe of the leaders of their choice.

For this you will have to see and hear and get the feel of many things. You will inevitably find your good offices involved in

the cause of free and fair elections, and the Commonwealth shall expect you to respond - provided you stay within the limits of a non-executive role. It means, too, that you must make your judgement in the context of Southern Rhodesia and of the kind of election the parties have agreed upon. As a country, it is sui generis; as an election, it is not much different. But that, in itself, is not a matter for judgement; what is for judgement is whether, given all these highly unusual elements, enough has been done to produce a result based on a free and fair election.

That implies, of course, great attention to the environment bearing on these special conditions of electioneering and of polling. Where the machinery is weak, or weaker than you would like it, confidence or the lack of it can become a factor of critical importance. The administration of the country, the impartial functioning of some of the major instrumentalities of Government which have a bearing on the election, the supervision of the ceasefire, the obligations of the parties and the measure of their fulfilment, the translation to Southern Rhodesia of the spirit no less than the letter of the accords at Lusaka and Lancaster House - all these become pertinent, I believe, to the formulation of your judgement.

It follows that you are there neither to whitewash what is unworthy nor to bring an adversary (and, therefore, imperfect) approach to bear on an electoral process that must by any standard be an enormously delicate and arduous undertaking.

I believe, however, that you have a higher, if more indirect task; it lies in your being as much as in your doing. The fact that these elections will be observed by you on behalf of some forty countries - whoever else may be observing all or part of them - must itself be a factor that cannot be discounted by anyone. In a sense, merely by going, you assist the process of making this election free and fair - and become something of a custodian, if only by exercise of a constraining influence.

I do not want to go here into specifics; nothing you see or hear in London, on the radio, on television, in the press, from the front-line states, from the British Government or, of course, from me, is a substitute for being there and hearing from the people and the parties. In recent months reports covering Rhodesia have been subject to an unusually high degree of press management. You will not be entirely free of it in Southern Rhodesia - but you will have there the best chance of making up your own minds.

The air is replete with allegations and counter-allegations - there are South African forces in Rhodesia where they should not be; there are Rhodesian forces deployed and auxiliaries 'at large' when all parties, save for limited emergency situations, were to be disengaged and confined to base. There are remaining political detainees in Southern Rhodesia and in Mozambique. Inevitably, they all now become your concern, for they concern the environment of the election.

But this, after all, is an election - a robust, angry, even violent election, held even before the weapons of war are cooled. It is not a Westminster style election proceeding sedately from nomination to election and with a moving van waiting at No. 10 to take the outgoing Prime Minister away. Were it so, you would not need to go. Why you do go, is because we are experimenting, in a manner critical, perhaps, to conflict resolution in our time, with bringing peace and independence to Zimbabwe by securing a pause in the war long enough for the people of Zimbabwe to say - freely and fairly - "these are the leaders we want", and for lasting peace thereafter to ensue.

It goes without saying that there must be no constraints on the choice of the people; that they must be allowed to choose between all the parties - with none excluded. The purpose, after all, of this entire exercise is to allow the people of Zimbabwe 'freely and fairly' to choose ("by the ballot") their leaders and to have that choice reflected in the election results. Your job is to tell us all whether this is how it went.

On your answer could turn not only the future of Southern Rhodesia but of South Africa. On your work could turn our hope for conflict resolution worldwide.

On your wisdom and integrity everything depends. That is why I feel so confident in wishing you success in what I truly say to you is one of the most important missions the Commonwealth has ever undertaken.

God's blessings on your efforts.

Marlborough House,  
London,  
23 January 1980.

FORM OF LETTER SENT TO LEADERS OF  
THE FOLLOWING POLITICAL PARTIES

The National Democratic Union

The National Front of Zimbabwe

The Patriotic Front

The Rhodesia Front

The United African National Council

The United National Federation Party

The United Peoples Association of Matabeleland

The Zimbabwe African National Union

The Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)

The Zimbabwe Democratic Party

# *Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat*

First Floor,  
36, Jameson Avenue,  
Salisbury.

Telephone: 793281/2.

28 January 1980

I am writing to you in my capacity as Chairman of the 11-member Commonwealth Observer Group, constituted by the Commonwealth Secretary-General pursuant to the Lusaka Accord of August 1979 and the Lancaster House Agreements to report collectively to all Commonwealth Heads of Government on the conduct of the forthcoming elections. A list of our members and a copy of our Terms of Reference is enclosed.

We have come to Rhodesia in a spirit of helpfulness and objectivity. Although our individual backgrounds and experience are diverse, we are inspired by a common purpose and a commitment to the emergence of an independent and internationally recognised Zimbabwe through the process of free and fair elections. All of us serve in our personal capacities, not as representatives of our governments.

In order to help us discharge our functions we attach the greatest importance to establishing personal contact with you and the leaders of other political parties. We would specially value a personal discussion with you at the earliest possible opportunity and would also like to establish regular liaison with designated office-bearers of your party here in Salisbury as well as in the Provinces. We understand, of course, the heavy demands on your time and would willingly fit in with any arrangements you may suggest. As we intend to engage in an intensive schedule of travel from 1st February to observe the election arrangements, I would very much hope that we will be able to meet before that date.

With my personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Rajeshwar Dayal,  
Chairman.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE UANC REGARDING  
PROPOSED MEETING WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA

## *Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat*

First Floor,  
36, Jameson Avenue,  
Salisbury.

Telephone: 793281/2.

28 January 1980

*My dear Bishop,*

I am writing to you in my capacity as Chairman of the 11-member Commonwealth Observer Group, constituted by the Commonwealth Secretary-General pursuant to the Lusaka Accord of August 1979 and the Lancaster House Agreements to report collectively to all Commonwealth Heads of Government on the conduct of the forthcoming elections. A list of our members and a copy of our Terms of Reference are enclosed.

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With my personal regards,

*Yours sincerely,*

*R. Dayal*

Rajeshwar Dayal  
CHAIRMAN

Bishop A. Muzorewa  
United African National Council  
130 Victoria Street  
Salisbury



# UNITED AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL

## NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

ZIMBABWE HOUSE  
130 VICTORIA STREET  
SALISBURY  
RHODESIA (ZIMBABWE)

PHONE 703709  
706574  
706573  
P.O. BOX 2266

*From the Office of the President*

Our Ref.

February 8, 1980

Your Ref.

Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal  
Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat  
1st Floor  
36 Jameson Avenue  
SALISBURY

Dear Ambassador,

I am in receipt of your letter dated 28 January 1980.

Before replying specifically to your request for a personal discussion with me on the subject of the forthcoming election, it is necessary that I draw to your attention your singularly unfortunate remarks at a News Conference held by you on Monday, January 29, 1980, following your meeting with His Excellency the Governor, Lord Soames.

You were reported as saying that you had raised the question of alleged breaches of the Lancaster House Agreement by the Security Force Auxiliaries and that the subject of violations by the ZANLA and ZIPRA elements had not arisen during your discussions.

To my mind this is a most serious omission since I would have expected that you would have fully acquainted yourself with the correct situation regarding ceasefire violations, either prior to or immediately following your arrival in this country. As you are now no doubt aware, as the Governor certainly is, there is a whole catalogue of ceasefire violations on the part of ZIPRA and more particularly ZANLA illegal elements, as evidenced by the regular communiques issued both by Combined Operations and the Commonwealth Monitoring Force. These range through numerous breaches from murder, torture, rape, abductions, robbery, the destruction of public and private property, violent intimidation at gun point together with physical attacks on innocent members of our population, illegal border crossing, movement out of the designated assembly places, the holding of illegal political meetings together with many other serious violations of the ceasefire agreement running into hundreds of such incidents. All have taken place since that agreement was signed and following the arrival of the Governor.

.../2

President: Bishop A. T. MUZOREWA

Vice President: E. L. BULLE

Second Vice President: T. G. MUKARATI

Secretary General: E. S. MAZAIWANA

I am, therefore, astounded that you chose to ignore these during your discussions with Lord Soames and furthermore that you have not taken the opportunity to refer to these publicly since your unfortunate remarks concerning allegations of breaches by the Security Force Auxiliaries which was a complete misrepresentation of the actual situation. I challenge you to present to me evidence of any such incident such as those covered in the communiques I have mentioned attributable to Security Force Auxiliaries.

Under the existing circumstance, I am left with no other conclusion but that you arrived in this country with pre-conceived ideas, that you are no way impartial, a state of mind I consider to be absolutely essential if the forthcoming election is to be judged fairly and that you hold a very distinct bias in favour of particular political parties and their armed wings to the detriment of other parties contesting the election.

Until you are able to provide the evidence I have requested together with undeniable proof of your personal impartiality I find that I have no alternative but to reserve my decision as to whether a meeting such as that suggested by you would serve any useful purpose insofar as I personally am concerned or my Party.

Yours sincerely,



BISHOP ABEL T. MUZOREWA  
PRESIDENT

c.c. Secretary General of the Commonwealth  
Commonwealth Secretariat  
Marlborough House  
Pall Mall  
LONDON SW1Y 5HX

# Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat

First Floor,  
36, Jameson Avenue,  
Salisbury.  
Telephone: 793281/2.

1 February 1980

Dear Mr. President,

I acknowledge, with thanks, receipt of your letter of 31 January 1980.

I regret that on the basis of an unverified press report, you should have come to certain unwarranted conclusions to which you gave public expression at a press conference. The facts could easily have been verified by reference to me or to any of my colleagues.


It is not correct that any allegations were made regarding breaches by the auxiliary forces. Reflecting the interest of the Group, I had enquired about the status and functions of the auxiliaries, without making any comments on their activities. Obviously such an enquiry regarding ZANLA and ZIPRA forces would have been unnecessary, because we were already aware of their status and obligations.

You can be assured that my colleagues and I are aware of the wide-spread reports of cease-fire violations by various armed groups as revealed by the proceedings of the Cease-Fire Commission and from our talks with a large number of personalities drawn from the official, political, church, social and other fields. These matters have been pursued in our extensive discussions with all those concerned, and continue to receive our constant attention. We would very much welcome an opportunity to elicit the views of your party and we hope it will be possible to arrange this.

You are no doubt aware, Mr. President, that our Group is here to observe the elections and to report on whether they have been free and fair, to the Heads of Government of the entire Commonwealth, who alone are competent to adjudge our findings.

Should you be willing to meet us in response to my letter, we would be happy to reciprocate. As most of us are proceeding to various centres for purposes of observation on Sunday, 3rd February, a meeting, should it be possible, could be arranged according to your convenience, on the afternoon of Saturday, 2nd February, or on the following Saturday, 9th February.

Yours sincerely,



Rajeshwar Dayal  
CHAIRMAN

Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa,  
President,  
United African National Council,  
Salisbury.



# UNITED AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL

## NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

ZIMBABWE HOUSE  
130 VICTORIA STREET  
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RHODESIA (ZIMBABWE)

PHONE 703709  
706574  
706573  
P.O. BOX 2266

*From the Office of the President*

Our Ref.

February 8, 1980

Your Ref.

Ambassador Rajeshwar Dyal,  
Chairman,  
Commonwealth Observer Group,  
First Floor,  
36 Jameson Avenue,  
SALISBURY

Dear Ambassador,


As you are no doubt aware, the President is currently heavily engaged in his electioneering programme, during the course of which he is touring practically the whole of the country. Consequently he is seldom in Salisbury, as is the case at present, and he has, therefore, instructed me to reply to your letter of 1st February, 1980.

Due to his absence from the capital of 2nd February it was not possible for him to meet you and representatives of your group. Identical circumstances also preclude the possibility of the meeting you have proposed for tomorrow, 9th February.

The President has asked me to say in reply to your observations that if you were misquoted or misrepresented in the press report of your news conference on Monday, January 29, 1980, he is at a loss to understand why you did not make an early opportunity to correct this. He also feels that your group should have made some public reference to the Ceasefire Agreement violations not only by the illegal ZANLA and ZIPRA elements but by ZANU (PF) and the Patriotic Front as political parties.

In regard to the possibility of a meeting with you and members of your group prior to the election, the President is only scheduled to return to Salisbury from his tour of the country at fairly irregular intervals but if you are in a position to suggest a number of alternative dates which fit in with his schedule, he will endeavour to accommodate you. He, however, asks that you appreciate that, having regard to his extremely busy and concentrated programme this may not be possible.

Yours sincerely,

  
DONALD LIGHTFOOT  
Public Relations Consultant

President: Bishop A. T. MUZOREWA

Vice President: E. L. BULLE

Second Vice President: I. G. MUKARATI

Secretary General: E. S. MAZAIWANA

DISPOSITION OF COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP  
DURING PERIOD OF POLL

VICTORIA PROVINCE

- (a) Observers: Mr. I.S. DeSouza (Jamaica) (Fort Victoria)
- (b) Assistants: Mr. J.E. Forrester (Canada) (Fort Victoria)  
Mr. M. Kanat (Papua New Guinea) (Nuanetsi)  
Mr. T.O. Lindsay (Ghana) (Gutu)  
Mr. E.A. Aina (Nigeria) (Fort Victoria)  
Mr. B. Kulatunga (Sri Lanka) (Chibi)  
Mr. S.R. Arya (India) (Zaka)  
Mr. W.E. Lang (Australia) (Chiredzi)  
Mr. K.D. Knight (Jamaica) (Bikita)
- (c) Secretariat Staff: Hugh Craft  
Ned Amerasinghe
- (d) Provincial Headquarters: Flamboyant Hotel, Fort Victoria  
Tel: (139) 2005/6
- (e) Locations: Fort Victoria (3)  
Chiredzi (1)  
Zaka (1)  
Bikita (1)  
Gutu (1)  
Chibi (1)  
Nuanetsi (1)

COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP

MANICA PROVINCE

- a. Observer: Mr. S.G. Ikoku (Nigeria) (Umtali)
- b. Assistants and Support Staff:
- |                                |               |
|--------------------------------|---------------|
| Mr. W.D. Bowtell (Australia)   | (Buhera)      |
| Mr. K.N. Daruwalla (India)     | (Melsetter)   |
| Dr. O.O. Fafowora (Nigeria)    | (Umtali)      |
| Mr. W. Jayasinghe (Sri Lanka)  | (Inyanga)     |
| Mr. R.D. Pickersgill (Jamaica) | (Chipinga)    |
| Mr. S. Okudzeto (Ghana)        | (Rusape)      |
| Mr. A. Macfarlane (Canada)     | (Chisumbanje) |
| Mr. H.V. Abu (Sierra Leone)    | (Umtali)      |
- c. Secretariat Staff:
- John Macpherson  
Prakash Ramgulam
- d. Provincial Headquarters:
- Manica (Cecil Hotel)  
Umtali. (Tel. (120 64431)
- e. Locations:
- Umtali (3)  
Rusape (1)  
Melsetter (1)  
Chipinga (1)  
Inyanga (1)  
Chisumbanje (1)  
Buhera (1)

COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP

MATABELELAND SOUTH PROVINCE

- a. Observer: Sir Carlisle Burton (Barbados) (Bulawayo)
- b. Assistants: Mr. L. Sealy (Barbados) (Bulawayo)  
Mr. L.E.A. Moyston (Jamaica) (Gwanda)  
Ms. J. Pearce (Canada) (Bulawayo)  
Mr. K. Duku (Ghana) (Gwanda)
- c. Secretariat Staff: Stephen Chan  
Emmanuel Apea
- d. Provincial Headquarters: Southern Sun Hotel, Bulawayo  
Tel. (19) 60101
- e. Locations: Gwanda (2)  
Bulawayo (3)

COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP

MATABELELAND NORTH PROVINCE

- a. Observer: Mr. J.W. Subasinghe (Sri Lanka) (Bulawayo)
- b. Assistants: Mr. W. Jayamaha (Sri Lanka) (Bulawayo)
- Mr. S.R. Sharma (India) (Wankie)
- Mr. Agyenin-Boateng (Ghana) (Wankie)
- Mr. A. Robinson (Canada) (Lupane)
- Mr. M. Warpulu (Papua New Guinea) (Lupane)
- c. Secretariat Staff:
- Stephen Chan
- Emmanuel Apea
- d. Provincial Headquarters:
- Southern Sun Hotel
- Bulawayo. Tel. (19) 60101
- e. Locations:
- Wankie (2)
- Lupane (2)
- Bulawayo (2)

COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP

MIDLANDS PROVINCE

- (a) Observers: Mr. Justice V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe (Ghana) (Gwelo)  
The Hon. O. Tammur (Papua New Guinea) (Gwelo)
- (b) Assistants: Mr. Abu MD. Basharat Ali (Bangladesh) (Que Que)  
Mr. K. Asilijoe (Ghana) (Gwelo)  
Mr. F. Karemo (Sierra Leone) (Gwelo/Shabani)  
Colonel T. Nauna (Papua New Guinea) (Enkeldoorn)  
Ms. J. Norwood (Australia) (Que Que)  
Mr. W.R. Bailie (Canada) (Gwelo/Belingwe)  
Mr. S.C. Sharma (India) (Selukwe)  
Mr. T.B. Dixon (Jamaica) (Enkeldoorn)
- (c) Secretariat Staff: Raja Gomez  
Dominic Sankey
- (d) Provincial Headquarters: Midlands Hotel, Gwelo  
Tel: (154) 2581
- (e) Locations: Enkeldoorn (2)  
Gwelo (5)  
Que Que (2)  
Selukwe (1)

COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP

MASHONALAND WEST PROVINCE

- a. Observer: The Hon. Justice A.K.M. Kutubu (Sierra Leone) (Salisbury)
- b. Assistants: Mr. D. Sheku (Sierra Leone) (Salisbury)  
Colonel A.B. Maman (Nigeria) (Kariba)  
Mr. A.C. Kevin (Australia) (Karoi)  
Mr. W.O.L. Perera (Sri Lanka) (Sinoia)  
Mr. R. Kaiulo (Papua New Guinea) (Gatooma)
- c. Secretariat Staff:  
Mark Robinson
- d. Provincial Headquarters:  
36 Jameson Avenue  
Salisbury. Tel. 793281/2.
- e. Locations: Gatooma (1)  
Karoi (1)  
Kariba (1)  
Sinoia (1)  
Salisbury (2)

COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP

MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE

- (a) Observer: Mr. R.G.L. Fairweather (Canada) (Salisbury)
- (b) Assistants: Mr. M.B. Phillips (Canada) (Salisbury)  
Mr. S. Harris (Barbados) (Salisbury)  
Mr. G.R. Landswehr (Australia) (Bindura)  
Mr. A. Jonathan (Papua New Guinea) (Bindura)  
Ms. Norma Segre' (Jamaica) (Bindura)
- (c) Secretariat Staff: Peter Snelson
- (d) Provincial  
Headquarters: 36, Jameson Avenue, Salisbury  
Tel: 793281
- (e) Locations: Bindura (3)  
Salisbury(3)

COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP

MASHONALAND EAST PROVINCE

- (a) Observers: Mr. Justice A.K.M. Nurul Islam (Bangladesh) (Salisbury)  
Mr. K.C.O. Shann (Australia) (Salisbury)
- (b) Assistants: Mr. L.A. Rowe (Australia) (Salisbury)  
Lt. Col. Syed (Salisbury)  
Badruzzaman (Bangladesh) (Goromonzi)  
Senator P. Lawes (Jamaica) (Salisbury)  
(Seki)  
Mr. D.C. Perera (Sri Lanka) (Mtoko)  
Mr. S. Koroma (Sierra Leone) (Marandellas)  
Mr. B. Rai (India) (Salisbury)  
(Seki)  
Mr. J. Harris (Sierra Leone) (Salisbury)  
(Goromonzi)  
Mr. G.K.G. Perera (Sri Lanka) (Marandellas)  
Mr. K. Agyei-Sakyi (Ghana) (Salisbury)
- (c) Secretariat Staff: Peter Snelson
- (d) Provincial Headquarters: 36, Jameson Avenue, Salisbury  
Tel: 793281
- (e) Locations: Marandellas (2)  
Mtoko (1)  
Salisbury (8)

## INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP

1. The Commonwealth Observer Group, since its arrival in Rhodesia on 24 January, has carefully scrutinised the entire electoral process and, through a programme of extensive and generally independent travel and enquiry throughout the country, covering more than 125,000 kilometres till 29 February, has acquired a unique position for assessing developments, the election campaign, and the actual conduct of the poll. The Group has been conscious throughout of the special responsibilities devolving on it under the Lusaka Accord and the Lancaster House Agreement.
2. The Group recognises that it is difficult, if not impossible, to make clear and unqualified judgements about every aspect of the electoral process carried out, as it has been, in the immediate wake of a protracted and bitter civil war. Various factors have sustained or created conditions where political activity was not always devoid of violence, where freedom of movement, assembly and expression were restricted in varying degree in parts of the country and where the performance of the publicly-owned media left much to be desired. The suspicions and hostility dividing different sections of Rhodesian society, exacerbated by years of armed conflict were not, and could not reasonably be expected to be, dissipated within a few weeks of the cease-fire. It is a matter of some satisfaction, however, that in a society as heavily armed as Rhodesia's, the level of violence during the campaign has not been higher than it was. In this context, the Group was gratified by the ready response of party leaders to its suggestion, subsequently pursued formally by the Election Council, that they issue a public statement adjuring their followers to eschew violence and to campaign peacefully.
3. The Group considered it important to keep in touch with the functioning of the administration especially in its bearing on the electoral process. While recognizing the complex nature of the problems confronting it, it noted with regret evidence of obstruction and a lack of a sufficient degree of impartiality in dealing with the interests of the different parties.
4. The problem of intimidation in these elections has been of central concern to the Group. That intimidation has occurred is a fact and there can be no doubt that intimidation whether in the form of violence, threats of violence or coercion has marred the election campaign. It is equally true that intimidation has not stemmed from only a single quarter. In the Group's

view, certain official agencies have also been culpable. It is impossible to judge accurately the extent to which intimidation, taken overall, has restricted the freedom of activity of the political parties or influenced voters. In many cases the Group found from personal observation in the field that charges of intimidation were being exaggerated or were being made in deliberately vague and general terms, inspired by considerations of political expediency. It also found that various political parties were indeed able to campaign actively in some of the areas where it was alleged that they were unable to do so. In any event, the limitations and constraints were to a degree overcome by the party political broadcasts on radio and television and the extensive use of advertising. The Group strongly cautioned the authorities against banning parties or candidates or disenfranchising voters in particular areas and it was relieved that, in the event, none of these major disqualifications was applied. The Group believes that the political parties have had, by and large, an adequate, if not entirely unrestricted, opportunity to solicit the support of the electorate.

5. The Group was impressed by the very high degree of political awareness among the people in both urban and rural areas. They showed a lively appreciation of the issues and a keen involvement in the election process and the future destiny of their country. The overwhelming urge for peace in freedom and dignity was throughout a key factor, and with the passage of time, the Group was encouraged to see a palpable strengthening of the forces working for peace and reconciliation. This was a sentiment strongly urged by the political leadership and widely echoed by the population. The beginning made in the process of integrating the armies was its most hopeful augury.

6. In addressing itself to the question of whether the election process has been entirely free and fair, the Group believes it would be unrealistic and misleading to apply conventional yardsticks in assessing a situation which is as unique and unparalleled as that in Rhodesia. For it is impossible to ignore the deep wounds left by the war, the burden of Rhodesia's troubled history and the unprecedented character of the Lancaster House Agreement itself. While recognising deficiencies in the implementation of the Agreement, the Group has taken careful note of the fact that none of the principal political leaders it met judged these to be such as to undermine the validity of the election. The collective experience of the Group, based on conversations with many thousands of people in all parts of the country, revealed a high level of awareness among the great majority of the electorate that their vote was and would remain secret. This assurance would have served to

attenuate the effects of intimidation on the voters' freedom of choice.

7. Having regard to all these factors, as well as the use of the party list system, it is the unanimous conclusion of the Commonwealth Observer Group that the election up to the end of polling can be considered to have been free and fair to the extent that it provided an adequate and acceptable means of determining the wishes of the people in a democratic manner. This view is fortified by the high turn-out, and the orderly and manifestly relaxed manner in which such a large percentage of voters went to the polls.

8. While the counting is not yet complete, it is the view of the Group that the organisational aspects of the election, including the arrangements for the polling, have on the whole been carried out efficiently and fairly in what were undoubtedly difficult circumstances. The 63-strong Group observed polling in 409 out of the 657 polling stations, and was present in all parts of the country while many hundreds of thousands cast their votes. Despite such comprehensive coverage, the number of deficiencies observed by the Group in the actual conduct of the poll was insignificant and will not affect the outcome in any material way. The Group is continuing to observe the final stages of the election process but so far has not discerned any significant anomalies which might vitiate its present conclusions.

9. A detailed and final report will be issued as soon as possible after the conclusion of the count.

Salisbury

2 March 1980

1979

AMNESTY ORDINANCE 1979

**SOUTHERN RHODESIA**  
**The Amnesty Ordinance 1979**  
 (Ordinance No. 3 of 1979)

*Soames*  
 Governor

21st December 1979

ENACTED BY THE GOVERNOR

1. This Ordinance may be cited as the Amnesty Ordinance 1979 and shall come into operation on 21 December 1979 (hereinafter referred to as "the appointed day").

Citation and  
commencement.

2. (1) No legal proceedings whatsoever, whether civil or criminal, shall be instituted in any court of law in respect of any act to which this section applies, done within Southern Rhodesia or elsewhere, before the appointed day.

Amnesty and  
abatement of  
proceedings in  
respect of  
certain acts, etc.

(2) The acts to which this section applies are—

- (a) the making of the purported declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia on 11 November 1965, the purported making of constitutional provision for Southern Rhodesia otherwise than under the authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom and, without prejudice to section 11 (1) of the Constitution (Interim Provisions) Ordinance 1979, any act done in good faith for the purpose of, or in connection with, resisting or combating any organization referred to in paragraph (b) or resisting, preventing or securing the apprehension of any person committing or having committed, or reasonably suspected of committing or having committed, any of the acts (whether or not themselves done in good faith) referred to in paragraph (b) or paragraph (c);
- (b) the establishment of, membership of, support of or adherence to any organization having the purpose of resisting or frustrating the administration purporting to be the government of the territory of Southern Rhodesia established under any of the instruments styling themselves respectively "The Constitution of Rhodesia, 1965", "The Constitution of Rhodesia, 1969", and "The Constitution of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, 1979", and any acts done between 11 November 1965 and the appointed day (whether or not done on the orders of any such organization) which were done in good faith in furtherance of that purpose or with a view to assisting any person acting in furtherance of that purpose;
- (c) any acts (including acts by way of conspiracy or incitement) preparatory or incidental to any of the aforesaid acts.

(3) Any prosecution pending immediately before the appointed day in respect of any act to which this section applies

shall be discontinued on that day and any civil proceedings pending immediately before that day in respect of any such act shall abate and terminate on that day.

(4) The provisions of subsection (1) shall be without prejudice to any conviction sustained, sentence imposed or civil judgment given before the appointed day, but any such civil judgment or part of any such judgment that has been given in respect of an act to which this section applies and that has not been enforced before the appointed day shall not be enforced thereafter.

(5) Where any civil proceedings abate and terminate in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3), the costs or expenses in the proceedings shall be in the discretion of the court.

(6) in this section "act" includes an omission, and references to the doing of an act shall be construed accordingly.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH GOVERNOR AND  
ELECTION COMMISSIONER CONCERNING  
UNAUTHORISED DISTRIBUTION OF  
ELECTION MATERIAL AND ALLEGED  
BRIEFINGS TO POLICE RESERVISTS

# Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat

First Floor,  
36, Jameson Avenue,  
Salisbury.  
Telephone: 793281/2.


15 February 1980

My dear Sir John,

I am writing to inform you that on Wednesday 13 February a Group of our Observers was in PV3, in Mutasa District, where they were informed by local residents that "a government plane" had been dropping election propaganda. One person said she now intended not to vote in the elections because of this. The following day, Thursday, 14 February, at 10.40 a.m. the same Group was travelling under escort to Murumbinda when they observed a grey Dakota dropping leaflets. Some of these they picked up, and photocopies are attached.

I now formally bring this matter to your attention and should appreciate advice as to the status of the aeroplane involved, and as to how it came about that leaflets from the National Electoral Directorate could be being distributed together with party propaganda.

I am sure that you will share our grave concern.

Yours sincerely,  


CHAIRMAN  
COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP

Sir John Boynton,  
Election Commissioner,  
Salisbury.

Encl.

# Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat

First Floor,  
36, Jameson Avenue,  
Salisbury.

Telephone: 793281/2.

17 February 1980

My dear Sir John,


As was mentioned to Mr. Cumber, yesterday, we have now heard from our Observers travelling in the rural areas of the Midlands, in Shabani, that the administration there is apparently distributing through the Security Forces a set of 11 illustrated political leaflets designed to influence the way in which the Africans will vote. I believe you may already have a set of these leaflets, and understand that you have received some information from other areas of similar conduct, from your own Supervisors.

We should very much appreciate any information you may be able to provide as to the source from which these leaflets emanate, and under whose authority this campaign is being conducted.

We have also been informed by a European police reservist who has been called up over the period of the poll, that he was required to attend two meetings which were addressed by high-ranking officers who informed the Group that it was imperative that a particular party be returned to Office in the elections, and that there was such an extensive range of powers available to control every facet of political activity that it should be possible for them, by selective application of these powers, to disrupt the political activities and the organisation of the other major parties to such an extent as to ensure an acceptable outcome in the elections. If what our informant tells us is true, such an attitude would have the capacity to negate the prospect of free and fair elections, and as such is deeply disturbing to us, as I am sure it would be to you.

We should appreciate whatever information you can give us as to the veracity or otherwise of what we have been told.

Yours sincerely,



Rajeshwar Dayal,  
Chairman.

Sir John Boynton,  
Election Commissioner.

OFFICE OF THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER  
Burroughs House, Gordon Avenue  
P.O. Box 4524. Telephone: 793211  
Salisbury.

18 February 1980

Ambassador R Dayal  
Chairman  
Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat  
First Floor  
36 Jameson Avenue  
Salisbury

*Dear Ambassador Dayal*

Thank you for your letter of 15 February about leaflets which members of the Commonwealth Observer Group picked up. I am greatly concerned about this and will make enquiries about the status of the aeroplane involved and generally.

Meanwhile the Governor has been informed and has given immediate directions that these leaflets, from wherever they originate, should not be distributed in any way through official channels or the governmental administrative machine.

*Yours sincerely*  
*John Boynton*

Sir John Boynton  
Election Commissioner

# Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat

First Floor,  
36, Jameson Avenue,  
Salisbury.

Telephone: 793281/2.

21 February 1980

My dear Lord Soames,

Further to our conversation about unauthorised literature being handled through official channels, I wish now to inform you that two members of the Group observed at 2.20 p.m. on 21 February an army truck full of soldiers driving down Jameson Avenue prominently displaying UANC T-shirts.

Another incident occurred yesterday on one of the Election Commission's facility trips. At the Dema village within the Seke TTL, the SFA detachment commander admitted that for the past week anti-Marxist leaflets were being pasted under the ZANU(PF) campaign posters by the auxiliaries. The Election Supervisor in the area confirmed that he had received such complaints and was looking into the matter.

Also at the meeting yesterday Sir Anthony Duff requested a copy of the set of literature which was collected from the Glenlivet Hotel. This is enclosed.

Yours sincerely,  
*Rajeshwar Dayal*

Rajeshwar Dayal  
Chairman.

The Rt. Hon. Lord Soames, P.C.,  
G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., C.B.E.,  
The Governor of Southern Rhodesia.

OFFICE OF THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER  
Burroughs House, Gordon Avenue  
P.O. Box 4524. Telephone: 793211  
Salisbury.

27 February 1980

Ambassador R Dayal  
Chairman  
Commonwealth Observer Group  
First Floor  
36 Jameson Avenue  
Salisbury

Dear Ambassador Dayal,

On 17 February you wrote to me about two matters and I have told you that so far as the political leaflets are concerned the Governor has given instructions that distribution is to cease.

The second part of your letter of 17 February refers to information given by a European police reservist. I referred this to the Commissioner of Police, who has expressed to me his deep concern at this allegation. However, before he can pursue the matter it would be necessary to know the dates and venues of the meetings and the name of the high ranking officers who are alleged to have made the statements to which you refer. It would of course also be helpful to be able to see the European police reservist but he may be unwilling to give his name. If you could let me have further information, I will pass it on to the Commissioner of Police with a view to a complete investigation being made.

Yours sincerely,



Sir John Boynton  
Election Commissioner

LIST OF ZANU(PF) SUPPORTERS ALLEGED TO  
BE DETAINED IN THE MIDLANDS REGION

ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION (PATRIOTIC FRONT)  
MIDLANDS HEADQUARTERS,  
BOX 693,  
GWELO.  
28-02-80

MEMBERS OF ZANU(PF) HELD IN DETENTION IN THE MIDLANDS PROVINCE AS  
FROM JANUARY, 1980 UNTIL PRESENT

- |                           |                            |
|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Phineas Ngohlo         | 51. Caster Rambo           |
| 2. Lazarus                | 52. Phiso Tumba            |
| 3. Sonny Ndugwa           | 53. Beatrice Dongo         |
| 4. Rodes Ruzive           | 54. Beauty Mapingire       |
| 5. Emmanuel Biri          | 55. Evangelister Mgobogobo |
| 6. Simba Gotera           | 56. Glorinah Zvoburanga    |
| 7. Mrs. Kwekwani          | 57. Easter Rambo           |
| 8. Phillip Manenji Kumira | 58. Morrison Garwe         |
| 9. Jafias Mavuwa          | 59. Moses Kubana           |
| 10. Madeshe Mavuwa        | 60. Gift Marara            |
| 11. Stanley               | 61. Simba Chitsoro         |
| 12. Silingwani            | 62. Mugabe                 |
| 13. Simbarashe Silingwani | 63. Machazi                |
| 14. Daglous Mandinyenga   | 64. Boaz                   |
| 15. Johnson Majange       | 65. Luke Zondiwa           |
| 16. Kufirwa               | 66. Mrs. Matarise          |
| 17. Robert Tongafa        | 67. Cornelius Rugodo       |
| 18. Msindo                | 68. Rosa Gwakuka           |
| 19. Joshiah Mpofo         | 69. Elias Virimai          |
| 20. Paul Mutizwa          | 70. Mrs. Makanda           |
| 21. Edward Yotemu         | 71. Makeke Nhesengi        |
| 22. Ishmaal Muchendeti    | 72. Joshua Mungeni         |
| 23. Mishack               | 73. Kefieas Matovhera      |
| 24. Joni Nyati            | 74. Heleck Sithole         |
| 25. Rosewell              | 75. Tapiwa Mubake          |
| 26. Matthew Thom          | 76. Simon Mubake           |

- |     |                       |      |                    |
|-----|-----------------------|------|--------------------|
| 27. | Portia Mutigwe        | 77.  | Mary               |
| 28. | Nathaiel Banda        | 78.  | Paurina            |
| 29. | Green Mabhera         | 79.  | Nyoni              |
| 30. | Teckler Dube          | 80.  | Peter              |
| 31. | Emious Murambi        | 81.  | William            |
| 32. | Gladys Kwenda         | 82.  | Anna Dube          |
| 33. | Sipiwe Maumbe         | 83.  | Mrs. Machaona      |
| 34. | Dani Nyoni            | 84.  | Mrs. Dave Simaizai |
| 35. | Meluse Ngwenya        | 85.  | Berita             |
| 36. | Alois Mtodza          | 86.  | Mrs. Pasu          |
| 37. | Joseph Chitapa        | 87.  | Mabasa V. Chihozho |
| 38. | Tandi Dube            | 88.  | Simon Matambo      |
| 39. | Daisy Lunga           | 89.  | Amos Chikwaire     |
| 40. | Muriel Hamandishe     | 90.  | Goldberg Tendai    |
| 41. | Eustina               | 91.  | Soul Hwengwere     |
| 42. | Stanley Masupe        | 92.  | Ignitious          |
| 43. | Musa Mupinzana        | 93.  | Nicholas Ncube     |
| 44. | Mushoriwa             | 94.  | Richard Chirimboyi |
| 45. | Alexio Mabeure        | 95.  | Tronos Chasasa     |
| 46. | Precious Madzivanyika | 96.  | George Shambamuto  |
| 47. | Felix Manyanga        | 97.  | Nevy Masendeka     |
| 48. | Antony Mania          | 98.  | Laxson Dzabula     |
| 49. | Makiwa Tsuru          | 99.  | Tadios             |
| 50. | Ishmaal Mambudzi      | 100. | Nicholas Manunure  |

.../mt

"BRIEF" PREPARED BY MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Reference: A/540/2/

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  
P.O. Box 4240,  
Salisbury,  
Rhodesia.

12 February 1980

WEEKLY BACKGROUND BRIEFING 6/80The Election Campaign

This has been another week of widespread violence and political intimidation. With every day that passes the prospects of holding an election that any reasonable man could regard as free and fair grow dimmer.

In the wake of over 800 convictions in the courts around the country during the past seven weeks for acts of violent intimidation, the Governor has announced new measures he may use to curb this violence.

These measures allow Lord Soames to restrict political meetings, suspend election candidates from campaigning, disqualify parties from contesting a particular district, if violence and intimidation continues. Lord Soames also called upon all nine black parties contesting the election to give the public a clear undertaking that they dissociate themselves from political violence and intimidation.

The following figures, announced by a British spokesman, are significant. Of the 185 convictions for political intimidation in the last week - 104 involved ZANU(PF Mugabe) supporters, 62 UANC supporters, 17 PF(Nkomo) supporters.

The security force auxiliaries, which have been the target of repeated allegations of intimidation by a number of the parties, have been praised by the British administration. A British spokesman said all the complaints against the auxiliaries were being thoroughly investigated, but few had been found to have any substance. He added that ceasefire monitoring forces have been carrying out extensive checks on auxiliary detachments and had found that they were playing a valuable role in helping restore tribal facilities disrupted by the war.

So far the Governor has not taken the effective action so badly needed to bring about a drastic reduction in the level of intimidation. For reasons of political expediency he would appear to have ruled out a nationwide ban on Mr Robert Mugabe's party in spite of the fact that election supervisors are said to have provided proof that ZANU(PF) forces are waging campaigns of terror in five of the eight electoral districts. The five areas where massive intimidation by ZANU(PF) is occurring are Manicaland, Victoria, Matabeleland South, and Mashonaland East and Central.

..../Page 2

Victoria is reportedly the worst-hit area. UANC leader, Bishop Muzorewa, and PF leader, Joshua Nkomo, are said to have abandoned attempts at holding election rallies in that district.

In Manicaland ZANLA terrorists are ordering tribesmen to vote for Mr Mugabe - or be killed. They have also threatened tribesmen that if ZANU(PF) loses the election the war will erupt again.

After a frustrating election tour of Victoria province and the Eastern Highlands, Mr Nkomo told a press conference "the word intimidation is mild. People are being terrorised, it is terror". Mr Nkomo added "there is fear in the peoples eyes. Lord Soames must do something".

One interesting development during the past week has been the growing rift between Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo as a result of ZANU(PF) intimidation. ZANU(PF) have also been exploiting the fact that Mr Nkomo's more disciplined forces have remained in their assembly points, by moving their forces into areas vacated by them.

UNFP party workers are also being terrorised with their meetings in Matabeleland South having been cancelled because of massive intimidation. UNFP representative on the Election Council, Mr Pincus, told the Council that time had run out for "half measures" and the Governor should ban from the election "in its entirety any party that persists in violence and intimidation".

Addressing a National Affairs Association meeting in Salisbury the Minister of Justice, Mr Andersen, said the "Mugabe marxist menace" must be cut down to size if there was to be a fair result in the election. "The Governor has growled. But we want to see if the British bulldog has teeth and will bite", Mr Andersen said.

In reacting to this pressure from most political parties Lord Soames suspended a top ZANU(PF) official, Mr Enos Nkala, from taking any further part in the election proceedings. A spokesman for the Governor said Mr Nkala had committed acts in breach of the Lancaster House agreement such as stating publicly that the war would continue unless ZANU(PF) won the election.

Mr Nkala is a candidate for the Matabeleland South constituency. His suspension is hardly likely to bring to an end the countrywide violence and intimidation but may be interpreted as a warning shot from the Governor across Mr Mugabe's bows.

Mr Mugabe's reaction has been a bitter attack on the Governor, describing Lord Soames as the "chief violator" of the ceasefire Mr Mugabe said "we will not be intimidated by anybody, including Lord Soames". Addressing a rally in Fort Victoria he threatened to send his ZANLA forces back to war if his party was banned from contesting any of the electoral districts.

It is obvious to any objective observer that the political situation in the country can at best be described as "a dogs breakfast" and is likely to remain so even after the election. No single party is likely to emerge an overall winner and therefore an uneasy and possibly unstable coalition will in all probability emerge.

...../Page 3

If the current tide of terror and intimidation continues unchecked it is possible that Mugabe's ZANU(PF) will win + 40 seats, with PF(Nkomo) UANC (Muzorewa) and RF(Ian Smith) having + 20 each.

Without an overall majority Mugabe will need a coalition partner and the obvious choice would appear to be his old military ally Nkomo. However, this veteran of nationalist politics is unlikely to want to play second fiddle to Mugabe especially as he is no longer young and is unlikely to have another chance of becoming Premier. Therefore, a coalition of the three minority parties could be a possibility, provided it is led by Mr Nkomo. However such a coalition could cause massive defections from the ranks of the UANC to ZANU(PF) thus giving Mugabe the overall majority he requires.

The situation is further complicated by the surprise decision of the 64 ZANU(PF) dissidents to join Rev. Sithole's ZANU party. This development will undoubtedly improve the chances of Sithole's party in winning three or four seats - a small number which could yet prove vital in the formation of a coalition government. For example should the UANC win 28 seats an alliance with ZANU and the RF could achieve the requisite 51 seat majority.

The period immediately following the election will be one of political intrigue, tension and instability, when many unpredictable political permutations are possible. One thing however, seems certain and that is that the losers, whoever they may be, are unlikely to accept the verdict gracefully. Regrettably, therefore, the election may only be a prelude to civil war which, as in Angola, will decide the final winners.

#### FOREIGN RELATIONS

##### Smith-Botha Meeting

Leader of the Rhodesian Front, Mr Ian Smith, visited Cape Town, early in February for talks with South African Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha. The talks were described by a R.F. spokesman as being "friendly and highly successful".

It has not been disclosed what was discussed during Mr Smith's visit, but it is well known that the former Rhodesian Prime Minister is very concerned about the present internal situation in the country.

##### Lord Carrington and the UN Security Council

The British Foreign Secretary has described last week's UN Security Council criticism of the British administration in Rhodesia as "one sided and absurdly selective".

Speaking in the House of Lords, Lord Carrington said Britain was being lectured on how to run the election by countries that "would not know a free and fair election if they saw it".

Britain refused to take part in the Security Council debate on a resolution sponsored by African and Third World countries.

## The O.A.U. and Rhodesia

Some African Foreign Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa have accused Lord Soames of applying double standards in maintaining law and order in Rhodesia.

O.A.U. spokesman, Mr Peter Onu, said certain delegates had complained about British violations of the London peace agreement. Some had even asserted that Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo are under virtual house arrest in Salisbury. For good measure Tanzania also bitterly attacked Britain's handling of the ceasefire in Rhodesia and called upon all Commonwealth countries to protest.

In contrast Zaire and Malawi urged black Africa not to favour Mugabe and Nkomo in the forthcoming election and stressed that the choice of Government should be left to Zimbabweans without outside interference.

## SECURITY SITUATION - CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS AND INTIMIDATION

1. During the past week security forces have reported 62 contacts with terrorist groups; 54 contacts initiated by ZANLA, 7 by ZIPRA and 1 unknown. 26 ZANLA and 3 ZIPRA terrorists have been killed. Two members of the security forces were killed in action while 4 terrorist collaborators were also killed. 38 ZANLA and 17 ZIPRA terrorists, a number of whom admitted having recently left Assembly places, have been captured by security forces. Large quantities of arms and equipment have been captured during contacts. Numbers of large weapons caches have been located.

2. Intimidation has continued to be rife. ZANU(PF) and PF elements have been holding illegal meetings, warning people with death should they not vote for their parties. Police are continuing to prosecute intimidators. While most prosecutions are against ZANU(PF), a number of UANC and PF members are also to appear in court for political violence offences.

3. The past week's level of intimidation and ceasefire violations is causing grave concern among all Rhodesians. The number of contacts reported between the Security forces and ZANLA and ZIPRA terrorists has increased drastically over last week's levels. Every political party is expressing concern that the elections might not be adjudged free and fair because of increased intimidation which is inhibiting political activity.

While most acts of violence and intimidation can be attributed to ZANLA and ZANU(PF) elements, there have also been 5 major attacks against top ZANU(PF) officials, including two against Mr Mugabe himself.

4. The main reported incidents are listed below. (Hundreds of other more "minor" cases have come to the attention of the Police in the past week).

- The Salisbury homes of Mr Mugabe and one of his top ZANU(PF) officials were attacked by a hand grenade and RPG7 rockets, respectively. The latter official was seriously injured. Two men were arrested after the ineffectual attack on Mr Mugabe's home.

...../Page 5

- On 10 February, there was an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Mr Robert Mugabe, when remote controlled explosive devices placed on the road to Fort Victoria airport detonated. Only minor injuries were suffered by the occupants of a car travelling behind Mr Mugabe's convoy.
- A ZANU(PF) chairman in Chipinga and his wife, were killed and another woman seriously injured when 4 communist grenades were thrown into their Chipinga home.
- A ZANU(PF) official, his wife and infant child were injured when petrol bombs were thrown into their Salisbury home.
- A black Roman Catholic priest from Gokomere Mission and his companion were clubbed to death by ZANLA collaborators, a number of whom have been subsequently arrested.
- Three ZAPU officials were abducted by ZANLA terrorists in the Midlands after being told they were not allowed in the area. Two escaped but the third man, who was known to have been beaten and tortured, has not yet been found.
- In the eastern area, a woman was thrown into a fire after being accused of being a "sell-out". In the south west of the country a tribesman drowned after ZIPRA terrorists tied his hands and threw him into a dip tank.
- One black man was killed and 36 injured, 9 seriously, when a communist grenade was thrown into a Bulawayo beerhall.
- A communist grenade was lobbed into a Gwelo beerhall, injuring 38 people, 4 critically.
- A member of the security forces on leave was abducted by ZANLA terrorists in the south east of Rhodesia, beaten and "questioned" before a local ZANU(PF) committee. He managed to escape.
- A tribesman was axed to death after advertising a UANC meeting in a tribal trust land.
- A security force convoy, accompanying an Electoral Commissioner, was ambushed by ZANLA terrorists in the Buhera area. No one was injured, though vehicles were hit.

INFORMATION SECTION

DVMB/EARMS/VMS

SAMPLE FORM OF APPROVAL FOR "CLOSED" POLITICAL  
MEETING FOR PUBLIC SERVANTS

REF: D/36

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,  
P.O. BOX 8080,  
CAUSEWAY

Mr John Maphosa,

21st February, 1980.

C/O Patriotic Front,  
Hassamali Building,  
Lobengula Street, BULAWAYO.

Dear Sir,

"CLOSED" POLITICAL MEETING FOR PUBLIC SERVANTS

In reply to your communication of the 21st February 1980 I have to inform you that the Public Service Commission has no objection to your political party holding a "closed" meeting for members of the Public Service at the time, date and venue stated below:-

Time : 1800 hours - 2000 hours  
Date : 22 February, 1980 (Friday)  
Venue : Primary School Nyamandhlovu

The following conditions must be observed -

1. The meeting must be open to all public servants and not restricted to particular sections of the Public Service.
2. Only the organisers and public servants may be present at the meeting.
3. The press must be excluded.
4. The chairman of the meeting, who must be a public servant, must take all reasonable precautions to ensure that these conditions are adhered to, and he must issue a warning to those present at the meeting that no statement may be made to the Press relating to any matter discussed at the meeting. He must also inform those present that permission to hold the meeting has been granted by the Public Service Commission on the basis that only the organisers and public servants are present.

Any publicity you wish to give this "closed" meeting should be undertaken by your party either by an appropriate notice to the Government offices in the area, or by notice in the Press which should indicate clearly that it is a "closed" meeting for public servants only.

This permission is related only to the provisions of the Public Service (Officers)(Misconduct and Discharge) Regulations, 1979, regarding the participation of public servants in political matters. Any other requirements in law concerning the holding of meetings must be settled with the appropriate authorities.

This permission is also subject to your having obtained approval from the appropriate authority (in the case of Government land or buildings, the Secretary of the appropriate Ministry) for use of the venue described above.

Yours faithfully,

T. CULVERHOUSE-STEADMAN

for SECRETARY  
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION CIRCULAR

1. Issuing Authority : Public Service Commission  
PO Box 8080, Causeway
2. Circular Number : 107/2 Date of Issue: 21 November 1979
3. Index Heading : Discipline
4. Subject Heading : Participation in Political Matters
5. X/R : Nil
6. Cancellations : PSB 107/1 Issued 1964 and 20 November 1975

The purpose of this Circular is to ensure that all officers and employees are aware of the provisions of the Public Service (Officers) (Discharge and Misconduct) Regulations, 1979, and the Public Services (Conditions of Service for Employees) Regulations, 1971, in regard to participation by public servants in political matters. This Circular supersedes all previous circulars on the subject.

2. It is essential that the provisions of this Circular should be brought to the attention of all officers and employees when they are first appointed and that they be reminded of them periodically thereafter.

3. The First Schedule to the Public Service (Officers) (Discharge and Misconduct) Regulations, 1979, which also applies to all employees in terms of Amendment No. 13 to the Public Services (Conditions of Service for Employees) Regulations, 1971, defines the following as an act of misconduct -

"10.(1) He commits any of the following acts relating to politics -

- (a) becoming or being, after the date of his appointment, a member of, or holder of an office in a political party, organisation or movement or an association of persons holding like political views;
- (b) canvassing members of the public in support of or otherwise assisting a party, organisation, movement or association referred to in sub-paragraph (a);
- (c) displaying or wearing rosettes, favours, symbols, posters, placards or like articles of a political character;
- (d) putting questions, written or oral, at a political meeting;
- (e) expressing views of a controversial political nature or views likely to engender political controversy by way of speeches, broadcasting, letters to the press, publication of articles, leaflets or books or otherwise;
- (f) committing any other act or conducting himself in any manner whatsoever whereby he might reasonably be associated or identified with a party, organisation, movement or association referred to in sub-paragraph (a).

- (2) The provisions of sub-paragraph (1) shall not be construed as precluding an officer from -
  - (a) voting at a parliamentary or local authority election or at a referendum; or
  - (b) performing the duties of a returning officer, registering officer or like officer at a parliamentary or local authority election or at a referendum; or
  - (c) with the approval of the Commission, standing as a candidate for election as a member or participating in the administration of a local authority; or
  - (d) asking questions at a political meeting -
    - (i) which is held with the permission of the Commission; and
    - (ii) at which attendance is confined to persons in the employment of the State; or
  - (e) explaining Government policy in the course of his duties as an officer if, in so doing, he avoids the expression of any personal opinion in regard to such policy.

4. In explanation of paragraph 3(2)(c) above, the Urban Councils Act, 1973 contains the following provision -

"(3a) Where the Minister is satisfied that it is in the interests of the inhabitants of a particular council area that a person holding an office of profit under the government should be eligible for nomination as a candidate for and for election as a councillor, he may, by notice in writing, declare that the provisions of paragraph (f) of subsection (1) shall not apply in relation to that particular person if the Minister responsible for the department or Ministry in which that person is employed, acting with the approval of the Public Service Commission, has certified that any duties of that person as a councillor, should he be elected, would not conflict with his duties as an employee of the Government."

It should be noted, therefore, that the following procedures must be followed before an officer or an employee may stand as a candidate for election as councillor in terms of paragraph 3(2)(c) of this Circular -

- (i) he must apply to his head of ministry for permission;
- (ii) the approval of the Public Service Commission must be obtained by the head of ministry. It will be necessary for the head of ministry to inform the Commission whether or not he considers that, in the event of the officer or employee being elected as councillor, his duties as a councillor would conflict with his official Government duties;
- (iii) the approval of the Minister of Local Government and Housing must be obtained by the head of ministry approaching the Secretary for Local Government and Housing with a request for such approval, forwarding a copy of the Commission's approval.

5. In explanation of paragraph 3(2)(d) above, closed political meetings at which officers and employees may put questions must have the prior permission of the Public Service Commission, which will ensure that -

- (a) the request has been received from a bona fide political party;
- (b) the meeting is open to all public servants in the area and is not restricted to particular sections of the Public Service; and
- (c) the Chairman of the meeting is a public servant.

Permission is subject to the Chairman at the meeting -

- (a) informing the meeting that permission to hold the meeting has been obtained from the Public Service Commission;
- (b) taking all reasonable precautions that only the organisers and public servants are present;
- (c) ensuring that no member of the Press is present; and
- (d) issuing a warning that no statements may be made to the Press relating to matters discussed at the meeting.

The fact that permission has been granted for a closed political meeting does not exonerate a public servant from the provisions of the regulations in regard to the disclosure of information acquired in the course of official duties.

6. The onus rests with the individual public servant to ensure that he complies with the requirements of the regulations in any matter relating to participation in politics. Should there be any doubt, officers or employees should seek advice from their head of department and, if necessary, the latter may approach the Public Service Commission.

C. NEWMAN  
SECRETARY  
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

*Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat*

First Floor,  
36, Jameson Avenue,  
Salisbury.

Telephone: 793281/2.

18 February 1980

*My dear Governor,*

I am writing to share with you the Commonwealth Observer Group's concerns regarding the problem of repatriation of refugees. We view the matter from the standpoint of paragraph 19 of the Pre-independence arrangements of the Lancaster House Agreement which recognises that it is desirable that as many refugees as possible who wish to return should do so prior to the election, and that refugees, should be returned to their homes as soon as possible.

In this connection, we note from UNHCR that approximately 17,500 persons have to date been repatriated from Botswana, and that it is likely that the remainder in that country will be able to return to Rhodesia prior to the poll, if they so wish, and thereby will be able to exercise their franchise.

As far as Zambia is concerned, we understand that approximately 4,200 refugees have returned to date out of a possible maximum of 45,000. We have also been informed that 22,000 of this number will not, with the agreement of the Patriotic Front, return until after the election as many of them are of school age. We understand that 4,200 is close to the final figure that will have returned before the elections, and are concerned that UNHCR believes that this number could have been nearer to 14,000 had it not been for the fact that, by 13 February, 131 returning refugees were detained by the police under emergency powers. We are told some 40 of these still remain in detention, and that allegations of torture have been made. We note that these allegations are being investigated by the Governor's Police Adviser. It seems to us unreasonable that peacefully returning refugees should be held for such a long period after their return. Mr. Nkomo has personally expressed to us his acute sense of grievance on this score.

We are particularly concerned at the situation regarding the return of refugees from Mozambique. We are given to understand by UNHCR that to date approximately 7,300 refugees have been repatriated and that out of a possible 155,000, only 11,000 at most are likely to have returned by Sunday 24 February, which we are informed will be the last day permitted for repatriation before the poll takes place. Two factors arise. First, the fact that the repatriation from Botswana started on Monday 21 January, that from Mozambique (and Zambia) not until 4 February. We find it hard to understand the necessity for such a long delay. The second factor is that, according to our information, an arbitrary limit of only 400 men of military age to be screened daily has been set, which results in a maximum of 600 to 700 persons being able to return from Mozambique each day.

On enquiry from the UNHCR, we were informed that 1,000 per day could easily be handled, especially as the current maximum imposed by local officials was often reached early in the afternoon. Indeed, we learnt that on 17 February, 100 men were actually turned back at gunpoint, when they could have easily been accommodated, because the target of 400 men of military age had already been reached. It also appears that it would have been possible to establish more centres for returns from Mozambique, had the local administration been more accommodating.

It now seems that, rather than 60,000 to 70,000 returning to Rhodesia in time for the poll from Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia, the likely number will be closer to 30,000. Against a possible total of over 200,000, this represents only a token figure when taken against the words of the Lancaster House Agreement which stated that "it will be desirable that as many as possible should do so (return) in order to vote in the election". We would be interested to learn what action the British Government has taken to assist in the process, as was provided for in paragraph 19 of the Pre-Independence Arrangements.

In view of the above, and of the fact that the return of the refugees in adequate numbers was an important feature of the discussions at Lancaster House concerning the holding of free and fair elections, we would urge that urgent steps be taken to ensure that in the next few days a very much larger volume of refugees be allowed to return in order that they may participate in the elections. Alternatively, if it is not possible for the authorities to satisfy themselves sufficiently that those returning are not members of the Patriotic Front forces, would it be possible to establish a right of temporary return for the sole purpose of enabling more refugees to exercise their right to vote at polling stations which could be sited at the return border crossings? Obviously, it would still be for such refugees to satisfy the polling station supervisors that they were entitled to vote.

*Yours sincerely,*

*Rajeshwar Dayal*

Rajeshwar Dayal,  
CHAIRMAN (COG)

The Right Hon. Lord Soames, P.C.,  
G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., C.B.E.,  
The Governor of Southern Rhodesia

FROM THE GOVERNOR

23 February 1980

*My dear Austenarr,*

Thank you for your letter of 18 February concerning the repatriation of refugees.

The repatriation of refugees from Botswana was completed on 15 February. 17,500 refugees have returned under UNHCR auspices. In addition some 2,000 refugees crossed the border before the repatriation exercise began. I understand that 40 families have elected to remain at Dukwe Refugee Camp in Botswana for the time being. There are a number of ordinary Rhodesian residents in Botswana, some of whom have sought UNHCR help to return to Rhodesia in time for the elections.

With the agreement of the UNHCR a start was made with refugees from Botswana, because they presented the least problems: a relatively small number, in good health, most of whom have already been documented by the UNHCR. There was also a suitable site for a reception centre near the border which could be quickly brought into use. It was much more difficult to identify suitable sites near Victoria Falls and Umtali.

The repatriation of refugees from Zambia has been complicated by the inclusion of a number of military personnel among the refugees. This is in direct contravention of the

/Ceasefire Agreement,

Ceasefire Agreement, which makes it quite clear that military personnel may not enter the country during this period. Of the 130 detained by the Police 91 have been identified as military personnel and returned to Zambia, and 35 have been released and sent on to their homes. 4 are still being held and will be returned to Zambia or released as soon as possible.

All allegations of ill-treatment of refugees are being investigated by my Police Adviser, and so far there is no evidence to substantiate them. A unit of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force has been established at the Gwai Reception Centre in addition to those units already at Wankie and Victoria Falls. Assistant Police Advisers continue to pay regular visits to all three places and to supervise all stages of the repatriation process. Mr Nkomo has accepted these assurances and we had hoped that the flow of refugees from Zambia would resume during the few days remaining before the elections. In fact only about 120 refugees have returned from Zambia during the past week. As you probably know Police and home affairs personnel running the reception centres will be needed for election duties. There will therefore be no repatriation of refugees between 25 February and 3 March.

In spite of the problems, 4,200 refugees have returned from Zambia. According to UNHCR, it is now clear that little more than 5,000 refugees were ready to return from Zambia before the elections, not 14,000 as originally thought.

I note your concern about the return of refugees from Mozambique. In fact repatriation from Mozambique has proceeded quite smoothly so far. However a very high proportion of those returning have been young men of military age, and there is evidence that some of these young men, having passed through the reception centre near Umtali, have joined up with ZANLA groups operating outside the assembly places. In view

/of the

of the difficult security situation in the eastern areas of the country this is a disturbing development. I have therefore requested the Mozambique Government to restrict the number of young men of military age returning at this stage and to send a higher proportion of women and children. The Mozambicans have not so far complied with this request, which is why some refugees had to be turned back at the border last week.

You ask why more centres have not been established for refugees returning from Mozambique. Originally 3 crossing points were planned: at Nyamapanda, Umtali and Mt Selinda. The Mozambique authorities themselves ruled out the use of Mt Selinda, because of difficulties of access on their side of the border. It has not been possible to use the Nyamapanda crossing because of the security situation in the north eastern area of the country. It would also be extremely difficult to find the necessary resources to set up and man another reception centre.

It is not unfortunately practical to follow up your suggestion that a right of temporary return should be given to refugees still outside the country for the sole purpose of enabling them to vote in the elections. The Lancaster House Agreement made it clear that only a start could be made in enabling refugees to return home before the elections. Completion of this enormous task will have to be carried out by the independence government. At the meeting in London on 4 January at which the Governments of Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia were represented, it was agreed that refugees could only return as fast as reception facilities allowed. There was never any question of setting a figure of 60 or 70 thousand to be returned before the elections.

In fact well over 30,000 refugees will have returned by the end of this month. I think you will agree that, for a country which has only recently emerged from seven years of civil war,

/and where

and where resources are necessarily limited, this is a considerable achievement.

Yours sincerely  
Christopher James

Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal

# Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat

First Floor,  
36, Jameson Avenue,  
Salisbury.  
Telephone: 793281/2.

23 February 1980

*My dear Sir Antony,*

Further to my letter to the Governor of 18 February, I am writing to let you know that yesterday I personally visited the refugee reception points on the Mozambique border near Umtali, and the Toronto refugee camp.

The refugee camp was running very smoothly, and we found no suggestion of any problems. However, we were disturbed by the fact that a total of 484 refugees only was accepted by the Rhodesian authorities yesterday, and 293 refugees were refused entrance. Moreover, it was clear that the screening of the refugees would have been completed by about 2.00 p.m. at the latest. Our inquiries on the spot suggested that neither the screening process nor the available accommodation was a constraint on the acceptance of about 300 additional refugees yesterday. When we raised the question of accepting more refugees with Mr. Brian Sharp of the Department of Social Affairs, he expressed his inability to do so as instructions received from Salisbury empowered only the police to decide upon the number of refugees to be admitted on a particular day.

My colleagues and I would urge you most strongly to consider issuing instructions so that on the remaining two days, and subsequently, the daily number of refugees admitted can be stepped up, as it appears that the present rate of progress is in no way constrained by the available physical resources.

I should be most grateful if you would inform me of whatever action the Governor decides to take on this matter.

*Yours sincerely,*

*Rajeshwar Dayal*

R. Dayal  
Chairman

Sir Antony Duff, GCMG, CVO, DSO, DSC,  
The Deputy Governor of Southern Rhodesia

26 February 1980

Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal,  
Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat,  
1st Floor,  
36 Jameson Avenue,  
Salisbury.

*My dear Ambassador,*

Thank you for your letter of 23 February concerning the repatriation of refugees from Mozambique.

As the Governor explained in his letter of 23 February, we were obliged to ask the Mozambique Government to restrict the number of young men of military age returning to Rhodesia during the period before the elections. This limit, provisionally set at 400 a day, was determined by the security situation in the eastern area of the country, not the rate of screening at the Toronto Reception Centre. We did not of course wish to hold up the flow of refugees as a whole and we therefore asked the Mozambique authorities and the UNHCR to arrange for the balance of the daily intake to be made up of women and children. As you may know, a similar arrangement worked well with refutes returning from Botswana.

Unfortunately, on several days, including 22 February, the Mozambicans were unable to comply with this arrangement and large groups consisting only of young men of military age arrived at the border. On such occasions between 400 and 500 men were admitted, but the Police were obliged to turn back the remainder. On days when a balanced proportion of men, women and children were sent, a high daily intake was achieved. On 20 February, for example, over 1,000 refugees were brought in.

In spite of the problems, almost 11,000 refugees have now returned from Mozambique. Although this represents a relatively small proportion of the total number of refugees waiting to return I am sure you will agree that it is a useful start.

*Yours sincerely,  
Antony Duff*

Antony Duff

# ANNEX 16

## DETAILS OF RETURN OF REFUGEES FROM ZAMBIA, BOTSWANA AND MOZAMBIQUE

	<u>BOTSWANA</u>	<u>MOZAMBIQUE</u>	<u>ZAMBIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
21 January	1050			
22				
23	1040 (2090)			
24	1020 (3110)			
25				
26	1960 (5070)			
27				
28				
29				
30	700 (5770)			
31	800 (6570)			
1 February	750 (7320)			
2	785 (8105)			
3	750 (8855)			
4	808 (9663)	526	687	10877
5	704 (10367)	736 (1262)	589 (1276)	12905
6	695 (11062)	748 (2010)	530 (1806)	14878
7	834 (11896)	675 (2685)	563 (2369)	16950
8	752 (12648)	497 (3182)	-	18199
9	782 (13430)	508 (3690)	536 (2905)	20025
10	757 (14187)	-	523 (3428)	21305
11	490 (14677)	635 (4325)	537 (3965) $\sqrt{16}^2$	22967
12	765 (15442)	585 (4910)	201 (4166)	24518
13	779 (16221)	571 (5481)	-	25868
14	753 (16974)	588 (6069)	-	27209
15	769 (17743)	697 (6766)	75 (4241) $\sqrt{35}^2$	28750
16	25 (18146) <sup>3</sup>	-	-	29153 <sup>3</sup>
17	-	539 (7305)	-	29692
18	-	104 (7409)	-	$\sqrt{40}^2$ 29796
19	-	410 (7819)	-	30206
20	52 (18198)	1050 (8869)	-	31308
21	-	611 (9480)	7 (4248)	31926
22	1 (18199)	484 (9964)	44 (4292)	32455
23	4 (18203) <sup>1</sup>	448 (10412)	-	32907
24	-	523 (10935)	-	33450

Notes: 1. plus 1705 own way  
 2. returned Zambia by police  
 3. includes 378 small children not in daily totals

A NOTE ON ADULT BLACK ILLITERACY IN RHODESIA  
IN RELATION TO THE 1980 ELECTION

by

Roger Riddell

Catholic Institute for International  
Relations, London

Salisbury  
8th February, 1980

SUMMARY:

For the forthcoming elections in Rhodesia, voters are required to mark their own ballot papers for the party of their choice. Those unable to read and write will be unable to carry out this operation on their own, while those with only a limited ability in reading and writing risk spoiling their ballot paper or marking their papers incorrectly.

An estimate of the number of black adults unable to mark their ballot papers without assistance can be obtained by analysing the level of illiteracy among the voting population. While there is no universally agreed definition of illiteracy, studies carried out in Rhodesia suggest that a certain number of years of schooling are necessary for the achievement of literacy and that a certain proportion of people reaching the defined level will revert again to illiteracy after leaving school. From these studies, a minimum and maximum level of adult black illiteracy can be calculated.

This Note estimates that 37% of all potential adult black voters in the 1980 elections have never been to school. With an estimated 2,883,000 voters, this would account for 1,067,000 voters; of these, 582,000 are women and 485,000 are men.

Taking account of low levels of schooling achieved by the black adult population, and drop-outs in the early years of primary school, it is estimated that a minimum of 44% and a maximum of 67% of adult black voters are functionally illiterate. This would give a minimum of 1,268,000 and a maximum of 1,932,000 voters who would be considered functionally illiterate. With higher levels of illiteracy for women, it is estimated that a minimum of 695,000 women and 573,000 men and a maximum of 1,043,000 women and 883,000 men are functionally illiterate.

Illiteracy rates vary not only between men and women but also between the different electoral districts. For example, levels of illiteracy for potential male voters vary from a minimum of 35% in Midlands and Matabeleland North to a maximum of 62% in Victoria, while, for potential female voters, illiteracy rates vary from a minimum of 43% in Manicaland to a maximum of 77% in Victoria. Estimates of the total numbers of illiterate potential voters vary from a minimum of 87,000 in Matabeleland South to a maximum of 278,000 in Victoria.

### INTRODUCTION

There are no accurate up-to-date figures on the number of illiterate black adults (people 18 years and over) in Rhodesia. Estimates can be made, however, using the Census of Population (conducted 11 years ago) and annual school enrolments published by the Central Statistical Office and the Ministry of Education. These figures give an estimate of the present level of adult black illiteracy and are probably accurate within a range of three or four percentage points.

An immediate problem in assessing literacy levels is the definition of literacy and illiteracy. While it can be assumed that all those adults who have received no schooling or adult literacy training are illiterate, it is also widely recognised, in Rhodesia as elsewhere, both that a certain number of years' schooling is necessary before literacy is achieved and also that people regress from the level of literacy achieved in school. Regression to illiteracy is related to a variety of factors such as the quality of schooling received, the length of time elapsed since leaving school and both the home and work environment.

Recent studies on literacy and illiteracy in Rhodesia have attempted to address these problems by suggesting that a certain number of years at school is necessary for the achievement of literacy and that a certain proportion of people completing the required number of years revert to illiteracy after leaving school. Thorpe (1964) suggests that anyone with more than five years at school can be assumed to be functionally literate and that a certain number of people with less than five years at school can be considered illiterate. Smith (1971) suggests that 50% of those with only five years' schooling will in practice be functionally

illiterate. Finally, Dean (1978) suggests that 25% of those with five years of schooling will relapse back to illiteracy. For Dean, an illiterate is defined as "a person who cannot read and write in his home language and cannot do arithmetic and tell the time".

These studies suggest that the number of adult illiterates range from those with no schooling plus 25% of those who have received five years of primary schooling to those with no schooling plus all those who have received only five years of primary schooling.

In this Note, no value-judgements are made concerning the number of years' schooling necessary to achieve literacy, although it will be assumed, in common with all Rhodesian studies, that illiteracy rates take some account of school drop-outs.

Four separate sets of figures are given:

Firstly, all those adults who never went to school; secondly, all adults never going to school plus 25% of those completing five years of primary education; thirdly, all adults never going to school plus 50% of those completing five years of primary education; and finally all those adults who never went to school plus all those who only completed five years of primary schooling.

#### THE NUMBER OF ADULT BLACK ILLITERATES

Tables 1 and 2 give the proportion of adult black illiterates in present-day Rhodesia and the estimated number of adult black illiterates based on population data supplied to the Election Commissioner by the Central Statistical Office, using the four different assumptions discussed above. Assuming that all those who never went to school and at least 25% of those with five years of schooling or less are functionally illiterate, Table 1 shows that adult black illiteracy ranges from 44% to 67% of the adult black population, the rate for adult males ranging from 39% to 60% and the rate for women ranging from 49% to 74%. Using the Central Statistical Office's estimates of the total black voting population, the numbers of functionally illiterate people range from 1,268,000 to 1,932,000. The number of illiterate men range from a low of 573,000 to a high of 883,000 and the number of illiterate women range from a low of 695,000 to a high of 1,043,000.

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE OF ADULT BLACK ILLITERATES, 1980 ELECTIONS

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>MALES</u>	<u>FEMALES</u>
1. Those who never attended school	37	33	41
2. Those who never attended school, plus 25% of those with 5 yrs schooling or less.	44	39	49
3. Those who never attended school plus 50% of those with 5 yrs schooling or less.	51	46	56
4. Those who never attended school plus all those with 5 yrs schooling or less.	67	60	74

SOURCE: SEE NOTE 1.

TABLE 2. ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF ILLITERATE BLACK ADULTS,

	<u>1980 ELECTION</u>		
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>MALES</u>	<u>FEMALES</u>
1. Those who never attended school	1,067,000	485,000	582,000
2. Those who never attended school, plus 25% of those with 5 yrs school- ing or less	1,268,000	573,000	695,000
3. Those who never attended school plus 50% of those with 5 yrs schooling or less.	1,470,000	677,000	793,000
4. Those who never attended school plus all those with 5 yrs school- ing or less	<u>1,932,000</u>	<u>883,000</u>	<u>1,043,000</u>
TOTAL NUMBER OF BLACK VOTERS	2,883,000	1,471,880	1,411,120

SOURCE: SEE NOTE 2.

ADULT BLACK ILLITERACY BY PROVINCE

Table 3 shows the distribution of the black electorate by sex and province. It has not been possible to provide a breakdown for the provinces of Mashonaland.

TABLE 3. NUMBERS OF BLACK MALE AND FEMALE VOTERS BY PROVINCE,

	FEMALE VOTERS		1980 ELECTION MALE VOTERS		TOTAL VOTERS
	NO.	%	NO.	%	NO.
	Manicaland	217,360	52	200,640	48
Mashonaland	490,500	45	599,500	55	1,090,000
Matabeleland North	165,600	46	194,400	54	360,000
Matabeleland South	107,800	55	88,200	45	196,000
Midlands	218,920	52	202,080	48	421,000
Victoria	210,940	53	187,060	47	398,000
TOTAL ELECTORATE	1,411,120	49	1,471,900	51	2,883,000

SOURCE: SEE NOTE 3.

Tables 4 and 5 give the proportions and numbers of adult female voters by province. It can be seen that illiteracy rates vary considerably between the various provinces, with Manicaland having the lowest illiteracy rates and Victoria having the highest. The figures are not directly comparable to the figures in the last section because they are based on the definition of an adult as 17 years and over.

TABLE 4. PERCENTAGE OF ILLITERATE BLACK FEMALES BY PROVINCE,

	1980 ELECTION			
	Never attended school	Never attended school plus 25% of those with 5 yrs or less	Never attended school plus 50% of those with 5 yrs or less	Never attended school plus all those with 5 yrs or less
Manicaland	34	43	52	72
Mashonaland	46	52	58	72
Matabeleland North	41	48	55	68
Matabeleland South	39	48	55	69
Midlands	37	47	55	72
Victoria	41	51	60	77

SOURCE: SEE NOTE 4.

TABLE 5. NUMBERS OF ILLITERATE BLACK FEMALES BY PROVINCE, 1980

	Never attended school	Never attended school plus 25% of those with 5 yrs or less	Never attended school plus 50% of those with 5 yrs or less	<u>ELECTION</u> Never attended school plus all those with 5 yrs or less
Manicaland	73,000	93,000	113,000	156,000
Mashonaland	225,000	255,000	284,000	353,000
Matabeleland North	68,000	79,000	91,000	113,000
Matabeleland South	42,000	52,000	59,000	74,000
Midlands	81,000	103,000	120,000	158,000
Victoria	86,000	108,000	126,000	162,000

SOURCE: SEE NOTE 5.

Tables 6 and 7 give the proportions and numbers of adult male voters by province. It can be seen that the illiteracy rate also varies markedly between the various provinces, with Manicaland having the lowest numbers who have not attended school and Matabeleland South and Victoria having the highest illiteracy rates on the maximum assumptions.

TABLE 6. PERCENTAGE OF ILLITERATE BLACK MALES BY PROVINCE, 1980

	Never attended school	Never attended school plus 25% of those with 5 yrs or less	Never attended school plus 50% of those with 5 yrs or less	<u>ELECTION</u> Never attended school plus all those with 5 yrs or less
Manicaland	29	37	44	59
Mashonaland	37	43	39	60
Matabeleland North	28	35	41	54
Matabeleland South	33	40	47	62
Midlands	28	35	43	58
Victoria	30	38	47	62

SOURCE: SEE NOTE 6.

TABLE 7. NUMBERS OF ILLITERATE BLACK MALES BY PROVINCE, 1980

	Never attended school	Never attended school plus 25% of those with 5 yrs or less	Never attended school plus 50% of those with 5 yrs or less	<u>ELECTION</u> Never attended school plus all those with 5 yrs or less
Manicaland	58,000	74,000	88,000	118,000
Mashonaland	221,000	258,000	249,000	360,000
Matabeleland North	54,000	68,000	80,000	105,000
Matabeleland South	29,000	35,000	41,000	55,000
Midlands	57,000	71,000	87,000	117,000
Victoria	56,000	71,000	88,000	116,000

SOURCE: SEE NOTE 7

Table 8 brings together the numbers of illiterate males and females by province to give the estimated total number of adult black illiterates by province.

TABLE 8. NUMBERS OF ILLITERATE BLACK ADULTS BY PROVINCE, 1980

	Never attended school	Never attended school plus 25% of those with 5 yrs or less	Never attended school plus 50% of those with 5 yrs or less	<u>ELECTION</u> Never attended school plus all those with 5 yrs or less
Manicaland	131,000	167,000	201,000	274,000
Mashonaland	446,000	513,000	578,000	713,000
Matabeleland North	122,000	147,000	171,000	218,000
Matabeleland South	71,000	87,000	100,000	129,000
Midlands	138,000	174,000	207,000	275,000
Victoria	142,000	179,000	214,000	278,000

SOURCE: TABLES 5 AND 6, ABOVE.

## NOTES

1. Calculated from and up-dated from 1969 data on adult illiteracy from Census of Population (1969), Tables 25, 26, 27 and 28 and Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics, January 1979. No account is taken of mortality, the numbers of adults trained in literacy or those recorded in the Census who failed to state their level of education. The latter figure was 66,000 for 1969 and the exclusion of this figure would tend to exaggerate literacy, on the assumption that more non-literate people would have failed to answer this question. The number of adults taught literacy between 1969 and 1976 was only 15,000 and so makes a negligible difference to the percentages. Although the exclusion of mortality factors might exaggerate illiteracy somewhat, this is counterbalanced to some extent by the growing absolute numbers of illiterates among the black population. On this last point see Smith (1971) and (1978).
2. Calculated from Table 1, above, and "Allocation of Common Roll Seats", Zimbabwe Rhodesia Press Statement, 46/80/JM.
3. Relative proportions of males and females by province are calculated from the Census of Population (1969). It is assumed that sex ratios have not changed since the Census.
4. Calculated from 1969 data from the Census of Population (1969), Table 28 and up-dated with proportions from Table 1, above.
5. Calculated from Table 4, above and Table 3, above.
6. Calculated from 1969 data from the Census of Population (1969), Table 27, and up-dated with proportions from Table 1, above.
7. Calculated from Tables 3 and 6, above.

## REFERENCES

- H. Dean (1978), Adult Literacy Programme, Project 2.09, Whitsun Foundation, Salisbury.
- G. Smith (1971), "Communication: Literacy and Development", paper presented to the Second Rhodesian Science Congress, Umtali.
- (1978), "The promotion of literacy in Rhodesia", paper presented to the Human Science Research Council: Literacy Conference, Rand Afrikaans University, South Africa.
- G. Thorpe (1964), Survey Report on Adult Literacy and Christian Literature in Southern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia Christian Conference.

## ADDENDUM

### PROFICIENCY IN ENGLISH

As estimates of levels of literacy and illiteracy used in the paper 'A note on adult black illiteracy in Rhodesia in relation to the 1980 election', and particularly the lowest estimate made by Dean (1978), refer to functional literacy in one's own home language, it can be assumed that the rates of functional illiteracy in English will be even higher than the figures in the paper suggest. Thus the proportion of black adults unable to read and write in English are higher than the range of 44% to 67% of the adult black population who are estimated to be functionally illiterate.

It is difficult to assess whether those who are functionally illiterate in English are nonetheless able to understand the advertisements placed in the press in English by the Election Directorate. While only a limited vocabulary is used, some rather technical words and concepts unfamiliar to many are used, such as "polling station" and "the right to vote". While it might initially be thought that comprehension would be assisted by the pictures used in the advertisements, these pictures do not tend to assist explanation of the words used. This point is well illustrated by reference to a Shona advertisement inserted by the Election Directorate in Moto and on the same page as a Shona cartoon which does assist comprehension of the written word. In short, one has to understand what is written in the "balloons" to understand the meaning conveyed. (See attached sheets).

It is far more difficult to estimate the numbers of black adults able to converse in English, although it would seem correct to assume that a far greater number of the adult black population can speak and understand spoken English than can read and write it. One can also assume that the proportion of those unable to converse in English is higher in those areas where English is rarely spoken.

The two main geographical areas where English is rarely spoken are the Tribal Trust Lands and among the black population living in white farming areas. On white farms, conversation between white employer and black employee usually takes place in 'chilapalapa' - a bastardised mixture of English, Afrikaans and a number of southern African languages. As the majority of black children on white farms do not attend school beyond the first two years of primary school, it seems likely that the vast majority of the approximately 500,000 black adults living in the white farming

areas are not able to converse in English. It also seems likely that a significant proportion of black adults living in the Tribal Trust lands cannot converse in English; if one assumed that these made up 25% of the functionally illiterate, then the proportion of the adult population of the Tribal Trust Lands unable to converse in English would be between 11% and 17%. Many commentators would put this figure much higher.

In the main towns of the country, one could assume that the vast majority of the men could converse in English, but that a lower proportion of town women would be able to do so. One urban group which would have a lower rate of ability to converse in English is the group of domestic workers who tend to have very little education. In 1978, these numbered 120,000 people, although perhaps 16% of these would have been under the age of 18 years.



**MUKUSARUDZA KWEKUZVITONGA KUZERE  
KWEMUGORE RA 1980**

## **Vakadzi vanogona kuvhota**



**SHANDISA VHOTI YAKO  
KUWANA ZIMBABWE**

EC 15715

Placed on behalf of the Election Directorate

# MUSHEREKETI

By courtesy of MONI. Limbe



1. Somukomana wamasipotsi Mushereketi anofarira kugara aine mari nguva dzose.




2. Rimwe zuva akanzi azosara achitandadza vana vaBaba naMai Chigure ivo vachienda kumusangano manheru. Zvikanzi naMushereketi endai zvenyu vana ndinavo.



3. Vachangoenda Mushereketi akati vana ngavapinde mumachira agovaudza ngano. Ivo ndokuti mumachira kwati vateerera. "Kare kwaive neshumba yaiuya pane umwe musha."



4. Vana vakatanga kubvunda pavakangonzwa nezveshumba. "Shumba iyi yaiuya kuzitora vana vabereki vavo vasipo. Yakatora umwe umwe kusvika vaperavose."



5. Mushereketi akabva azvibudira mumba muya oenda kunoridza radio. Vana kungoti wakotsira otanga kurota shumba ichimutora. Shasha iri muradio vana vairidza mhema mumba mavo.



6. Vabereki vachidzoka vakawana vana vatotsvetera manzwi nokuchema. Umwe noumwe achiti ona shumba pasi pemubhedha wake yanga ichirehwa naMushereketi.

LETTERS FROM HEADMASTERS IN  
MIDLAND AREA

Majada School  
Box 130  
Gutu

25-1-80

The Supervisor,  
Chikwanda Council

Dear Sir,

The school could have started well if it had not been set back by the soldiers who are booming their guns within the vicinity of the school. Guns are occasionally fired in the kopjes near the school and children are now afraid of coming to school. If this continues I will not be surprised to see the school vacated, not only by the children, but also by the teachers.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) C.S. Mushuku, H/M.

Bawa School,  
Zimuto Council,  
P.B. 9183,  
Fort Victoria.

4th February 1980

Dear Sir,

We hereby write to report an incident of assault by the Security force auxiliaries on Monday the 4th of February 1980.

The auxiliaries arrived at Bawa School in Zimuto area at about 8.00 am. on Monday the 4th of February 1980. We were getting on morning parade at about 8.00 am. in the morning. They ordered the teachers to leave parade and they ordered the children to get into their classrooms. They threatened to beat the teachers in front (before) the school children.

They then demanded that teachers say what had happened or else the teachers would be beaten. Since it was a Monday morning, we had been away for the weekend. We did not know what it was that had happened that they wanted us to tell them. We did not know what they were asking for and still we don't know.

In their process of inquiring they took one of the teachers aside Mr. N. Chinyombe - Code No. 224241 and demanded that he tell them or they would beat him. He did not know a thing so we had nothing to tell. One of the auxiliaries holding a drum stick in his hand beat Mr. N. Chinyombe on the left shoulder twice. Another auxiliary came to Mr. N. Chinyombe's help and told him to go to his classroom.

Another auxiliary got into the Grade seven - Grade six classroom and brought out three school children, Frank Muzenda, Gloria Mapuranga and Kundai Magampani. These children were ordered to tell what had happened. When they failed to tell what had happened, they were beaten with a picture rail which broke to pieces in the process. After this, the auxiliaries drove away at about 9.00 am.

Such an incident makes us feel insecure in our work because we have no way of resisting armed men who come and treat us as they feel. We therefore ask that these armed auxiliaries be properly disciplined so as to prevent such unruly behaviour to innocent civil servants.

Thank you,

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) Nehemiah Chinyombe

(for Bawa School Staff)

Compiled at 1030 hours.

Nemarundwi School,  
P.B. 9183,  
Fort Victoria.

4th February 1980

The Secretary,  
Zimuto Council,  
P.B. 9183,  
Fort Victoria.

PER REPORT ON NEMARUNDWI SCHOOL (1994)

This is a report from the teaching staff on the activities of auxiliary forces at Nemarundwi School: On the night of 3rd February 1980 at 2400 hours a group of about thirty armed auxiliary forces raided every teacher's house, breaking window panes and doors thereby hacking teachers out. The Headmaster of the school was brutally beaten with the butts of guns, sticks and iron bars. Thereafter they drove a group of villagers into the school premises and forced them to attend their meeting. More beatings continued throughout their meeting. Finally the villagers were cruelly driven away from the school premises to an unknown destination at 0130 hrs.

The following morning, on 4th February, one Grade 7 boy (Shepherd Masocha) was prevented from going to school by the same forces despite he being on the way to school. Up to the time of compiling this report, the school boy is still away. His whereabouts are not known. This atmosphere is breaking the tone of the school and the moral of the staff, parents and pupils.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) D. Chipato

HEAD.

P.S. 6/02/80

The following steps have been taken:

- (i) This has been reported to the Police and I (D. Chipato) Head, examined by the Doctor.
- (ii) The Supervisor has been informed.
- (iii) \$65.00 were stolen from my house by the same forces on that same night of the 3/01/80 and this too has been reported to the Police.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) D. Chipato

HEAD  
6/02/80

Gono School,  
PO Box 28,  
Fort Victoria.

8 February 1980

The Supervisor,  
Gutu South,  
P/Bag 9192,  
Fort Victoria.

Dear Sir,

I am hereby notifying you that on the 25 January 1980 the so called (Pfumo ra vanhu) came via my school on their way to Guni School. This happened when we were at Gutu for the Headmasters' meeting. I then later on found out that the movement of the (Pfumo ra vanhu) does perturb my children from coming to school daily.

Furthermore they came via my home on their way from Chikomo township where they spent the whole day drinking. As there was beer at the neighbour's home, people were happy singing and dancing. Without the knowledge of what was taking place they started firing at people indiscriminately and a lot of damage happened. My furniture was completely destroyed, utensils stolen, clothes stolen. As a result of this firing school children from that part of area are not coming to school. The (Pfumo ra vanhu) is stationed between the three schools and as such parents are finding it difficult to send children to any of these schools. The presence of these men affects our daily attendance.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) H.R. Moyo. H/M

Gono School,  
P.O. Box 28  
Fort Victoria

11 February 1980

The Supervisor,  
Gutu South,  
P/Bag 9192.

Dear Supervisor,

I am hereby writing to you asking whether it is proper for the auxiliaries to display their posters within the school area as well as in the classrooms. This act took place on the abovementioned date at.

Four of the auxiliaries arrived at school at 9.0'clock am. Before they left the auxiliaries told the staff that if they come back after some time and miss the posters the teachers themselves will get it thick.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) H.R. Moyo, H/M.

HEADMASTER  
GONO H.P. SCHOOL  
MUKARO MISSION  
GUTU

Shambayaonda School  
P.B. 9154  
Fort Victoria.

12.2.80

The Secretary,  
Victoria Management,  
Fort Victoria.

Sir,

I am notifying you of the arrest of two school pupils and a teacher by the auxiliary force.

Pupils: (1) Mephibosit (Grade 5) 8-2-80  
(2) Pinga Mavhaire (Grade 6) 9-2-80  
Teacher: Amasa Ndofirepi - 10-2-80

I am notifying for it may lead to the disturbance of the school.

(Signed) T.J. Tapanzure,  
Headmaster.

## STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNOR TO SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES

1. There should be no confusion or misunderstanding about what is expected of all members of the security force auxiliaries.
2. They have two important tasks to perform. First, they have an important role in restoring and maintaining security throughout the country by assisting the police in the maintenance of law and order. This is an indispensable task.
3. Secondly, they must help the civil authorities to restore normal services to areas where they have been disrupted by the war. This work is equally important.
4. Under the aegis of the security forces of this country, they are required to behave as a disciplined force. They have been given clear instructions that as members of the security forces they can play no part in political activities. They must avoid anything which could be construed as activity on behalf of or against any political party.
5. The security force auxiliaries are required to maintain the standards which have been set for them. Their commanders have made clear to them that anyone who fails to do so will face immediate disciplinary proceedings.

Issued 12 February 1980.

"T.V. EYE" PROGRAMME - HOW FREE, HOW FAIR?

Tx: 7.2.80

Editor: Mike Townson  
Producer: Linda McDougall  
P.A.: Carole Brown  
Reporter: Julian Manyon

7TH FEBRUARY 1980

RADIO MESSAGE IN AIRCRAFT

JULIAN MANYON:

Rhodesia at three hundred miles an hour, a hundred and fifty feet above the ground. An RAF Hercules skims the tree tops, the supply missions have been a triumph for the RAF. But the question now is whether the rest of the tiny monitoring force can do as well. Can they ensure the free and fair elections that the radio promises people of Zimbabwe?

DRUMS

1980 is the year of the new Zimbabwe. A new Constitution has been agreed in London and all Parties have agreed to a cease-fire. The people of Zimbabwe should vote again for a new black majority government. Remember your vote is secret. Vote for the Party of your choice. Zimbabwe needs your vote.

THEME MUSIC

LORD SOAMES:

It is not going to be easy. I believe a very heavy responsibility gentlemen, if I may say so, rests upon your shoulders in the advice that you as a Commission give to me on how we should best deal with any outbreaks or any incidents.

JULIAN MANYON:

Perhaps Lord Soames never spoke a truer word than when he told the Cease-Fire Commission that their job would be difficult. After a deceptively peaceful start, this week's terrorist attack on a civilian bus, has shown just how fragile the cease-fire is, and just what bitter hatreds still lie beneath the surface. With three weeks to go, Lord Soames now faces his stiffest test. Can he prevent this British backed election from being destroyed by intimidation and fear?

We did not visit the areas influenced by Joshua Nkomo and his ZIPRA army, and where the cease-fire arrangements seem to be working reasonably well. Instead, we concentrated on the much larger Shona tribal area, where Robert Mugabe's ZANU (PF) and Bishop Abel Muzorewa's UANC are fighting a savage electoral battle.

#### SHOUTING AND WHISTLING

JULIAN MANYON:

Outwardly, Bishop Muzorewa is conducting a Western style campaign, arriving at a string of remote air strips in a plane loaned by a South African millionaire. As well as South African money, Muzorewa carries with him the hopes of most whites and many moderate blacks who see the tiny campaigner as their last champion against the terrorist armies of the Patriotic Front.

#### AFRICAN SPEAKING

JULIAN MANYON:

This almost desperate desire to see the Bishop win leads to some interesting variants on the democratic process. For instance, this apparently ordinary meeting in a farming community called the Burma Valley, where the Bishop addresses about two thousand African workers, virtually the entire electorate. Watching from the sidelines, a local farmer's wife, who told me why many of the Africans have come.

FARMER'S WIFE:

They are all our labourers in the Burma Valley for all the farmers.

JULIAN MANYON:

Right, so you've brought them down here in fact have you?

FARMER'S WIFE:

Yes we brought them in tractors and trucks and trailers and everything we've got to transport them to here.

JULIAN MANYON:

Why did you do that?

FARMER'S WIFE:

Well because we think we see a future in, if Bishop comes in again, that's what we want, and we want them to listen to him, and that's why we did it.

JULIAN MANYON:

So you're obviously encouraging all the labourers who work for you to vote for the Bishop .....

FARMER'S WIFE:

Yes.

JULIAN MANYON: ..... and come to these meetings.

FARMER'S WIFE: Oh yes that's right, yes.

JULIAN MANYON: He's, as far as the whites are concerned he's a bit of a last hope really isn't he?

FARMER'S WIFE: Yes he is definitely our last hope, otherwise I can see no future for us.

JULIAN MANYON: But the grim truth that Muzorewa's supporters already have to face is that the Bishop's campaign is flagging. As his plane, called the Free Enterprise, puts down at another strip, the passengers know that their whistle stop tour is turning out to be an air borne flop.

#### AIRCRAFT NOISE

JULIAN MANYON: Like a string of other destinations, Melsetta Football Ground was supposed to be the scene of a Muzorewa rally. But though the Party started on time, the guests were very few. Only about fifty supporters turned up instead of the expected five hundred. With his campaign hat telling its own sad story, the disappointed Bishop was plainly reluctant to even get out of his Land Rover. In fact he waited for nearly an hour while more supporters trickled in.

#### SINGING

JULIAN MANYON: To many it's confirmation that the Bishop faces an uphill battle in this campaign, that many Africans were suspicious of his internal settlement with Ian Smith, and that many more were disappointed by the slow pace of change in his six months in power.

#### SINGING

JULIAN MANYON: With the crowd at around a hundred the Bishop does his best. He describes his opponents as thugs and murderers, men who have to rely on terrorism to get what they cannot win by democratic means.

#### BISHOP SPEAKING IN NATIVE TONGUE

JULIAN MANYON: Afterwards, he claims that teams of young terrorists called Mujibas are systematically trying to wreck his election campaign.

BISHOP SPEAKING IN NATIVE TONGUE

BISHOP MUZOREWA:

Every meeting I've been since I left Salisbury on Friday, addressing at least four meetings a day, every meeting I go to we find that there have been Mujibas or terrorists going on before I come, house to house telling them not to come to the meeting or else they'll be killed. Every meeting. And so this has made our campaigning very difficult.

JULIAN MANYON:

The people are actually afraid, do you think, to turn out for you, to show their support for you?

BISHOP MUZOREWA:

That is correct, that is correct. In fact those who have dared to come must be very bold because they're frightened of their lives if they go to these meetings.

TRUCK NOISE

JULIAN MANYON:

But in this African election intimidation is a game that everyone denounces but everyone still plays. Deep in a Tribal Trust Land a unit of Bishop Muzorewa's auxiliaries starts a combat patrol. Described by some as the Bishop's private army, they're known officially as the Spear of the People, and they're attached to the Rhodesian security forces under white command. The operation they're about to conduct was not authorised by the Governor Lord Soames, and is clearly outside the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement. But with no monitoring force observers within twenty miles, the Spears of the People can effectively ignore the cease-fire. Leading this operation, a British born mercenary who helped us film without the knowledge of his Rhodesian commanders.

MERCENARY:

Do a full sweep.

AFRICAN:

Yeah

MERCENARY:

Okay.

AFRICAN:

Sure.

MERCENARY:

You do the old rear view mirror with that thing, alright?

AFRICAN:

Yeah.

MERCENARY:

You just watch my back.

AFRICAN: Yeah, sure.

JULIAN MANYON: Since the cease-fire, the thirty thousand auxiliaries in Rhodesia have been under orders to show the flag in the African villages. The target today is a hostile area known to have sheltered ZANLA terrorists. The objective - to try and root out those guerrillas who have stayed behind in defiance of the Lancaster House Agreement.

DOOR BEING PUSHED DOWN

JULIAN MANYON: Many of the people have fled into the bush, but every hut has to be treated as if an armed man were waiting inside. The soldiers discover tracks, tracks left by guerrillas or as the soldiers call them, gooks.

AFRICAN: These tracks look very fresh and it's likely the gooks are very ..... got our tracks so I've got to track them as soon as possible.

MERCENARY: We've got to go back through that kraal.

AFRICAN: Yes through that kraal and then check what is taking.

MERCENARY: We'll pay a lot of attention and we'll get out of here quite quickly when we get back to that track, I don't fancy getting a rocket in the truck.

JULIAN MANYON: While the men take up combat positions, the unit leaders try to get information from a villager.

AFRICAN: He's afraid.

MERCENARY: Ask him why is he afraid?

AFRICAN SPEAKING

MERCENARY: Look Maxwell tell him we know he has collaborator activity in this area, especially in this kraal, so if he's got something to say let him say it, otherwise we're not going to come back and help him if the terrorists show up.

AFRICAN SPEAKING

JULIAN MANYON: The villagers say nothing but as the troops leave they round up two more people who immediately become suspects.

AFRICAN SPEAKING

JULIAN MANYON:

They're men of military age, dressed in civilian clothes with identity papers that don't quite match their stories.

MERCENARY:

Pick 'em up, let's have a look.

AFRICAN SPEAKING

MERCENARY:

Jacket off .....

JULIAN MANYON:

Within minutes the Muzorewa soldiers are convinced that they've caught a couple of terrorists in disguise. Even in a cease-fire it doesn't take much to get arrested in the Rhodesian bush.

MERCENARY:

Who's got the handcuffs?

AFRICAN:

I've got them.

MERCENARY:

Okay. Put the cuffs on, let's not hang around eh, I don't want their mates to show up.

AFRICAN SPEAKING

MERCENARY:

Ask them if they hid their guns well.

AFRICAN SPEAKING

MERCENARY:

Make it very clear to them that if they try and break the gap, if they say one word they're going to get that whole belt in them, alright, and you do it as well.

AFRICAN SPEAKING

MERCENARY:

And you, do you understand?

AFRICAN SPEAKING

MERCENARY:

Come on you two lovelies, go for a walk.

AFRICAN SPEAKING

MERCENARY:

We had an idea it was a feeding place, it was a likely spot for these buggers to hold up, and that's just what they were doing when we run into them. Anyway, they've stashed their weapons, they've runned around like this, they've picked up papers which states they come from Katuna and they don't even know their head man's name, which is something everybody knows, you know, they know it before they know their own father's name.

JULIAN MANYON:

Apparently the two men later confessed to being terrorists. Under the cease-fire they should have been sent to an assembly point. Instead, after we left, one was sent for interrogation, the other was shot while trying to escape.

MERCENARY:

There's nobody here to see what we're doing, the internal affairs which used to sort of be a civvy police unit, they've pulled out, they're frightened they'll get red and shot to bits. So we've got a free hand. And the army never comes down and looks at us too closely, they just make sure we operate correctly and in a military fashion that's it.

JULIAN MANYON:

And so how is this translated into votes for Muzorewa, what kind of pressures would be brought to bear on the people around here?

MERCENARY:

Old Abel's got himself something which any politician in UK would give his right arm for, someone to go out and get the people to vote, you know, vote for us, you know, don't forget if you don't vote for us your village might get hit by lightning or your kids fall down the well, you know. Yeah, they vote.

JULIAN MANYON:

And that's really what these people are supposed to do, is it, I mean they are supposed to pressure the population into voting for Muzorewa?

MERCENARY:

Oh no we don't pressure them, we just say, look you can either vote for them or take the risk of, you know, the lightning babies down the well and all that kind of thing. You know these houses catch fire real easy.

SHOUTING

JULIAN MANYON:

Like most of Bishop Muzorewa's auxiliaries, the unit we filmed is based in an African village, a village where they get a hero's welcome at the end of the patrol.

SHOUTING

JULIAN MANYON:

There are more than thirty thousand of these men based in villages up and down the country. The Bishop's supporters hope that their physical control will help to deliver the votes.

What kind of support for Muzorewa do you think there is in this area for example?

MERCENARY:

Well being as we've got a lot of auxiliaries there's a lot of support, you know, they haven't got much choice, the locals.

JULIAN MANYON:

So what has been the effect of the war on the ordinary African people around here?

MERCENARY:

One of total intimidation, they just don't know which side to turn to, so, you know, with that in mind they'll look to anybody who offers to protect them, as long as that person will, you know, protect them from violence, from pillage and all that which goes with it, they're not worried who it is they vote for, they will just, they will give their absolute unreserved support to any Party which just, you know, keeps violence off their backs, they're sick of it, they really are sick of this war.

JULIAN MANYON:

So you're really saying then that the mass of votes are going to be dictated by that rather than by feelings of support for Mugabe of the PF or Muzorewa?

MERCENARY:

Oh no they're not particularly loyal towards Muzorewa, in fact the Africans were expecting, you know, some kind of instant social change when they brought Muzorewa in, they all expected new cars and, you know, two hundred percent pay raises within the next, you know, few days; they didn't get that, he lost a lot of support then.

JULIAN MANYON:

And it's up to your units here to try and hang on to what support he's got?

MERCENARY:

Oh we just build it up, we're not worried whether we've got support or not as long as they go in that polling booth and they put an X in the right square, and that's it.

MUSIC

JULIAN MANYON:

In many areas the Bishop is going to need every vote he can get. For if one fact has emerged clearly in this campaign, it's that his main opponent, Robert Mugabe, is riding a tidal wave of support. It's support above all from the younger Africans who have identified with the struggle against white rule and see Mugabe as its most potent symbol. For many the simple fact that the whites hate him above all other black leaders makes him a kind of Messiah.

MUSIC

JULIAN MANYON:

The rally which welcomed the ZANU leader back to Salisbury literally changed the face of the election. Until this day Mugabe had been the most anonymous of the Nationalist leaders, no one really certain how much support he commanded. As it turned out, his rally was the biggest that Salisbury had ever seen.

ROBERT MUGABE:

I felt extremely delighted, overwhelmed by the whole event, it was really fantastic. I had not expected it. I knew our people supported us, I knew they supported the struggle, but I didn't appreciate the extent to which they would go in welcoming me back, it was really fantastic. Before the elections, now that we have achieved peace, I think we must remove this pressure of the war upon the people, and ensure that the people will be free to exercise their vote and that they will do it really voluntarily without any pressures being exerted on them.

JULIAN MANYON:

But out in the villages where Mugabe's movement is still based, the claim that he is willing to relax the political control that his soldiers have imposed rings a little false.

AFRICANS CHANTING

JULIAN MANYON:

Ostensibly this is one of the ZANU (PF) candidates addressing an election rally. In fact he knows that he can already count on every single vote, because this village has long been a base for Mugabe's terrorist war. These people have lived with ZANLA guerrillas around them and among them, and not surprisingly their view of Bishop Muzorewa is harsh.

AFRICAN: Muzorewa? Of course yes, we voted for him, but what happened after that, there has been no change, there's no change until today.

CLAPPING AND SHOUTING

JULIAN MANYON: What? The people here in this village actually voted for Bishop Muzorewa last time did they?

AFRICAN: Of course, yes, by force, by gun point.

JULIAN MANYON: What did you hope though that Bishop Muzorewa would do for you people here, when you voted for him, what did you hope would happen?

AFRICAN: Well when Muzorewa's the Prime Minister all this six months time gone, Muzorewa, we see so many bloodshed under Muzorewa's government, so that's what we don't want, we want a free government, we don't want bloodshed in our country.

JULIAN MANYON: So what you're saying is that you want the war to end?

AFRICAN: Yes.

JULIAN MANYON: The fighting to stop?

AFRICAN: Yes.

JULIAN MANYON: But there are a lot of people in this country who still believe that Bishop Muzorewa can win the election, do you think he can?

AFRICAN: Never.

JULIAN MANYON: What happens if he does, what happens if somehow he does win?

AFRICAN: War goes on.

JULIAN MANYON: Why is that, why are you so bitter against the Bishop now?

AFRICAN: Now, he has cheated us.

AFRICAN TALKING

AFRICAN: He has cheated us enough, now we want to play the other side of the record now.

LAUGHING

JULIAN MANYON:

While the older villagers spoke to us the younger men held back. Several of them, we were told privately, were ZANLA guerrillas who in violation of the Lancaster House Agreement have not reported to their assembly points. Instead, they've received orders to hide their weapons and remain among the population to make sure that all goes well. At the end of the meeting they drifted off into the bush. Father Stephen Matewa is the village priest. In the last three years he like the other villagers has had to make his own accommodation with the ZANLA guerrillas - the only way was to help them.

FATHER:

If I reveal the truth I have taken in two guerrillas, shot seriously, into hospitals, of course I had to tell lies, that they were my sons, you know. We have, my wife is a nurse, we have treated people, we have stolen, I think this is correct, we have stolen medicines which we claimed, which we said we wanted to keep the people who are suffering around here, people whom we keep here, the children I keep here, to give the guerrillas.

JULIAN MANYON:

But you know that the Salisbury regime has always said, who ever was in power in Salisbury, that the guerrillas, the freedom fighters as you call them, are in fact terrorists who keep their hold over the people here through fear.

FATHER:

That is what they say, but that is not quite true here. Yes, you see, when you have a gun, there is a bit of fear behind it, like a father, when you have your son obeying you, or respecting you, there is a bit of fear behind it. So with these young men because they had guns, there was a little bit of fear, but this fear is not reflected by people, they should be hating them, but they still like them, because the cause for which they are fighting is a genuine cause. The method may be wrong, but the cause is perfectly legitimate.

JULIAN MANYON:

So you're really saying that the majority of the people in this area are involved in the ZANU struggle in fact?

FATHER:

All of them without exception.

JULIAN MANYON: Without exception?

FATHER: Without exception. Anybody who is an exception is not living here.

JULIAN MANYON: Could he live here if he wanted to, or would it be impossible?

FATHER: It would be impossible, because he would be forced, this is what you would call intimidation.

JULIAN MANYON: The guerrilla soldier by his very nature is forced at times to exert pressure upon the civilian population isn't he, because he himself is at times .....

ROBERT MUGABE: Well there are bound to be instances, but these are instances where certain pressures are exerted so that there is conformity, so that actually the enemy does not take advantage of the situation. It's a war you see when it's being fought, and certain rules must be applied. If the enemy's attacking a certain area and it's necessary that the population be pressurised into taking a definite defensive position, well it's in their interests and they have just to do that. But this was not the rule it was more the exception than the rule.

JULIAN MANYON: Do you accept responsibility yourself, does your Party accept responsibility for any incident involving intimidation, any incident involving fear among the population?

ROBERT MUGABE: We have not had any incident whatsoever reported to us concerning intimidation, there may be one or two incidents relating to contact with the security forces, but in those circumstances the security forces should not have been deployed at all, it's contrary to the agreement that they are just now on deployment. And our people naturally get worried that they're being encircled by the forces, and they've a right to defend themselves. And a right to defend the masses too in those circumstances.

JULIAN MANYON: But in spite of the denials and evasions of political leaders, the realities of their terrorist war remain.

This week's rocket attack on a bus carrying Muzorewa's supporters, was a grim reminder of how thousands of

Africans have died since the war began.

For the British and Commonwealth monitoring forces, it was a harsh warning of how close their fragile cease-fire arrangements can come to break down. One of the terrorists killed himself accidentally during the attack, and evidence found on the body and put on display by the Rhodesian police indicated that the murderers may have come straight from a guerrilla assembly point called Echo, an area monitored by Australian troops.

POLICEMAN:

An Australian box of matches which you may like to examine, has a kangaroo and the crown on it, and is of the type used in ration packs by members of the Australian monitoring forces at assembly place Echo.

RADIO MESSAGE IN AIRCRAFT

JULIAN MANYON:

Assembly point Echo lies in a remote valley near the Mozambique border. It's a place deliberately chosen, it seems, to keep the guerrillas as far from the population as possible.

AFRICANS CHANTING

JULIAN MANYON:

On the ground a political commissar called Comrade Bowaz, who according to some Rhodesians ordered the attack on the Muzorewa bus.

When we filmed, just before the bus attack, he had about a thousand men under his command. Since then, the Rhodesian claim, groups of these guerrillas have left the assembly point to commit terrorist acts among the population. Comrade Bowaz however, rejected all suggestions that his men would do anything unlawful to try and influence the election.

COMRADE BOWAZ:

We come from the people, and we fight for the people, we are their sons and daughters in the bush, those who are going to vote are our fathers and mothers, sisters and brothers, so I think we will win.

GUERRILLAS PUFFING!

JULIAN MANYON:

But already when we were there it was clear that Echo was a cease-fire flash point. Every day while the ZANLA guerrillas train and drill they hear of new operations

carried out by the Muzorewa auxiliaries. The reports anger them and their stay at the assembly point has done nothing to make them forget the purpose of their struggle.

What experiences have you had in the struggle yourself?

COMRADE BOWAZ:

A bitter experience, it's quite bitter, because the time I left home, I left the village burning, I don't know at present whether my parents are existing or are dead. This is, you know, you can see the bitterness in me, and the desire for revenge.

JULIAN MANYON:

What kind of revenge do you mean though Comrade Bowaz?

COMRADE BOWAZ:

The revenge I mean is to overthrow the enemy, the Smith regime and all those, you know, he took to be his shields.

JULIAN MANYON:

Who did he take to be his shields?

COMRADE BOWAZ:

Muzorewa.

CHANTING

JULIAN MANYON:

When Lord Carrington decided to try and hold an election in a land full of armed men, he was taking a brave gamble. As an attempt to let the people decide their fate without reference to the bully-boys with guns, it was perhaps unique in history. But with three weeks to go the realities of this African war are closing in, and the question is whether the British government has the power or the inclination to do anything effective about them. Perhaps it was not entirely coincidence that when we asked for an interview with the Governor Lord Soames, he replied that he was too busy to see us.

CHANTING

THEME MUSIC

END

EXAMPLES OF UNATTRIBUTED  
ANTI-MARXIST LITERATURE

# MARXISM SOCIALISM




Those who are supported by Communist Russia claim they will give jobs to everybody. But in reality they will rob you of your chosen job and force you to work for the State — at the lowest wage because that is all the State can afford. Under them, the state will control your type of employment and the place where you work, if the State can find jobs for everyone, which has not happened in Angola and Mozambique.

Self employment is impossible under Socialism. The State controls prices of the goods and crops you produce. The State controls all commerce and industry. You cannot own your business. You cannot sell your goods to make money for yourself.

This form of Socialism is a trick! Don't be forced to work for the State. Choose your own work and enjoy your freedom.

# TRUE FREEDOM



The true freedom of a democratic government means the worker is paid a fair wage for his work. He can choose the place where he works. Free enterprise is encouraged and a man can save his money by working hard and own his own possessions. He can start his own business and save money to buy the things his family wants. Hard work and ability are rewarded and commerce and industry will help produce a prosperous country with wealth for all.

True freedom means work for all and a fair wage for every worker.


# MARXISM SOCIALISM



Those who are supported by Communist Russia claim they will give you all the things you want. But they are evil because the State will own all the things that are yours. Your land . . . your cattle . . . your home . . . even your children will belong to the State. The State will give you only what it says you need — you will have only the poorest things in life . . . and your neighbour will have only the same.

This form of Socialism is a trick. This form of Socialism will rob you of your own property.

# TRUE FREEDOM




The true freedom of a democratic government means you will have your own home and your own cattle.

Your children will be free to choose their own jobs and their own education.

All the things you own now will remain yours to do with exactly as you wish.

True freedom lets you work and save for the things you want.

# MARXISM SOCIALISM



Those who are supported by Communist Russia claim they will give everyone free education. But the truth is that they will destroy your children. Under their rule, there is total control over what your children will be taught at school. They will be forced to learn Marxist-Socialist politics.

There will be total control over the choice of job for every child.

They must work where the State decides. They cannot work for themselves.

They cannot choose their own job.

They cannot choose a career which suits their abilities and interests, and they cannot study to be experts in jobs of their own choice.

This form of Socialism is a trick! This form of Socialism will destroy your children.

# TRUE FREEDOM



With the true freedom of a democratic government freely chosen by the people, your children will benefit because they will have freedom of choice in education, to study the subjects they are interested in, and do well at.

They will be free to choose the type of training and the type of job they want.

They will be free to work at the career of their choice. To work for themselves or to choose a career that is useful and rewarding.

True freedom lets your children study the things they like most.

# MARXISM SOCIALISM



Those who are supported by Communist Russia claim they can end the war. But they have split their forces because of their selfish greed. They will split the country in the same way. If either is elected, the other will continue the war and bring further ruin to our country. Socialism is a trick! Socialism will continue the war— not bring peace.

# TRUE FREEDOM




Only a freely elected, truly democratic government recognized by the free world can bring an end to the war. Prosperity will come only when Zimbabwe joins the free world community and offers no shelter for the enemies of the people and their foreign masters.

The good things in life can only come when all people are united under one leader and there are no factions fighting for their own greedy ambitions.

True freedom and the end of the war will come only from a free Government.

# MARXISM SOCIALISM



Those who are supported by Communist Russia claim they will give houses to everybody. But they cannot keep such wild promises because they don't have the money to pay for this. Under them, there is no private ownership of homes. The state decides where you will live and whether you will have a home or not.

This form of Socialism is a trick. No government in the world will give you a home for nothing. Somebody must pay.

# TRUE FREEDOM



A truly democratic government will give everyone the opportunity to earn their own living and buy their own home.

There will be homes for everyone and the home of your own choice to suit your needs and income. There will be private ownership of all homes and land. The home of your choice you can keep for all time. Nobody can take it away from you. You have freedom of choice where you wish to live. By working and saving money, you will be able to buy the home of your choice wherever you wish to live.

True freedom lets you choose the home that suits your needs and your income.

ANNEX 22

CORRESPONDENCE AND POLICE REPORT  
CONCERNING DISTRIBUTION OF FORGED  
ISSUE OF MOTO

*Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat*

First Floor,  
36, Jameson Avenue,  
Salisbury.  
Telephone: 793281/2.

23 February 1980

*My dear Lord Soames,*

I am writing to draw your attention to the appearance of a pirate edition of "MOTO" which has appeared bearing today's date (although misprinted on the front page as 32 February). This unauthorised edition of Moto is, in fact, an amended version of the genuine issue of 16 February. Most of the material of 16 February is repeated, with the exception of the front page, and a small section of page 2.

The front page, a photocopy of which is attached, purports to be a profile of Robert Mugabe, and incorporates a "Psychological analysis of the Profile" suggesting paranoid schizophrenia, and that he is mentally ill, having unreasoned hatred and suspicions.

Apart from all else, this copy was provided to us by a member of the police, who found it last night in a large pile in a police post in one of Salisbury's African townships. He had the clear impression that some at least of the police posts may be involved in distributing this literature. I thought this should be brought to your notice without delay.

*Yours sincerely,*

*Rajeshwar Dayal*

R. Dayal.  
Chairman.

The Rt. Hon. Lord Soames, PC, GCMG, GCVO, CBE,  
The Governor of Rhodesia.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE

P.O. BOX 368

SALISBURY

FROM THE PRIVATE  
SECRETARY

23 February 1980

Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal  
Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat  
First Floor  
36 Jameson Avenue  
Salisbury

*Dear Ambassador,*

Thank you for your letter of today's date to the Governor. The Governor was grateful to you for bringing the pirate edition of "MOTO" to his attention. A copy of the unauthorised edition and your letter has been passed to the Commissioner of Police for investigation.

I will write to you again as soon as I have the police report.

*Yours sincerely,*  
*J Buckley*

J Buckley

*See  
K Dayal  
25/2/80*

FROM THE PRIVATE  
SECRETARY

GOVERNMENT HOUSE  
P.O. BOX 368  
SALISBURY  
27 February 1980

Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal  
Chairman  
Commonwealth Observer Group  
First Floor  
36 Jameson Avenue  
SALISBURY

*Dear Ambassador,*

... Thank you for your letter of 23  
February about the pirate edition of the  
MOTO newspaper. The Governor has asked  
me to send you the attached copy of the Police  
Report which was sent to him by the Police  
Commissioner.

*Yours sincerely,*  
*J Buckley*

J Buckley

## POLICE REPORT

MOTO NEWSPAPER : PIRATE EDITION DATED 23rd FEBRUARY, 1980

1. Unreferenced letter dated the 23rd February, 1980, to Lord Soames from the Chairman of the Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat is relevant.
2. Checks were carried out of all South District Police Stations and Posts and the Police Stations of Dzivaresekwa and Mabvuku for copies of the pirate edition of Moto.
3. Only two copies of this newspaper were located on Police Stations as follows:
  - a) One copy found in Harare Charge Office. No one laid claim to it and no one knew how it had got there. Questioning of the details present elicited the information that an African Male in civilian clothing, thought to be a policeman but not confirmed, had had about six copies of this newspaper and had handed them out at the Harare Police Station Gate. Occurred about 6.30pm on Friday the 22/2/80.
  - b) One copy found at Stodart Charge Office in the possession of 24053 Constable Msawu. He advises that at approximately 4.30pm on the 23/2/80 he was carrying out cycle checks outside the station when he had occasion to stop an African Male who had two copies of the newspaper. This African had given him a copy. Constable Msawu had not read the paper and was not aware that there was anything amiss.
4. Both the above copies taken possession of.
5. During enquiries in the Suburban area a check was made at Strathaven Service Station where a bundle of these papers were located. The Bag Sergeant advised that on 23/2/80 he noticed the bundle just after the delivery of the Herald had been made. He was under the impression, though not certain, that they had been delivered by the Herald.
6. Unconfirmed information was received that in the very early hours of the morning of the 23/2/80 a European Male wearing a face mask and driving a vanette was seen to drop off a bundle of these newspapers at a Harare African hotel.
7. Information also received that when Herald newspapers were dropped off at Harare Police Station on morning of 23/2/80 a bundle of Moto newspapers were also located. Once again it was thought, but not confirmed, that they had been delivered along with the Herald.
8. Enquiries with the Herald indicates that they are aware of the existence of these papers (a story appears in the Sunday Mail dated the 24/2/80) but that they have no knowledge of how or by whom the newspapers were delivered.
9. Press and Liaison are apparently aware of the existence of these papers and are investigating the matter.

10. No bundles of these newspapers were located at any police station.
11. None of the Officers Commanding Districts were aware of the existence of these newspapers.
12. There is no evidence whatsoever that Police are involved in any way in distributing these newspapers.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'N.K. Macaulay', written in a cursive style.

(N.K. Macaulay) Superintendent,  
SALISBURY CENTRAL DISTRICT.

FORM OF STATEMENT BY PARTY LEADERS ESCHEWING THE USE OF VIOLENCE

1. In signing the report of the Constitutional Conference held at Lancaster House in London from September to December 1979, the delegations participating in the Conference solemnly undertook to campaign peacefully and without intimidation and to renounce the use of force for political ends.

2. I, ....., leader of the ..... party participating in the elections and represented on the Election Council hereby renew my party's commitment to campaign peacefully and without intimidation. As a party we call upon all persons who support us to desist from any activities designed to influence voting by threats of force; and to desist also from interference with the ability of other parties to campaign freely, to hold meetings and to put their case to the electorate.

3. As leader of the party I assure the citizens of this country that the ballot is secret and that voters should vote without fear for the party of their choice.

Signed:

Date:

**SOUTHERN RHODESIA**  
**The Elections (Prevention of Disruptive Activities)**  
**Ordinance 1980**

(Ordinance No. 7 of 1980)

*Soames*

Governor

5th February, 1980

ENACTED BY THE GOVERNOR

1. (1) This Ordinance may be cited as the Elections (Prevention of Disruptive Activities) Ordinance 1980 and shall be construed as one with the Electoral Ordinances 1979.

Citation and  
construction.

(2) Section 1 (3) of the Elections (Procedure) (No. 2) Ordinance 1980 is repealed.

(3) This Ordinance, the Electoral Ordinances 1979, the Elections (Procedure) Ordinance 1980 and the Elections (Procedure) (No. 2) Ordinance 1980 may be cited together as the Electoral Ordinances 1979 and 1980.

(4) In this Ordinance—

- (a) “disruptive activities” means any activities incompatible with the holding of free and fair elections and includes serious breaches of the cease-fire agreement, the intimidation of voters and other serious breaches of the Lancaster House agreement;
- (b) “the Lancaster House agreement” means the agreement embodied in the Report of the Constitutional Conference held at Lancaster House, London, September to December 1979, which was signed at Lancaster House on the 21st December 1979;
- (c) “the cease-fire agreement” means the agreement on arrangements for a cease-fire that constituted Annex E to the afore-said Report and that was also signed at Lancaster House on the 21st December, 1979;
- (d) “public meeting” has the meaning assigned to it by section 2 of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act [Chapter 65].

(5) Section 175 (13A) of the Act (as inserted by section 22 (5) of the Elections (Procedure) Ordinance 1979) shall be deleted and the following definition shall instead be inserted at the appropriate place, in alphabetical order, in section 3 (1) of the Act—

““administrative district” means one of the districts into which Southern Rhodesia is for the time being divided under section 2 (1) of the General Administrative Act [Chapter 85];”.

2. (1) If the Governor is satisfied that in any electoral district or administrative district disruptive activities have been persistently committed by the supporters of a political party that has been

Restrictions on  
meetings.

registered under section 175 of the Act as a party contesting the elections in that electoral district or, as the case may be, in the electoral district of which that administrative district forms part, he may, by instrument in writing under his hand (hereinafter referred to as a "restriction of meetings order"), which shall be notified in the *Gazette*, impose such prohibitions or restrictions on the holding, in that electoral or administrative district, of public meetings by that political party, being any one or more of the prohibitions and restrictions provided or by subsection (3), as are specified in the instrument.

(2) A restriction of meetings order shall, without prejudice to its amendment or revocation, be in force until immediately before the day after the last polling day in the elections or for such shorter period as may be specified therein.

(3) A restriction of meetings order that is made in respect of any political party may—

- (a) prohibit the holding of any public meeting by that party in the whole, or such part as may be specified therein, of the electoral or administrative district concerned; or
- (b) restrict the holding of any such meeting to such place or time, or both such place and time, as may be specified therein; or
- (c) prohibit the holding of any such meeting at such place or time, or both such place and time, as may be specified therein; or
- (d) restrict the persons who may address or attend any such meeting.

(4) Any public meeting which is convoked or organized by any person, whether or not he is a member of, or a candidate for, the party in question, for or on behalf of or in support of a political party shall be deemed for the purposes of this section, but without prejudice to the liability of that person under subsection (5), to be so convoked or organized by that party.

(5) Any public meeting which takes place in contravention of any prohibition or restriction imposed by a restriction of meetings order shall, for the purposes of any provision of law for the time being in force relating to unlawful gatherings, be deemed to be a meeting at which persons are conducting themselves in such a manner that a breach of the peace is likely to occur or public disorder to be occasioned; and any person who convokes or organizes such a meeting or who disregards any such restriction with respect to his own participation in such a meeting shall be guilty of an offence and any such offence shall be deemed to be an illegal practice for the purposes of section 128 of the Act.

Suspension from  
campaigning.

3. (1) If the Governor is satisfied that any person (whether or not he is himself a member of, or a candidate for, the party concerned) has, on behalf of or in support of any party that has been registered under section 175 of the Act as a party contesting the elections, committed, or has encouraged or assisted other persons to commit, acts that are in breach of the Lancaster House agreement, he may, by instrument in writing under his hand (hereinafter referred to as a "suspending order"), which shall be notified in the *Gazette*, declare that person to be suspended from campaigning in the elections.

(2) A suspending order shall, without prejudice to its amendment or revocation, be in force until immediately before the day after the last polling day in the elections or for such shorter period as may be specified therein.

(a) A person in respect of whom a suspending order is in force shall not, unless authorized by the Governor by instrument in writing—

- (a) convoke or organize (or join with others in convoking or organizing) or address or attend any public meeting; or
- (b) make any radio or television broadcast; or
- (c) publish or disseminate any document (including any letter or article for publication in a newspaper), or any pictorial or symbolic representation, which is intended for circulation or display to members of the public or of any class of the public, if its purpose is to influence the casting of votes in the election; or
- (d) canvass voters in connexion with the elections.

(4) Any person, being a person in respect of whom a suspending order is in force, who does any act which he is prohibited from doing by subsection (3) shall be guilty of an offence and any such offence shall be deemed to be an illegal practice for the purposes of section 128 of the Act.

4. (1) If the Governor is satisfied that—

- (a) in any administrative district disruptive activities have been persistently committed by the supporters of a political party that has been registered under section 175 of the Act as a party contesting the elections in the electoral district of which that administrative district forms part; and
- (b) those activities have been committed with the approval, consent or prior knowledge of the leadership of that party in that administrative district; and
- (c) those activities have been sufficiently serious to affect the ability of other persons in that administrative district to take part freely and fairly, whether as a voter, a candidate or otherwise, in the elections;

Disqualification  
of a party from  
contesting the  
elections.

he may, by notice in writing which shall be published in the *Gazette*, declare that party to be disqualified from contesting the elections in that administrative district.

(2) Where a party has been declared under subsection (1) to be disqualified from contesting the elections in an administrative district, then—

- (a) the Registrar-General shall take such measures as he considers practicable to omit or expunge or delete from the ballot papers issued to voters in that administrative district the name, abbreviation of the name and symbol of that party; and
- (b) whether or not such measures are taken or are effectively taken, no vote may be validly cast for that party in the elections in that administrative district, and any ballot paper which is marked so as to indicate a vote so cast shall be rejected at the counting of the votes; and the

- provisions of the Act with respect to rejected ballot papers shall apply accordingly; and
- (c) the Registrar-General shall, notwithstanding any other provision of law, take such measures as he considers appropriate to ensure that all votes cast within that administrative district shall be counted separately from the votes cast elsewhere in the electoral district of which that administrative district forms part; and
  - (d) any person who, whether or not for hire or reward, provides or facilitates the provision or the use of any animal, motor vehicle or any other form of conveyance whatever for the carriage of voters for the whole or part of the journey from a place in that administrative district to a place in another administrative district for the purpose of voting in that other district, or the return journey, shall be guilty of an offence and any such offence shall be deemed to be an illegal practice for the purposes of section 128 of the Act.

## SOUTHERN RHODESIA

## The Elections (Prevention of Disruptive Activities)

## (No. 2) Ordinance 1980

(Ordinance No. 8 of 1980)

*Soames*

Governor

12th February, 1980

## ENACTED BY THE GOVERNOR

1. (1) This Ordinance may be cited as the Elections (Prevention of Disruptive Activities) (No. 2) Ordinance 1980 and shall be construed as one with the Elections (Prevention of Disruptive Activities) Ordinance 1980 (hereinafter called "the principal Ordinance").

Citation and  
construction.

(2) Section 1 (3) of the principal Ordinance is repealed.

(3) This Ordinance and the Ordinances referred to in the said section 1 (3) may be cited together as the Electoral Ordinances 1979 and 1980.

2. Sections 2 (5), 3 (4) and 4 (2) (d) of the principal Ordinance shall each be amended by the deletion therefrom of the words "an illegal practice for the purposes of section 128 of the Act" and the substitution therefor, in each case, of the words "a corrupt practice for the purposes of section 115 of the Act for which the penalty shall be the same as for the offence of personation".

Amendment of  
sections 2 (5), 3 (4)  
and 4 (2) (d) of  
principal Ordinance.

3. Section 4 of the principal Ordinance shall be further amended—

Further amendment  
of section 4 of  
principal Ordinance.

(a) by the insertion, immediately after the words "that party" in section 4 (1) (b) thereof, of the words "or of its leadership"; and

(b) by the addition, immediately after section 4 (2) (d) thereof (as amended by section 2 of this Ordinance), of the word "and" and the following new paragraph as paragraph (e)—

"(e) without prejudice to any other provision of law in that behalf, any animal, motor vehicle or other form of conveyance which is concerned in or is on reasonable grounds believed to be concerned in the contravention or suspected contravention of paragraph (d) or which is intended to be used or is on reasonable grounds believed to be intended to be used in such a contravention may be seized by any officer or authority of the Government of Southern Rhodesia and, if a court convicts any person of such a contravention in respect of the use of that animal, motor vehicle or conveyance, it may, without notice to any other person, declare it to be forfeited to the Government of Southern Rhodesia; and the provisions of

the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 59] in relation to the seizure and forfeiture of articles shall apply accordingly.”.

Abrogation of  
elections in  
particular districts.

4. (1) If the Governor is satisfied that in any administrative district or any part thereof disruptive activities have taken place to such an extent as to render impossible the holding of free and fair elections in that district or in that part thereof, he may, by instrument in writing under his hand (hereinafter referred to as an “abrogation of elections order”), which shall be notified in the *Gazette*, declare the elections in that district or in that part thereof to be abrogated.

(2) Where an abrogation of elections order has been made in respect of an administrative district or a part thereof—

- (a) no polling station shall be established within, and no mobile polling station shall be provided for, that administrative district or that part thereof;
- (b) no public meeting shall, until after the declaration of the result of the poll in the electoral district of which that administrative district forms part, be held in that administrative district or in that part thereof by any party that is registered as a party contesting the elections in that electoral district;
- (c) no person shall, whether or not for hire or reward, provide or facilitate the provision or the use of any animal, motor vehicle or any other form of conveyance whatever for the carriage of voters for the whole or part of the journey from a place in that administrative district or in that part thereof to a place outside that administrative district or, as the case may be, outside that part thereof for the purpose of voting in that other place, or the return journey.

(3) Any public meeting which is convoked or organized by any person, whether or not he is a member of, or a candidate for, the party in question, for or on behalf of or in support of a party shall be deemed for the purposes of this section, but without prejudice to the liability of that person under subsection (5), to be so convoked or organized by that party.

(4) Any public meeting which takes place in contravention of subsection (2) (b) shall, for the purposes of any provision of law for the time being in force relating to unlawful gatherings, be deemed to be a meeting at which persons are conducting themselves in such a manner that a breach of the peace is likely to occur or public disorder to be occasioned.

(5) Any person who convokes or organizes a public meeting in contravention of subsection (2) (b) or who does any act in relation to the conveyance of voters that is in contravention of subsection (2) (c) shall be guilty of an offence and any such offence shall be deemed to be a corrupt practice for the purposes of section 115 of the Act for which the penalty shall be the same as for the offence of personation.

(6) Without prejudice to any other provision of law in that behalf, any animal, motor vehicle or other form of conveyance which is concerned in or is on reasonable grounds believed to be concerned in the contravention of subsection (2) (c) or which is

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intended to be used or is on reasonable grounds believed to be intended to be used in such a contravention may be seized by any officer or authority of the Government of Southern Rhodesia and, if a court convicts any person of such a contravention in respect of the use of that animal, motor vehicle or conveyance, it may, without notice to any other person, declare it to be forfeited to the Government of Southern Rhodesia; and the provisions of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [*Chapter 59*] in relation to the seizure and forfeiture of articles shall apply accordingly.

MAP AND LIST PROVIDED BY GOVERNOR  
SHOWING AREAS WHICH, ACCORDING TO  
HIS INFORMATION, WERE MOST AFFECTED  
BY INTIMIDATION

FROM THE GOVERNOR

15 February 1980

My dear Ambassador,

When you called to see me the other day, we had what was for me a very useful discussion of the problems which have arisen in the pre-election period. I explained to you my concern about the extent of intimidation and the difficulty of holding fair elections in areas which have been particularly affected by continuing ZANLA activity, the intimidation of voters and an inability of other parties to campaign freely. ... I am enclosing a map prepared in consultation with our election supervisors and taking account of reports from the Monitoring Force and from police which indicates the areas which are most affected by problems of this kind. As you know it is my fervent hope that there will be at least some improvement between now and the elections.

I would like to suggest to you that you and your observer team might make enquiries from party leaders as to the extent to which it is possible for the parties to campaign freely in these areas. Naturally I would welcome any comments you may wish to make to me about them.

Yours sincerely,  
Christopher Lame

Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal

# SOUTHERN RHODESIA


150 Kilometres

Z A M B I A

M O Z A M B I Q U E

S O U T H A F R I C A

B O T S W A N A



## LEGEND

- Severely affected by intimidation (Shown red on original map)
- Heavily affected by intimidation (Shown blue on original map)
- Affected by intimidation (Shown blue on original map)

This map is not necessarily comprehensive

Based upon map provided by Governor showing areas allegedly affected by intimidation. See Schedule overleaf

LEGEND TO MAP PROVIDED BY GOVERNOR

LIST A: (AREAS SHADED WITH RED DIAGONAL LINES)

<u>AREAS:</u>	<u>TRIBAL TRUSTLANDS</u>
No. 1	Kachuta, Bakasa, Sipolilo
No. 2	Chiswiti, Kandeya, Masoso, Chimanda, Pfundwe, Mkota, Ngarwe, Maramba, Mudzi, Chikwize, Uzumba, Mtoko, St. Swithin's, Sawunyama, Tanda, Zimbiti, Inyanga.
No. 3	Sabi
No. 4	Matsai, Manjirenji, Bangala, Nyajena, Matibi No. 1, Maranda.
No. 5	Musikavanhu, Ndownoyoyo, Sangwe, Matibi No. 2, Gonarezhou, Malapiti, Sengwe, Manjinji Pan.

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LIST B: (AREAS SHADED WITH BLUE DIAGONAL LINES)

<u>AREAS:</u>	<u>TRIBAL TRUSTLANDS</u>
No. 1	Chiweshe
No. 2	Madziwa
No. 3	Mangwende
No. 4	Wedza, Sabi North, Narira
No. 5	Maranke
No. 6	Muwushu
No. 7	Gutu, Bikita, Ndanga, Chikwanda, Zimutu, Mtilikwe, Victoria.
No. 8	Serma
No. 9	Chilimanzi
No. 10	Selukwe, Runde, Mashara, Mazvihwa, Ungova, Chibi, Belingwe.

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INTERFACTION INCIDENTS REPORTED TO POLICE BETWEEN  
9 DECEMBER 1979 AND 25 FEBRUARY 1980

	Number of Incidents	Party Responsible	Arrests	Convicted	P/Trial	
SALISBURY	531	ZANU (PF)	210	209	110	99
		ZAPU	17	10	5	5
		PF u/k	72	30	21	9
		UANC	198	97	69	28
		ZDP	2	2	-	2
		ZANU(S)	9	1	-	1
		UNKNOWN	41	4	1	3
		TOTAL			353	206
MASHONALAND	65	ZANU (PF)	39	53	34	19
		ZAPU	5	18	8	10
		PF u/k	3	1	-	1
		UANC	15	28	5	23
		ZANU(S)	4	22	-	22
		ZDP	1	-	-	-
		UNKNOWN	5	1	1	-
		TOTAL			123	48
MATABELELAND	210	ZANU (PF)	34	24	-	24
		ZAPU	137	326	52	274
		UANC	19	31	10	21
		ZDP	1	1	-	1
		ZANU(S)	2	2	4	1
		UNKNOWN	23	12	-	12
		TOTAL			396	63
MIDLANDS	22	ZANU (PF)	7	7	3	4
		ZAPU	9	40	-	40
		PF u/k	1	-	-	-
		ZANU(S)	2	15	-	15
		UANC	2	2	2	-
		TOTAL			64	5

	Number of Incidents	Party Responsible		Arrests	Convicted	P/Trial
VICTORIA	20	ZANU (PF)	14	28	19	9
		UANC	3	20	20	-
		ZDP	1	1	-	1
		ZANU(S)	1	-	-	-
		UNKNOWN	1	-	-	-
		TOTAL		49	39	10
MANICALAND	20	ZANU (PF)	8	3	-	3
		PF u/k	2	-	-	-
		ZANU(S)	1	4	-	4
		UANC	5	3	-	3
		UNKNOWN	5	3	-	3
		TOTAL		13	-	13

**SAMPLE GAZETTE NOTICE  
LIFTING BAN ON SCHEDULED  
PUBLICATIONS**

Nagle House Commercial Centre, Marandellas.  
Parisiash School, Salisbury.  
Professional Management, Salisbury.  
Rio Tinto—Empress Mine—Zhombe Tribal Trust Land.  
Rusape College of Commercial Studies, Rusape.  
Y.W.C.A. Dressmaking School, Harare.

General Notice 144 of 1980.  
**EMERGENCY POWERS (MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND  
ORDER) REGULATIONS, 1977**

**Order Made in Terms of Section 64**

IT is hereby notified that the Governor has, by order made on the 8th February, 1980, in terms of section 64 of the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations, 1977, prohibited the possession in a public place of anything representing, resembling or similar in appearance to any arms of war, as that term is defined in subsection (5) of section 37 of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act [Chapter 65].

For the purposes of this order, a public place shall mean any public place which is defined as such in section 2 of the Miscellaneous Offences Act [Chapter 68].

In terms of subsection (3) of section 72 of the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations, 1977, any person who contravenes or fails to comply with the provisions of the order shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months, or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

15-2-80. P. CLAYPOLE,  
Secretary for Law and Order.

General Notice 145 of 1980.  
**CENSORSHIP AND ENTERTAINMENTS CONTROL ACT  
[CHAPTER 78]**

**Revocation of Previous Decisions of Board**

IT is hereby notified that, a period of at least two years having elapsed since the decisions concerned were made, the Board of Censors has, in terms of section 20 of the Censorship and Entertainments Control Act [Chapter 78], revoked its declarations as undesirable or undesirable and prohibited, as specified in the second column of the Schedule, of the publications specified in the first column of the Schedule, and has declared that the said publications are, in the opinion of the board, not undesirable.

The Rhodesia Notices specified in the third column of the Schedule are accordingly amended or cancelled, as may be appropriate.

15-2-80. P. D. W. R. SHERREN,  
Chairman,  
Board of Censors.

**SCHEDULE  
REVOKED DECLARATIONS**

Author/Editor and title of publication	Effect of declaration	Rhodesia Notice notifying declaration
Turnbull, Colin M. <i>The Lonely African</i>	Undesirable	526 of 1969
Simons, H. J. and R. E. <i>Class and Colour in South Africa 1850-1950</i>	Undesirable	1626 of 1969
Benson, Mary <i>South Africa: The Struggle for a Birthright</i>	Undesirable	1626 of 1969
Odinga, Oginga <i>Not Yet Uhuru</i>	Undesirable	1704 of 1969
Sleeper, C. Freeman <i>Black Power and Christian Responsibility</i>	Undesirable	1704 of 1969

Author/Editor and title of publication	Effect of declaration	Rhodesia Notice notifying declaration
Mazrut, Ali A. <i>Towards a Pax Africana</i>	Undesirable	91 of 1970
Fanon, Frantz <i>Black Skins, White Masks</i>	Undesirable	672 of 1970
Wautheir, Claude <i>The Literature and Thought of Modern Africa</i>	Undesirable	915 of 1970
Mbeki, Govan <i>South Africa: The Peasant's Revolt</i>	Undesirable	954 of 1970
Levitt, Leonard <i>An African Season</i>	Undesirable	1212 of 1970
Hough, Joseph C., jr. <i>Black Power and White Protestants (1973)</i>	Undesirable and prohibited	45 of 1975
Rodney, Walter <i>How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1972)</i>	Undesirable and prohibited	565 of 1975
Nkosi, Lewis <i>The Rhythm of Violence (1964)</i>	Undesirable and prohibited	1071 of 1975
Cartey, Wilfred, and Kilson, Martin <i>The Africa Reader: Independent Africa (September, 1970)</i>	Undesirable and prohibited	509 of 1976

General Notice 146 of 1980.

**NOTICE BY THE GOVERNOR (No. 16)**

The Elections (Prevention of Disruptive Activities) Ordinance 1980 (Ordinance No. 7 of 1980)

**Suspending Order**

IT is hereby notified that the Governor has, on the 9th February, 1980, made an instrument under his hand under section 3 of the Elections (Prevention of Disruptive Activities) Ordinance 1980 declaring Mr. Enos Nkala to be suspended from campaigning in the elections.

15-2-80. H. STEEL,  
Legal Adviser to the Governor.

General Notice 147 of 1980.

**GOVERNMENT TENDER BOARD**

**Tenders Invited**

ALL tenders must be submitted to the Secretary, Government Tender Board, P.O. Box 8075, Causeway.

Tenders must in no circumstances be submitted to departments.

Tenders must be enclosed in sealed envelopes, endorsed on the outside with the advertised tender number and the description, and must be posted in time to be sorted into Post Office Box 8075, Causeway, or delivered by hand to the Secretary, Government Tender Board, Second Floor, Regal Star House, Gordon Avenue, Salisbury, before 2.45 p.m. on the closing-date advertised.

Offers submitted by telegraph, stating clearly therein the name of the tenderer, the service and the amount, must be dispatched in time for delivery by the Post Office to the Secretary, Government Tender Board, by 2.45 p.m. on the closing-date, and the confirmation tender posted not later than the closing-time and date. The telegraphic address is "Tenders, Salisbury".

Note.—Tenders which are not received by 2.45 p.m. on the closing-date, whether by hand, by post or by telegraph, will be treated as late tenders.

If a deposit is required for tender documents, it will be refunded on receipt of a bona fide tender or if the tender documents are returned complete and unmarked before the closing-date.

For supply contracts, the country of manufacture must be stated. When tenders are compared, a degree of preference is deducted from prices tendered for goods manufactured in this country.

No tender can be withdrawn or amended during a period of 30 days (or any other period specified in tender documents) from the stated closing-date.

The Government does not bind itself to accept the lowest or any tender, and reserves the right to select any tender in whole or in part.

Tenders which are properly addressed to the Government Tender Board in sealed envelopes with the advertised tender number and description endorsed on the outside are not opened until 2.45 p.m. on the closing-date.

Members of the public may attend the opening of tenders on Second Floor, Regal Star House, Gordon Avenue, Salisbury, from 2.45 p.m. onwards on the date specified.

D. I. J. LINDSAY-WHITE,  
Secretary,  
Government Tender Board

**Tender**

**No.**

5445. Printing of the 1981 Tourist Board desk-diary. Documents from the Production Officer, Department of Tourism, P.O. Box 8052, Causeway. Closing-date, 13-3-80.

## ANNEX 29

## DISPOSITION OF POLLING STATIONS BETWEEN PROVINCES

MR - Rural Mobile Station

SU - Static Urban Station

MU - Urban Mobile Station

SR - Static Rural Station




DISTRICT	MR	MU	SU	SR	AIR MOB	TOTAL
a	b	c	d	e	f	g
<u>Mashonaland West</u>						
1. Kariba	2		1	5		8
2. Urungwe	18		2			20
3. Lomagundi	10		4	11		25
4. Hartley	8	1		3		12
5. Gatooma	8		4			12
TOTALS	46	1	11	19		77
<u>Mashonaland Central</u>						
1. Sipolilo	6			6		12
2. Centenary	6			1		7
3. Darwin	8			1		9
4. Rushinga	2			1		3
5. Mazoe (Concession)	19		1	3		23
6. Bindura	8					8
7. Shamva	5			2		7
TOTALS	54		1	14		69
<u>Mashonaland East</u>						
1. Mudzi	3					3
2. Mtoko	5			1		6
3. Mrewa	1			17		18
4. Marandellas	6		1	3		10
5. Wedza	3			2		5
6. Goromonzi	9			8		17
7. Seke	3			5		8
8. Salisbury	9	10	55	6		80
TOTALS	39	10	56	42		147
<u>Manicaland</u>						
1. Buhera	1			6		7
2. Chipinga	8		1	2		11
3. Melsetter	3			7		10
4. Inyanga	2			5		7
5. Mutasa	5			3		8
6. Makoni	6		2	6		14
7. Umtali	5		4	1		10
TOTALS	30		7	30		67

DISTRICT	MR	MU	SU	SR	AIR MOB	TOTAL
a	b	c	d	e	f	g
<u>Midlands</u>						
1. Belingwe	7			3		10
2. Charter	4		1	4		9
3. Gokwe	9			2		11
4. Gwelo	5	1	3	1		10
5. Que Que	9	2	4			15
6. Selukwe	3		1	1		5
7. Shabani	2		5	4		11
8. Umvuma	2		1	3		6
TOTALS	41	3	15	18		77
<u>Victoria</u>						
1. Bikita	2			7		9
2. Chibi	3			4		7
3. Chiredzi	20		3			23
4. Gutu	3			5		8
5. Fort Victoria	8	3	2			13
6. Zaka	5			2		7
7. Nuanetsi	3			3		6
TOTALS	44	3	5	21		73
<u>Matabeleland North</u>						
1. Bulawayo	6	6	24			36
2. Bubi	3			3		6
3. Nyamandhlovu	6			6		12
4. Nkai	2			5		7
5. Lupane	4			5		9
6. Wankie	3			9		12
7. Binga	1			7		8
TOTALS	25	6	24	35		90
<u>Matabeleland South</u>						
1. Kezi (Matobo)	1			8		9
2. Plumtree	7			6		13
3. Gwanda	4			5		9
4. Beit Bridge	2			10	1	14
5. Filabusi	3			5		8
6. Essexvale (Umzingwani)	2			3		5
TOTALS	19			37	1	57

<u>SUMMARY</u>	<u>MR</u>	<u>MU</u>	<u>SU</u>	<u>SR</u>	<u>AIRMOB</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. Mashonaland West	46	1	11	19		77
2. Mashonaland Central	54		1	14		69
3. Mashonaland East	39	10	56	42		147
4. Manicaland	30		7	30		67
5. Midlands	41	3	15	18		77
6. Victoria	44	3	5	21		73
7. Matabeleland North	25	6	24	35		90
8. Matabeleland South	19			37	1	57
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>298</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>216</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>657</b>

No 028602

**MASHONALAND CENTRAL**

<b>National Democratic Union</b>	<b>N.D.U.</b>		
<b>National Front of Zimbabwe</b>	<b>N.F.Z.</b>		
<b>Patriotic Front</b>	<b>P.F.</b>		
<b>United African National Council</b>	<b>U.A.N.C.</b>		
<b>United National Federal Party</b>	<b>U.N.F.P.</b>		
<b>Zimbabwe African National Union</b>	<b>Z.A.N.U.</b>		
<b>Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)</b>	<b>Z.A.N.U.(P.F.)</b>		
<b>Zimbabwe Democratic Party</b>	<b>Z.D.P.</b>		

(2) If—

- (a) any person who has been nominated in terms of subsection (1) is aggrieved by the decision of the Registrar-General to reject his nomination; or
- (b) any party is aggrieved by a decision of the Registrar-General in terms of subsection (1);

such person or party shall have the right of appeal from such decision to a judge of the General Division in chambers and the provisions of paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of subsection (14) of section *fifty-three* shall, *mutatis mutandis*, apply.

#### PART IV

##### MODIFICATION OF CHAPTER IV

173. (1) A person shall be eligible for election as a Senator other than a Senator Chief if he— Eligibility for election as elected Senator.

- (a) is entitled in terms of section *nineteen* to be registered as a voter; and
- (b) satisfies the requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of section *forty*.

(2) Anything which in terms of Chapter IV may or is required to be done by a person who is registered as a voter on the Common Roll or the White Roll may be done by a person who is entitled to be registered as a voter on that roll.

(3) The poll for the first election of elected Senators shall be conducted in the Chamber of the Senate or the House of Assembly as constituted in terms of the former Constitution.

#### PART V

##### MODIFICATION OF CHAPTER V

174. A person shall be eligible for election—

- (a) as a Common Roll constituency member if he— Qualifications for election as constituency member.
  - (i) is entitled in terms of section *nineteen* to be registered as a voter on the Common Roll; and
  - (ii) satisfies the requirements of subparagraphs (i), (iii) and (iv) of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section *fifty-two*;
- (b) as a White Roll constituency member if he—
  - (i) is entitled in terms of section *nineteen* to be registered as a voter on the White Roll; and
  - (ii) satisfies the requirements of subparagraphs (i), (iii) and (iv) of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section *fifty-two*.

175. (1) In relation to the election of the seventy-two Black members of the House of Assembly, the provisions of this section shall apply. Special provisions for election of Common Roll constituency members on party-list system.

(2) Instead of Rhodesia being divided into Common Roll constituencies, the eight provinces into which Rhodesia, immediately before the appointed day, has been divided in terms of the General

Administration Act [*Chapter 85*] shall each constitute an electoral district and each such electoral district shall be allocated a number of seats as follows—

- (a) Manicaland, ten;
- (b) Mashonaland Central, five;
- (c) Mashonaland East, fifteen;
- (d) Mashonaland West, six;
- (e) Matabeleland North, ten;
- (f) Matabeleland South, five;
- (g) Midlands, eleven;
- (h) Victoria, ten.

(3) On the day and at the place fixed in accordance with the provisions of section *one hundred and seventy-one* the Registrar-General shall hold a public court in accordance with the appropriate provisions of section *fifty-two* and any party which wishes to contest the general election in any electoral district shall apply for registration therefor by submitting to the Registrar-General—

- (a) the name of such party which is to appear on the ballot paper; and
- (b) an abbreviation of the name of such party which is to appear on the ballot paper; and
- (c) the distinctive symbol used by such party which is to appear on the ballot paper; and
- (d) the address in Zimbabwe Rhodesia of the main office of such party; and
- (e) a copy of the constitution of such party or of the agreement or other instrument by which it was established; and
- (f) unless the constitution, agreement or other instrument referred to in paragraph (e) discloses that such party was established with the object of taking part in the election, a copy of a resolution or other authorization to take part in the election taken or granted in accordance with such constitution, agreement or other instrument; and
- (g) the name of each electoral district for which such party wishes to be registered; and
- (h) a list of the names of candidates nominated by such party for each electoral district for which such party wishes to be registered, with the number of candidates being not less than the number of seats allocated to that electoral district in terms of subsection (2) and each candidate being a person who is eligible in terms of paragraph (a) of section *one hundred and seventy-four* for election as a Common Roll constituency member.

(4) The Registrar-General may reject any application in terms of subsection (3) if he considers that the abbreviation or symbol referred to in paragraph (b) or (c) of subsection (3) so closely resembles an abbreviation or symbol in an application already accepted by him as to be likely to cause confusion or if,

for any other reason, the application is not in order and the provisions of subsection (14) of section *fifty-three* shall, *mutatis mutandis*, apply.

(5) If it appears to the Registrar-General at any time prior to the first polling day that—

- (a) any person whose name appears on the list of candidates was not eligible or has become ineligible for election as a Common Roll constituency member; or
- (b) the name of any person appears on more than one list of candidates which has been submitted by a party;

he shall delete the name of that candidate from such list or from wherever it appears on such lists, as the case may be, and that candidate shall be regarded as not having been duly nominated:

Provided that where the Registrar-General has so deleted the name of any candidate, the provisions of subsection (14) of section *fifty-three* shall, *mutatis mutandis*, apply.

(6) At the same time as an application in terms of subsection (3) is submitted there shall be deposited with the Registrar-General the sum of two hundred dollars in cash for each electoral district in respect of which the party wishes to be registered and if a poll takes place and the party receives less than ten *per centum* of the votes validly cast in the electoral district concerned, the sum deposited shall be forfeited and the money paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

(7) If two or more parties have been registered for any electoral district, the Registrar-General shall, in accordance with the provisions of section *fifty-five*, notify—

- (a) the names of the parties which have registered for each electoral district; and
- (b) the names of the candidates duly nominated by each party for each electoral district in the order in which such names appear on the appropriate list of candidates.

(8) The Minister shall not exercise his powers in terms of section *fifty-six* if a duly nominated candidate dies.

(9) The ballot paper for the election in each electoral district shall have—

- (a) the names of all the parties registered for that electoral district printed on it in alphabetical order, the name being followed by the abbreviation furnished in terms of paragraph (b) of subsection (3) and the distinctive symbol furnished in terms of paragraph (c) of subsection (3); and
- (b) the names of the registered parties and the abbreviations of those names printed in capital letters of equal size; and
- (c) the distinctive symbols printed to a size which permits the vertical extremities or the horizontal extremities or both such extremities to touch opposite sides of the appropriate square on the ballot paper.

(10) At the election—

- (a) any person who is entitled to be registered as a voter on the Common Roll may vote in any electoral district and shall be entitled to cast at the election one vote for one registered party only:

Provided that in the case of the first general election referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section *one hundred and sixty-seven* any person who is entitled to apply for registration as a citizen of Rhodesia and, if he were so registered as a citizen, would be entitled to be registered as a voter on the Common Roll shall be entitled to cast at the election one vote for one registered party only;

- (b) the presiding officer shall, if so required by virtue of instructions issued by the Registrar-General, require an applicant for a ballot paper to produce such evidence of his identity and eligibility to vote as may be specified in such instructions and, if the applicant fails to comply therewith, he shall refuse to issue a ballot paper to him;
- (c) there shall be printed on every ballot paper in respect of each electoral district the name, abbreviation of name and distinctive symbol of each party which is registered for that electoral district;
- (d) when the person claiming the vote has received the ballot paper, he shall signify the party for which he desires to vote by secretly placing a cross in the rectangle opposite the name of the party.

(11) At the request in person of a voter who cannot read or write or who is incapacitated by blindness or other physical cause from voting in the manner required by subsection (10), the presiding officer shall mark the vote of that voter on the ballot paper in the manner directed by the voter and place it in the ballot box and if the instructions of the voter as to the manner in which the presiding officer is to make his vote on the ballot paper are not sufficiently clear to enable the presiding officer to make the vote without further instructions from the voter, the presiding officer may put such questions to the voter as, in his opinion, are necessary to elicit such further instructions.

(12) No postal ballot papers shall be issued.

(13) At the counting of votes no more than two duly nominated candidates for the electoral district concerned from each party registered for that electoral district shall be permitted to attend.

(14) At the counting of the votes the returning officer shall not reject any ballot paper where the voter has indicated with certainty the party for which he intended to vote merely by reason of the fact that the voter has so indicated otherwise than by means of a cross.

(15) In each electoral district the returning officer shall—

- (a) count the total number of votes cast in the electoral district, excluding those that have been rejected in

terms of this Act, and the number of such votes given to each registered party; and

- (b) eliminate any registered party which has been given less than ten *per centum* of the total number of votes determined in terms of paragraph (a) and disregard, for the purposes of paragraph (c), all the votes given to any party so eliminated; and
- (c) allocate, in accordance with the provisions of section *one hundred and seventy-six*, to the registered parties which have not been eliminated in terms of paragraph (b) seats in the House of Assembly and then declare to be members of the House of Assembly such number of duly nominated candidates whose names appear on the list of candidates submitted by the party concerned as is equal to the number of seats so allocated to such party, selecting the candidates to be so declared in order from the top of the list of candidates and disregarding any candidate who might have died or become ineligible for election as a Common Roll constituency member since the list was accepted by the Registrar-General.

176. (1) A quota shall be determined by dividing the total number of votes given to all those registered parties for that electoral district which have not been eliminated in terms of paragraph (b) of subsection (15) of section *one hundred and seventy-five* by the number of seats allocated to that electoral district in terms of subsection (2) of section *one hundred and seventy-five*, with any fraction obtained in such calculation being disregarded.

Allocation of seats to registered parties.

(2) The number of seats to be allocated to each registered party in terms of subsection (15) of section *one hundred and seventy-five* shall be calculated by applying the formula—

$$\frac{A}{- + C} B$$

in which—

- A represents the number of votes given to the registered party concerned;
- B represents the quota fixed in terms of subsection (1);
- C represents the value 1 if a seat is allocated to the registered party in terms of subsection (3) and the value 0 if no seat is so allocated to the registered party;

and any fraction obtained in calculating the value of  $\frac{A}{B}$  shall be disregarded except for the purposes of subsection (3), in which such fraction is referred to as unallocated votes.

(3) If, after the value of  $\frac{A}{B}$  has been determined in terms of subsection (2) for each registered party, the number of seats represented by the aggregate of all such values is less than the number of seats allocated to the electoral district by subsection

(2) of section *one hundred and seventy-five*—

- (a) by one seat, the seat shall be allocated to the registered party which has the greatest number of unallocated votes;
- (b) by two or more seats, the seats shall be allocated to an equal number of registered parties determined in the order of that party having the greatest number of unallocated votes, that party having the next greatest number of unallocated votes and so on :

Provided that, where two or more registered parties have an equal number of unallocated votes and the addition of one vote would entitle any such party to have allocated to it one seat, the Registrar-General shall inform the Minister and the Minister shall, as soon as possible thereafter, arrange for the determination of the party or parties to which such one additional vote shall be deemed to have been given by the drawing of lots by the Registrar-General in the presence of a judge of the High Court.

#### PART VI

##### MODIFICATION OF CHAPTER VI

Qualifications for election as non-constituency member.

177. A person shall be eligible for election as a non-constituency member if he is eligible in terms of paragraph (b) of section *one hundred and seventy-four* for election as a White Roll constituency member.

Electoral college for nomination of candidates.

178. For the purposes of the first general election referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section *one hundred and sixty-seven*, the electoral college to nominate the sixteen candidates for the election of the non-constituency members shall consist of the members referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of section 18 of the former Constitution who were in office immediately before the date of the publication in the *Gazette* of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, 1979, and any reference in Chapter VI to the electoral college referred to in subparagraph (i) of paragraph (c) of subsection (2) of section 22 of the Constitution or to the White members of the House of Assembly referred to in that subparagraph shall be construed accordingly.

#### PART VII

##### MODIFICATION OF CHAPTER VII

Election expenses.

179. The provisions of Chapter VII relating to election expenses shall not apply in relation to any election in accordance with the provisions of section *one hundred and seventy-five*.

Agents.

180. Every registered party shall be entitled to appoint one election agent for each electoral district for which it is registered and such number of polling agents as may be prescribed for such electoral district.

#### FIRST SCHEDULE (Section 3)

##### BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN MASHONALAND AND MATABELELAND

A line drawn from a point on the Zimbabwe Rhodesia-Zambia international boundary on the Zambezi River, due west of

INSTRUCTIONS AND NOTES FOR THE GUIDANCE OF RETURNING OFFICERS AND  
PRESIDING OFFICERS

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These instructions are based on the provisions of the Electoral Act No. 14 of 1979 as amended by the Elections (Procedure) Ordinances, 1979 and 1980 with particular reference to Chapter XI dealing with the transitional provisions which are included in the Act to cope with the situation created by the use of the party list system in this general election to be held under the supervision of the British Government.

These instructions cannot control the discretion or limit or define in full detail the duties and powers of the returning officer or the presiding officer, both of whom must make themselves acquainted with the law and with the duties of their office as set out in the Electoral Act of 1979 as amended.

RETURNING, PRESIDING AND POLLING OFFICERS

The Administrative District returning officer, who will in fact be a District Commissioner, is responsible for the administration, organisation and conduct of the Common Roll election within his district. In each of his polling stations there will be a presiding officer appointed by the Administrative District returning officer who, in the same manner as the returning officer, must make himself acquainted with the law as set out in the Electoral Act, 1979 as amended and the Electoral Regulations published in the Government Gazette of Friday, 23rd March 1979.

The presiding officer is the person at and in charge of a polling station. Polling officers are subject to and must obey the orders of the presiding officer. Similarly, any members of the Security Forces who may be in attendance at the polling station for the purposes of internal security as distinct from any Security Forces deployed for the external security of the polling station will act under the direction of the presiding officer. The returning officer or a presiding officer may appoint a polling officer to act as a presiding officer during such time as the presiding officer may be absent from the polling station.

The returning officer is responsible for the staffing of every polling station with a presiding officer and sufficient polling

officers to deal with the anticipated number of voters who will attend at the polling stations, whether it be a static or mobile station. It is hoped that it will be unnecessary to invoke the Emergency Powers (Electoral) Regulations, 1979, published in R.G.N. 190B in order to direct staff to undertake election duties. In any event, R.G.N. 190B would have to be amended to be made applicable to this election. In the unlikely event of it being necessary to direct staff, certificates of appointment will be issued on similar lines to those used in the election of April 1979.

Returning officers, presiding officers and polling officers who require petrol for election duties may obtain coupons from their local petrol rationing office. The Petrol Controller has given a blanket authority to all issuing officers in regard to petrol for election purposes.

#### HOURS OF POLL

The hours of poll have been agreed in respect of this election in terms of the Electoral Act, 1979 by the Electoral Directorate as follows:-

(a) Rural Polling Stations

Polling will commence at 7 a.m. on each polling day and stations will remain open for a minimum of nine hours continuous polling, that is to say, no rural polling station will be closed before 4 p.m. in the afternoon. Polling stations must admit any voters who have formed a queue or are in the precincts of the polling station at 4 p.m. Alternatively, the polling station may remain open after 4 p.m. at the discretion of the presiding officer.

(b) Urban Polling Stations

Urban polling stations will operate from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. on each day of the poll. As with rural polling stations, any person wishing to vote and in the precincts of a polling station at 7 p.m. will be allowed to cast his vote before the polling station closes.

(c) Mobile Polling Stations

All mobile polling stations may operate at any time between the hours of 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. at the discretion of the

returning and presiding officers. There is no fixed number of hours per day for mobile stations as in the case of static stations.

#### MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY

Every returning, presiding and polling officer must maintain the strictest impartiality in the discharge of his duties and by nothing in his speech or manner give cause for suggestion or suspecting the contrary. In exercising this strict impartiality all election officials must do everything in their power to ensure that the secrecy of the voting is maintained at all times and is seen to be maintained. Every returning officer, presiding officer, polling officer and counting officer, also every candidate and candidate's agent must BEFORE the opening of the poll make the prescribed declaration of secrecy on form V.17.

#### PROCEDURES BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE POLL

##### POLLING STATIONS

Every Administrative District returning officer will notify, by such means as he thinks fit, the situation of every fixed polling station in his district and the hours at which the fixed polling stations will be open. The method of advising the public may differ from district to district but returning officers MUST ensure that the widest publicity is given to the situation of the polling stations and, where practical within the limits of security, the itinerary of every mobile polling station.

It has been agreed with the British Election Commissioner that a presiding officer of a mobile polling station may exercise a discretion to allow a duly accredited polling agent of a political party to travel with the mobile station wherever this is practicable.

##### ELECTION EQUIPMENT AND STATIONERY

The Electoral District returning officer will have provided every Administrative District returning officer with sufficient ballot boxes, polling booths, testing devices, marking fluid, batteries, presiding officer's seals and stationery to meet the needs of the number of polling stations within each Administrative District.

The Administrative District returning officer must ensure that

he is in possession of sufficient items of this equipment to equip each of his presiding officers by not later than two weeks before the date of commencement of the poll. Sufficient supplies of all items of equipment have been distributed to electoral district returning officers to provide a back-up of reserves for spares and replacements if necessary.

#### BRIEFING OF PRESIDING AND POLLING OFFICERS

Every Administrative District returning officer will fully brief his presiding and polling officers prior to the setting up of polling stations using these instructions and, where necessary, reference to the Electoral Act and the Electoral Regulations, 1979 as amended. Any queries or any areas of uncertainty must be referred in the first instance to the Electoral District returning officer.

#### RATIONING

In addition to the election equipment, Administrative District returning officers and presiding officers deployed in the rural areas will ensure, where appropriate, that all arrangements have been completed for the acquisition and distribution of ration packs to cover the whole period of deployment.

#### BALLOT PAPERS

Each Administrative District returning officer will be issued with ballot papers amounting to approximately twice the number of estimated voters in his district. This is essential to ensure that every presiding officer has a more than adequate supply of papers as it cannot be anticipated in advance the volume of voting at any particular station and it is imperative that no station should run out of ballot papers.

Every presiding officer will be required to account for the number of ballot papers issued to him on form V.11, supplies of which will be distributed. This form discloses the number of ballot papers issued to a presiding officer and are accounted for therein under the headings of issued ballot papers, unused ballot papers and spoilt ballot papers. The difference between the number of ballot papers issued and the unused and surrendered spoilt papers at the close of the poll will represent the number of papers in the ballot box. Strict security precautions have been taken in the distribution of ballot papers to Electoral District returning officers. Throughout the whole period of the poll and until the

return to the Administrative District returning officer of unused ballot papers at the close of poll, presiding officers must ensure the security and protection of unused ballot papers in exactly the same way as they ensure the safety and protection of the ballot boxes.

#### SETTING UP OF POLLING STATIONS

It is not possible to lay down hard and fast rules for the lay-out of the polling stations as accommodation will differ in practically every case. The points to remember are that the presiding officer, or the polling officer acting for the presiding officer, will identify voters at the entrance to the polling station. Voters will be required to first place each of their hands in the checking device and thereafter proceed to dip the fingers of both hands in the marking fluid. Thereafter they will be given a ballot paper and proceed to the polling booths which should be so situated as to be well away from the officials conducting the poll and sufficiently separated from each other to ensure complete privacy. The ballot box, which must be under the supervision of either the presiding officer or a polling officer acting for him, at all times, should be situated well away from the polling booths and en route to the exit from the polling station. A separate paper entitled "Voting Drill" which also deals with the identification of voters and the treatment of blind or otherwise incapacitated voters is attached to these instructions and marked Annexure 'A'

#### BALLOT BOXES

It was found at the April, 1979 election that the apertures in the ballot boxes were rather small for the size of the ballot paper. For this election the ballot paper will be approximately twice the size of that used last year. Consequently care must be taken in the folding of the ballot papers by voters to ensure that they can be passed into the box without tearing. Unfortunately it was not possible within the time prescribed to modify the boxes.

#### SECRET MARKS

For the purposes of this election every presiding officer will be provided with a perforated seal instead of the normal secret mark and rubber stamp. Every ballot paper issued must be perforated with this

machine which will constitute the secret mark of the polling station. In addition, the perforation must be placed over the serial number of the ballot paper in the top right-hand corner in order to obliterate the number as much as possible.

#### MARKING FLUID

The marking fluid is over 90% pure alcohol and consequently it has a high rate of evaporation. Plastic bowls have been provided in the election equipment containing a pad of plastic foam material into which voters will dip their fingers. Lavish use of the fluid is unnecessary. All that is required is to check from time to time that the pad of plastic foam remains reasonably saturated.

#### CONDUCT OF THE POLL

##### PERSONS ENTITLED TO ATTEND AT A POLLING STATION

The presiding officer shall exclude from the polling station all persons other than polling officers, internal security officers on duty, the candidates or their election or polling agents, the staff of the British Election Commissioner and accredited observers.

The presiding officer must satisfy himself that any person who claims to be a candidate or a candidate's election agent has in fact been so appointed. Candidates whose name appear on the lists submitted by participating political parties have been issued with a certificate of identity. These have been given to the parties concerned for distribution to their candidates. In addition each candidate will receive with his certificate of identity a paper setting out a candidate's rights and liabilities, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure 'E'. A copy of the candidate's certificate of identity is annexed as Annexure 'C'. Candidates' election agents of whom each political party is entitled to one for each Electoral District in which they are participating, will likewise be issued with a certificate of identity, a specimen of which is attached as Annexure 'D'. In addition each political party is entitled to one polling agent for every polling station in every district in which it is participating. These polling agents will likewise carry a form of identification and will be issued with a paper setting out their rights and liabilities. A copy of this paper will be forwarded to every presiding officer as soon as it has been prepared by the British

Electoral Commission. As previously pointed out, all such persons are required to make a prescribed declaration of secrecy before the commencement of the poll. Apart from election officials, candidates, candidates' election and polling agents, the British Election Commissioner and his staff, which includes the "supervisors", together with duly accredited "observers" are the only persons authorised to enter polling stations to witness the voting procedure. "Supervisors" and "observers" will be issued with visible identification documents and presiding and polling officers must examine these and satisfy themselves of the bona fides of the holder before entry to the polling station is permitted.

Polling officials will display at all times when on duty the lapel labels which have been issued for this purpose.

#### POSTERS FOR THE GUIDANCE OF VOTERS

Before the commencement of the poll the presiding officer must place inside each voting compartment the poster regarding the secrecy of the vote and in a conspicuous place, both inside and outside the polling station, the poster giving directions for the guidance of voters. Presiding and polling officers should not answer any questions put by a voter on the method of voting but must refer the voter to this poster.

#### SEALING OF BALLOT BOXES

Before the polling station is opened on the first day of poll the presiding officer will display the ballot boxes empty to any persons who are present and who are authorised to be present at the polling station. He will then close and lock the box by means of a padlock which should be wrapped in paper and sealed with the presiding officer's seal, and the seal or mark of any candidate or candidate's agent or polling agent who wishes to do so. The key of each padlock will then be placed in an envelope which will also be sealed and tied and sealed to the ballot box.

In addition it is understood the British Electoral Commission intends to tape the lid of the box with gummed paper imported from Britain. This may be allowed and signatures may be placed across this gummed paper. In addition it is understood the British "supervisors" intend to put string around the ballot box and a metal seal when the

box has been completed and is being despatched to the place of counting. This tying of string around the ballot box will not take place while the box is in use or while it is in transit and in safe custody overnight. This procedure by the British "supervisors" of tying and sealing the box will only take place when the box has finally been sealed for the purpose of transmitting it to the place of counting.

At the end of each day's polling the presiding officer will close the slot at the top of the box by means of the string through the eyelet operating the slot, which will be sealed to the top of the box using the presiding officer's seal and the seal or mark of any other person authorised to be present within the polling station.

At the commencement of the poll on the second and third day of polling before the polling station is opened, the presiding officer and any candidate or candidate's agent or polling agent may examine the seal or seals on the closed slot and the padlock to ensure that the box has not been tampered with and will thereupon break the seal of the slot and open it for the day's polling.

At the close of poll on the final day the slot will again be closed and sealed in a like manner and will only be opened by the returning officer at the commencement of the count.

Mobile polling stations should, whenever it is practical, use a new ballot box every day of the poll. At the close of poll on each day the mobile polling station will, on return to base, deliver the sealed ballot box with the slot duly sealed, to a presiding or returning officer and the box will be placed in safe custody until the returning officer commences the count.

Overnight protection of ballot boxes will be dealt with at local level according to the circumstances and situation of each polling station. General guidelines, however, in the rural stations are that at no time will the ballot box be unattended or unprotected both night and day. In urban areas, whenever possible, ballot boxes will be delivered to a central protected point for safe custody overnight. In such circumstances presiding officers will personally deliver the boxes, under escort, to the security point and likewise collect them and return them to polling stations the following morning.

The safety of the ballot boxes is of paramount importance. No risks will be taken in their transportation no matter what delay may result. This must be made clear to every person to whom a presiding officer may be required to hand a ballot box for onward transmission either to the security point or to the returning officer.

#### POLLING BOOTHS

The presiding officer must ensure that the polling booths are so situated that no person can enter or leave a voting compartment without being seen by the presiding officer. Only one voter should be allowed in any one compartment at a time.

#### SECRET MARKS

In all past elections every polling station has been issued with its own individual secret mark with which each ballot paper is validated before being handed to the voter for marking. For this election ballot papers will be validated by a perforating machine which will be issued to each polling station in lieu of the traditional secret mark. Polling staff must be instructed that before handing a ballot paper to a voter it must be perforated in the top right-hand corner in order that the perforations obliterate the serial number of the ballot paper.

Presiding officers may find, within the books of ballot papers, unnumbered papers. In such event the unnumbered paper must not be issued to a voter but endorsed as cancelled, initialled by the presiding officer and at the close of poll on each day, sealed in a separate packet marked "unnumbered ballot papers cancelled" and the number of such papers in the packet endorsed thereon.

#### MOBILE POLLING STATIONS IN URBAN AREAS

As a result of information being received that owners of premises such as factories and industrial sites may object to polling stations being set up on their property, mobile polling stations should, unless the owners of private property specifically agree to their presence, be sited on empty ground near the installation concerned.

#### KEEPING ORDER AT POLLING STATIONS

The presiding officer shall keep order at the polling station and

regulate the number of voters to be admitted at a time. He shall exclude all persons who are not authorised to be in attendance at a polling station other than persons admitted in order to cast their vote. The presiding officer has the power to order arrest without warrant for disorderly conduct or where he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person is interfering with voters. However, presiding officers are warned that this power must not be lightly used.

Where a presiding or polling officer is not satisfied that any person presenting himself is qualified to receive a ballot paper he can insist that the person concerned produces documentary evidence to the effect that he is in fact so entitled. Where a person is refused a ballot paper for any reason, details of the person's name and the reasons for refusing to issue a ballot paper must be recorded by the presiding officer. At the close of poll any list containing details of refusal to issue ballot papers will be sealed in a separate packet and endorsed accordingly.

#### QUERIES

Any queries in connection with the conduct of the poll or any other matter to which the presiding officer requires an immediate answer must be referred by telephone or radio to the Administrative District returning officer who will, if necessary, refer the matter to the Electoral District returning officer who will, if necessary, refer the matter to the Registrar-General. Radio procedures will be the subject of instructions at local level.

#### PROCEDURE AT CLOSE OF POLL

The procedure at the close of poll on the final day will be substantially the same as on each preceding day. Once again the presiding officer will, notwithstanding the time at which the poll closes, permit every voter who is inside the polling station or in the immediate precincts of the polling station, to record his vote before closing the poll.

When the last voter has cast his vote the presiding officer will seal the ballot box or boxes in the manner as on previous days by closing and sealing the aperture of the ballot box and affixing his seal and allowing any candidate, candidate's agent or polling agent to affix their

seals if they so wish. In addition, duly accredited "supervisors" and "observers" may also sign and affix their seals to the boxes if they so desire.

The presiding officer will make up into a separate bundle or bundles all unused ballot papers which will be sealed with his seal and that of any such candidate or other person mentioned above who wishes to do so.

The ballot box or boxes, the sealed packets containing the unused ballot papers and the ballot paper account will be delivered to the Administrative District returning officer as soon as possible. Where, particularly in the rural areas, it is not possible to deliver these items to the Administrative District returning officer immediately after the close of poll, the arrangements for the personal supervision and protection of these items will remain in force until delivery is effected.

#### COUNTING

At the time these instructions are being prepared it is the intention that the counting of the votes will be conducted on the same basis as the election of April 1979. However, there is a suggestion that counting should take place at provincial level. If this is adopted these instructions will be modified accordingly but the whole basis of the counting procedure will remain identical.

#### RECEIPT OF BALLOT BOXES

The Administrative District returning officer will receive from each presiding officer his ballot boxes, unused ballot papers and statement of account. The counting of the votes should not commence until the Administrative District returning officer has received all the ballot boxes from all of his presiding officers. The counting of the votes must commence immediately the Administrative District returning officer has received all his ballot boxes even if this day falls on a Sunday.

#### PERSONS ALLOWED AT THE COUNT

The only persons who are allowed to witness the opening of the ballot boxes by the Administrative District returning officer, the verification of the ballot paper statements and the counting of the votes are those officials who have been appointed for that purpose by the returning

officer and not more than two duly nominated candidates from each party contesting the election in the Electoral District concerned and the election agent for any such party. In addition the election agent may appoint a counting agent in each Administrative District who may witness the counting in the Administrative District for which he is appointed and who may appoint a polling agent to act for him in his absence from the count. British "supervisors" and accredited overseas "observers" will likewise be able to witness the counting subject to being identified as previously described. British "supervisors", of course, includes the British Electoral Commissioner and his staff.

#### VERIFICATION OF STATEMENTS

When the Administrative District returning officer has received all the ballot boxes in respect of the election within his district he will, polling station by polling station, verify the presiding officer's statement of account by checking the number of unused ballot papers and by counting the total number of votes in the ballot boxes from each polling station which total should agree with the number of papers issued by the presiding officer. Any discrepancy must be recorded. Before opening the ballot boxes for this purpose the returning officer must check, together with any candidates or other authorised persons as may be present that the seals on the ballot boxes have not been tampered with.

#### COUNTING

When the statements of account from each polling station have been verified, the counting of the votes cast for each participating political party will begin. Returning officers will doubtless make their own arrangements for the method of counting but it is suggested that the papers first be sorted according to the votes cast for each participating political party and thereafter the votes cast for each party be made up into bundles of fifty or one hundred. Each such bundle to be checked by a second counting officer.

#### SPOILT PAPERS

Returning officers and counting officers are reminded that in terms of section 175 of the Electoral Act a ballot paper shall not be rejected where a voter has indicated with certainty the party for which he intended to vote merely by reason of the fact that he has so indicated otherwise than by means of a cross.


RESULT OF POLL

When the counting has been completed and the number of votes cast for each political party and the number of spoilt papers has been ascertained, the figures will be transmitted immediately by telephone followed by a telegram to be confirmed in writing to the Electoral District returning officer who in turn will collate the results from each Administrative District within the Electoral District for onward transmission to the Registrar-General by telegram to be confirmed in writing.

FEES FOR ELECTION OFFICIALS

Fees payable to election officials as agreed by the Treasury are as follows:-

- (a) Returning Officer including Electoral District Returning Officer ..... \$250,00
- (b) Assistant Returning Officer ..... \$125,00
- (c) Presiding Officer ..... \$ 20,00 per day
- (d) Polling Officer ..... \$ 10,00 per day
- (e) Counting Officer ..... \$ 1,50 per hour or part thereof
- (f) Distance rates as prescribed in Public Services (Travelling and Subsistence) Regulations, 1972.



E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS.

VOTING DRILL - ELECTION OF EIGHTY MEMBERS OF  
THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY

1. The presiding officer will regulate the number of voters to be admitted to a polling station at any one time.
2. The voter will be identified as a person eligible to receive a ballot paper before being admitted to a polling station. Voters will have been instructed to take to the polling station whatever personal documents they may have in order to establish identity and eligibilitiy.

The presiding officer may or may not call for such documents but in the event of his being in any doubt as to the right of any person to receive a ballot paper he is empowered to insist upon documentary evidence. (Section 175 (10)(b)).

3. On admission to the polling station the voter, who may only vote once at an election, will be directed to the checking device in which he or she will place each hand palm downwards. (Section 175 (10)(a)) and (Section 62 (4)(a)).
4. If the checking device reveals that the voter has already voted in the election a ballot paper will not be issued and the person concerned will be requested to leave the polling station. (Section 62 (4)(a)).
5. If the checking device reveals that the voter has not previously voted in the election he or she will be requested to dip the fingers of both hands into the invisible marking fluid. (Section 62 (4)(b)).
6. A polling officer will perforate the ballot paper in the top right-hand corner to obliterate the serial number with the perforating machine which will be used at this election in lieu of a secret mark which was previously the practice. Once the paper has been perforated the polling officer will hand it to the voter. (Section 63 (L)(b)).
7. The voter will be directed to a polling booth where, in complete privacy and secrecy, the ballot paper will be marked with an X against the name of the political party of his or her choice.

Before leaving the polling booth the voter will fold the ballot paper so that the official mark of the polling station is visible but the names of the political parties and the cross made by him or her is not visible. (Section 63 (1)(c)).

8. Having marked and folded the ballot paper as set out above the voter is required to drop the ballot paper into the ballot box displaying to the presiding officer or polling officer in attendance the official mark of the polling station but NOT the manner in which the voter has cast his vote. (Section 63 (1)(c)).

9. The voter will then leave the polling station.
10. If a voter inadvertently spoils a ballot paper before dropping it into the ballot box he or she may surrender it to the presiding officer who will issue a new ballot paper and endorse the surrendered ballot paper as "cancelled".

Ballot papers surrendered in these circumstances will be made up into a separate packet by the presiding officer at the close of poll. The packet will be labelled "spoilt ballot papers surrendered" and will be endorsed with the number of papers contained therein. (Section 64).

11. At the request, in person, of a voter who cannot read or write or who is incapable by blindness or other physical cause from voting in the manner set out in paragraphs 1 to 8 above, the presiding officer shall mark the vote of that voter on the ballot paper in the manner directed by the voter and place it in the ballot box.

If the instructions of the voter as to the manner in which the presiding officer is to make his vote on the ballot paper are not sufficiently clear to enable the presiding officer to make the vote, the presiding officer may put such questions to the voter as he considers necessary to enable him to do so. (Section 175 (11)).

All references are to the Electoral Act No. 14 of 1979.



E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS.

EWPS/cp

ELECTORAL ACT, 1979 AS AMENDED

ANNEXURE 'B'

APPOINTMENT OF POLLING OFFICER

Notice is hereby given that in terms of subsection (2) of section 58 of the Electoral Act, 1979,

.....

has been appointed a Presiding/Polling Officer for the Common Roll election in the Electoral District of

.....

PLACE : .....

DATE : .....

ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT  
RETURNING OFFICER

ELECTORAL ACT, 1979 AS AMENDED

ANNEXURE 'C'

PARTY LISTS - CANDIDATES

It is hereby notified that the person whose name appears below has been nominated as a candidate in the Electoral District and for the party shown against his name.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>PARTY</u>	<u>ELECTORAL DISTRICT</u>
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E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS

ELECTORAL ACT, 1979 AS AMENDED

ANNEXURE 'D'

APPOINTMENT OF CANDIDATE'S AGENT

In terms of section 180 of the Electoral Act, 1979 as amended, it is hereby notified that .....  
of .....  
has been appointed a candidate's agent in respect of the .....  
..... Electoral District.

E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS

GENERAL ELECTION, 1980 : ELECTION OF EIGHTY BLACK  
MEMBERS TO THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY

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ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO RETURNING AND PRESIDING  
OFFICERS

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These instructions are to be read with and are in addition to those already circulated.

COUNTING AT PROVINCIAL LEVEL

In your original instructions it was indicated that counting might take place at provincial level and this has now been firmly decided. Consequently the counting procedure will be as follows:-

- (i) Ballot boxes from all polling stations within an Administrative District will be recovered to a central point by the Administrative District returning officer. There in the presence of the observers and other authorised persons the ballot boxes from each individual polling station will be opened, the papers will be unfolded and made up into bundles of one hundred, face downwards at all times. The ballot papers contained in each box from each polling station will be balanced with the unused ballot papers returned from that polling station together with any papers which were surrendered to the presiding officer. In other words the verification of ballot paper accounts from each polling station will be done at district level.
- (ii) When all the ballot paper accounts have been verified, the used ballot papers in their bundles of one hundred will be packed into one or more ballot boxes, as may be necessary, and these will represent the total ballot papers used in that Administrative District. The boxes will then be resealed in like manner as originally sealed and together with the unused and surrendered ballot papers will be despatched, under escort, to the Electoral District returning officer.
- (iii) The Administrative District returning officer will prepare a ballot paper account in the form set out as Annexure 'A' to these instructions which will balance with the total number of ballot papers he originally received from the Electoral District returning officer.

- (iv) On receipt of the ballot boxes, unused and surrendered ballot papers, from each Administrative District within his Electoral District, the Electoral District returning officer will verify the global ballot paper account referred to in paragraph (iii) above received from each Administrative District returning officer.
- (v) When the Electoral District returning officer has received the ballot boxes and unused and surrendered papers from every Administrative District within his province and has verified the account from each individual Administrative District as set out above, the counting of votes will take place.

This procedure will in effect provide a double check on both used and unused papers which is a requirement of the British Electoral Commissioner.

On completion of the count the Electoral District returning officer will immediately advise me of the result of the poll in his Electoral District, firstly by telephone, secondly by telegram and thirdly by confirmation in writing.

#### COUNTING TIMETABLE

All returning officers should note that the following timetable has been set for the counting of the votes and must be strictly adhered to unless exceptional circumstances intervene:-

- (i) Saturday, 1st March - ballot boxes, unused and surrendered papers to be recovered and delivered to Administrative District Headquarters.
- (ii) Sunday, 2nd March - verification of ballot paper accounts at Administrative District level and despatch of boxes containing the used papers, the unused and surrendered papers, to Electoral District Headquarters.

NOTE: If recovery permits verification at District level on Saturday, 1st March this may be done provided all parties authorised to be present are notified.

Electoral District Headquarters to receive ballot boxes containing the aforementioned papers from Administrative District after verification.

- (iii) Monday, 3rd March - counting of votes at Electoral District level in each of the eight districts to commence at 8 a.m.
- (iv) Tuesday, 4th March - all results to have been conveyed to the Registrar-General.

The authority for the abovementioned procedure is contained in the Elections (Procedure) (No.2) Ordinance, 1980, a copy of which is annexed to these instructions as Annexure 'D'.

It must be remembered that once the counting of votes has commenced it must continue until the exercise has been completed. There must be no adjournment of the proceedings.

#### POLITICAL PARTY POLLING AGENTS

As you are aware, each political party is entitled to nominate one polling/counting agent for each polling station. In terms of subsection (2) of section 6 of the Electoral Ordinance (Annexure 'D' to these instructions) political parties have until 18th February to nominate their agents. Because of the numbers involved and the time factor it is not possible to deal with this at central level. Accordingly, each and every Administrative District returning officer should prepare at local level a form of appointment of polling/counting agent in the form set out as Annexure 'B' to these instructions. Political parties will be instructed to approach Administrative District returning officers with their nominations and that officer will make the necessary appointments and issue the forms he has prepared in terms of these instructions and Annexure 'B'.

All returning officers are referred to section 7 of the Elections Ordinance (Annexure 'D' to these instructions) and to note that paragraph (2) to the proviso should be amended to read " ..... one other such party" instead of " ..... two other such parties".

The effect of the Ordinance is that a presiding officer shall not allow more than one polling agent for any particular party to be in a polling station at any time. In addition, at no time will he allow less than two polling agents nor more than four polling agents to be in a polling station at any time. Returning officers should instruct their presiding officers that they must not in any way be timid when enforcing this provision of the Ordinance. The British Electoral Commission

have produced some notes on the effect of section 7 which are included in these instructions as Annexure 'C' and these should be carefully studied.

#### DECLARATION OF SECRECY

A declaration of secrecy which will be used by every person involved in this election is being prepared. The persons concerned will include all election officials, candidates, candidates' agents, polling agents, counting agents, supervisors and members of the Electoral Commission.

Supplies of these forms are to be printed and will be distributed in time for the election.

Returning officers are reminded that they must take the oath of secrecy before a Commissioner of Oaths. Other persons may take the oath of secrecy before either a Commissioner of Oaths or a Returning Officer.

#### IDENTIFICATION OF VOTERS

For obvious reasons the identification of voters assumes greater importance at this election than it did in the election of April, 1979. The discretion remains with presiding officers. However, it is not considered that the ability to establish the right to a ballot paper by a citizen or a resident qualified for citizenship will present any great difficulties. The anticipated problem area is where a ballot paper is refused because the presiding officer is not satisfied that the applicant has attained the age of eighteen years.


The discretion still remains with the presiding officer who again should not be timid in exercising his discretion. Returning and presiding officers are reminded that they may call upon a person to produce documentary evidence of his right to receive a ballot paper. Where a ballot paper is refused because of doubt and documentary evidence is demanded and subsequently supplied, that evidence will be perforated by the perforating machine of the polling station concerned. It must be stressed that documents produced as evidence of identification where no doubt exists will NOT be perforated. It is only in cases where there is doubt and a document is subsequently produced as evidence of age or citizenship that such document will be perforated, in practice it will mostly be documents such as birth certificates or old type registration certificates establishing age.

SECRET MARKS AND PERFORATING MACHINE

All Administrative District Returning Officers will be issued with the traditional secret marks. These are NOT to be used unless the perforating machine breaks down and a replacement perforater is not available. The British Election Commissioner has issued a paper regarding the secrecy of the voting process which deals with the perforating of ballot papers and the sealing of ballot boxes which is annexed to these instructions as Annexure 'E'.

FOLDING OF BALLOT PAPERS

It has been possible to modify a few of the ballot boxes by increasing the size of the slot. These boxes will be used at the more busy polling stations. When issuing a ballot paper, and after its perforation, and always provided it will not delay the voting process and create long queues, it is suggested that the polling officer fold the ballot paper in such a way that the voter, when he has made his mark, will automatically fold the paper on the same creases to enable it to pass through the slot without tearing. This will also assist when unfolding the ballot papers for counting purposes.



E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS

REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS.

SALISBURY

7th February, 1980.

ELECTORAL ACT, 1979 AS AMENDED

ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT BALLOT PAPER ACCOUNT

FROM : ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT RETURNING OFFICER,  
\_\_\_\_\_ DISTRICT.

TO : ELECTORAL DISTRICT RETURNING OFFICER,  
\_\_\_\_\_ ELECTORAL DISTRICT.

Details of the verification of the ballot in the above Administrative District are as follows:-

Number of Ballot Papers received from the Electoral District Returning Officer .....	Total number of Ballot Papers verified from _____ Polling Stations .....
	Unused Ballot Papers returned ....
	Ballot Papers surrendered .....
Ballot Papers unaccounted for ... _____	Ballot Papers unaccounted for ..... _____
_____	_____
_____	_____

ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT RETURNING OFFICER, \_\_\_\_\_ DISTRICT

PLACE : \_\_\_\_\_

DATE : \_\_\_\_\_

ELECTORAL ACT, 1979 AS AMENDED

APPOINTMENT OF POLLING - COUNTING AGENT

In terms of section 180 (1) of the Electoral Act, 1979, as amended it is hereby notified that

\_\_\_\_\_

has been appointed a polling/counting agent for the \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ political party at the

\_\_\_\_\_ polling station.

\_\_\_\_\_  
ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT  
RETURNING OFFICER

PLACE : \_\_\_\_\_

DATE : \_\_\_\_\_

GUIDANCE ON THE EFFECT OF THE ELECTIONS (PROCEDURE) (NO.2) ORDINANCE  
SECTION 7

1. The Presiding Officer may limit the number of party agents officially present inside the station during the voting to four. The four persons need not all be polling agents. There can be a mixture of election agents, counting agents or polling agents, although in practice polling agents are the most likely.

2. No party can have more than one of its agents in the polling station during the voting. So if one party happens to have, for example, its election agent and its polling agent available, only one of the two could be admitted.

3. It is not in order to have the agent of only one of the parties inside the polling station during the voting. There must be at least two parties represented inside the station. If only one party has an agent available, he must be excluded.

(Note: Rules 2 and 3 above apply in any event, ie whether or not the Presiding Officer is limiting the total number present).

4. The effect of the limitation rule is that if there are only four, three or two agents of different parties available, the Presiding Officer must admit the four, three or two as the case may be. His discretion arises only if there are more than four agents seeking admission. A single agent cannot be admitted and must remain outside, as stated in rule 3.

5. The Presiding Officer must give fair shares to all the parties. Polling and other agents must comply with the Presiding Officer's directions on this matter, although with some co-operation, eg by some agents agreeing to absent themselves until their turn comes, it should be possible to make sensible and equitable arrangements for covering the polling hours whilst restricting numbers present.

6. Polling Agents, whether inside or outside the polling station, must not wear uniform, or carry party labels or identification. They must not talk to voters unless the voter first talks to them. Contravention of these rules constitutes an offence.

7. All agents (and the candidate) are under the general law entitled to see the ballot box shown empty at the beginning of the poll, and to see it closed and sealed at the end of each day. The agents should be allowed to affix their own seals or sign the paper seals in order to assist security. The agents should at the end of each day be invited to record the number of unused ballot paper remaining in the pad of papers in use and to see that this paper is the one which is available for issue on any following day of polling.

**SOUTHERN RHODESIA****The Elections (Procedure) (No. 2) Ordinance 1980**

(Ordinance No. 5 of 1980)

*Soames*

Governor

29th January, 1980

## ENACTED BY THE GOVERNOR

1. (1) This Ordinance may be cited as the Elections (Procedure) (No. 2) Ordinance 1980 and shall be construed as one with the Electoral Ordinances 1979.

Citation and construction.

(2) Section 1 (2) of the Elections (Procedure) Ordinance 1980 is repealed.

(3) This Ordinance, the Electoral Ordinances 1979 and the Elections (Procedure) Ordinance 1980 may be cited together as the Electoral Ordinances 1979 and 1980.

2. (1) For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that different times and places may be fixed under section 78 (1) of the Act for the verification of the statement made under section 66 (2) of the Act and for the counting of votes.

Verification of statements, et cetera.

(2) At the verification of the statement in accordance with section 78 (3) of the Act, the ballot papers shall be counted face downwards so that the printed and marked part of each paper is not visible to the returning officer or any counting officer or any other person.

(3) Section 78 (4) of the Act shall have effect as if, for the words therein "one container", there were substituted the words "one or more containers, as may be necessary"; and, if a time or a place for the verification of the statement has been fixed which is different from that fixed for the counting of the votes, then, when the returning officer responsible for the verification of the statement has complied with the said section 78 (4), he shall seal the container or containers referred to therein with his own seal, and shall permit the Election Commissioner or a member of his staff and such of the candidates or their agents as are present to affix their own seals, and he shall thereafter be responsible for the custody of the container or containers, and shall remain so responsible until they are delivered to the returning officer (if different) responsible for the counting of the votes.

3. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 84 of the Act, the Election Commissioner or a member of his staff may, at any time after the documents referred to in section 84 (2) of the Act have been received by the Registrar-General and before they are transferred by the Governor to the custody of an authority in the United Kingdom in accordance with section 84 (3) of the Act, open or cause to be opened any packet of unused and spoilt ballot papers and may examine the contents of the packet and the statement referred to in section 66 (2) of the Act for the purpose of

Checking and custody of ballot papers.

verifying that statement in so far as it relates to them; and, if he does so, he shall thereafter seal that packet again with his own seal.

(2) For the references to the electoral officer in section 84 of the Act, and in any other provision of the Act relating to the custody and handling of ballot papers and documents connected therewith, there shall be substituted references to the Registrar-General.

Amendment of lists  
of candidates.

4. (1) Any person who claims that his name has been included without his consent in any list of candidates submitted by a party under section 175 (3B) of the Act may, at any time not later than the 11th February 1980, apply to the Registrar-General for the removal of his name from that list and, if the Registrar-General is satisfied as to the correctness of his claim, he shall amend the list accordingly and notify the party concerned; and the Registrar-General shall not exercise, in relation to a person to whom section 175 (5) (b) of the Act applies, the power conferred on him by section 175 (5)—

- (a) before the time for making applications under this subsection has expired; or
- (b) when such a person has made an application under this subsection, before that application has been rejected.

(2) For the reference in section 22 (4) of the Elections (Procedure) Ordinance 1979 to the proviso to section 175 (5) (a) of the Act there shall be substituted a reference to the proviso to section 175 (5) of the Act.

(3) A party which has been registered under section 175 of the Act as a party contesting the elections in an electoral district may, at any time not later than the 12th February 1980, submit an application to the Registrar-General, as provided for in subsection (4), for the late nomination of candidates for that electoral district.

(4) Every application under subsection (3) shall—

- (a) specify each person in respect of whom it is made, that is to say, whose name it is sought to include in the list of candidates nominated for that electoral district which that party submitted under section 175 (3B) of the Act; and
- (b) specify the place in that list in which it is sought to include the name of that person (and, if there is more than one such person and the names of all such persons are sought to be included at the same place in the list, the order among themselves in which they are to be so included); and
- (c) be accompanied by a declaration in respect of each person in respect of whom the application is made that—
  - (i) he was, immediately before the 21st January 1980, detained outside Southern Rhodesia against his will; or
  - (ii) his name is being submitted for inclusion in the list in lieu of the name of a person who has died since the list was originally submitted; or

(iii) his name is being submitted for inclusion in the list in lieu of the name of a person who has made an application under subsection (1).

(5) If the Registrar-General is satisfied, as regards any person in respect of whom an application is made under subsection (3), that he is qualified for election as a member of the House of Assembly in accordance with Schedule 3 to the Constitution of Zimbabwe and that the declaration made in respect of him in accordance with subsection (4) (c) is correct, and if, in a case to which subsection (4) (c) (iii) applies, he is also satisfied as to the correctness of the claim made under subsection (1), he shall include that person's name, in accordance with the application, in the list of candidates nominated by the applicant party for the electoral district concerned under section 175 of the Act, and that list shall have effect accordingly for the purposes of the Act.

5. The provisions of section 65 (2) of the Act shall apply to votes marked by the presiding officer under section 175 (11) of the Act as they apply to votes so marked under section 65 (1) of the Act.

Votes of blind,  
et cetera, voters.

6. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 99 of the Act, the right, under section 180 (1) of the Act, of every registered party to appoint an election agent for each electoral district for which it is registered may be exercised at any time not later than the 12th February 1980.

Appointment of  
agents.

(2) The right, under the said section 180 (1), of every registered party to appoint a counting agent for each administrative district and a polling agent for each polling station may be exercised at any time not later than the 18th February 1980.

7. (1) The presiding officer conducting the poll at a polling station within an electoral district in accordance with Chapter XI of the Act may, notwithstanding section 61 (1) (b) of the Act read together with section 180 (2) of the Act, decline to permit the presence in the polling station, at any one time during the poll, of more than four persons who are election agents, counting agents or polling agents of the parties which are registered as parties contesting the elections in that electoral district:

Election agents,  
counting agents and  
polling agents.

Provided that—

- (i) he shall not in any event permit the presence, at any one time, of more than one agent of any one such party;
- (ii) he shall not in any event permit the presence of an agent of any one such party unless there are present at the same time the agents of at least two other such parties;
- (iii) subject to provisos (i) and (ii), he shall arrange that the right to have agents present in the polling station during the poll is enjoyed as nearly equally as may be by all such parties which seek to avail themselves of it.

(2) For the purpose of giving effect to subsection (1), the presiding officer at a polling station may give such directions as he considers necessary to the agents of the parties contesting the

elections concerning the periods of time during which they may, severally, be present in the polling station and the agents shall, in exercising their right to be present in the polling station, comply with any such directions.

(3) No person who is present in or in the vicinity of a polling station as an agent of a party contesting the elections shall wear any uniform or wear or carry any other outward identification of the party which he represents, nor shall he, unless first addressed by the person concerned, speak to or otherwise communicate with any person who is proceeding to or from the polling station for the purpose of voting or after having voted.

(4) Any person who contravenes any direction given by the presiding officer under subsection (2) or who contravenes subsection (3) shall be guilty of an offence and any such offence shall be deemed to be an illegal practice for the purposes of section 128 of the Act.

Suspension of  
section 161 of the  
Act.

8. (1) Unless the Governor otherwise directs in any particular case, section 161 of the Act shall not have effect in relation to anything which is required to be commenced, concluded or done under Chapter IV, Chapter V or Chapter XI of the Act.

(2) Any direction under this section shall be notified in the *Gazette*.

SECURITY OF THE VOTING PROCESS

1. A number of measures have been introduced to increase the security of the voting process and to make it easier to counter any allegations to the effect that the poll was rigged. These measures are as follows:

PERFORATING INSTRUMENTS

2. In the April 1979 Election, rubber stamps were used to validate ballot papers before they were handed to voters. However, as rubber stamps can be copied easily, perforating instruments have been imported from Britain and these will be used to validate ballot papers with a perforated identification mark immediately before the papers are handed to the voters.

3. Ballot papers must be inserted in the machine, one at a time, and the perforation made through the serial number in the top right-hand corner of the paper. The serial numbers have been so placed that the machine will perforate the number either from the top edge or from the right-hand edge of the ballot paper.

4. Provided the perforating machines are handled properly they should not break-down but, in the event of a failure, the matter should be reported immediately to the District Returning officer so that a replacement can be supplied. Pending the replacement of a perforating machine, rubber stamps will be provided as a fall-back and, where it is necessary to use the rubber stamp, a note must be made of all ballot papers validated with the rubber stamp.

SEALING OF BALLOT BOXES

5. It is anticipated that few of the party agents will possess seals which will enable them (where permitted under the electoral law) to add their own seals to that of the Presiding Officer on the ballot boxes. In order to overcome this difficulty, and otherwise to increase security, rolls of gummed paper, printed with the words "Election Commissioner" will be issued to all Presiding Officers.

6. Before use, the gummed surface of the paper should be wiped with a damp sponge or cloth, and adhesion to the wooden surface of the ballot box is facilitated if the wood itself is also well dampened before the adhesive strip is applied. The paper should then be pressed into position firmly.

7. The method of applying the gummed paper is as follows:

At the start of the poll

(i) A strip should be placed around the ballot box so as to seal the wooden portion of the lid (immediately below the galvanised metal rim) to the box itself. The paper should be started on one side of the hasp for the padlock and continued around the box to the other side of the hasp leaving a small gap in the paper for the hasp itself on the front of the box.

(ii) A second strip should be passed from the middle left-hand side of the box, over the middle of the lid and down the right side of the box for extra security. This should be kept well clear of the aperture for the voting papers.

#### At the Close of the Day's voting

(iii) When ballot boxes are full, and before partially-filled boxes are removed to a place of safety overnight, the aperture in the lid must also be securely sealed with a strip of the gummed sealing paper. A razor blade or a sharp knife will be needed to clear the aperture of unfilled ballot boxes on the following day, and Presiding Officers should provide themselves with a suitable knife or blade.

8. It is vital that in each case when the sealing paper is used, the Presiding Officer, the polling and other party agents present in the polling station should sign their names on the paper so as further to strengthen security.

#### Cording and Sealing of Ballot Boxes at close of Poll

9. After the close of the poll, all ballot boxes will be moved to a place of safety at administrative district headquarters. On arrival at those places of security, the District Election Supervisor will supervise the cording of each ballot box and the sealing of the knot with a special metal seal. Sufficient quantities of the cord and the seals (which have been supplied by HM Stationery Office in Britain) will be provided to each District Election Supervisor.

#### Cording and Sealing of Ballot Boxes between Preliminary and Final Counts

10. After the preliminary count (for reconciliation purposes) at administrative district headquarters, the District Election Supervisor will supervise the sealing (with adhesive paper) and cording (with cord and metal seal) of all ballot boxes used for conveying the ballot papers to the duly appointed places of safety, or places of the count at Provincial (ie electoral district) headquarters.

SUMMARY OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF POLLING AGENTS

Each political party registered in an Electoral District is entitled to appoint one Polling Agent for each polling station in that Electoral District. A person nominated by a party as a Polling Agent will be issued with a Certificate of Appointment by the Administrative District Returning Officer and will be required to sign a declaration of secrecy.

RIGHTS

Every Polling Agent is, upon presentation of his Certificate of Appointment and proof of identity, entitled to:-

- (a) see the ballot box shown empty at the commencement of the poll and witness the padlocking of the boxes;
- (b) subject to the limitation of numbers imposed by law and only in designated stations he may enter the polling stations for which he has been appointed as a Polling Agent for the purpose of witnessing the voting procedure. Whilst in a polling station a Polling Agent is under the instructions of the Presiding Officer and under no circumstances may he be permitted to see how a voter casts or has cast his/her vote. He must take up and stay in whatever position is allocated to him by the Presiding Officer;
- (c) witness the sealing of ballot boxes when filled and at the conclusion of polling on any polling day. He may affix his seal or sign the paper seals to increase security - it is desirable that some agents sign the paper seals. He should also record the number of the unused ballot paper remaining in the pad of papers in use and see that this paper is the one which is for use on any following day of polling;
- (d) examine, at the commencement of the poll on any day subsequent to the first polling day, the ballot box and both the lock and the sealing of the slot and the lid to satisfy himself that the ballot box has in no way been tampered with. He is also entitled to witness the unsealing of the slot for the purpose of that day's polling. On the final day of poll a Polling Agent may witness the final sealing of the ballot box and again sign the paper seal;

- (e) in the case of a mobile polling station, two Polling Agents from different parties may be invited by the Presiding Officer to travel in the same vehicle as the ballot boxes when there is space available. The Polling Agents may also witness the sealing and unsealing of the ballot box before and after each journey between polling points in order to satisfy themselves that the box is properly secured during the time it is in transit;
- (f) at the conclusion of each day's polling two Polling Agents may accompany the ballot boxes to the place of safekeeping and return with the ballot boxes to the polling station the following morning;
- (g) at the close of the poll two Polling Agents from different parties may, if they so wish, accompany the ballot boxes to the place of safekeeping and thence to the place at which the reconciliation of the ballot paper account will take place;
- (h) in the absence of the Election Agent or Counting Agent, one Polling Agent appointed for the purpose from each party is entitled to witness the count at administrative district level, i.e., Polling Agents from different parties may accompany the ballot boxes to the place at which the count will be carried out;
- (i) one Polling Agent appointed for the purpose from each party will be entitled to witness the counting of the votes in the absence of the Election Agent or Counting Agent. Whilst at the place of counting a Polling Agent is under the instructions of the Counting Officer.

#### LIABILITIES

A Polling Agent shall:-

- (a) obey the lawful instructions of either a Returning Officer or a Presiding Officer;
- (b) not interfere with or attempt to interfere with a voter;
- (c) not speak to any voter unless he is first addressed by the voter;
- (d) in accordance with the Declaration of Secrecy he may not communicate at any time to any person any information obtained in a polling station;

- (e) not at the counting of votes attempt to ascertain any number on any ballot paper or communicate any information obtained at such counting as to the candidate for whom any vote is given in any particular ballot papers;
- (f) maintain and aid in maintaining the secrecy of the voting at all times;
- (g) not wear uniform or carry party labels or identification, whether inside or outside the polling station.

EXAMPLES OF PUBLICITY MATERIAL  
OF THE NATIONAL ELECTION DIRECTORATE



# **1980 is the year of the new Zimbabwe**

A new Constitution has been agreed for Zimbabwe by an all-party conference in London. We must now vote again to elect a new Government. Once the election has been held, Zimbabwe will become legally independent. The process of lifting sanctions has already begun. The Governor is here to ensure that Government services continue to operate effectively whilst your political leaders conduct their election campaigns. The Governor's task will be complete when the new Government has been elected. He will then return to Britain.

Everything depends upon the elections being seen to be free and fair. The world is watching. The prize of a better and more peaceful future for all the people of our country depends upon the forthcoming election being seen to be free and fair. Under the new Government, Zimbabwe will have the opportunity to take its rightful place among the nations of the world.

**YOUR VOTE IS YOUR RIGHT.  
USE IT.**



**INDEPENDENCE ELECTION  
1980**

# **YOUR VOTE IS SECRET.**

**You are the only  
one who will ever know  
for whom you voted.**

**Your vote is completely secret.  
But it is vital that you use your vote to  
choose a black majority Government.**


**DO NOT BE AFRAID TO VOTE.**

**YOUR VOTE IS YOUR RIGHT.  
USE IT.**



INDEPENDENCE ELECTION  
1980

# YOUR VOTE IS YOUR SECRET.



**YOUR VOTE IS YOUR RIGHT.  
USE IT.**



INDEPENDENCE ELECTION  
1980

# Women can vote



**USE YOUR VOTE  
IT IS FOR ZIMBABWE**



INDEPENDENCE ELECTION  
1980

# Now to vote for the new Zimbabwe

All men and women 18 years and older who were born in this country have the right to vote. Also all men and women 18 years and older who were born outside this country and who have become citizens, have the right to vote.

You may vote at any polling station anywhere in the country. Your vote is secret. You may vote for any party, but only you will know for which party you have voted.

**Vote for our new government.**

**Vote for Zimbabwe.**


**USE YOUR VOTE. IT IS SECRET.**



ZIMBABWE NEEDS YOUR VOTE

INDEPENDENCE ELECTION  
1980

# Where to vote



"James, is it true there is a special place where we can vote in secret?"

"Ben, my friend, because your vote is secret, there must be a 'special place to go and place your vote.'"

"But how will I know where to go? It's too far to go to Harare."

"Ben, that is why there are more than a thousand places to vote in Zimbabwe. There will be mobile voting stations travelling around the country."

"But will I know where to go?"


"You will hear. All the people will be told where their nearest voting station is. Then you will be able to join all the other people of Zimbabwe in voting for your choice of government."

**USE YOUR VOTE  
IT IS FOR ZIMBABWE**



**INDEPENDENCE ELECTION  
1980**

# You can vote without fear



**YOUR VOTE IS YOUR RIGHT.  
AND IT IS SECRET.**



# Where you can vote

There will be more than 1 000 places all over the country where you can make your vote. There will be a place near you.

If you live far from towns or cities, the polling stations will be brought to your area.

Vote for our new Government.  
Vote for Zimbabwe.

**USE YOUR VOTE FOR THE NEW ZIMBABWE  
YOUR VOTE IS YOUR RIGHT**



**INDEPENDENCE ELECTION  
1980**

# **WHEN TO VOTE**

Voting for the 20 white members of Parliament will take place on 14th February, 1980. Only registered voters on the white voters' roll (including coloureds and Asians) will be able to vote in this election.

The election for the 80 black members of Parliament will take place on 27th, 28th and 29th February, 1980.

For the purpose of this election the persons who will be entitled to vote will be all persons, male and female, over the age of eighteen years who are either black citizens of Rhodesia or who are black non-citizens but who have been permanently resident in Rhodesia for a continuous period of two years before the date of the election.

**THERE WILL BE A PLACE TO VOTE  
NEAR YOU - USE YOUR VOTE.  
IT IS YOUR RIGHT.**

TRANSLATION OF SOUNDTRACK OF "HOW TO VOTE" FILMPRESENTER:

Greetings Beloved People,

You all remember the elections held in April, 1979.

That was the first occasion in the history of Zimbabwe Rhodesia that all men and women were entitled to vote. Throughout the country many people voted, not because voting is compulsory, but because they knew that their votes would produce a black majority rule government, thus taking the initial step towards international recognition.

The British Government noted this development and, in response to its invitation, representatives of all political parties of Zimbabwe Rhodesia attended a Conference at Lancaster House in London. That Conference has produced an Independence Constitution for our country which has been accepted by all of the parties concerned. Under this Independence Constitution it is necessary now to hold another election so that the resulting black majority rule government can obtain international recognition for our country as a free and independent nation.

We must demonstrate to all that we are both ready and determined to take our place among the free and independent nations of the world. Further, that we intend to create conditions in which all of us can enjoy peace, stability, harmony and prosperity.

The voting procedures will be the same as before. Please exercise your right to vote and remember that your vote remains absolutely secret.

NARRATOR:

What exactly is voting? How do we vote? Where do we vote? How do we set about it?

Let's see.

First of all - where to vote.

On polling day, there will be a place near your home, where you can go and cast your vote.....your local Common Roll Polling Station.

It could be a building like this.....

or the council hall.....

the local school.....

a church hall.....

a District Commissioner's protected office.....any suitable building in your area.

And where there are no suitable buildings, mobile polling stations will visit the district.

Wherever you go, the voting procedure will be the same.

Now, let's see what happens at the polling station.

Outside the polling station, there will be notices clearly explaining the voting procedure in your own language.

At the entrance to the polling station, a Polling Officer may wish to check the voter's identity, to satisfy himself that you are over eighteen, and that you have lived in the country for two years.

People who are in any way incapacitated should not hesitate to go along and cast their votes. They will receive a sympathetic response, like this blind man. It is only necessary to bring along a relative or trusted friend. His identification is in order; he passes on to the next stage.

One-man-one-vote of course means voting once only and to make sure that no voter votes twice, each voter is asked to take part in a

special test. If he has already voted at some other polling station, this test will reveal it.

All clear. Now the voter dips his fingers into a special solution that is quite harmless and dries out quickly. This will stay on the fingers for several days and if the voter puts his hands in the testing box again it will show up and prove that he has already been to a polling station. This test is also used in other African countries during elections.

The voter is now ready to collect his ballot paper. What does a ballot paper look like?

It looks something like this. The names of parties participating in the election appear on the left side of the paper. These are not the real names of the parties. We are using made-up names of the parties, to show you how the voting is done and we're calling the parties "A" party, "B" party, "C" party and "D" party.

The initials of the parties appear in the column next to the names of the parties - in this case, "AP, BP, CP and DP".

The symbol of each party appears next to the initials.

On the right hand side we have an empty block next to the symbol of each party. The voter will put his cross in the block next to the party he is voting for. We shall see in a minute how the cross must be made.

The Polling Officer will place a special mark on the ballot paper. Each polling station will have its own individual mark to prevent forgeries - this mark will ensure that the voter returns the same paper that he is given.

Your vote is secret. No one will know how a voter votes. The voter goes to a polling booth where he will mark his paper in private - nobody will be able to see how he votes.

The voter marks his paper by putting a cross next to the name and symbol of the party he is voting for. He mustn't write his name or anything else on the paper - just a simple cross - that's all.

The paper is then folded so that only the mark shows on the outside. The Presiding Officer checks the special mark. He is satisfied, and the ballot paper is placed in the ballot box. This voter's vote has now been cast and it's the next one's turn.

Every voter goes through the same voting process. First, the hand test. Then the paper is stamped and the voter takes it to the private booth. The voter places a cross next to the name of the party of her choice - just that and nothing else.

The paper is correctly folded so that only the special mark shows.

The paper is checked and placed in the ballot box.

This voter places his cross next to the name of the party he supports.

And folds his paper correctly.

And another vote is cast.

People who cannot read or write should not find voting difficult.

This voter can't read, but she is familiar with her party's symbol and places her cross in the right block. But she isn't folding that paper too well.

The paper has been incorrectly folded so that the special mark can't be seen. The Presiding Officer helps the lady to fold it correctly so that the mark can be seen - but not how she voted. Correctly folded, the paper is placed in the ballot box.

Even a blind man, or anyone else who might in any way be incapacitated, can vote with the aid of a trusted friend or relative.

He goes through the same process as any other voter, and finds the officials patient and understanding.

It may take a little more patience than usual but the officials are glad to help.

Inside the booth, the blind man instructs his friend for which party to cast his vote and his paper is marked for him. Which party did he vote for? Only the blind man and his friend know that.

Everyone who is entitled to vote should go along on polling day and cast his or her vote.

When all the votes are in, the papers are counted at a central depot. Nobody can tell from these papers who voted for whom - all that the officials can see are the crosses the voters have made next to the names of the parties they support. When the final results are in, the papers are locked away and kept for a year, in case there are any queries and they have to be re-counted.

After the year is up, the papers are taken away and burned - the final act in keeping your vote secret.

Let's have a quick look once again at how to vote.

You may vote once only - a test will show whether a person has already voted or not.

The ballot paper is stamped with a special mark to prevent forgeries.

You vote in secret and put only a cross on the ballot paper in the empty space next to the name and symbol of the party you support.

Fold the paper so that the inside cannot be seen and only the special mark on the outside shows.

Your paper is then checked and placed in the ballot box.

Remember, our future is now in our hands - it depends on how we vote.

This is what we've always wanted - we are ALL going to vote.

INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH POLICE OFFICERS ASSIGNED AS  
ASSISTANT ELECTION SUPERVISORS TO POLLING STATIONS

1. Your function, simply, is to see fair play in the polling station to which you are assigned - to see that the various stages of the voting process are fairly and impartially administered. You will quickly discover that a major element in this election is the widespread mistrust and suspicion. You are in the polling station as a mark of confidence to voters that the rules will be scrupulously followed and that the secrecy of their votes is completely guaranteed.

2. You are not there to enforce law and order as you would be in a British election. That is the responsibility of the British South Africa Police.

3. The law governing these elections is similar to that in Britain, but you will find many differences in the actual voting process. These arise mainly from the fact that there is no register of voters, such as we have in Britain. In consequence every voter goes through a six stage process, as follows :-

(i) Identification

Difficult questions may arise here, particularly whether a potential voter is eighteen or not. The final decision lies with the Presiding Officer and if he is not satisfied he is entitled to call for documentary evidence. You should satisfy yourself that he is generally exercising his discretion fairly and impartially.

(ii) Checking

All voters are required to put their hands in an ultra violet light device to check that they have not already been marked as having voted previously. You should observe that this is done.

(iii) Marking of Voters

All voters are next required to dip both hands in a colourless marking fluid, which will show up under the ultra violet light should they attempt to vote a second time. You should see that no one is allowed to by-pass this stage.

(iv) Ballot Papers

You will need to observe that only ONE ballot paper is issued to each voter and that it is duly authenticated by the perforating machine.

(v) Marking of Ballot Papers

You should observe that all voters are left to mark their ballot papers within the polling booth in complete privacy. The Presiding Officer alone may, on request, assist a blind, disabled or illiterate voter. You should note whether any intimidation or undue influence, express or implied, occurs at any time within the polling station.

(vi) Casting the Vote

You should observe that voters fold their ballot papers so that the authenticating perforations are visible for checking as the vote is cast without in any way prejudicing the secrecy of the voter's mark.

4. You should observe whether, once voting starts, the security of the ballot box is preserved.
5. You should be aware that the Presiding Officer is in charge of the polling station and that he is legally responsible for the administration of polling procedure.
6. Should you encounter any irregularities you should report them at once to the British Election Supervisor for your District.

C. M. CARRUTHERS  
ASST. ELECTION COMMISSIONER

SUMMARY OF DUTIES OF BRITISH ELECTION SUPERVISORS

1. The Election Supervisor shall familiarise himself with the Rhodesia Electoral Act 1979, as amended by Governor's Ordinance for the 1980 Election.
2. He shall consult with the Provincial/District Commissioner about all the arrangements being made for the forthcoming election, attend any planning meetings for this purpose and monitor action taken by the appropriate authorities.
3. He shall make himself familiar with the area to which he is assigned, travelling as widely as circumstances permit. In this he shall take the advice of the Provincial/District Authorities on the security situation and on any measures necessary for his safety.
4. He shall endeavour to contact such Chiefs, Committees, Associations, Community organisations or other bodies as may reflect the views of any section of the community in his area. In this he shall include such concentrations of the people as occur at Protected Villages, Markets, Police posts, Government camps, Schools, Missions, etc.
5. He shall identify the major concentrations of the population and satisfy himself that election plans will permit them to vote freely and fairly. Should facilities not prove possible in any areas he should satisfy himself as to the reasons for this and be prepared to explain any such deficiency.
6. He shall visit all the proposed polling station sites and satisfy himself that these make adequate provision for the people to vote.
7. He shall contact local agents of the contesting political parties and meet with them regularly to ascertain any view they may have on the arrangements for the elections.
8. He shall endeavour to listen in on some political meetings of all the contesting parties to satisfy himself that "undue influence" is not being exerted upon the electorate.
9. He shall take all steps necessary to monitor the campaigns of the parties, in whatever form they are conducted, to satisfy himself that intimidation is not being used. He should report any doubts he may have to the Provincial/District Authorities and to the office of the British Election Commissioner.
10. He shall visit all Polling Stations at least once during polling and satisfy himself that all procedures are being correctly followed by polling station staff, that the duties of all officials (including security staff) are being carried out with total impartiality and that party agents are exerting no "undue influence" upon voters.

11. He shall attend and supervise the counting of votes and satisfy himself that all procedures are being correctly applied, that the total secrecy of the votes is preserved, that decisions relating to spoilt papers are consistent with the law, and that party agents' rights at the count are not being curtailed, abused or exceeded.

12. He shall report on the discharge of his responsibilities to the British Election Commissioner in such manner and with such frequency as may from time to time be requested of him.

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The Ministry of Home Affairs will have advised all their staff to co-operate with the British Election Commissioner and his staff and specifically that:

A. Provincial/District Commissioners shall brief Election Supervisors upon all their preparations for the Election, upon their experience of the previous election and shall associate them with all further arrangements for the 1980 Election.

B. Provincial/District Commissioners, to the extent that their resources permit, shall assist the Election Supervisors over such matters as transport, escorts, interpreters, accommodation, communications, secretarial services and any other facilities which may be necessary for the proper discharge of their duties.

C. The Provincial/District Authorities shall keep Election Supervisors informed of the overall situation in their areas of responsibility and shall give such advice as they deem necessary for the safety of the supervisors. They shall also inform the supervisors of all incidents or developments which may have any bearing upon the conduct of the Election.

EXAMPLES OF PARTY ADVERTISEMENTS  
INDICATING METHOD OF VOTING


ADVERTISEMENT

# VOTE PF




## For Land, Peace, Unity and Prosperity

# VOTE



Inserted by Mr. W. Musarurwa, Publicity Director, Vanguard House, Railway Avenue, Salisbury.

# MAKE JANUARY 27, 1980



# A DAY OF NATIONAL CELEBRATIONS AT ZIMBABWE GROUNDS ZANU (P.F.)

PUBLISHED BY THE INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY COMMITTEE ELECTIONS DIRECTORATE ZANU(PF), 88 MANICA ROAD, SALISBURY

**BEA  
WINNER**



**X**

**VOTE UANC**

ELECTION (PROCEDURE) (NO.3) ORDINANCE 1979  
(NO.9 OF 1980) SHOWING SCHEDULE OF POLLING  
STATIONS TO WHICH PARTY POLLING AGENTS  
GRANTED ACCESS,

**SOUTHERN RHODESIA**  
**The Elections (Procedure) (No. 3) Ordinance 1980**  
(Ordinance No. 9 of 1980)

*Soames*

Governor

21st February, 1980

**ENACTED BY THE GOVERNOR**

1. (1) This Ordinance may be cited as the Elections (Procedure) (No. 3) Ordinance 1980 and shall be construed as one with the Electoral Ordinances 1979.

Citation and  
construction.

(2) Section 1 (3) of the Elections (Prevention of Disruptive Activities) (No. 2) Ordinance 1980 is repealed.

(3) This Ordinance and the Ordinances referred to in the said section 1 (3) may be cited together as the Electoral Ordinances 1979 and 1980.

2. (1) Section 41 (1) (a) of the Act shall be modified by the deletion of the words "not less than thirty and not more than fifty" and the substitution therefor of the words "not less than ten and not more than twenty".

Modification of  
section 41 of the Act.

(2) In section 41 (7) of the Act the words "and the provisions of subsection (14) shall apply" shall be deleted.

(3) Section 41 (14) of the Act shall be deleted.

3. Section 6 (2) of the Elections (Procedure) (No. 2) Ordinance 1980 shall be amended by the deletion of the words "not later than the 18th February 1980" and the substitution therefor of the words "not later than the 22nd February 1980".

Appointment of  
agents.

4. (1) Section 7 of the Elections (Procedure) (No. 2) Ordinance 1980 is repealed.

Election agents,  
counting agents and  
polling agents.

(2) The presiding officer conducting the poll in accordance with Chapter XI of the Act in a polling station to which this subsection applies may, notwithstanding section 61 (1) (b) of the Act, decline to permit the presence in the polling station, at any one time during the poll, of more than four persons who are election agents, counting agents or polling agents of the parties which are registered as parties contesting the elections in the electoral district concerned:

Provided that—

- (i) he shall not in any event permit the presence, at any one time, of more than one agent of any one such party;
- (ii) he shall not in any event permit the presence of an agent of any one such party unless there is present at the same time the agent of at least one other such party;

(iii) subject to provisos (i) and (ii), he shall arrange that the right to have agents present in the polling station during the poll is enjoyed as nearly equally as may be by all such parties which seek to avail themselves of it.

(3) For the purpose of giving effect to subsection (2), the presiding officer at a polling station to which that subsection applies may give such directions as he considers necessary to the agents of the parties contesting the elections concerning the periods of time during which they may, severally, be present in the polling station, and the agents shall, in exercising their right to be present in the polling station, comply with any such directions.

(4) The polling stations to which subsection (2) applies are the polling stations which are for the time being designated in the Schedule to this Ordinance.

(5) The Governor may by order, which shall be notified in the *Gazette*, amend the Schedule to this Ordinance.

(6) Notwithstanding section 61 (1) (b) of the Act but without prejudice to sections 60 (1) (b), 60 (4) and 66 (1) (a) of the Act, no election agent, counting agent or polling agent of a party contesting the elections in any electoral district shall be permitted to be present during the poll in a polling station other than one to which subsection (2) applies.

(7) No person who is present in or in the vicinity of a polling station as an agent of a party contesting the elections shall wear any uniform or wear or carry any other outward identification of the party which he represents, nor shall he, unless first addressed by the person concerned, speak to or otherwise communicate with any person who, for the purpose of voting or after having voted, is in or is proceeding to or from the polling station.

(8) Any person who contravenes any direction given by the presiding officer under subsection (3) or who contravenes subsection (7) shall be guilty of an offence, and any such offence shall be deemed to be a corrupt practice for the purposes of section 115 of the Act for which the penalty shall be the same as for the offence of personation.

(9) Subsection (5) of section 61 of the Act shall apply for the purposes of this section as it applies for the purposes of the said section 61.

Further invigilation  
at polling  
stations.

5. (1) Without prejudice to the generality of section 61 (1) (b) of the Act as modified by section 6 (3) of the Election Commissioner and Election Council Ordinance 1979, the Election Commissioner may appoint persons assisting him to be present during the poll in such polling stations as he may direct for the purpose of invigilating the conduct of the poll and other matters incidental thereto, and thereafter to report to him thereon.

(2) Any person who is appointed to be present in a polling station in accordance with subsection (1) shall have the duty of observing whether the poll is so conducted that no voter is subjected to any duress or undue influence or other improper pressure in respect of how he casts his vote and that all relevant rules with respect to the secrecy of his vote are duly complied with; and all officers and authorities having responsibility for or otherwise concerned in the conduct of the poll at that polling station shall

co-operate with that person in his discharge of that duty and shall give him such assistance therein as he may require.

6. (1) Without prejudice to—

- (a) any other provision of law with respect to the maintenance of law and order; or
- (b) any provision of the Act with respect to corrupt or illegal practices;

Activities forbidden  
in vicinity of  
polling  
stations.

no person shall, within one hundred metres of any polling station, engage in any of the activities to which this section applies.

(2) The activities to which this section applies are convoking or taking part in any gathering of more than twelve persons; canvassing for votes; uttering slogans, displaying posters or placards or displaying or distributing leaflets relating to the elections; organizing or engaging in public singing or dancing; and using bands of music or loudspeaker vans or apparatus.

(3) Any person who contravenes subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding nine months, or to both such fine and imprisonment.

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (15) of section 175 of the Act, the returning officer for each electoral district shall, having carried out the functions described in paragraph (a) of that subsection, inform the Registrar-General of the results thereof; and the functions vested in that returning officer by paragraphs (b) and (c) of that subsection shall then be carried out instead by the Registrar-General.

Counting of  
votes.

SCHEDULE

POLLING STATIONS TO WHICH SECTION 4 (2) APPLIES

*Bulawayo*

Mzilikazi, Macdonald Hall  
Makokobo, Stanley Hall  
Njube, Njube Community Hall  
Iminyela, Community Hall  
Lobengula, Brethren in Christ Church Hall  
Luveve, Community Hall  
Tshabalala, Tshabalala Youth Club  
Old Magwegwe, Community Hall  
New Mangwe, House 4127, Link Road, Magwegwe North  
Pumula, Community Hall  
Matshobana, Railway Community Hall  
Sizinda, Railway Community Hall  
Mpopoma, Mpopoma Community Hall  
Bellevue, former T.M.B. Offices  
Hillside, Women's Institute Hall  
Drill Hall, District Commissioner's Office  
City, Small City Hall  
North End, Scout Hall  
Kumalo, Milton School  
Queens Park, Queens Park Scout Hall  
Thorngrove, 19, Khami Road  
Belmont, 3, Falcon Street  
Donnington, Mafeking Road  
Matsheumphlope, Leaside Store  
Drill Hall, Mobile I  
Drill Hall, Mobile II  
Drill Hall, Mobile III  
Drill Hall, Mobile IV  
Drill Hall, Mobile V  
Drill Hall, Mobile VI

*Salisbury*

Glen Lorne Shopping Centre  
Lakeside Service Station  
Warren Hills Golf Club  
Highlands Municipal Offices  
Rhodesville, St. Luke's Church  
Newlands Shopping Centre, Marquee  
Sherwood Drive, Church Hall  
Borrowdale Scout Hall  
Guide Hall, Oriel (opposite School)  
Greystone Park Shopping Centre, empty shop  
Marlborough Scout Hall  
Avonlea, Presbyterian Hall  
Milton Park, Scout Hall, Lezard Avenue  
Mount Pleasant Catholic Church Hall, Pendennis Road  
Strathaven, Gospel Church  
Postals Sports, Second Street  
Rhodes Memorial Hall, Colquhoun Street  
Market Square, District Commissioner's Office  
Parktown Area Office  
Waterfalls, 7 Mile Hotel  
Hatfield, Hall  
Hatfield, Scout Hall  
Churchill School Cricket Pavilion, Eastlea  
Scout Hall, McChlery Avenue  
Raylton Club, Fifth Street  
Arcadia, Community Centre  
St. John Ambulance, King's Crescent  
Queensdale Shopping Centre, empty shop  
Braeside, Scout Hall  
Belvedere, Roads Training Centre  
Scout Hall, Snowdon Road, Belvedere  
Greendale, Beverley Rocks Motel  
Greendale, Scout Hall  
Southerton Shopping Centre, empty shop  
Workington, Coventry Road  
Stodart Gymnasium  
Harare, Old Superintendent's Office  
Harare, Chinembiri Vocational Training Centre  
Highfield, Old Highfield Social Centre  
Highfield, Zimbabwe Social Centre  
Highfield, Zororo Social Centre  
Highfield, Kuwudzana Centre  
Glen Norah Social Centre  
Glen Norah, Marquee near Primary School  
Dzivaresekwa Community Hall  
Tafara, Tafara Hall  
Mabvuku, Rufaro Hall  
Mabvuku, Area "D" Club-room  
Kambuzuma Social Centre Area "2"  
Mufakose, Rutenda Hall  
Mufakose, Area "E" Social Centre  
Mufakose, Area "J" Social Centre  
Rugare, Welfare Hall  
Parkhill Shopping Centre, Pendennis/Braemar roads  
Quinnington, Anglican Church, Wheeldon Avenue  
Industrial Mobile I  
Industrial Mobile II  
Industrial Mobile III  
Industrial Mobile IV  
Industrial Mobile V  
Industrial Mobile VI  
Industrial Mobile VII  
Industrial Mobile VIII  
Industrial Mobile IX  
Industrial Mobile X

CORRESPONDENCE WITH ELECTION  
COMMISSIONER CONCERNING ACCESS  
TO POLLING STATIONS BY PARTY  
AGENTS

# Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat

First Floor,  
36, Jameson Avenue,  
Salisbury.  
Telephone: 793281/2.


20 February 1980

My dear Sir John,

My colleagues and I this morning discussed the implication of the decision announced at yesterday's meeting of the Election Council concerning a proposed change in the law so as to exclude party representatives from polling stations. As you know, para. 38 of the Pre-independence arrangements provides that each party is to be entitled to have one representative at each polling station "to observe the polling". We wish to place on record our disquiet at this proposed change although we appreciate the reasons that lie behind it. It seems to us that a party representative cannot "observe the polling" if he is outside and cannot see it take place. A laudable feature of the arrangements for the elections has been the participation of party representatives to satisfy themselves that irregularities are not taking place. This my colleagues and I most warmly applaud, and it is why it causes us concern when a decision is taken to exclude them. Had this decision received the positive support of all the main parties contesting the elections, I would not be writing to you in this vein. However this is not the position, and it is our sincere hope that whatever decision is finally taken on this important matter has the unanimous approval of all the principal parties.

On the question of the distribution of propaganda through official sources raised in my letter of 17 February, we understand that on 16 February a plane was dropping such pamphlets together with official material in Mucheke township, Fort Victoria. Further, when one of our Group visited the Glenlivet Hotel, Victoria Province yesterday he found piles of the offending leaflets, together with official material, being distributed there. The impression was that all the material had been delivered to the hotel at the one time.

Yours sincerely,

  
Rajeshwar Dayal,  
Chairman.

Sir John Boynton,  
Election Commissioner.

OFFICE OF THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER

Burroughs House, Gordon Avenue  
P.O. Box 4524. Telephone: 793211  
Salisbury.

25 February 1980

Ambassador R Dayal  
Chairman  
Commonwealth Observer Group Secretariat  
First Floor  
36 Jameson Avenue  
Salisbury

Dear Ambassador Dayal,


Polling Agents

Thank you for your letter of 20 February. We do not think that the change made in the law which excludes party polling agents from rural polling stations, contravenes the provisions of para. 38 of the pre-independence arrangements. This gave an entitlement to have representatives at each polling station and not in each polling station. In those cases where polling agents are excluded, there will be a British police officer present throughout the whole of the time of the poll. Polling agents will be entitled to be outside the station and to see the ballot boxes open at the beginning of the poll, sealed up and closed at the end of each days polling. They will be entitled to sign the paper tape and/or to affix their seals.

You will know that when this matter was raised with the Election Council the majority of the parties were prepared to see polling agents excluded from all polling stations. Only the Patriotic Front party and ZANU(PF) raised objections. I think that the position which now obtains is a reasonable result which will work well in practice. In urban areas the polling agents will be entitled to be present subject to the restrictions on numbers imposed by law. In rural areas their rights are limited but a British police officer will be present at all times.

Your letter also raised the question of offending leaflets and I have replied telling you of the instructions which the Governor has given in regard to this matter.

Yours sincerely,



Election Commissioner

CHECKLIST FOR POLLING STATION VISITS BYOBSERVERS AND ASSISTANTSCOMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP

36, Jameson Avenue, Salisbury Telephone No. 793281/2

PROVINCE	ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT	LOCATION OF STATION	STATIC OR MOBILE

TIME ARRIVED	TIME LEFT	APPROX. VOTERS PROCESSED	POLITICAL PARTIES REPRESENTED AT STATION (tick as appropriate)						
			UANC	PF	ZANU (PF)	ZDP	ZANU (SITHOLE)	OTHERS	

COMMENTS

1. ADEQUATE FACILITIES?
2. APPROXIMATE WAITING TIME:
3. VOTING PROCEDURES FOLLOWED?
4. ATTITUDE OF POLLING STAFF?
5. ELIGIBILITY PROCEDURES WORKING?
6. INSTANCES OF ATTEMPTED DUAL VOTING?
7. BALLOT BOX SECURE?
8. ORDERLY BEHAVIOUR NEAR STATION?
9. INTERFERENCE?
10. SECRECY?
11. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS (POLICE/ARMY etc.)?
12. ANY OTHER COMMENTS (Continue overleaf if necessary)

Name of Observer: \_\_\_\_\_

Date:

COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUPDAILY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR OBSERVERS AND ASSISTANTS

1. Were you satisfied that adequate facilities had been provided for each voter to vote? If the answer is NO provide details.

NOTE:

Static polling stations will normally be set up in a school, office or other convenient building. It will be staffed by one presiding officer (normally a civil servant) and up to three poll clerks (often teachers). Because the polling station is usually in a small room there will not be space for the agents of the parties to be present in the room. They may have to remain outside where they can keep count of the number of voters who enter and hopefully observe proceedings through an open window.

Polling stations should not be set up in police stations or any facilities used by the security forces.

Polling stations should be located so that each voter will have adequate time to travel from his place of residence to the polling station and return home during the hours of daylight. Static polling stations must remain open from 0700 - 1600 hours in rural areas on each of the three polling days.

Mobile polls are kept open until the presiding officer is satisfied that all voters in the area have voted. Under such circumstances a mobile poll might move two or three times per day.

2. (a) Were proper voting procedures followed at the polling stations?

(b) List any specific instances where, in your opinion, the proper procedures were not followed and give details.

NOTE:

It must be remembered that there is no roll or list of electors and voters may cast their ballot at any polling station. All persons, male and female, over the age of eighteen years who are either black citizens of Rhodesia or who are black non-citizens who have been permanently resident in Rhodesia for a continuous period of two years before the date of the election are eligible to vote. The following voting procedure should be carried out at each polling station:

(a) The voter is subject to a physical search for weapons on entering the polling station compound.

(b) The voter is observed, and, if necessary, questioned on eligibility to vote. Young voters may be asked to produce a birth certificate or baptism certificate, but the poll clerks, who are often teachers, are usually able to judge if a person is eighteen. If there is any doubt they may be asked to go away and return with proof of age. The same applies when there is doubt as to citizenship.

(c) If accepted, the voter places both hands in a machine which can detect the invisible marking fluid on his or her fingers.

(d) If accepted, the fingers of both hands are immersed in the invisible marking fluid.

(e) The voter is then given a ballot which is validated by a punch (or perforator) in the top right-hand corner.

(f) The voter enters the polling booth, marks the ballot paper, folds it and personally places the folded ballot in the ballot box.

(g) The voter leaves the polling station.

3. Did you observe any instances where voters tried to vote a second time? If so, give details.

NOTE:

This should not occur because when the voter places his hands in the small machine containing the ultra violet light, the colourless fluid in which his hands were immersed when he previously voted will cause his hands to take on a white glow.

4. Were you satisfied that no voters were turned away from the polling station by the election officials because of early closing of the poll?

NOTE:

The Electoral Act states "the presiding officer shall permit every voter who, at the time fixed for the closing of the polling station concerned -

(a) is inside the room, tent, vehicle or other place in which the ballot box is placed; or

(b) in his opinion, was in the immediate precincts of the polling station and was prevented from entering the room, tent or vehicle or other place in which the ballot box is placed owing to congestion therein to record his vote before closing the polling station."

5. Blind and other physically handicapped voters, who are unable to mark a ballot themselves, cannot be accompanied into the polling booth by a friend to assist them in marking the ballot. Instead, the presiding officer will mark the ballot in accordance with the direction given by the voter. Were you satisfied that this procedure was carried out properly on all occasions? If not, give details.

6. The voter who is unable to read or write may request assistance from the presiding officer in marking his ballot. Were you satisfied that this procedure was carried out properly on all occasions and that the ballot was marked in accordance with the wishes of the voter?

7. Were you satisfied as to the security of the ballot box and its contents at all times, both during the hours of voting, overnight, between polling days and until delivery to the Administrative District Returning Officer for the official count? If the answer is NO, provide details.

NOTE:

The Electoral Act states that not more than thirty minutes before the commencement of the poll on the first polling day, the presiding officer shall show the interior of the empty ballot box to such election officials and agents of political parties who are entitled to be present. The ballot box is then closed and locked with a padlock, which must remain locked until the box is opened for the counting of the ballots.

At the close of the poll on each polling day the presiding officer shall seal the slot, through which the ballot papers enter the ballot box, in the presence of the agents of the political parties. The agents of the political parties can either place their own signature on that seal or add their own party seal.

The ballot box is then taken to the local police station or some other secure place under police guard. Agents of the various political parties may accompany the move of the ballot box to the secure place.

In the morning of each subsequent voting day it is returned to the polling station, where the seal on the ballot box may be examined by all persons entitled to be present at the poll, and on being satisfied that the seal is intact the presiding officer will break the seal and voting will resume. The same procedure will be followed on the final day of the poll when ballot boxes will be returned to the Administrative District Returning Officer for the official count.

Party agents may accompany the ballot boxes during all movement and storage.

8. Did you observe any interference by the police or any other persons with a voter attempting to enter a polling station and cast his or her ballot? If the answer is YES, provide details.

NOTE:

In this regard, it should be pointed out that police should not be used at the doors of polling stations to check on the eligibility of voters.

9. Did you observe any instances of any pressure being brought to bear on the voters during the process of voting in an attempt to influence his or her vote? If the answer is YES, provide details.

COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP

DEBRIEFING - OVERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR  
OBSERVERS AND ASSISTANTS

PROVINCE	ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT/S COVERED
NAME & NATIONALITY (PLEASE PRINT)	

1. Total hours spent in and at polling station:
2. Approximate number of voters witnessed voting:
3. Approximate mileage travelled in District/s:       Kms/       miles
4. Total number of different polling stations visited (excluding repeats):
5. Total number of visits paid to polling stations (including repeats):
6. Did you encounter any difficulty entering polling stations? If so, please give details:
7. From your observations, was supervision by the British Supervisors of a high standard? If not, please give details:
8. From your observations, was organisation by the District Commissioner or Provincial Commissioner of a high standard? If not, please give details:
9. Were you satisfied as to the impartiality of polling staff? If the answer is NO, please give details:
10. What was the degree of representation at polling stations by political parties?

UANC	PF	ZANU (PF)	ZANU (Sithole)	ZDP	OTHERS
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(Mark your estimate in each box giving from 10 points for total coverage down to 0 for none).

11. Were you satisfied from what you saw that the eligible voters in the areas you visited had an adequate opportunity to cast their votes? E.g. were the polling stations, in the event, capable of handling the numbers who wished to vote and were they correctly and conveniently sited? If NO, please provide details.
12. a) Were proper voting procedures followed at the polling stations?  
b) List any specific instances where in your opinion, the proper procedures were not followed and give details.

13. Did you observe any instances where voters tried to vote a second time? If so, give details:
14. Were you satisfied that no voters were turned away from the polling station by the election officials because of early closing of the poll on the final day? If not, how many were to your knowledge denied the chance to vote, and at which polling station?
15. Blind and other physically handicapped voters, who are unable to make a ballot themselves, could not be accompanied into the polling booth by a friend to assist them in marking the ballot. Instead, the presiding officer was to mark the ballot in accordance with the direction given by the voter. Were you satisfied that this procedure was carried out properly on all occasions? If not give details.
16. The voter who was unable to read or write was able to request assistance from the presiding officer in marking his ballot. Were you satisfied that this procedure was carried out properly on all occasions and that the ballot was marked in accordance with the wishes of the voter?
17. Were you satisfied as to the security of the ballot box and its contents at all times, both during the hours of voting, overnight, between polling days and until delivery to the Administrative District Returning Officer for the official count? If the answer is NO, provide details.
18. Did you observe any interference by any person with a voter on his way to a polling station to cast his or her ballot? If the answer is YES, provide details. In particular, were the residents of Protected Villages free to leave their village to vote?
19. Did you observe any pressure being brought to bear by employers or by others who may have provided transport to the polling station?
20. Were you satisfied as to the handling of unused ballot papers both before and during the poll?
21. From your observations, did the security arrangements assist with or intrude into the polling process? If they had a negative effect, please give details.
22. Were you at any time apprehensive as to your personal safety?
23. Did you at all times gain the impression that voters were relaxed and free in the exercise of their franchise? If not, give details.
24. What is your overall comment on the three days of the poll?
25. Did you observe any of the parties using their own seals to seal ballot boxes? Or did they rely simply on their signatures?
26. How many ballot boxes did you actually witness being sealed:
  - a) at the commencement of the poll
  - b) overnight
  - c) as being full
  - d) for transmission to administrative district centres for reconciliation

e) for onward transmission to the provincial centres for the count?

27. What was the degree of party participation in each of 26(a) to (e) inclusive?

SUMMARY OF POLLING STATIONS VISITED BY  
OBSERVERS AND ASSISTANTS

	NUMBER OF DIFFERENT POLLING STATIONS VISITED	TOTAL VISITS
MASHONALAND CENTRAL	42	70
MASHONALAND EAST	115	268
MASHONALAND WEST	44	80
MATABELELAND NORTH	57	74
MATABELELAND SOUTH	24	29
MIDLANDS	48	198
MANICALAND	62	138
VICTORIA	45	124
TOTALS	<u>437</u>	<u>981</u>

6 March 1980

P.D. Snelson

"COCA-COLA" PRESS RELEASE

Reports have been circulating that the dye used to identify persons as having voted can be removed by scrubbing the hands with Coca-Cola.

The Commonwealth Observer Group has today carefully investigated this possibility and carried out renewed tests. As a result, the Group is completely satisfied that the reports are without foundation. Moreover the journalist who was able to obtain a second ballot paper this afternoon has taken part in these tests and he, too, is satisfied that whatever the explanation, it does not lie in the removal of the dye by Coca-Cola.

The Group has previously conducted exhaustive tests with cold cream, sophisticated solvents and barrier creams, some imported for the purpose. These convinced them of the dependability of the fluid in use at polling stations.

28 February 1980



**SOUTHERN RHODESIA**

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**RESULTS  
OF  
COMMON ROLL  
ELECTION**

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**FEBRUARY, 1980**

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PARTY	TOTAL VALID VOTES CAST	% OF VALID VOTES	SEATS
N.D.U.	15 056	0,568	-
N.F.Z.	18 794	0,709	-
P.F.	638 879	24,113	20
U.A.N.C.	219 307	8,277	3
U.N.F.P.	5 796	0,219	-
U.P.A.M.	1 181	0,045	-
Z.A.N.U.	53 343	2,013	-
Z.A.N.U. (P.F.)	1 668 992	62,992	57
Z.D.P.	28 181	1,064	-
TOTAL VALID VOTES	2 649 529	100%	
SPOILT PAPERS	52 746		
TOTAL POLL	2 702 275		
TOTAL SEATS	-		80

COMMON ROLL ELECTION 27TH TO 29TH FEBRUARY, 1980

ELECTORAL DISTRICT	VALID VOTES CAST	SPOILT PAPERS	TOTAL
MANICALAND	313 786	7 334	321 120
MASHONALAND CENTRAL	174 930	4 782	179 712
MASHONALAND EAST	632 440	8 741	641 181
MASHONALAND WEST	282 932	7 212	290 144
MATABELELAND NORTH	396 505	5 834	402 339
MATABELELAND SOUTH	172 108	3 115	175 223
MIDLANDS	350 111	5 884	355 995
VICTORIA	326 717	9 844	336 561
<u>TOTAL</u>	2 649 529	52 746	2 702 275

BLACK ROLL ELECTION, 1980  
RESULT OF POLL  
SECTION 176 OF THE ELECTORAL ACT, 1979  
MANICALAND ELECTORAL DISTRICT  
ELEVEN SEATS

1. VOTES CAST

	NO. OF VOTES	% OF POLL
National Democratic Union .....	1 837	0,585
National Front of Zimbabwe .....	1 283	0,409
Patriotic Front .....	4 992	1,591
United African National Council ....	19 608	6,249
Zimbabwe African National Union ....	16 843	5,368
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) .....	263 972	84,125
Zimbabwe Democratic Party .....	5 251	1,673
<b>VALID VOTES CAST</b> .....	<b>313 786</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>SPOILT PAPERS</b> .....	<b>7 334</b>	
<b><u>TOTAL</u></b> .....	<b>321 120</b>	

Number of papers without official mark included in count ..... <sup>6</sup>

2. QUOTA

Total valid votes cast .....	313 786
Less votes cast for eliminated parties .....	
National Democratic Union	1 837
National Front of Zimbabwe	1 283
Patriotic Front	4 992
United African National Council	19 608
Zimbabwe African National Union	16 843
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	5 251
	49 814

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263 972

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$$\frac{263\ 972}{11 \text{ (number of seats)}} = 23\ 997 \quad \text{Quota}$$

3. ALLOCATION

National Democratic Union	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
National Front of Zimbabwe	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Patriotic Front	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
United African National Council	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Zimbabwe African National Union	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	263 972	=	11,00	= 11 Seats
	<u>23 997</u>			
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats

SALISBURY  
4th March, 1980

  
 E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS

BLACK ROLL ELECTION , 1980  
RESULT OF POLL  
SECTION 176 OF THE ELECTORAL ACT, 1979  
MASHONALAND CENTRAL ELECTORAL DISTRICT

SIX SEATS

1. VOTES CAST

	NO. OF VOTES	% OF POLL
National Democratic Union .....	1 216	0,695
National Front of Zimbabwe .....	1 086	0,621
Patriotic Front .....	3 947	2,256
United African National Council .....	14 985	8,566
United National Federal Party .....	914	0,523
Zimbabwe African National Union .....	3 671	2,099
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) .....	146 665	83,842
Zimbabwe Democratic Party .....	2 446	1,398
<b>VALID VOTES CAST .....</b>	<b>174 930</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>SPOILT PAPERS .....</b>	<b>4 782</b>	
<b><u>TOTAL</u> .....</b>	<b>179 712</b>	

Number of papers without official mark included in count .....

2. QUOTA

Total valid votes cast .....	174 930
Less votes cast for eliminated parties .....	
National Democratic Union	1 216
National Front of Zimbabwe	1 086
Patriotic Front	3 947
United African National Council	14 985
United National Federal Party	914
Zimbabwe African National Union	3 671
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	2 446
	28 265

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146 665


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$$\frac{146\ 665}{6 \text{ (number of seats)}} = 24\ 444 \text{ Quota}$$

3. ALLOCATION

National Democratic Union	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
National Front of Zimbabwe	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Patriotic Front	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
United African National Council	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
United National Federal Party	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Zimbabwe African National Union	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	<u>146 665</u> <u>24 444</u>	=	6,0 = 6	Seats
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats

SALISBURY  
4th March, 1980

  
 E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS

BLACK ROLL ELECTION, 1980

RESULT OF POLL

SECTION 176 OF THE ELECTORAL ACT, 1979

MASHONALAND EAST ELECTORAL DISTRICT

SIXTEEN SEATS

1. VOTES CAST

	NO. OF VOTES	% OF POLL
National Democratic Union .....	2 359	0,373
National Front of Zimbabwe .....	1 668	0,264
Patriotic Front .....	28 805	4,555
United African National Council ....	75 237	11,896
United National Federal Party .....	1 593	0,252
Zimbabwe African National Union ....	9 499	1,502
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) .....	508 813	80,452
Zimbabwe Democratic Party .....	4 466	0,706
<b>VALID VOTES CAST</b> .....	<b>632 440</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>SPOILT PAPERS</b> .....	<b>8 741</b>	
<b><u>TOTAL</u></b> .....	<b>641 181</b>	

Number of papers without official mark included in count .....

2. QUOTA

Total valid votes cast .....		632 440
Less votes cast for eliminated parties .....		
National Democratic Union	2 359	
National Front of Zimbabwe	1 668	
Patriotic Front	28 805	
United National Federal Party	1 593	
Zimbabwe African National Union	9 499	
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	4 466	48 390

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584 050

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
584 050 = 36 503 Quota

16 (number of seats)

3. ALLOCATION

National Democratic Union	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
National Front of Zimbabwe	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Patriotic Front	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
United African National Council	<u>75 237</u>	=	2,06	= 2 Seats
	36 503			
United National Federal Party	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Zimbabwe African National Union	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	<u>508 813</u>	=	13,94	= 14 Seats
	36 503			
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats

SALISBURY  
4th March, 1980

  
E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS

BLACK ROLL ELECTION, 1980

RESULT OF POLL

SECTION 176 OF THE ELECTORAL ACT, 1979

MASHONALAND WEST ELECTORAL DISTRICT

EIGHT SEATS

1. VOTES CAST

	NO. OF VOTES	% OF POLL
National Democratic Union .....	2 211	0,781
National Front of Zimbabwe .....	2 589	0,915
Patriotic Front .....	37 888	13,391
United African National Council ....	28 728	10,154
Zimbabwe African National Union ....	4 688	1,657
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) .....	203 567	71,949
Zimbabwe Democratic Party .....	3 261	1,153
VALID VOTES CAST .....	282 932	100
SPOILT PAPERS .....	7 212	
<u>TOTAL</u> .....	290 144	

Number of papers without official mark included in count .....

2. QUOTA

Total valid votes cast .....	282 932
Less votes cast for eliminated parties .....	
National Democratic Union	2 211
National Front of Zimbabwe	2 589
Zimbabwe African National Union	4 688
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	3 261
	12 749

---

270 183


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270 183 = 33 772 Quota  
8 (number of seats)

3. ALLOCATION

National Democratic Union	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
National Front of Zimbabwe	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Patriotic Front	<u>37 888</u> <u>33 772</u>	=	1,12	= 1 Seats
United African National Council	<u>28 728</u> <u>33 772</u>	=	0,85	= 1 Seats
Zimbabwe African National Union	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	<u>203 567</u> <u>33 772</u>	=	6,02	= 6 Seats
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats

SALISBURY  
4th March, 1980

  
E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS

BLACK ROLL ELECTION, 1980

RESULT OF POLL

SECTION 176 OF THE ELECTORAL ACT, 1979

MATABELELAND NORTH ELECTORAL DISTRICT

TEN SEATS

1. VOTES CAST

	NO. OF VOTES	% OF POLL
National Democratic Union .....	1 840	0,464
National Front of Zimbabwe .....	4 517	1,139
Patriotic Front .....	313 435	79,049
United African National Council ....	30 274	7,635
United National Federal Party .....	1 340	0,338
United People's Association of Matabeleland .....	729	0,184
Zimbabwe African National Union ....	3 218	0,812
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) .....	39 819	10,042
Zimbabwe Democratic Party .....	1 333	0,337
VALID VOTES CAST .....	396 505	100
SPOILT PAPERS .....	5 834	
<u>TOTAL</u> .....	402 339	

Number of papers without official mark included in count .....

2. QUOTA

Total valid votes cast ..... 396 505

Less votes cast for eliminated parties .....

National Democratic Union	1 840	
National Front of Zimbabwe	4 517	
United African National Council	30 274	
United National Federal Party	1 340	
United People's Association of Matabeleland	729	
Zimbabwe African National Union	3 218	
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	1 333	43 251

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353 254

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353 254 = 35 325 Quota

10 (number of seats) 336

3. ALLOCATION

National Democratic Union	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
National Front of Zimbabwe	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Patriotic Front	$\frac{313\ 435}{35\ 325}$	=	8,87	= 9 Seats
United African National Council	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
United National Federal Party	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
United People's Association of Matabeleland	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Zimbabwe African National Union	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	$\frac{39\ 819}{35\ 325}$	=	1,13	= 1 Seats
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats

SALISBURY  
4th March, 1980

  
 E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS

BLACK ROLL ELECTION, 1980

RESULT OF POLL

SECTION 176 OF THE ELECTORAL ACT, 1979

MATABELELAND SOUTH ELECTORAL DISTRICT

SIX SEATS

1. VOTES CAST

	NO. OF VOTES	% OF POLL
National Democratic Union .....	927	0,539
National Front of Zimbabwe .....	2 494	1,449
Patriotic Front .....	148 745	86,425
United African National Council ....	5 615	3,262
United National Federal Party .....	619	0,360
United People's Association of Matabeleland .....	452	0,263
Zimbabwe African National Union ....	694	0,403
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) .....	11 787	6,849
Zimbabwe Democratic Party .....	775	0,450
<b>VALID VOTES CAST</b> .....	<b>172 108</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>SPOILT PAPERS</b> .....	<b>3 115</b>	
<b><u>TOTAL</u></b> .....	<b>175 223</b>	

Number of papers without official marks included in count .....

2. QUOTA

Total valid votes cast .....		172 108
Less votes cast for eliminated parties .....		
National Democratic Union	927	
National Front of Zimbabwe	2 494	
United African National Council	5 615	
United National Federal Party	619	
United People's Association of Matabeleland	452	
Zimbabwe African National Union	694	
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	11 787	
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	775	
		<b>23 363</b>
		<hr/> <b>148 745</b> <hr/>


148 745 = 24 791 Quota

6 (number of seats)

3. ALLOCATION

National Democratic Union	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
National Front of Zimbabwe	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Patriotic Front	<u>148 745</u> <u>24 791</u>	=	5,999	= 6 Seats
United African National Council	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
United National Federal Party	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
United People's Association of Matabeleland	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Zimbabwe African National Union	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats

SALISBURY  
4th March, 1980

  
E. W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS

BLACK ROLL ELECTION, 1980  
RESULT OF POLL  
SECTION 176 OF THE ELECTORAL ACT, 1979  
MIDLANDS ELECTORAL DISTRICT  
TWELVE SEATS

1. VOTES CAST

	NO. OF VOTES	% OF POLL
National Democratic Union .....	2 218	0,634
National Front of Zimbabwe .....	3 087	0,881
Patriotic Front .....	94 960	27,123
United African National Council ....	30 245	8,639
United National Federal Party .....	1 330	0,380
Zimbabwe African National Union ....	5 792	1,654
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) .....	209 092	59,721
Zimbabwe Democratic Party .....	3 387	0,968
VALID VOTES CAST .....	350 111	100
SPOILT PAPERS .....	5 884	
<u>TOTAL</u> .....	355 995	

Number of papers without official mark included in count .....<sup>9</sup>.....

2. QUOTA

Total valid votes cast .....		350 111
Less votes cast for eliminated parties .....		
National Democratic Union	2 218	
National Front of Zimbabwe	3 087	
United African National Council	30 245	
United National Federal Party	1 330	
Zimbabwe African National Union	5 792	
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	3 387	46 059

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304 052

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304 052 = 25337 Quota

12. (number of seats)


3. ALLOCATION

National Democratic Union	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
National Front of Zimbabwe	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Patriotic Front	<u>94 960</u>	=	3,7	= 4 Seats
United African National Council	<u>25 337</u> <u>ELIMINATED</u>	=		
United National Federal Party	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Zimbabwe African National Union	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	<u>209 092</u> <u>25 337</u>		8,2	8
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats

SALISBURY

4th March, 1980

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**E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS**  
**REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS**

BLACK ROLL ELECTION, 1980  
RESULT OF POLL  
SECTION 176 OF THE ELECTORAL ACT, 1979  
VICTORIA ELECTORAL DISTRICT  
ELEVEN SEATS

1. VOTES CAST

	NO. OF VOTES	% OF POLL
National Democratic Union .....	2 448	0,749
National Front of Zimbabwe .....	2 070	0,634
Patriotic Front .....	6 107	1,869
United African National Council ....	14 615	4,473
Zimbabwe African National Union ....	8 938	2,736
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) .....	285 277	87,316
Zimbabwe Democratic Party .....	7 262	2,223
VALID VOTES CAST .....	326 717	100
SPOILT PAPERS .....	9 844	
<u>TOTAL</u> .....	336 561	

Number of papers without official mark included in count .....

2. QUOTA

Total valid votes cast ..... 326 717

Less votes cast for eliminated parties .....

National Democratic Union	2 448	
National Front of Zimbabwe	2 070	
Patriotic Front	6 107	
United African National Council	14 615	
Zimbabwe African National Union	8 938	
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	7 262	41 440

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285 277


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285 277 = 25 934 Quota  
 11 (number of seats)

3. ALLOCATION

National Democratic Union	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
National Front of Zimbabwe	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Patriotic Front	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
United African National Council	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Zimbabwe African National Union	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	<u>285 277</u> <u>25 934</u>	=	11,00	= 11 Seats
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	<u>ELIMINATED</u>	=	=	Seats

SALISBURY  
4th March, 1980

  
E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS

BLACK ROLL ELECTION, 1980  
CANDIDATES DECLARED ELECTED

PARAGRAPH (C) OF SUBSECTION (15) OF SECTION 175 OF THE  
ELECTORAL ACT, 1979

MANICALAND ELECTORAL DISTRICT - ELEVEN SEATS


PARTY

CANDIDATE

ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION  
(PATRIOTIC FRONT)

1. K. Kangai
2. M. Nyagumbo
3. D. Mutasa
4. W. Ndangana
5. F. Shava
6. V. Chitepo
7. N.P. Nhiwatiwa
8. M. Mahachi
9. T. Dube
10. C. Makoni
11. E. Sanyangare

SALISBURY  
4th March, 1980

  
E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS

BLACK ROLL ELECTION, 1980  
CANDIDATES DECLARED ELECTED

PARAGRAPH (C) OF SUBSECTION (15) OF SECTION 175 OF THE  
ELECTORAL ACT, 1979

MASHONALAND CENTRAL ELECTORAL DISTRICT - SIX SEATS


CANDIDATE

PARTY

ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION  
(PATRIOTIC FRONT)

1. E.Z. Tekere
2. T.R. Nhongo
3. S. Sekeramayi
4. F.J. Masango
5. G. Rutanhire
6. J. Kaparadza

SALISBURY  
4th March, 1980



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REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS


BLACK ROLL ELECTION, 1980  
CANDIDATES DECLARED ELECTED

PARAGRAPH (C) OF SUBSECTION (15) OF SECTION 175 OF THE  
ELECTORAL ACT, 1979

MASHONALAND EAST ELECTORAL DISTRICT - SIXTEEN SEATS

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>CANDIDATE</u>
ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION (PATRIOTIC FRONT)	1. R.G. Mugabe
	2. M. Dube
	3. R. Marere
	4. W. Mangwende
	5. M. Mvenge
	6. E. Shirihuru
	7. E. Pswarayi
	8. G. Ziyenge
	9. P. Murambiwa
	10. J. Hunda
	11. H. Nyazika
	12. G. Chidyausiku
	13. A. Kabasa
	14. S. Rambanepasi
UNITED AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL	15. A.T. Muzorewa
	16. S.C. Mundawarara

SALISBURY  
4th March, 1980

  
E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS


BLACK ROLL ELECTION, 1980  
CANDIDATES DECLARED ELECTED

PARAGRAPH (C) OF SUBSECTION (15) OF SECTION 175 OF THE  
ELECTORAL ACT, 1979

MASHONALAND WEST ELECTORAL DISTRICT - EIGHT SEATS

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>CANDIDATE</u>
ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION (PATRIOTIC FRONT)	1. R. Manyika 2. J. Chivaura 3. N. Shamuyarira 4. A. Mudzingwa 5. S. Mombeshora 6. E. Chikowore
PATRIOTIC FRONT	7. A.M. Chambati
UNITED AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL	8. T.G. Mukarati

SALISEBURY  
4th March, 1980



F.W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS

BLACK ROLL ELECTION, 1980  
CANDIDATES DECLARED ELECTED

PARAGRAPH (C) OF SUBSECTION (15) OF SECTION 175 OF THE  
ELECTORAL ACT, 1979

MATABELELAND NORTH ELECTORAL DISTRICT - TEN SEATS

PARTY

CANDIDATE


PATRIOTIC FRONT

1. V. Moyo
2. D. Mangena
3. S. Malunga
4. J. Ntuta
5. J. Nkomo
6. D. Ngwenya
7. R. Chinamano
8. J. Ngwenya
9. T.V. Lesabe

ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION  
(PATRIOTIC FRONT)

10. H. Ushewokunze

SALISBURY  
4th March, 1980

  
E.W. ROBE-STEAMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS

BLACK ROLL ELECTION, 1980  
CANDIDATES DECLARED ELECTED

PARAGRAPH (C) OF SUBSECTION (15) OF SECTION 175 OF THE  
ELECTORAL ACT, 1979

MATABELELAND SOUTH ELECTORAL DISTRICT - SIX SEATS

PARTY


CANDIDATE

PATRIOTIC FRONT

1. T.G. Silundika
2. S. Nkomo
3. E. Ndlovu
4. B. Mguni
5. C. Ndlovu
6. P. Njini

SALISBURY

4th March, 1980



E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS

BLACK ROLL ELECTION, 1980  
CANDIDATES DECLARED ELECTED

PARAGRAPH (C) OF SUBSECTION (15) OF SECTION 175 OF THE  
ELECTORAL ACT, 1979

MIDLANDS ELECTORAL DISTRICT - TWELVE SEATS

PARTY

CANDIDATE


ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION  
(PATRIOTIC FRONT)

1. S.V. Muzenda
2. E.R. Kadungure
3. E. Munangangwa
4. R.C. Hove
5. S. Makoni
6. S. Mumbengegwi
7. J. Zvobgo
8. S.E. Mativenga

PATRIOTIC FRONT

9. J. Nkomo
10. C. Muchachi
11. C. Msipa
12. W. Kona

SALISBURY  
4th March, 1980



E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF ELECTIONS

BLACK ROLL ELECTION, 1980  
CANDIDATES DECLARED ELECTED

PARAGRAPH (C) OF SUBSECTION (15) OF SECTION 175 OF THE  
ELECTORAL ACT, 1979

VICTORIA ELECTORAL DISTRICT - ELEVEN SEATS


PARTY

CANDIDATE

ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION  
(PATRIOTIC FRONT)

1. M. Urimbo
2. D. Mutumbuka
3. E. Zvobgo
4. S. Tavarwisa
5. N. Makombe
6. S. Mazorodze
7. O. Munyaradzi
8. J.B. Moyo
9. N. Mawema
10. D. Mavaire
11. A. Taderera

SALISBURY  
4th March, 1980



E.W. POPE-SIMMONDS  
REGISTRAR-GENERAL OF ELECTIONS

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