PEACE: AN AMBITION BEYOND ARMISTICE

I — The Agenda of Anxiety
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I —THE AGENDA OF ANXIETY

I count it a great honour to be invited to deliver this third series of Bertrand Russell Peace Lectures. The two previous distinguished speakers in this series were 'peace activists' in a very practical sense; peace was more than simply their field of academic inquiry, it was their vocation.[1] As a practitioner of international affairs I have many pursuits, but because peace is an over-arching concern in my endeavours on behalf of the Commonwealth and the wider international community, I think of myself as an activist of sorts. I hope my predecessors at this rostrum would not be unhappy with my admission to their ranks.

Bertrand Russell himself was, of course, in a special sense an activist for peace, and it is a tribute to the judgement of this University that it has amassed an exceptional archive pertinent to the study of peace, including the Bertrand Russell papers, and that this Lecture Series has been established in his memory. Russell focussed the laser of his thought on practically the whole of human life. But he stood especially both for the achievement of civilisation and for civilisation's survival against the threat of global destruction posed by nuclear weapons—a cause in which he campaigned with unremitting vigour until his last breath.

He worked for peace in the universities and through the media and on the streets, everywhere that he could make his voice heard, and twice went to prison for his beliefs, the last time when he was close on ninety. His pitting of the power of reason against the anxieties of many decades, and pre-eminently against the gross unreason of war, teaches us to be rigorous in intellectual examination, just as his courageous action on his conclusions teaches us to be, as he was, passionate in pursuit of peace.

I have had the unique good fortune in recent years to have been a member of three international Commissions—independent Commissions whose mandates taken together represent a global agenda of anxiety. They dealt respectively with development, security and environment issues as they affect all countries

and all people. In retrospect, it is remarkable how closely entwined was the work of the three Commissions—not by some master plan, but by the interdependence of the issues themselves. The Brandt Report on Development Issues is also about security. The Palme Report on Security Issues is also about development. The Brundtland Report on the Environment is also about both development and security issues.

But there was another shared factor that emerged from this separate work. The Brandt Commission's Reports were called 'North-South: A Programme for Survival'[2] and 'Common Crisis'.[3] The Palme Commission's Report was called 'Common Security'.[4] The Brundtland Commission's Report, published this year, is called 'Our Common Future'.[5] The theme of one world, of an inseparable humanity, of a common human destiny, is a thread that runs through all three; it does so, because that thread of inseparability—of interdependence we call it now—runs through the lives of all who inhabit this planet. Nothing I say in these Lectures will make full sense if I fail to convey why we simply have to accept, as these Commissions came to accept, that the bedrock of our rich human variety is our oneness and the unity of our mutual needs.

Bertrand Russell recognised the reality of interdependence, the mutuality of human interests, as long ago as 1950 when he declared; "Mankind has become so much one family that we cannot insure our own prosperity except by insuring that of everyone else."[6] And near the end of his life he wrote: "It is necessary to teach both individuals and Governments that as one family mankind may prosper as never before, but as many competing families there is no prospect before mankind except death."[7] The relevance of peace studies here at McMaster could seek no better justification.

The link between the issues—one might almost say the 'missing link', the interconnecting theme of our human agenda of anxiety that emerges is, unquestionably, 'peace'. But it is peace whose parameters go beyond the conventional—peace with wider perspectives than those an East-West context impresses on it. War may be the ultimate antithesis of peace; but the absence of war is not necessarily peace. Peace is more than freedom from armed conflict; it is ambition that reaches beyond armistice. The real challenge that faces us, the basic moral imperative of our

time, is not merely to avoid war, but to achieve peace.

In this Lecture I want to focus on our contemporary agenda of anxiety; in the next, on the priorities of peace. To start with, however, let me make two basic points relevant to the Lectures. Both points relate to ethics.

Twenty-five years ago, when he was America's Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, one of the truly great men of the post-war period, spoke of this being "the anxious age" and of our need for "an ethic of survival".[8] He acknowledged that the search for ethical guidelines of human endeavour is as old as man himself. But his point was that never before in human history has the need been as great as it is now to develop such guidelines and to live by them. Never before, indeed, have we faced the danger of total extinction. When we speak of human survival today, we no longer mean survival of family, of tribe, of race, of culture, or even of civilisation. We mean, comprehensively, what we say: survival of *homo sapiens*. That is a compelling incentive for finding a path to human self-preservation.

But why an ethical path? The answer to that must lie, in part, in the gravity of our situation. But it lies essentially in our growing awareness that it is precisely the undeveloped nature of a universal morality that has put human existence at risk. Bertrand Russell, again with relevance to your programmes at McMaster, held that "only a new kind of education, inculcating a new set of moral values, will make it possible to keep a peaceful world in existence."[9] Your own Pierre Trudeau has eloquently argued the need for a new international morality, a new outlook by peoples and governments about the morality governing our relations with each other.[10] I am sure they were both right; in our not heeding their urgings, the gravest questions remain unanswered today.

Yet the very enormity of our present danger has a tendency to narrow the thrust of that demand. An ethic of survival must, of course, be concerned with survival itself: with ensuring perpetuation of our human species; with securing for mankind as a whole the basic right to life. But this cannot be the only effort. There is another tributary of this ethical stream. There is an equally great moral compulsion to secure for all members of the human family a condition of life that does not deny their very humanity.

Human development over the aeons of man's existence is, in one sense, the story of our uneven progress towards this second goal—realisation of the right to a tolerable level of existence: at the level of family, of tribe, of nation and now of the wider human society. It is my contention that, as I will try to elaborate, the quality of life has a crucial bearing on life itself. Salvation is more than mere survival. The impulse for peace must be directed to the nature as well as the continuity of human existence. Humanity's most pressing need is to evolve effective responses to the predicament we face on both fronts: to the threat our anxious age presents to peace in this wider sense.

Like justice and freedom, peace is indivisible. As justice is about the quality of life that the law ordains not only within countries but within our global society, so peace goes beyond relations between states to the environment of every human life. And that environment is enhanced or polluted not just by war and preparations for war but by a whole variety of other relationships shaped by human conduct. At the heart of them are the relationships between rich and poor in the world.

We recognise that a national society cannot be at peace if power, privilege and prosperity are the prerogatives of only a few, with deprivation, degradation and despair the lot of the many. Why do we think our world society can be at peace when such disparities prevail within it, such yawning disparities between a few who prosper and the great majority trapped in poverty? Poor countries may not yet have the power to disrupt the international system as oppressed workers can within a nation, but poverty encourages regions of insecurity which cannot be confined discreetly within such boundaries. For those thus entrapped, but in truth for all of us, it cannot be a time of peace. It must be a supreme moral obligation to release humanity from such bondage.

I said earlier that the quality of life bears on life itself. For some it does so in fearfully practical terms. War, in our minds, conjures up a toll of human life: the tragedy of many who die prematurely and others whose lives are blighted by the deprivations and deformities that go hand in hand with conflict. By these same standards, many hundreds of millions pass all their lives in war-time: condemned by poverty to a state of perpetual siege. Life expectancy, for example, is less than 40 years in Sierra Leone or

Guinea, compared with 75 years in France or Japan; infant mortality rates are in excess of 150 per thousand in Mali or Ethiopia, compared with six in Finland or nine in Canada. If only one child in sixteen were to die in the Third World before the age of one, rather than the one in eight who on the average die at present, two and a half million lives would be saved each year. On present demographic levels, if average life expectancy in the Third World were to be raised to that of the developed countries, some 7 million more would live not die every year.[11]

Thus, over a period of five years, the ravages of poverty and under-development are estimated to take their toll of a minimum of 35 million lives. What of the rights of those millions? Ironically, that is the minimum number of combatants and non-combatants who perished in the five years of World War II. For some, war never ends. Per capita GNP—income per head—is our rough measure of poverty and wealth; it is less than $200 per head in Mali and Bangladesh, compared with $16,000 per head in Switzerland and $15,000 in the United States.[12] It is more than futility, it is downright provocation, to ask Malians or Bangladeshis to hail the end years of the twentieth century as a time of peace. The Horsemen of the Apocalypse were charged to kill with famine as with the sword; today, they acknowledge no frontiers, certainly none that insulate the Third World, which has some disturbing parallels with the Biblical "fourth part of the earth" over which they were given dominion.[13]

But the paradox is that poverty diminishes humanity both directly by taking lives and indirectly by making life more unendurable for ever-enlarging numbers. In terms of the prospects of peace in the next century, few factors are likely to be more important than world population growth. The trends should fill us with foreboding, especially their conjuncture with poverty. It took 150 years (from 1750 to 1900) for the world's population to double; but from 1950 to 1980 it rose from 2.5 billion to 4.8 billion—doubling now in about 30 years.[14] The annual increment today is about 100 million people: equivalent to a new Bangladesh every year; an acceleration of both population and poverty. Twenty-two cities now have a population of more than 7 million. Twelve are in the developing world. By the end of the century—less that 13 years away—there will be 35 cities of over 7 million, and 23 of them will be in the

developing world. Mexico City, now 18 million, will have grown to over 26 million—the entire present population of Canada.[15]

None will suffer more from this urban explosion than tomorrow's children, for whom the future is anything but a promise of peace. Already, the phenomenon of street children—at present, some 30 million who know no home but the street—casts a grim shadow of abandonment, illiteracy, unemployment and alienation across a generation yet unborn.[16] How many millions are we condemning to life as primitives at the centre of our cities of the twenty-first century? Is theirs a prospect of peace? Have we no ethical compulsions to try to make it so?

If there is to be hope of improving on these prospects of enlarging the potential for peace, it must lie in real development, in reducing those gross disparities between prosperity and poverty. This is the central challenge of the Papal assertion that "the new name for peace is development". Meeting that challenge requires a world economic environment that offers something more than that the rich will grow richer at no slower a pace, and that the poor will actually not get poorer. It means looking towards a new, more equitable, order of world economic relationships in which the gap, far from enlarging, begins to close. It means managing the world economy for the benefit of all the world's people. As Bertrand Russell urged, "A continual attempt to move towards economic equality must, therefore, be part of the pursuit of secure and lasting peace."[17]

For most of the world's 5 billion people there is little in the world economic situation to justify encouragement, much less faith. Even in the industrialised world these are times of greater unemployment than anyone under 50 can remember; a debt problem threatens countries whose creditworthiness has never before been in question; commodity prices, the mainstay of the economies of most developing countries, have fallen in real terms to their lowest levels since the 1930s; currency distortions have become so gross that they have been authoritatively described as having reached a stage of 'mature anarchy'.

And, in our 'anxious age' adopting Adlai Stevenson's term, the agenda of anxiety is a long one. It is a time of vanishing forests and encroaching deserts; a time once more of famine and of refugees; a time of disappearing persons. It is a time when rain sometimes falls with an acidic content the equivalent of lemon

juice. It is a time of drug abuse of the most frightening proportions, and of the excesses of national and international terrorism, sometimes even at the level of state action. More and more, we resemble that time in the sixteenth century when Sir Thomas More described the world as "ruffled and fallen into a wildness".[18] It is a time of world-wide hunger for peace in its deepest, most profound, and most universal sense.

The Brundtland Commission, the World Commission on Environment and Development, has now alerted the world to the need to be guided by concepts of sustainable development, by "an approach to human progress which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."[19] We are talking here not just of the economic development of developing countries but of all development—of human progress. The requirement that such development be 'sustainable' is an injunction to all countries and all people. Since the ability of future generations to meet their own needs can be compromised as much by the excesses of industrial and technological development as by the environmental degradation of under-development, sustainability has to be both perceived and measured in global terms.

In specific and important areas, careful management of resources is already needed to avoid sustainable limits being surpassed—in drinking water, in fish stocks, in the extermination of biologically valuable and irreplaceable plant and animal species through the clearance of tropical forests. Perhaps the most serious of the limits now being recognised relates to the atmosphere. The long-term energy problem has traditionally been seen in terms of the world running out of non-renewable fuels. A more serious and immediate threat is the steady build-up in the atmosphere of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning. Acid rain from emissions of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides destroy forests thousands of miles away. Other atmospheric pollution includes damage to the ozone layer by chlorofluorocarbons (like those released daily from millions of aerosol cans) and the 'greenhouse' warming of the planet from both carbon dioxide emissions and deforestation.[20] Here we are much in the hands of the scientists; but the scientific consensus is now such as to serve notice on us all that in tampering in these ways with the composition of the atmosphere we court an

awesome peril. Is it not almost unbelievable that in this situation what seems uppermost in the policies of some governments is not so much the fate of their populations as the fortunes of their chemical industries?

At the very least, until we understand this phenomenon better, there must be a large question mark over growth in the use of fossil fuels. At the same time, in the aftermath of Chernobyl, can anyone be surprised at the conclusion of the Brundtland Commission that "the generation of nuclear power is only justifiable if there are solid solutions to the presently unsolved problems to which it gives rise"?[21] These two constraints—on the expansion of fossil fuel use and nuclear power—present an acute dilemma that bears on human survival: how to provide the necessary energy for the growth of developing countries, much of which will inevitably be centred on energy-intensive forms of development? 'Sustainable development' must mean growth, but growth which respects limits to environmental resources such as clean air, water, forests and soils; which maintains genetic diversity; and which uses energy and raw materials efficiently and safely—in ways not endangering human survival.

And growth and conservation objectives have to be balanced against equity. In the international context this arises specially in respect of the global 'commons': the oceans, including the sea-bed; Antarctica; and space. These are all the world's resources which no individual or nation owns. They must all ultimately be regarded as the common heritage of mankind, and present trends are in that direction. But management has evolved on an *ad hoc* basis and has tended to be dominated by countries whose wealth or advanced technology has given them a head start.

The Law of the Sea Convention has created a legal basis by which maritime states can defend offshore resources; but, for the same reason, small and weak states still remain vulnerable to predatory fishing and waste dumping—no collective security system protects their resources. And a major unresolved problem relates to the ocean sea-bed, where the failure of the present American Administration to sign the Convention, and of a number of industrialised countries to ratify it, has left a large hole in the evolving system of management of the global commons. The ethic of 'one world' lags too far behind the separatist habits

of an earlier era.

The Antarctica Treaty is a somewhat happier story—at least in terms of conservationist objectives; but there is growing restiveness among many countries that a self-elected group of strong states should usurp a continent by asserting the right to manage it on behalf of the rest of mankind.[22] As the hole in the ozone layer widens over Antarctica, threatening life on the planet, the possessiveness of earlier times seems wholly out of place.

The empty wastes of space have not yet been brought within the ambit of 'possession'; but there is a growing awareness of its great potential as a global resource. And, immediately, the potential for conflicts of interest also emerge; for example, in respect of the geosynchronous orbit—increasingly seen as crucial for satellite communications. And as awareness of the communications value of space—including its value for development—increases, there is growing questioning of the assumption by the superpowers that they can use inner space as a kind of free-fire-zone for space weapons and a dumping ground for space debris.

Let me turn, therefore, to the larger issue of militarisation which bears both on the quality of life and on life itself—on peace in its widest sense. Perhaps I should start by saying that the disarmament debate, whatever form it takes between the superpowers and in Europe, is now a debate which concerns all humanity. When I was growing up as a boy in Guyana it was natural for us to assume detachment from the arms race. Viewed from the Caribbean it was tempting to conclude that if the Americans and the Europeans, East and West, chose to blow themselves up in a new round of tribal wars, that would be their affair: sad, tragic, deplorable in every respect; but their affair. Today, we know better. The Third World is acutely aware that real disarmament is not merely a matter of domestic concern to the super-powers or nuclear powers only.

One year ago, at a meeting in Mexico of the Six Nation Peace Initiative, former President Nyerere of Tanzania expressed these common concerns of the Third World in this way: "We have a right to be heard. As nations and people we exist. And whatever other rights our peoples lack, they have at least the right to continue to exist."[23] At that same meeting, the novelist Gabriel

Garcia Marquez gave vivid expression to the right of every human being to join the crusade for disarmament when he evoked a post-nuclear holocaust world of everlasting night, hurricanes and polluted orange rain, a world 'peopled' only by cockroaches.[24] A few months later at Madrid, International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War, which links the medical professions of the United States and the Soviet Union, re-asserted that human life could cease on this planet in the wake of a major nuclear war.[25]

The Brundtland Commission highlighted nuclear war as "a threat to civilisation," a threat before which "other threats to the environment pale into insignificance." In doing so, the Report drew attention to the prospect of 'nuclear winter' authoritatively explored by some 300 scientists from the United States, the USSR and 30 other countries, working on a collaborative basis across ideological divides. It concluded that "a nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought"; that "in the aftermath, there would be no difference between so-called victor and vanquished."[26]

In the early aeons of existence, human beings on our planet faced, and soon overcame, real challenges to survival from a hostile and untamed environment. But never since has the threat of human extinction ever been seriously revived—until now. Our response, of course, must depend on the nature of the threat. And here there is a difference from immemorial times. Now, in strange reversal of man's predicament, the threat to human survival—the threat to peace—comes not from forces ranged against the human race on a hostile planet, but from the power which man's genius has vouchsafed him over a bountiful planet—the threat comes from man himself. Accepting this reality, and taking it as axiomatic that it must be the primordial duty of every generation to preserve for the next at least the right to life, can the ethics of human survival be anything but compelling and ineluctable? It is to this ethical dimension of ensuring human survival that I call attention—as others have done from time to time. But I do so all the more insistently today as the threat to human survival constantly enlarges, and as the policy debate on relevant issues ignores (or sometimes denies) the implications of those issues for human survival and relegates ethics to an irrelevancy.

In 1945, with the pain and anguish of war fresh and raw, nations acknowledged this man-made threat and their moral duty to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. The war, after all, had ended with the first nuclear explosions ever to take place in conflict; and nations knew that these had to be the last. Indeed, it helped to soothe troubled consciences that those explosions, above all the other horrors of the conflict, might ensure that the Second World War did end all wars. In founding the United Nations, they solemnly promised "to beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks".[27] In making that early Biblical injunction their own, they accepted as well that "nation shall not lift up sword against nation. Neither shall they learn war any more."[28] They understood in that brief moment of enlightenment the need for an ethic of human survival.

That understanding, sadly, has faded over time. It was made so subordinate to doctrines of deterrence that global militarisation now has little need for rationality, though it has long passed levels which 'deterrence' could defend. All the fire-power expended in World War II amounted to no more than 6 megatons of TNT. The world's current nuclear arsenal is the equivalent of 18,000 megatons—3,000 World War IIs. A single US Trident submarine represents 24 megatons of destructive power—four World War IIs. For the two atomic bombs that changed the world in 1945, there exist today some 50,000 nuclear warheads. We have fallen, indeed, "into a wildness".[29]

And this armoury has its huge and unacceptable cost—both in money terms and in terms of the corrupting influence of a military culture. Today, annual global military spending has probably reached US$1,000 billion;[30] more than US$2.5 billion a day—nearly US$2 million a minute; figures so enormous as to make the imagination boggle. The real cost, of course, is how the same resources might otherwise be used. Earlier this month an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development ended at the United Nations in New York. That it was convened only after postponement and international wrangling, and in the absence of the United States, is a measure of the reluctance of governments to acknowledge the real cost of militarisation. To the credit of this country, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs put on record the

fact that Canada is investigating the possibility of a national study on the conversion of defence production into civilian production, in order to identify and publicise the benefits of conversion.[31] Few governments have gone so far. We can choose to ignore, we can never defend, the ethical implications of the choices our generation has made. In the end, despite all the promises of the United Nations 'operation ploughshares', we have turned the post-war period into an era of militarisation.

The argument of both NATO and Warsaw Pact Governments that military expenditure is a necessary insurance against war, and that the nuclear deterrence strategy which underpins the arms race has succeeded in keeping the peace between East and West for over 40 years, cannot easily be dismissed. It is arguable, of course, that there is no evidence that supports this claim. Nonetheless, many do believe that an element of deterrence has been a factor in preserving an uneasy peace between the superpowers in the post-war period. What is clear, however, is that this situation has changed qualitatively as it has changed quantitatively.

In present circumstances, the argument that if our children are to inherit the earth we must have the capacity to destroy it several times over has no credibility with the vast majority of people—and not only the man in the street. Many leading politicians, scientists and doctors from all regions of the world are now convinced that the continuing competitive stockpiling of lethal weapons threatens the very survival of our humankind. That is, of course, the conviction of the hundreds of thousands of people who participate in the peace demonstrations that have become such a feature of the contemporary scene in North America and Western Europe, and who would surely be marching as well in Eastern Europe were they allowed to do so.

Apart from anything else, they know that as weapons systems grow more complex and more sensitive, the danger also grows that the world could be destroyed not only by design but also by misadventure. When Pershing II and Cruise Missiles were recently deployed in Europe in reply to Warsaw Pact deployments, what was done in the name of NATO's security interests produced a heightened sense of insecurity in many Europeans. Quite apart from any predictable Soviet response, they knew that the safety margin in accidental terms had been dramatically

reduced.

And now the American Strategic Defence Initiative, 'Star Wars', threatens a major new dimension of military expenditure—and apocalyptic danger—taking the arms race into outer space. Of course, as with all weapons development, this is sold politically as another 'defence' capability. SDI is a 'shield' not a 'sword'. I wonder what the tortured survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would think about that reassurance. An ethic of survival, the imperative of peace, demands an end to this truly terrible danger. But the need for such a response goes deeper; and it is on these less visible, less apocalyptic, implications of global militarisation that I wish to place some emphasis.

The two super-powers, with only 11 per cent of the world's population, control 97 per cent of its inventory of nuclear weapons. They account for more than half the world's military budget and 80 per cent of the military research budget. But, as important as any of these, is that between them they account for such a vast proportion of the arms moving abroad. During 1980–83, the value of world exports of arms was US$141.6 billion. The United States held its lead as the world's major arms exporter with 38.7 per cent of this total, but the Soviet Union was not so far behind at 27.6 per cent, while France, at 10.6 per cent, had sprinted into double figures—high achievers in the export of the militarist culture almost frenetically promoted at the arms bazaars.[32]

Attractive credit terms, often unavailable for food or medicines, are never in short supply for arms and, in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union, arms come often as part of aid programmes. In the decade up to 1980, US weapons (on the authority of the Department of Defence) were sold and transferred to 130 different countries.[33] There is talk now of an arms embargo against the combatants in the Gulf War—a war waged with arms supplied by all five permanent members of the Security Council, the self-appointed paramount custodians of peace. And this is to say nothing of the thriving illicit trade in arms. No wonder the world's terrorists have no difficulty in getting hold of Kalishnikovs, Uzis and M-16s! But, what, after all, is 'illicit' when arms become barter for hostages, with profits re-invested in other militarist adventures?

And the virus of militarisation has taken firm hold in the Third

World. By 1985, Third World military spending had increased five-fold since 1960, amounting to about 20 per cent of annual global expenditure.[34] As much as one quarter of the Third World's crippling debt burden has resulted from arms purchases.[35] Of course, there are minimum needs of security, and sometimes—as in Southern Africa—major needs imposed by gross and unremitting threats to the security of new and largely defenceless states. I do not mean to impugn expenditure that responds to such needs. But there is more besides. And Third World arms production has grown steadily, with fifty-four developing countries having indigenous arms industries in 1985.[36] At present, the spread is of old conventional arms technology; but Third World countries will soon begin demanding 'ET'—not a friendly being from another planet, but the 'Emergent Technology' of the next generation of conventional weapons systems now in the hands of the industrialised countries.

The link between technology and the arms race must also be high on our agenda of anxiety. Of all the world's scientists and technologists at work today on research and development, one out of every four is employed on weapons and, to adopt Bertrand Russell's distinction, many serve the ends of governments rather than those proper to science. Yet scientists could help to cauterise the danger they have created and allay the anxiety. Arthur C. Clarke, the science writer who first suggested geostationary and communications satellites, has recently proposed, as a counter to 'Star Wars', 'Peacesat'—reconnaissance satellites controlled by an international monitoring satellite agency as a watchdog to verify arms control agreements and warn of other visible threats to the peace. As he notes, "the real problem is not military hardware, but human software."[37]

Numerous companies exist chiefly on what are euphemistically described as 'defence' contracts. What vested interests are being acquired in the preservation of this military culture? How hard will these interests strive to sustain it? Already, it is being said that a major cutback in defence expenditure in the United States would severely disrupt its economy and add significantly to unemployment. Are we building prosperity for industrialised societies, and perhaps some newly industrialising ones, on the production of increasingly unusable weapons of destruction?

And are we doing so to the point where sustaining this production becomes for these countries a desirable, even compulsive, objective in itself? If this is so, what are the implications for disarmament, or even for arms control? Has the military culture spawned an economic structure which now, in turn, generates new incentives, even imperatives, for further militarisation? And all this in the name of peace!

Were we really, then, at the super-power summit in Reykjavik last autumn, on the threshold of a decade that would bring us close to the end of nuclear weapons? I remember saying at the time that, while the promise to release the world from nuclear thraldom was not sealed at Reykjavik, nothing could ever be the same again in the entire field of disarmament. My point was that for a long time, many (like Bertrand Russell) had argued that there existed no military purpose for nuclear weapons of any kind; that their role, including deterrence, is essentially political; and that what is needed is a decision to advance to a post-nuclear political era of international relations. Reykjavik, I suggested, had put that proposition beyond serious contention.[38]

Now, substantial and welcome progress has been made towards the elimination from Europe and beyond of US and Soviet intermediate nuclear forces. As the leaders of the Six Nation Peace Initiative said as long ago as last May, such an agreement "would constitute the crossing of an important psychological threshold, since, for the first time, it would lead to mutual withdrawal and destruction of fully operational nuclear weapon systems."[39] But, we must recognise (with the British Foreign Secretary) that this is only "the beginning of the beginning."[40] An INF agreement will eliminate a substantial number of nuclear weapon systems; many tens of thousands more—some 96 per cent of nuclear war-heads in existence—will not be affected. The level of economic effort dedicated to both nuclear and conventional arms will not be significantly reduced. There is even a danger that the INF agreement will be used by some to promote increases in other military sectors.

If the present prospect of progress is not to be nullified it must be sustained—through, for example, the pursuit and fulfilment of the Shultz-Shevardnadze promise of negotiating on "50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons in the framework of the Geneva talks".[41] The Secretary-General of NATO may be

right in asserting that the INF agreement will not by itself lead to "some mythical non-nuclear nirvana";[42] but, that is precisely what the world's people expect the world's leaders—all of them, not just the leaders of the super-powers—to secure in the name of disarmament.

So peace must not grow complacent. Not everyone, remember, was disappointed by the retreat from agreement at Reykjavik; some, specially in Europe, said openly: :"Thank goodness, they didn't agree." Nor should we ignore the strength of the military/industrial lobby against disarmament, within both alliances. They will now be re-grouping. There is no shortage of spoilers. The Pentagon thought it necessary to underline American commitment to a 'Star Wars' programme even as the INF agreement was being announced.[43] A non-nuclear peace is not about to break out.

The real challenge ahead, however, is whether the spoilers of that peace are able to resume ascendancy. If they are able to miniaturise the disarmament process; if the negotiations that follow the INF agreement are an exercise in arithmetic mainly, ignoring altogether the ethics of human survival, even the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will prove beyond our grasp. As the pace of arms control negotiations between the superpowers quickens, it must not be forgotten that there is no basis for halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons on our planet save through the genuine commitment and example of the major nuclear powers themselves. A world that is not free from all nuclear weapons, is a world that lives forever with the prospect of their proliferation.

The agenda of anxiety I have put before you in these Lectures is a long one. It may strike a sombre note but, in truth, for many in the world community the present is a bad enough time—even if, for a few, it may look like the best of times. This is because we live with the most extraordinary disparities between prosperity and poverty. Yet even for the few who are advantaged, complacency is wearing thin in the political environment of our anxious age. Why this environment? Why are so many governments ready to embrace—or, at least, acquiesce in—a world characterised by disorder, insecurity and massive human suffering? The world's governments are not evil; they are not in conspiracy to enlarge human disparities, to destabilise world

society or to destroy us altogether.

At least in part, the answer lies in the drift away from the global morality that once underpinned internationalism. With that erosion of moral values as the foundation of human solidarity, the vision of our oneness, of an inseparable humanity, of a world community of people, has not sharpened as it should have done and found expression in new or strengthened internationalist institutions; the spirit of global co-operation so carefully nurtured in the early post-war years has withered; an old, narrow, inward-looking nationalism has re-emerged, fortified by an adversary system of international relations, nurtured by concepts of national sovereignty and, in the case of the superpowers, national sufficiency and even primacy. This is bad enough in itself; it becomes more dangerous for the world's political system and more debilitating for the world economy when it is so much at variance with the palpable unity of human needs and the mutual dependence of nations in meeting them. Internationalism has lost its ethical moorings just at the moment when it needs a firm base from which to respond to our insistent agenda of anxiety—to the expanded dimensions of global interdependence that the 70s and 80s have highlighted.

But consideration of these issues evokes the true priorities of peace, to which I shall turn in my next Lecture.

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II—THE PRIORITIES OF PEACE

In my first Lecture I put before you the agenda of anxiety that I believe demands attention on a global basis. Will we give it that attention and, if we do, how will we respond to its compulsions for peace? In the early 1970s—in the early days of her writing that was to flow so bounteously—the Canadian writer Margaret Atwood in her poem 'They are Hostile Nations' warned us:

> It is cold and getting colder:
> we need each other's
> breathing, warmth, surviving
> is the only war
> we can afford.[1]

She did not know in those days of the prospect of a nuclear winter; but her poet's prescience led her to warn in memorable verse how compelling were the priorities of peace. In this Lecture I want to ask: what are those priorities; and, even more immediate, what is peace?

It was Margaret Atwood also who once reminded us that the Eskimo people have 52 names for 'snow'—because it is so important to them. She urged that "there ought to be as many for 'love'".[2] I would add: there ought to be as many for 'peace'—not only because it is so important to us, but also because it has so many faces. I have little doubt that we would find that those 52 names would work for both 'peace' and 'love'. When Bertrand Russell declared in the Prologue to his Autobiography that 'the longing for love, the search for knowledge, and unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind' were the three simple but overwhelming passions that governed his life,[3] I have little doubt that subsumed in all these was the goal that dominated his closing years, his passion for peace.

Yesterday, I stressed that peace is more than the absence of war; that its ambition reaches beyond armistice; that it pertains both to the quality and the continuity of human existence; that

human salvation is more than mere survival. If we are to 'give peace a chance'; if we are to respond to its priorities, we shall have to keep these wider parameters in focus.

The trouble is that the image of peace is all too often cast in the obverse mould of strife. We know what war is; indeed, in the evolution of human history, we have come so much to accept its inevitability, almost its naturalness, that we make rules for it: 'rules of war' made, with supreme irony, in response to high humanitarian instincts. We have rules that govern the conduct of war, the treatment of prisoners, of the sick and wounded, of the victims of war at sea and the treatment of civilians. It is as if we have inherited the perceptions of some earlier era when war was accepted as a natural if unpleasant element of human existence, given a place even within a system of world order. It is a touch of humanity amid the horrors of war that these rules and conventions exist, and that organisations like the International Red Cross sustain them. But what about the 'rules of peace'? Are there no priorities that enjoin respect for them?

As people everywhere recoiled in horror in 1939 from the looming calamities of World War II, that war, like its predecessor, came to be seen and eventually to be fought as a "war to end wars'. As it ended in 1945, the United Nations was devised in a rare moment of collective enlightenment—a creative act to which many contributed, almost as a symbol of the new world that peace would bring. This time we would, through the United Nations, "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war";[4] we would make it the repository of what were agreed to be the 'rules of peace'. The post-war era would be an era of peace.

Has it been? There are some who assert that, in the absence of a major war, it has been an era of peace. But does this not represent tunnel vision or even myopia, or is it a case of the triumph of hope over logic? The questioning goes beyond 'major' and 'minor' wars. It took the United Nations ten years to agree this year even on a draft declaration enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations;[5] and as long as thirty years to reach agreement on the definition of 'aggression' for the purposes of the Charter.[6] Perhaps those who are so certain about the meaning of 'peace' and 'war' would cite that as the ultimate in international semantics. In truth, it was a groping for a deeper understanding

of 'war'; for an acknowledgement that, as between states, there is behaviour other than outright war—techniques of aggression short of mass destruction—that our human society must regard as unacceptable and, therefore, outlaw.

The agreed definition of 'aggression' did not ultimately encompass all such acts. But that definition has not ended the debate; people will continue the quest for a world order in which, both by definition and intuition, war is understood and acknowledged to be the absence of peace, rather than peace perceived as the absence of war. Over fifty years ago, W.B. Yeats, decrying, in his "Supernatural Songs", mankind's endless cycles of destruction, wrote with poetic insight that:

> Civilisation is hooped together, brought
> Under a rule, under the semblance of peace
> By manifold illusion.[7]

It is against that semblance of peace that I warn.

Such illusions are not new. The nineteenth century used to be described by English writers as "the Great Peace", when Britain was, broadly speaking, 'at peace' between Waterloo and World War I. It is a description which, in its own terms invites inquiry about, for example, the Crimean or the Boer Wars. But, those apart, what of the many other wars of empire which kept Britain's forces permanently employed somewhere on the globe—in the Chinese Opium Wars, on the frontiers with Afghanistan, in India during the so-called Mutiny, in the Sudan, in Ethiopia even—what Kipling aptly called "the savage wars of peace"?[8] The British public were able to celebrate victories, to enjoy their spoils—and to forget. For them, it was a time of peace. Pax Britannica.[9] And as is often the case, the perceptions of the dominant become falsely the predominant consciousness.

But those who were conquered or subdued by force of European arms saw things in a different light—and still do. It would be hard to persuade the Ashanti, the Zulus, or the Maoris that Britain had not been at war. They know that they had been. The dichotomy, of course, has parallels in the history of other imperial powers. Those conflicts, quickly forgotten in Europe, were often the inspiration for renewed nationalisms after 1945—sometimes well after. In Zimbabwe right up to 1980, the armed struggle, the 'second Chimurenga', as ZANU called it, took its

name from the unsuccessful resistance to white settler rule in the 1890s.[10] In such conflicts lie deep the roots of the world's new states. And still, today, illusions persist. Is it not, for example, essentially a major-power fallacy that the post-war era has been a time of peace? Were the Hungarians of 1956, or the Czechs of Dubcek's "Prague Spring" of 1968, in their enforced submission, casualties of someone else's peace? Was military intervention in Suez in 1956, was the 'Bay of Pigs' in 1961, or the mining of Managua's harbour in 1984 not each an act of war? And were there, are there, not many others?

Is there peace within South Africa? Obviously, today, the answer is 'no': the brutal repression of a racist regime and the struggle of a people yearning for freedom from it make the spiral of violence visible. But was there peace for fifty years before, when many would have readily answered 'yes'; years in which the West invested and helped, almost without demur, in building apartheid South Africa into what some even chose brazenly to describe as 'a bastion of the free world'? Illusions of peace again! Whose freedom? And, without freedom, what peace?

Such illusions are dangerous, for they encourage deliberate obfuscation—including obfuscation of our ethical choices. Mr. Botha claims, for example, the right to preserve 'his' culture in the land of 'his' birth, not only inverting history and ignoring the claims of others, but, more insidiously, encouraging the world not to notice that an essential element of 'his' culture is the suppression of the rights of others—in this case, the rights of the majority black population. He implies that a 'whites only' election can settle the destiny of that majority non-white population and, in legitimation of the fraudulent process, claims that sanctions will help those opposed to democracy.[11] How can we find a way through such obfuscation without ethical values to guide us? It is, of course, Mr. Botha and the apartheid system that violates the 'standards' his perfidy espouses; it is he and the apartheid system that opposes and defies democracy. It is apartheid that requires a totalitarian regime—his regime—as its bedrock. This is the 'double speak' of apartheid. When bolstered by illusions of 'peace' contrived by distortion and sustained by censorship they help it to become the 'double think' of even decent people, and, of course, the masquerade of the South Africa lobby.

And such illusions in the end lead to massive contradictions. Recently, in France, we witnessed the great show trial of Klaus Barbie, the former Nazi officer, who was both the symbol and the instrument of the most horrific torture meted out to those who struggled for freedom against oppression in occupied France.[12] France, and Europe in general, indeed people everywhere, cannot forget or forgive the inhumanities for which he was brought to book. How can they, when those atrocities so brutalised humanity itself? Today, atrocities of that same nature and scale are being systematically carried out in South Africa against those who struggle for freedom from the oppression of apartheid. And yet France not only does business with South Africa but does business in arms, helps the regime of repression, is hesitant even about economic sanctions.[13] Does race so colour our ethical standards that what we rage against as an assault on our own people we can acquiesce in when the assault is upon others of a different hue? What are the moral underpinnings of these incongruous responses? Are they incongruous because our morality denies itself by being selective and occasional?

Selectivity of moral viewpoint is a major element of distortion encouraging the wider illusion that the post-war period has been an era of peace. Even if we view peace in conventional terms, reality world-wide is very different. A 1985 Report of the United Nations Secretary-General revealed that, since 1945, there had been over 150 armed conflicts (defined as having more than 1000 casualties), accounting in all for some 20 million dead—almost all of them in developing countries and a great many of them civilians.[14] There are currently nearly 50 wars or armed conflicts of varying degrees; indeed, it has been calculated that there has not been a single war-free day since September 1945.[15] Is it possible then to say we are at peace?—unless we really are in an Orwellian '1984' situation where 'peace means war'—or the desolation that war brings. Remember how Byron, updating Tacitus, wrote about the Roman super-power long ago:

> Mark! Where his carnage and his conquests cease!
> He makes a solitude, and calls it peace![16]

Those lines may yet serve as an epitaph to our human species—etched in the frost of a 'nuclear winter'.

But my essential point is that the aftermath of war is by no means the only solitude we make or the only one we venture to call peace. What of the deepening silence of the world's millions overborne by poverty—for whom life is a series of transitions to tomorrow, always only to tomorrow; millions who simply pass away from want without ever knowing the reason why? Are they at peace? What of their human rights? Do we dare to speak of peace in our time while they endure the ravages of poverty's aggression against basic human values? When we talk of 'preserving' peace, what do we preserve for them?

But, in truth, it is a question that concerns all people. Interdependence makes a unity of the prospects for peace. For one thing, few of the problems on our agenda of anxiety fit neatly within national frontiers. They arise within and between both developed and developing countries. One country's cheap electricity is paid for elsewhere in polluted air and acid rain; unchecked desertification in one place manifests itself in a tide of refugees somewhere else; one community's ample diet of fish is at the expense of another's protein deficiency if stocks are being fished out; what is seen from a creditor's standpoint as an admirably sound policy of exporting natural resources to pay foreign debts is experienced by the debtor nation as a reckless squandering of real capital.

And who among us is free of myopia of some kind from our disciplines or our background? What to the scientist is valuable technological advance may be seen by the economist as economically unviable; and what the economist pronounces viable is sometimes plainly nonsensical to the ecologist.

As someone who approached environmental issues from a 'development' background, I confess to having had some initial reservations about the environmental movement. It had, after all, emerged essentially from the changing preoccupations of post-industrial societies; having achieved affluence, the rich now wanted to concentrate on improving the quality of their lives: clean air and rivers; more hedgerows and meadows; more bicycles and fewer heavy lorries; saving whales and seals—all a little late in the day but, if anything, worthier because of that. Yet these were concerns and causes far removed from the daily preoccupations of the majority of humanity, for whom improving basic living standards—for some, survival itself—were not so

much causes as compulsions. And when Northern environmentalists turned their attention to the South they sometimes seemed more concerned with pandas than people; with the static needs of conservation rather than the dynamic needs of a growing population seeking to escape from poverty.

On the Brundtland Commission it soon became clear that such reservations were an indulgence, given the sheer magnitude of the challenges of environment and development. It was an acknowledgement made easier by the perception that environmental degradation, poverty, the skewed international distribution of wealth and power, the selfish pursuit of national interests over global needs, were but different aspects of the same set of problems. All lie at the heart of peace.

Remember the despairing cry of Camus: "The absurd is born of this confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable silence of the world".[17] That unreasonable silence in our time is rooted in the challenge that multilateralism faces: a challenge from nationalism that takes us back to the decade before 1939; from anti-internationalism that batters the structures of global co-operation built patiently and with sacrifice over the entire post-war era; from militarism that reflects a recrudescence of power and authoritarianism in our global society; from arbitrariness and indifference to principle that erodes the foundations of world order; and even, sometimes, from fanaticism that makes a virtue of extremism.

I ended my last Lecture by regretting that internationalism had lost its ethical moorings just at the moment when it needed a firm base from which to respond to the expanded dimensions of global interdependence, including pre-eminently the priorities of peace.

This weakening of internationalism is the result of many factors, among them, regrettably, our experience of the inadequacies and frustrations of international co-operation since 1945. But it is also, in some measure, induced by the passage of time: time which has blurred human memory of how diminished international co-operation brought the world to economic disaster in the 1930s and to near self-destruction in the war that followed.

The United Nations was created at San Francisco for the express purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Chapter VII of the Charter contains a blueprint for an international security system with an enforcement capacity to deter aggression and prevent local disputes from erupting in armed conflict. Had it been implemented, it could have gone a long way to establishing the rule of law world-wide and saving the world both from the scourge of war and the waste of resources on the instruments of war. But the Charter's promise was not kept. The security system it embodies was placed under the exclusive direction of the Security Council, on which the United States and the Soviet Union sit as permanent members with the right to veto its decisions. Their power struggle was carried into the Council chamber itself, frustrating agreement on implementing the Charter's key security provisions, and defying proposals for reactivation for reform of its powers, such as those of the Palme Commission in 1982.[18]

Today, the United Nations itself is under siege and there are several specific assaults on internationalism. There has been hostility from powerful states to the ILO, to UNESCO, to the World Court, to UNCTAD, to the International Fund for Agricultural Development—even to the International Planned Parenthood Federation and the UN Committee for Development Planning. The arduously-negotiated Law of the Sea Treaty has been stalled, and in place of the North-South dialogue there is a deafening silence. These are ominous developments—associated as they are with a new respectability for doctrines of dominance whose political and economic strands are interwoven. On the political side these doctrines translate into the ascendancy of unilateralism over pluralism, of militarist intervention over peaceful means of conflict resolution, of national will over global goals. On the economic side, there is the same emphasis on compulsion—the preference for bilateralism over multilateralism; the paramountcy of conditionality over dispassionate assistance; the elevation over social needs of what the Pope recently, and relevantly, in debt-racked Argentina, called "the inhuman forces of the market".[19]

And, as frightening as anything else in this return to the cult of national power, are the indications that democracy itself is being made subservient to it. The bombing of Tripoli in 1986 had been preceded by American naval manoeuvres in the Black Sea and in the Gulf of Sidra: manoeuvres described by Pentagon

officials at the time as "intended in part to buttress President Reagan's request for more military spending next year." "After past incidents", they said, "in which the United States flexed its military muscle, the President's popularity boomed and his policy won renewed support in Congress".[20] Today, it is accepted as obvious that American policy in the Gulf is informed by the need to strengthen the President's standing after recent setbacks at home. The dangers of such indulgences are manifold and, increasingly, manifest.

And the macho militarist posture is not a secret political weapon new-found by the White House. France, the year before, displayed its own talent for it when, at a time of electoral choice at home, it persisted with nuclear testing in the Pacific.[21] Despite—or, perhaps, because of—the outrage of small nations whose habitat is that ocean, defiant testing was good for votes at home. I do not exempt the Soviet Union and its allies from criticism. But it is precisely my point that we do not expect an 'Afghanistan' style from the traditional defenders of democracy; still less that democracy itself should be manipulated to sustain an anti-internationalist culture or gratify lapses into it.

Small wonder then, when genuine democracies behave in this way, that imposters feel free to follow. Recently, on the eve of the 'whites only' election, South African forces flagrantly violated Zambian sovereignty and murdered Zambian citizens in Livingstone. According to the British newspaper *The Independent,* in a report datelined Johannesburg, 27 April 1987, "the weekend military clash involving South African forces inside Zambia was seen yesterday as having strengthened Pretoria's hand in the white election now only ten days away".[22]

The implications of these trends are horrendous. Under challenge are all our evolved concepts and structures of world order. However limited, they are the highest points we have reached as a global society in developing perceptions of the world as a community of people and nations and in creating structures of organisation and management consonant with such perceptions. As Ivor Richard said so picturesquely ten years ago in the Security Council, we simply cannot afford to reduce international affairs to a series of shoot-outs in a global 'OK Corral'; internationalism 'Rambo-style' is a contradiction in terms.[23] All people and countries are the potential victims of such

a retrogression from world order. If we fail to alter course, how can we hope to respond effectively to the priorities of peace? These are not new questions; but, these priorities demand that they be asked with a new urgency.

We could express differently that imperative for changing course. Four years ago the German philosopher Professor C.F. von Weizsacker, in a lecture in London, referred to the ideas of Immanuel Kant when speaking to the theme of peace and ethics. What he said struck me as being of the utmost relevance to our present global condition. It was this:

> Kant says that the civilised state has been achieved within our nations, but that between the nations the natural state still prevails. The civilised state means the rule of law... Kant continues that there will be no end to the sufferings and tragedies of history until the civilised state, the rule of law, is also established between nations.[24]

200 years after Kant, von Weizsacker's conclusion was that a minimal condition for both a functioning world economy and the political preservation of peace had to be the rule of enforceable law.

A few years earlier, in 1980, Willy Brandt's Commission on International Development Issues had reached a not dissimilar conclusion—albeit through processes for which none of us would claim the credentials of philosophical reasoning. In a key passage, the Commission underlined its essential thinking in these words:

> One ambition of this Report is to propose steps along the path to what would genuinely be called a society of nations, a new world order based on greater international justice and on rules which participating countries observe.[25]

Earlier in the same chapter (which dealt with 'Mutual Interests') we had signalled the attributes of that society of nations:

> We are looking [we said] for a world based less on power and status, more on justice and contract; less discretionary, more governed by fair and open rules.[26]

It is my general thesis that not just 'sufferings and tragedies', in Kant's phrase, but human survival itself now makes it imperative that the rule of law be established between nations. My basic proposition is that it is inescapable that we should, and without further delay, devote our energies to giving to our human society the attributes of a civilised state.

The reach of the rule of law, the domain over which enforceable law rules, is central to both the reality of the civilised state and the quality of its civilisation. To underline this, let me remind you of a particular, almost colloquial, extension of the reach of the common law: both for its relevance to life within nations and its potential for life between them.

It derives from a famous decision of Britain's highest court, delivered in 1932 by Lord Atkin. As a piece of litigation, it had humble beginnings—a snail in an opaque bottle of ginger beer. But what Lord Atkin adumbrated was an extension of the rule of law to relations between individuals in a way that allowed the common law to take a giant step; confirming, as it did, that we all owe a duty of care to our neighbour, a duty to act in a reasonable way to avoid injury to him, or her. Who is our neighbour, said Lord Atkin, is anyone we ought reasonably to have in contemplation as being affected by our actions. What is reasonable, is what ordinary people—"the man on the Clapham omnibus"—understand to be reasonable: like not selling an opaque bottle of ginger beer contaminated by the remains of a snail.[27] In a general sense, that had always been unreasonable. After that decision of the courts, it was unlawful—and that has made all the difference.

Today, as our planet becomes more and more a global village, a human neighbourhood, the duty of care we owe must be a duty to all the world's people, for they—all of them—are our neighbours now. And, in fact, the nature of that duty, in terms of what is reasonable conduct in relation to other people in the world, is known intuitively by ordinary people everywhere. They know that our shrinking world holds no human sanctuaries; that there are no shelters that insulate anyone, anywhere, from disease, from poverty, from terrorism, from cultural penetration, from environmental collapse. It is surely time that, in a new and broader jurisprudence, we provide conceptual space for these realities. We need to develop between nations new precepts of

rights and duties as relevant to our time as any that Lord Atkin formulated at the national level in an earlier era.

That is why we called, in the Brandt Report, for 'a world based less on power and status, more on justice and contract'—a continuation internationally, within the society of nations, of the struggle for just national societies. The challenge now is basically the same as that once faced within nations through earlier eras of slavery, of feudalism, of the beginnings of social and economic reform, to the flowering of just consensual communities. Today, for the greater part, we no longer face so many separate feudal societies; but we do confront a human society that bears too many of the attributes of a feudal state: not one state and two people but one earth and two worlds—and global warlords for good measure.

What more is required to convince us of the need to put in place a global regime of collective security under the rule of enforceable law? Isn't something badly wrong when the countries of the South Pacific, for example, resolve to declare their region a nuclear-free zone—only to command not guaranteed respect for that decision, which should be their right, but instant opposition of major powers outside the region? And in Southern Africa, is there not a palpable need for collective action now to compel an end to South Africa's 'policies of destabilisation'—policies that are a euphemism for systematic aggression directly, and by proxy, against African Front-Line States in general and Mozambique in particular. And, in quite another part of the world, in the Gulf, should we not be talking in terms of truly international action, United Nations action, rather than national assertiveness, to protect the world's shipping from the excesses of the combatants? What is needed is not unilateral vigilante action, but international enforcement of universally accepted norms. Only the rule of law, applied by all nations acting together, can make the world safe for each and every nation.

The truth is that 'Glasnost' and its potential notwithstanding—if the super-powers cling to such notions as 'spheres of influence', they will prove themselves both short-sighted and old-fashioned; and, in the process, become a calamity for the rest of the world. Inexorably, we are moving into the kind of truly interdependent world where 'spheres of influence' Bhreznev-style will be wholly unacceptable: not merely because repugnant

to sovereignty, but because anachronistic in a global milieu in which increasingly everywhere is everyone's sphere of interest. Who can doubt that we shall have to redefine sovereignty itself in the twenty-first century in terms more compatible with our maturity as a human society and more conformable to its insistence on the norms of a civilised state? Nor need this trouble us; and particularly not small states. Freedom at home is enhanced by the rule of enforceable law. So will sovereignty be, under the rule of law world-wide.

But we are short of time. To borrow words used by Freud in his famous letter to Einstein on the danger of war in 1934, these failures "conjure up an ugly picture of mills that grind so slowly that, before the flour is ready, men are dead of hunger".[28] The 'common security' of the world's people cannot be left to those whose concept of an ordered world is one ordered by themselves alone. Bertrand Russell recognised and never ceased to act upon this reality; and, among great scientists and thinkers, he was not alone. Readers of his *Autobiography* will recall that in July 1955, just before the Big Four summit in Geneva, he penned a resolution which was to be signed by Einstein himself and nine other Nobel Prizewinners in science. The resolution took note of the fact that, in any future war, nuclear weapons would threaten the continued existence of mankind, and urged governments to acknowledge that their purposes could not be furthered by a world war, and to find peaceful means for the settlement of all disputes.

Before Einstein had agreed to sign the resolution, news of his death was conveyed to Russell during a journey by air to Paris; but arriving later at his Paris hotel, Russell found a letter from Einstein agreeing to sign.[29] That protest against war was truly Einstein's final word to humanity. Their examples are there to be followed. At no time in the post-war era has there been more pointed a need for a return to the internationalism which was the dominant ethic of the men of 1945 who built the UN as the foundation of a new world order, and the ideal of great men like Russell and Einstein.

Winston Churchill, by contrast, was a pragmatist and a man of empire; but his internationalism, shaped by his long crusade against the weakness of the League of Nations and the conflict he saw looming, over-rode imperialist ambition. The lessons of

the 1930s never left him. On 6 September 1943, World War II was at its apogee when, receiving an honorary degree from Harvard University, Churchill spoke of his vision of the future beyond the conflict.[30] His theme was Anglo-American unity and the fraternal association of the Commonwealth. As so often, he used words which have since passed into legend: "We have learned from hard experience [he said] that stronger, more efficient, more rigorous world institutions must be created to preserve peace and to forestall the causes of future wars." He saw as a central and creative task the working out of the "form a system of world security may take"—a task which included coming to grips with "whatever derogations are made from national sovereignty for the sake of a larger synthesis." Churchill complained that if the League of Nations had failed, it was "largely because it was abandoned and later on betrayed". He counselled the youth of America and Britain: "There is no halting place at this port. We have now reached a stage in the journey where there can be no pause. We must go on. It must be world anarchy or world order".[31]

Already, in August 1941, in a sea-tossed meeting with President Roosevelt off the coast of Newfoundland for the signing of the Atlantic Charter, they had together sketched out the form of peace, when for the first time the adhering countries called themselves 'the United Nations'. Among their aims—it is useful to recall—were economic co-operation between all nations in a new world order to be ushered in by, among other measures, general disarmament.[32]

And that, of course, was the compelling vision that led, two years after the Harvard speech, to the United Nations; the vision that Roosevelt did not live to put into words himself but left Truman to convey to the founding Conference at San Francisco:

> We still have a choice between the alternatives: the continuation of international chaos... or the establishment of a world organisation for the enforcement of peace.
>
> If we should pay merely lip-service to the inspiring ideals and then later do violence to simple justice, we would draw down upon us the bitter wrath of generations yet unborn.[33]

Notice that same insistence on a choice between 'world anarchy' and 'world order'; the same emphasis on 'enforcement' of peace. But we have paid lip-service to the 'ideals' of the Charter and done violence to 'simple justice'.

A few years ago, the Independent Commission on International Security Issues—the Palme Commission—in its Report, *Common Security,* called specifically for the strengthening of the United Nations security system by a return to the concept of collective security—at least initially in the context of Third World conflicts.[34] It recognised that the world, as it evolves into a more mature community, must somehow ensure that the answer to a threat of aggression, and to aggression itself, must not depend only on the capacity and resolve of the victim to respond. That recognition is timely and relevant in our present situation. States do not permit the law of the jungle to hold sway within their national societies; they should not allow it in the global society. It is time to ensure, as the Charter promised, that the burden of making the world safe for all is shared by all. This is the essential beginning of the rule of enforceable law.

The Palme Commission's recommendations envisage a structure of preventive peace-keeping, involving fact-finding missions, military observer teams, and military collective security forces, all to be deployed in advance of armed conflict. A vital element of the proposal is that such action under the Charter should be underpinned by a political 'concordat' between the permanent members of the Security Council to exercise restraint in the use of the veto, thus ensuring that the UN has both the will and the means to prevent armed conflict rather than having to face the imponderables of political reaction to a conflict once it has broken out.[35]

The Palme Report was followed by a call by the UN Secretary-General in 1982 "to reconstruct the Charter concept of collective peace and security" and to meet the need of governments for "a workable system of collective security in which they can have real confidence".[36] Over forty nations sponsored a resolution requesting the Security Council to give due consideration to the Secretary-General's Report.[37] Once more, however, after two years of wholly ineffectual consultation, the Security Council failed to respond to the hopes of the world. And apathy has been piled on inertia.

Mahatma Gandhi was once asked what he thought of Western civilisation. He reflected for a while and then answered cautiously: "I think it is a good idea".[38] He was not, I believe, being cynical. Fifty years later, it is becoming clear that a final judgement on our 'civilisation' is, indeed, going to depend on how we respond to the wider challenge of making human society a civilised state through applying the rule of law between nations.

Was Woody Allen, after all, right when he said:

> More than at any time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The other, to total extinction. Let us [he added with scathing cynicism] pray that we have the wisdom to choose correctly.[39]

Whether right or wrong, we have, assuredly, to do more than pray. Hopelessness is intellectually indefensible and extinction an unacceptable human choice. We have to work as well: whatever the frustration, however incremental the progress, we cannot face the next generation—or perhaps have a next generation to face—unless we can give a good account of our stewardship of peace in our time.

And I do see signs of hope. They lie, in part, in the idealism and international solidarity which many of you, in your several pursuits of peace in its widest sense, symbolise. And, in the longer-term, I see hope, too, in the realisation by hard-headed people in developed countries that the poor world, if it is not helped to achieve sustainable development, could wreck not only its own environment, but also that of the planet as a whole. The message of the Brandt Report was that mutual interest bound rich and poor countries together. The World Commission on Environment and Development has given that message powerful reinforcement. The Palme Commission, in between, pointed the way to the machinery of world order through collective security.

The way forward requires vision and genuine internationalism. Both may now be in short supply; but cannot forever be smothered. I have no doubt that, as we approach the twenty-first century, our perception of the future will cease to be defined in national terms. The present century may, indeed, come to be

seen as the time in which the concept of sovereignty and the nation state reached its peak and began to provide diminishing returns. In its place, must come what Bertrand Russell himself called for insistently: a measure of world governance—a more democratic world; one less susceptible to the usurpation of power on a global scale, less vulnerable to the imposition of one nation's will: one more hospitable to world order, more hostile to arbitrariness and compulsion. A world, in short, not permanently skewed, with the few always more than the many, the wronged forever wrong, the righteous never right, poverty in the midst of plenty, a life of crisis for most, a crisis of leisure for some; pursuit of peace through preparations for war; search for survival through enlarging our capacity for self-destruction.

But, most of all, we must work for a world in which our efforts are directed to ending 'the sufferings and tragedies of history' by establishing (in Kant's terms) the civilised state, the rule of law between nations. The pursuit of this goal remains, I believe, the highest priority of peace today, as it was to Bertrand Russell, however differently he expressed it. Our generation's historic mandate is to respond steadily and with unswerving resolve to this challenge. We must do so by helping to secure in many spheres—economic, political, military, perhaps even scientific—the governance of enforceable law; helping to make the world 'one based less on power and status, more on justice and contract, less discretionary, more governed by fair and open rules'.

If peace is, indeed, ambition that reaches beyond armistice, can there really be any higher priority than establishing the rule of law between nations? Can we pay higher tribute to the memory of Bertrand Russell than by committing ourselves to being activist in that cause? We like to think of ourselves as the 'management generation'. It is time we gave some priority to managing genuine peace in the world, and in the lives of the world's people.

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