

## **NKRUMAH AND THE EIGHTIES**

- I — The Political Domain**
- II — The Economic Domain**

*The Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Lectures  
Kwame Nkrumah Conference Centre, Accra  
and University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast,  
12 and 15 November 1980*

## I—The Political Domain

*P*leasure and pride conjoin on the occasion of these lectures which salute the memory of Kwame Nkrumah. The pleasure is personal, out of my own respect for this man of many gifts; but I feel pride also on behalf of the Commonwealth, because it was Nkrumah who initiated Africa's outstandingly constructive role in Commonwealth affairs. I am grateful for the honour of having been asked to deliver these Memorial Lectures.

Three years ago I addressed the Seventh Commonwealth Education Conference in this Conference Centre in Accra which bears Kwame Nkrumah's name. By a happy coincidence the Conference opened on the first ever Commonwealth Day, when the Commonwealth is commemorated at the same time in all its member countries, and I was called upon to mark the event by planting a tree in the grounds of the Conference Centre. I saw that tree as symbolising the spirit of Africa's relations with the Commonwealth: a spirit rooted in patriotism but flowering in Africa's endeavours within man's collective pursuit of betterment. The tree, I am glad to say, has grown; and Africa's share in creating a future for us all has continued to grow steadily. What Kwame Nkrumah planted in Ghana, in Africa and in the world is a mighty growth indeed.

As I prepared for this address I reflected on Anthony's eulogy of Caesar:

The evil that men do lives after them;  
The good is oft interred with their bones.

So, perhaps, it is; but only in a very contemporary sense. Who among those we now acknowledge as the great men of all time has not been flawed? Yet, on the whole, what history remembers are not the transient flaws, grave as they sometimes were, but their grand achievements that transcend time, that make their having been part of human society the occasion of lasting human satisfaction. So let it be with Kwame Nkrumah. Certainly, so be

it for the purpose of this Memorial Lecture; for it is against the backdrop of those grand achievements of this great son of Africa that I look to the decade of the 80s.

The first Prime Minister of the first black African state in this century to regain its freedom, he was both the chief architect of Ghana's independence and the builder of much of her early development. These were real achievements which, because of their contemporary significance, their shock value to the old world system, translated easily on to the symbolic plane, and enabled Ghana to play a frontline role in one of the noblest campaigns of our time, the struggle to bring freedom to colonised peoples in Africa and the world at large. A man of ideas who believed that ideas should find physical, institutional expression, he contributed creatively to the modern Commonwealth, was a founding father of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), a vigorous champion of the United Nations and a leader in the Non-Aligned Movement.

With any visionary it is the vision itself that distinguishes him from others. Once he has communicated the vision, and it has been consummated even partly, it easily becomes commonplace. To appreciate Nkrumah's vision at its true value, we have to go back to the international system as it existed between the two World Wars. That was the period when the independence of African states was a far-off dream; when the European-oriented League of Nations showed itself less than resolute to help stricken Ethiopia; when other organisations of international and especially African co-operation were not thought of, and the Commonwealth embraced only the old white Dominions.

Nonracialism, a generosity of mind and an intuitive internationalism all seem to have merged naturally from Kwame Nkrumah's early life. But what about that feeling for Africa's limitless future, and that global vision? Among many influences contributing to the commingling in his ideas of Africa and the outside world I think of the revered example of Dr. Kwegyir Aggrey<sup>1</sup> of Achimota College who infused Nkrumah with his belief in the role of the youth of Africa in a multi-racial world; of the venerable black American thinker, W.E.B. Du Bois, who chaired the fifth Pan African Congress in Manchester in 1945, where the direction of Nkrumah's political career became plain; and men from my own part of the world, Marcus Garvey of

Jamaica, and George Padmore of Trinidad<sup>2</sup>—men whose forebears had travelled the cruel middle passage from Nkrumah's West Africa and whose association with him would be a bridge that both they and he would cross.

The title of the journal that Nkrumah published briefly in Britain after 1945, *The New African*, is instructive, because he himself embodied that new African restless to invent the future, passionate for change and freedom, and summoning all his powers to the supreme effort.<sup>3</sup> After he returned home in December 1947, he worked to create a national party drawn from the masses, which would reach beyond the inherited limits of tribe and language. His radical, populist approach was ideally suited to the task. This was the period when his supporters were sometime disparagingly described as "the verandah boys";<sup>4</sup> the *sans-culottes*, those who could afford no home but slept instead on the streets and verandahs. The example of Gandhi and the Indian equivalents of the verandah boys had already demonstrated the power that the masses could wield in pursuit of national independence.

In the struggle for independence, it was Nkrumah's achievement to be supremely a man of his time—times changed forever by the Second World War which brought the passion for freedom in its wake. Nkrumah grasped the need for political organisation, had the ability to fulfil it and the flair for using the machine created to maximum effect. One of his best-known pre-independence rallying-cries exhorted his countrymen: "Seek ye first the political kingdom"—an effective adaptation of the Biblical injunction. And when the time came to agitate for complete independence, he was equal to the challenge. He knew that it is never too soon to be free; that freedom is a man's inalienable birthright; often stolen, but never revoked.

If Nkrumah's role in bringing about Ghana's independence must be his great practical achievement, his contributions in realms beyond Ghana must rank as high. For his ambition did not stop at the independence of his own country. Time and again, in the run-up to independence, he saw Ghana's freedom within a wider continental perspective. In 1956, he observed:

How we conduct ourselves when we become independent will affect not only Ghana but the whole of

Africa. We have a duty not only to the people of this country, but to the peoples everywhere in Africa who are striving towards independence.<sup>5</sup>

And a year later, at the Independence Ceremony itself on the Polo Ground in Accra, he made perhaps his most celebrated and justly remembered assertion:

Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.<sup>6</sup>

Freedom, Nkrumah knew, brought responsibilities; a lesson which so clearly bears reiteration that in 1979, the joint OAU-ECA Symposium on the future development prospects of Africa towards the year 2000 declared that freedom should not be that of “a free fox in a free hen house.”<sup>7</sup>

The moment of independence revealed Nkrumah at his greatest, at his most magnanimous, uniting in one instant Ghana’s past and Africa’s future. He had a naturally centrifugal mind; it constantly whirled out ever-expanding political visions, sweeping a wide path in time and range. The very name chosen for the new country illustrates this, because ‘Ghana’ was not just a name from the history of the West African region but an ancient empire which spread across the whole southern Sahara. He craved for ever-broader political entities, in contrast to the balkanised Africa which European colonialism had carved out—a yearning that, perhaps, derived from this experience; for in the process of balkanising Africa, the colonisers blurred ethnic and linguistic boundaries, leaving behind a new kind of nation state with a new potential for the future. Hence Nkrumah’s vision of a united Africa; accepting, as a modern man must, the realities of existing national boundaries, but recognising from the very way they had been drawn that change need not stop there. Hence, also, his support for a multi-racial Commonwealth and for an internationalism rooted in the United Nations system.

This is not to say that he was always right; indeed his critics might well argue, with reasons, that realities cannot be changed by vision alone. But there are times when vision and reality coalesce. Midnight on 6 March 1957, with all the implications of that moment for the watching and waiting world, was one of

those times.

Let us remember that it would have been possible for African countries, attaining independence, to have voluntarily balkanised themselves, returning to older limits and narrower loyalties of tribe and language. That they did not; that grander, more modern visions have on the whole prevailed, has been due in no small part to the example of Nkrumah's Ghana. He knew that Africa could be central in world affairs, but that it might well become marginal if its passion was the pursuit of narrow nationalisms—mimicking the nationalisms of an era that was already passing in Europe.

From the moment of Ghana's independence, the pace of change in Africa quickened inexorably, by the force of Ghana's example, as much as by any physical assistance afforded to those working, and sometimes fighting, for independence in other parts of Africa. In 1958, the Conference of Independent African States and the All-African People's Conference kept up the momentum for change, as did Nkrumah's personal tour of independent African countries. The wind of change was indeed blowing through the Continent; and it was blowing predominantly from West Africa. It is singularly appropriate that Harold Macmillan's famous phrase about 'the wind of change' in his speech to the South African Parliament in February 1960,<sup>8</sup> in fact first came to Africa in a speech he made in Accra three weeks earlier, and that Nkrumah himself qualified the phrase by calling it "no ordinary wind, but a raging hurricane."<sup>9</sup>

In describing the impact of an independent Ghana on the process of decolonisation in Africa, metaphors recalling an elemental force come naturally to mind. At any rate, the wind was a forceful and cleansing one. Three years after Ghana's independence, twenty-three African countries had followed the trail blazed there. And now the number of independent African states in the United Nations has reached fifty.

Freedom for other African states remained Nkrumah's goal right to the end. After his loss of power, from exile in Conakry, he described how he looked towards the shores of then Portuguese Guinea, and thought of the liberation struggle going on there.<sup>10</sup> How much he would have rejoiced in Zimbabwe's freedom for which he fought so resolutely in so many fora; and how fitting a memorial to those efforts it was that one of his early

young assistants—Sam Ikoku from Nigeria—should have been one of the team of Commonwealth Election Observers whose work made such a vital contribution to the consummation of the freedom struggle.

Nkrumah inevitably sought to bring Ghana's prestige and influence to bear not only in Africa but in the wider world. He offered to mediate in several conflicts, from the Middle East to Kashmir to Vietnam.<sup>11</sup> And he contributed in important ways to a saner global society by his efforts to keep Africa a nuclear-free zone. He protested vigorously against atomic bomb testing in the Sahara, and in June 1962 convened a "World without the Bomb" Conference in Accra. These particular efforts did not change the policies of the nuclear powers; but he showed that those policies were questionable and he created fora for the circulation of alternative ideas. The contribution itself might have been small. Its significance, and it was a major one, lay in Nkrumah's assertion of Africa's right to contribute to the evolution of human destiny.

His adherence to Non-Alignment was a natural development of his own background and education. He saw it in ideological terms as enlarging Ghana's freedom and as an activist involvement in service to the wider world community. The "positive neutrality" of which he spoke did not imply a passive spectator role.<sup>12</sup> Ghana's balance on the delicate fulcrum of Non-Alignment was, admittedly, not always steady; but in all this Nkrumah was first and foremost an African working, as he often said, for African solutions. After his loss of power, he still maintained "The experiment which was tried in Ghana was essentially one of developing the country in co-operation with the world as a whole. Non-Alignment meant exactly what it said."<sup>13</sup> Nkrumah's bent was towards a naturally open and eclectic ideological system and his commitment to it came under strain only in the disappointment of his final years.

He took a leading part in the famous initiative of the Belgrade Conference of 1961 in sending a letter in identical terms to Kennedy and Khrushchev appealing to them to renew their negotiations "in order to avoid the danger of war in the world and allow humanity to proceed along the road of peace."<sup>14</sup> How near might we not be to the need for another such invocation in the name of human survival, and how much in need of Nkrumah's

early vision of Non-Alignment if it is to be made today?

If the strengthening of Non-Alignment as a worldwide movement was one of Kwame Nkrumah's achievements, another which has a special meaning for me is that he led the way for independent African nations to join the Commonwealth. That, in itself, was not necessarily the simple step it has become. While India was the first Third World country to join, and also gave a lead in Non-Alignment, there was the example of Burma to suggest that Commonwealth entry was by no means a matter of course. But it was clear at an early stage that the concept of a Commonwealth family voluntarily joined appealed to Nkrumah; perhaps because, in its friendliness and flexibility, it resembled the West African extended family situation in which he had been so happy. At any rate, in the historic "Motion of Destiny" of 1953 in which he called for independence, he expressed the country's desire to become a member of the Commonwealth.<sup>15</sup>

When he visited the United States in 1958 he explained Ghana's decision in what still remains one of the best definitions of the Commonwealth:

We believe that the evolving form of the Commonwealth is an institution which can work profoundly for peace and international co-operation. It is the only organic world-wide association of peoples in which race, religion, nationality and culture are all transcended by a common sense of fellowship. No policies are imposed on it from above. It does not even seek unity of policy. But it provides a unique forum in which men of different culture and different approach can sit down together and see what can be done to lessen tensions and to increase the economic and social well-being of themselves and their neighbours. This is not a bloc. It is not a power grouping. It is a club or family of friends who see their continuing friendship as a strand of peace in a troubled world.<sup>16</sup>

Ghana joined the forces of change, especially Nehru's India, that were already at work within the Commonwealth to make it a modern grouping aptly geared to our changed and changing world. In 1964, Nkrumah took the lead in proposing the

establishment of a permanent Commonwealth Secretariat<sup>17</sup> in order, as he put it, "to make the Commonwealth more in tune with the common aspirations of its members."<sup>18</sup> The Commonwealth's collective decision to set up a Secretariat was not without its critics and there were those who would have limited it to being a mere conduit for Commonwealth communications.<sup>19</sup> Time, and the many ways we have devised of working together for our collective and individual betterment, have confounded the doubters and proved the wisdom of Nkrumah's leadership and the validity of his vision, expressed in a working institution.

As with the Commonwealth, so with the United Nations; Ghana entered and changed the organisation. Ghana was a leader in the vanguard of that great army of Third World, Afro-Asian-Pacific-Caribbean, nations which have fundamentally altered the nature of the world organisation, complicating yet enriching it with a multiplicity of view-points, fortifying it as a force for peace, enlarging its role in development. At the United Nations, Ghana came to be at the hub of the African group which rapidly made its voice heard, especially in the continuing debate on decolonisation, reaching always toward the goal of self-determination for all enshrined in the Charter. Nkrumah made the United Nations Charter a plank of his foreign policy, and the United Nations a forum for the practice of Non-Alignment as he worked with other Afro-Asians between the blocs and ideologies.<sup>20</sup>

In the United States in 1958 he declared that "our task as a group in the United Nations is to use our strength wisely and objectively on the side of peace."<sup>21</sup> When the Congo crisis arose in 1960, Ghanaian troops were among the first United Nations forces sent to the country. They played their part with distinction; but the difficulties of the situation there seem to have confirmed Nkrumah in his belief that African problems demanded African solutions, which in this case included an African High Command.<sup>22</sup> The Congo strengthened his conviction of the need for pan-African approaches and made him redouble his efforts to achieve a functioning pan-African organisation.

When the Organisation of African Unity finally came into being in 1963, it was not the decision-making African Parliament, the vital step towards the unity of the Continent, for which

Nkrumah had hoped. It was the result of the labours of many men and a compromise between many views. In itself, that was perhaps no bad thing. The fact that a workable compromise was possible shows the power and the potential of the unifying ideal. And the important point is that the spirit of African unity is captured in the Organisation's Charter, a precious spark which may yet light the lamps of the future.<sup>23</sup> Historians of the formative discussions agree that this vital gleam was infused into the Charter above all by Kwame Nkrumah.<sup>24</sup> With the Commonwealth Secretariat, so with the OAU: the organisations exist, that is the achievement of Nkrumah and his fellow pioneers. It is for us to make of them what we will.

What are we doing with them—these large visions? How is the world of the 80s, our world, reflecting in its concerns the glimpses of universality, the intimations of mutual need, that Nkrumah in the wider reaches of his endeavours passed on to us? How is the Third World, more especially, responding to the challenges he never failed to hold out?

As Nkrumah perceived so clearly in his own time, human history is not predetermined. It is for us constantly to strive to move the course of events in desirable directions. We shall have to do so in the 80s; certainly the Third World must do so; but so also must all those of the other worlds in this one who share their hopes and see in their non-fulfilment implications for their own future. I do not need to press on this audience the validity of such a vocation. You know only too well what a struggle the people of Africa have waged to gain their freedom from colonialism and are continuing to wage as they seek to translate legal rights into genuine human entitlement.

Decolonisation required a quantum leap. A similar leap will have to be made to move relationships between developed and developing countries on to a more humanistic course. It will be inspired by successes in the political field but will need to be propelled by commitment and contribution and by passion of the kind that moved Martin Luther King to cry out against deprivation within his own country: "We will not be satisfied until justice rolls down like water and righteousness like a mighty stream."<sup>25</sup> But with economic deprivation as an aspect of the 80s I shall be in the main concerned in my second address. In this one, I dwell instead on those elements of the decade ahead that fall more

naturally in the political domain.

While many factors will shape the world of the 80s, none, perhaps, will play a greater formative role than the reality that we have actually begun to move from a world of dominance and power to one of growing interdependence and shared responsibility; one, therefore, in which, increasingly, global affairs will have to be decided by consensus and governed by contract. I feel that, quintessentially, the last two decades before the 21st century will confirm important limits to the power that so much of the 20th century was concerned with accumulating: limits that are already emerging. Cuba—Suez—Vietnam—were all testimony to those limitations on the ability of crude military power to determine events; and, even now, the same message echoes from the roof-top of the world in Afghanistan.

And limits to crude power are also appearing in economic relations. Mutual dependencies arising, for example, from the need for unimpeded expansion of world trade, from the prospect of mineral shortages and, more specifically, of oil depletion, are now imposing compulsions for global consensus on fundamentally new arrangements and relationships. And the imperatives of global agreement in areas of the environment like the future of the forests and the life-sustaining qualities of the seas and the atmosphere defy all notions of 'going it alone'. No one nation or group of nations can resolve these issues independently of others, or impose solutions of its own devising.

And, not surprisingly, it is not only that the world is changing, it is also that mankind is coming to a new awareness of global realities and needs. We, too, are changing in our changing world. This new awareness responds in large measure to the kind of signals that Ghana's freedom and Nkrumah's articulation of its meaning sent: that the developing countries are coming into the mainstream of international political and economic life, and bringing with them not only new aspirations but new insistences. Their very involvement—the involvement on the world stage of some one hundred new countries since 1945 and their own one billion people—highlights the need for new vistas in international thinking, new approaches to international action.

My point is to register the need in the 80s for human society to proceed on the assumption that we have entered the era that Alastair Buchan foresaw as the "era of negotiations"<sup>26</sup>—an era in

which the old premises of power will no longer suffice as the touchstone of human destiny. At the heart of those negotiations, whatever their form and content, will be the issue of sharing—sharing of power and responsibilities; and the question for us all in the 80s should really not be ‘whether’ but ‘how’ that sharing is to take place. The Third World will need to harness all its strength for this new era; and the effort must begin at home.

Democracy, as Nkrumah once argued forcefully, needs no more justification than the manifest right of all human beings to be treated as equals.<sup>27</sup> It is, therefore, as imperative in the Third World as it is elsewhere. But the Third World’s search for equity in global relationships imposes a further obligation on it. Third World credibility on the world stage is too often eroded by domestic imperfections. Its case for global redress is weakened when it fails to promote social justice at home and denies democracy within its national societies. It is true that such efforts are harder to pursue in the stony ground of poverty, but we know only too well and too sadly that some times they are not even attempted.

The tendency to repression within some—by no means all—developing countries has been one of the sadder imperfections of our world. Surely, we can do better than mark the purity of our radicalism with refusal to tolerate another view, or the robustness of our democracy with bullets and bombs and *coups d’etat*, realised or aborted. The people of the Third World themselves know that this falls far short of their aspirations for nationhood.

The early decades of sovereignty are a testing time in a nation’s life. Dangers abound as colonial links are snapped and the search begins for solutions to the myriad problems of independent national growth. The cement of internal solidarity developed in the struggle for nationhood is often dissolved as the external target is withdrawn; national unity faces the threat of ideological polarisation or of baser factional conflict. Even the minimum consensus indispensable for the orderly working of political systems can be jeopardised, and sometimes fail to survive altogether. And the difficulties of achieving development that fulfils the expectations raised by the dawn of freedom only aggravate the dangers to democracy.

In the process, many nations have succumbed and democracy has been replaced by authoritarianism, sometimes by despotism.

The record, of course, is not everywhere shameful; it has its shining pages. Even where democracy has been subverted, recent years have seen the heartening resilience of man's instinct for freedom. Here in West Africa you have shown that in societies where an ethos of freedom persists it is possible for democracy to be restored by military regimes themselves.<sup>28</sup> From these triumphs of freedom and the less dramatic but steady successes of democracy elsewhere in the Third World, we must draw hope and sustenance for the better mobilisation of the strengths of the Third World in the decade of the 80s.

And that mobilisation will call for greater collective efforts rooted in the faith which Kwame Nkrumah brought so confidently to the struggle for self-determination—the belief, the assurance, that organisation, and where necessary institutions, are critical to the political process whether within nations or between them. As I have argued elsewhere, for the Third World in the era of negotiations, effective unity is the mandate of the world's poor.<sup>29</sup> But without organisation real unity will be forever a mirage. Certainly, without it, that strength that is supposed to be unity itself will be forever elusive. It is time that the domestic lessons of organisation were applied by the developing countries to their global objectives. If they are not applied, if the Third World does not organise for the era of negotiations, even the fruits of victories already won at home could yet be lost. It would be tragic and wasteful if we were to fail to fulfil in the world of the 80s Nkrumah's vision of the upliftment of the human condition world-wide.

There may be argument over some aspects of Ghana's diplomacy under Kwame Nkrumah; but on one fundamental human issue the international community is still following a course which Nkrumah did much to chart twenty years ago—the campaign to rid the world of racialism, especially of apartheid. In this cause Nkrumah used all the organs of international action, including the Commonwealth, with unswerving resolution. By the time of his first Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in 1960, the Sharpeville massacre<sup>30</sup> had cast its grim shadow across the world, and several Commonwealth leaders were asking cautiously whether South Africa could continue as a member of the Commonwealth.<sup>31</sup>

But it was Nkrumah who publicly declared after that meeting

that "the Government of Ghana for one would find it embarrassing to remain in the Commonwealth with a Republic whose policy was not based upon the purpose and principles of the United Nations."<sup>32</sup> When Commonwealth Prime Ministers met again in 1961, Nkrumah was one of those who led discussion towards the incompatibility of apartheid with Commonwealth principles, and helped to mount the final assault on South Africa's racist policies, forcing South Africa to withdraw from the Commonwealth.<sup>33</sup>

The Commonwealth stands for inclusion, not exclusion. But if South Africa had not been forced out, the Commonwealth could not have become the credible and respected multiracial association it now is. Nkrumah greatly helped to ensure that the modern Commonwealth he had helped to nurture did not wither on the strangling vine of apartheid. At the United Nations too, Ghana and the other African members used the machinery of the General Assembly against the racist regimes of Southern Africa. The current call in the United Nations for sanctions against South Africa<sup>34</sup> is the unfolding in the 80s of a struggle that Ghana spearheaded in the early 60s.

Nkrumah's early use of one international organisation to reinforce action taken in another is now established practice. At the start of the current session of the UN General Assembly, President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, speaking as Chairman of the OAU, said that the OAU would press for total economic sanctions against South Africa because of her refusal to accept eradication of the apartheid system, and would call for enforcement action if the UN independence plan for Namibia continued to be delayed by South Africa.<sup>35</sup> President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria issued a grave and measured warning to like effect.<sup>36</sup> Both, of course, were African and Commonwealth voices reaffirming a long held determination to eradicate this deeply-rooted evil.

The Commonwealth has been much involved in the fulfilment of this resolve. At the Singapore Summit of 1971 the United Kingdom was dissuaded from selling frigates and helicopters to South Africa,<sup>37</sup> an internal dialogue that could have brought the Commonwealth to its knees but in which principle triumphed. It was a triumph that paved the way for the eventual international arms embargo on South Africa adopted by the United Nations

five months after its urging by another Commonwealth Summit—at London in June 1977.<sup>38</sup> The victory for principle at Singapore found expression in the Commonwealth Declaration of Principles adopted at that meeting—the nearest we have come to a Commonwealth ‘Charter’.<sup>39</sup> Six years later, in the Gleneagles Agreement,<sup>40</sup> Commonwealth leaders committed themselves in practical ways to the international sporting boycott of South Africa—a commitment which it is my duty to constantly hold up before the member states; and not only their governments, but also their people.

More recently, in 1979 the Commonwealth’s burning resolve to stamp out apartheid was expressed once more in the strongest possible terms in the Declaration on Racism and Racial Prejudice adopted on African soil at Lusaka. In it Commonwealth Heads of Government reaffirmed:

that it is the duty of all the peoples of the Commonwealth to work together for the total eradication of the infamous policy of apartheid which is internationally recognised as a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind and the very existence of which is an affront to humanity.<sup>41</sup>

The Commonwealth’s discussion of an arms embargo in 1977 had been in the context of Namibia. South Africa’s consistent defiance of United Nations directives on bringing Namibia to independence has been a major factor in the Southern African problem, and one to which Nkrumah always accorded special attention. He argued that the Commonwealth had special responsibility for South-West Africa because when the United Kingdom accepted responsibility for the territory at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 it did so “in the name of and on behalf of the then British Empire”. He continued:

What, therefore, was done at Versailles was done in the name not only of the United Kingdom, but of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and, though they were not yet independent, of India and Ghana.<sup>42</sup>

And, by implication, he could have added all the other new

Commonwealth members.

Certainly the Commonwealth has felt a special involvement in the constant efforts of the United Nations to secure genuine independence for the territory. In 1975, at Kingston, Commonwealth Heads of Government initiated a programme to help prepare Namibia for independence,<sup>43</sup> and we have worked closely with the United Nations and with the South-West African People's Organisation in developing practical responses to a variety of needs. The Commonwealth can legitimately claim to be acting over Namibia in continuance of the tradition of Nkrumah. And we must sustain that commitment to action.

But the element of the Southern African problem which Nkrumah regarded as a test case for the effectiveness of the Commonwealth was Zimbabwe. It took longer than it should have done to reach the goal of Zimbabwe's freedom and it is, of course, to the people of Zimbabwe through their resolute and gallant struggle that must go the essential credit for success. But the role of the front-line States and of Nigeria, the role of other African countries, and the particular role of the Commonwealth and its Secretariat<sup>44</sup> were intimations of the fervour and commitment that Nkrumah had much earlier shaped. He, too, shared in that triumph.

Nevertheless, in all our pleasure at this new birth of freedom in Southern Africa, we must not lose sight of the magnitude of what still remains to be achieved. The struggle continues to the South and West; in Namibia and South Africa freedom still remains to be realised. In Namibia a ruling white minority strives to perpetuate its dominance, attempting to stall change by forging a coalition with amenable sections of the black leadership—exactly the formula which proved to be unworkable in Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, freedom fighters operate from outside the country in grim re-enactment of the Zimbabwe scenario.

In South Africa itself, the heartland of intolerance, the inhuman system of apartheid continues unchecked, while the seething cauldron of Soweto<sup>45</sup> signals both hope and danger—hope in these young Africans who aspire for progress and freedom, danger in the looming crisis of confrontation. If any proof were needed that the South African regime stands for a massive and flagrant denial of human rights to its citizens, there is the grim example of Robben Island where imprisoned African

leaders like Nelson Mandela await their deliverance.

The South African writer Mtutuzeli Matshoba tells of a man travelling by train to visit his brother on Robben Island. When he mentions his destination to African women on the train, they ask him to convey through his brother a message to Mandela and his comrades. "Tell him to say 'bayethe' for us to all the great men there who have sacrificed themselves for us".<sup>46</sup> 'Bayethe', the Zulu salutation for a great king, is their spontaneous gesture of respect towards these imprisoned warriors against apartheid. We too must salute them and ensure that they are not forgotten.

The example of Zimbabwe suggests that even in South Africa it is not too late for change; that even there conflict can be averted and the peoples come together for a genuine multiracial union which could offer hope to all. Yet we have to face the uncomfortable truth that, after decades of effort within the international community to remove the evil of apartheid, there is little to show by way of accomplishment, except a wider acknowledgement of its hideousness by people outside South Africa. Within South Africa itself the ruling minority remains obdurate in its refusal to countenance the dismantling of its system of racial oppression and determined to use an armoury of coercive measures to put down opposition within the country. There are, of course, much publicised gestures designed to create the illusion of change, gestures compelled by the growing pressure in the country and the wider condemnation outside. There are also moves to erode the growing solidarity between all the disadvantaged communities of South Africa, between the various shades of the non-white community. But apartheid remains, and white supremacy rules, seeking as ever—but heartened no doubt by the re-emergence of East-West tensions—to dissolve concern abroad by confusing the real issue of racism with the false one of ideology.

We need to ask ourselves why the world has failed, after all these years of campaigning against apartheid, to extract from the rulers of South Africa nothing more than gestures, why it has failed to secure significant lessening of the rigours of apartheid let alone its total rejection. If we do that honestly and squarely, we will have to admit that we all share in the responsibility for this failure. But a greater blame must surely lie with those countries that are in a stronger position to influence South Africa

and are better placed to compel concessions from its rulers.

It is sometimes said in justification of this neglect that they decline to use their full weight out of concern for South Africa's value to the "free world" and out of solicitude for their trading and investment interests.<sup>47</sup> The first is shameful and contradictory; the second downright short-sighted.

To say this is not to absolve the rest of the world from the duty to intensify its own action against apartheid. Others need not remain helplessly inactive. They can keep up the pressure on major powers to be more effective in constraining South Africa. And it need not just be moral pressure to summon them to the professed values of Western civilisation or to warn them of the folly of depending on South Africa to defend the world against threats to freedom. They can also give greater support to those African states that are in the front-line of the war against apartheid, both out of moral outrage and sympathy for the victims of oppression and also to protect their very sovereignty.

The countries in Southern Africa, through the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference,<sup>48</sup> are now seeking with determination to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa, a dependence which is the legacy of colonial history and is heightened by accidents of geography. They have been carrying heavy burdens, carrying them with admirable resolution and fortitude, but they remain exposed and vulnerable. As tension grows within South Africa, as opposition to the system mounts from within the country, these countries at the frontline will come under greater threat. It should be the duty of other nations to help them stand on their own feet and reduce their vulnerability to pressure from Pretoria.

There are just two roads to freedom in South Africa. If the world fails to force South Africa's rulers to dismantle apartheid, it will leave that task to be accomplished by the blood of the oppressed people of the country. That is the lesson of Zimbabwe. Readiness to come to the Conference table to negotiate a basis for a multiracial society was induced by the people of Zimbabwe, by the men and women, old and young, who became soldiers of liberation, ready to die so that racism may end and their country be free. The struggle in South Africa will be longer and bloodier, vastly more costly in human life and suffering. Its rulers have the Continent's most powerful military arsenal; the odds are

more heavily stacked against the oppressed than they were in Rhodesia. But how long will the passion for freedom count the cost?

Each generation strives to make the world better for its children. In South Africa, we are perhaps already seeing the signs that the next generation is losing faith in our capacity to assure its future. Driven to desperation by their present and denied hope for their future, the children of Soweto have signalled their resolve to make their own future, even if it be only death. Each day the world delays to compel South Africa, Soweto's children will grow in numbers and in desperation and the certainty that their blood will flow will be made greater.

Slavery once proved to be too unbearable an affront to man's nobler instincts. We must hope that apartheid, equally barbaric in its denial of dignity, will one day crumble because humanity finds it too repugnant to tolerate. Deliverance may lie in the hands of those who wield power in South Africa, but the world has the power to demand that deliverance. To the ultimate use of that power we must dedicate ourselves. And we must not leave it to governments alone, but seek to move governments through their people. Africa cannot do it alone, but must join hands with all those elsewhere in the world who value freedom. All must work to make that day of deliverance dawn so that the children of all of South Africa's Sowetos may live in the sunshine of a free society.

Now that he is no longer in the world of men, Kwame Nkrumah lives still as a symbol. If I need a reminder of that truth, I have only to turn to a quiet garden in Georgetown, the capital of my own country of Guyana. There, in the Monument to Non-Alignment, is the bust of Nkrumah next to those three other giants of the Non-Aligned Movement, Nasser, Nehru and Tito.<sup>49</sup> In these four patriots, love of country was enriched by a larger vision of the way nations can live together in a world at peace. All the world is heir to their achievement—the epilogue to their work serving also as the prologue to a new chapter in the chronicle of man's restless quest for peace and understanding with himself and his environment.

The words inscribed on that monument are these:

Having led their peoples to freedom  
They did not rest

But taking the whole earth for their nation  
and all peoples for their brothers  
They sought to free the world from war

Gave to the oppressed a sense of dignity and the  
hope of justice

Ensured for all peoples the right to freedom and  
independence,  
and to determine and pursue without hindrance  
the paths  
of their political, economic, social and cultural  
development.

Secured for all states respect for their sovereignty  
and territorial integrity and the right to equality  
and active participation in international affairs

With them through the Movement of Non-Align-  
ment  
our human race took a major step forward  
towards a world of peace, of justice and of  
progress.

They began the dialogue of all mankind.

That commemoration is testimony to Kwame Nkrumah's  
vision of the world and to its steady translation into the reality of  
our times. I invoke it in his memory.

## Notes and References

1. Kwame Nkrumah, *Autobiography* (Panaf, London, Panaf Edition 1973), pp.12-13.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.
3. Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom* (Panaf, London, Reprinted Edition 1976), p. 107.
4. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, *The Problems of Africa*, Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Lectures First Series, University of Cape Coast (MacMillan, London, 1977), p.xiv. Also Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, *op.cit.*, p. 90.
5. Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, *op.cit.*, p. 71.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
7. *What kind of Africa by the Year 2000?, Final Report of the Monrovia Symposium on the Future Development Prospects of Africa towards the year 2000* (Organisation of African Unity, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1979), p. 28.
8. Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, *op.cit.*, p.203. The occasion in Accra was a state banquet in the British Prime Minister's honour on 9 January 1960. The speech to the South African Parliament in Cape Town took place on 3 February 1960. J.D.B. Miller, *Survey of Commonwealth Africa, Problems of Expansion and Attrition 1953-1969* (Oxford University Press, London, 1974), p.122.
9. Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, *op.cit.*, p.203, n.1.
10. Kwame Nkrumah, *Dark Days in Ghana* (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1968), p. 149.
11. W. Scott Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-66* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, USA, 1969), pp.418-419.

12. Address to the Belgrade Conference, 1961, in Colin Legum *Pan Africanism* (Pall Mall Press, London, Revised Edition 1965), pp.114, 116.
13. Nkrumah, *Dark Days in Ghana*, op.cit., p. 71.
14. The *Times*, London, 7 September 1961.
15. Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, op.cit., pp.161-162.
16. Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, op.cit., p. 144.
17. Miller, op.cit., p.398. Also Derek Ingram, *The Commonwealth at Work* (Pergamon Press, London, 1969), p. 23.
18. Address to the National Assembly, Accra, 16 December 1965, in Kwame Nkrumah, *Rhodesia File* (Panaf, London, 1976), p. 124.
19. Miller, op.cit., p.400. Also Richard H. Leach, "The Secretariat", (1970-71) 26 No. 2 *International Journal*, pp.374-400, at pp.377, 382-383.
20. Miller, op.cit., p.119. Also Thompson, op.cit., pp.41, 289-290.
21. Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, op.cit., p. 149.
22. *Ibid.*, pp.267 *et seq.* Also Thompson, op.cit., p. 159.
23. Thompson, op.cit., p. 321.
24. *Ibid.*, pp.321-23. Also Legum, *Pan Africanism*, op.cit., pp.136, 281-287.
25. Martin Luther King, *Strength to Love* (Harper and Row, London, 1963), p. 114.
26. Alastair Buchan, *The End of the Post-War Era* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1974), p. 318.

27. Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, op.cit., p.184.
28. Ghana returned to civilian rule on 24 September 1979; Nigeria returned to civilian rule on 1 October 1979.
29. Shridath S. Ramphal, *One World to Share* (Hutchinson Benham, London, 1979), p. 201.
30. On 21 March 1960 (the date selected by the Pan-Africanist Congress for a non-violent campaign against the law compelling Africans to carry pass books for identification), police fired on a large crowd of Africans at the township of Sharpeville near Vereeniging, killing 67 people and wounding 186, which led to strikes and riots after which 2000 people were arrested.
31. Miller, op.cit., pp.144-145, 148.
32. Quoted in Miller, *ibid.*, p. 149.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 154-55.
34. A week before the Memorial Lecture the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly called for sanctions against South Africa in the context of Namibia: UNGA Draft Resolution A/C. 4/35/L.17, (New York, USA, 6 November 1980), para. 5.
35. *Official Records of the General Assembly, 35th Session, Plenary Meetings, Volume 1* (UN Doc. A/35/PV.8, 24 September 1980), pp.113-119.
36. *West Africa*, 13 October 1980, p.1999. Also in *Official Records of the General Assembly, 35th Session, Plenary Meetings, Volume 1* (UN Doc. A/35/PV.24, 6 October 1980), pp.463-467.
37. *Report of the Commonwealth Secretary-General, 1973, (December 1970-March 1973)*, (Commonwealth Secretariat, London), p.2. Also *Racism in Southern Africa: The Commonwealth Stand*, (Commonwealth Secretariat, June 1979).

38. Commonwealth Heads of Government: The London Communiqué, June 1977. Also in *The Commonwealth at the Summit: Communiqués of Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings 1944-1986* (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987), pp.187-188, para. 17. Also *Racism in Southern Africa: The Commonwealth Stand*, op.cit., pp.4-5; UNGA Resolution 32/9D of 4 November 1977, *Official Records of the General Assembly, 32nd Session*, Supplement No.45, (UN Doc. A/32/45, 1978), pp.16-18, at p.18.
39. *Report of the Commonwealth Secretary-General, 1973*, op.cit., Appendix 1, pp.65-66. Also in *The Commonwealth at the Summit*, op.cit., pp.156-157.
40. Commonwealth Heads of Government: The London Communiqué, June 1977, pp.21-22. Also in *The Commonwealth at the Summit*, op.cit., pp.198-199.
41. Commonwealth Heads of Government: The Lusaka Communiqué, August 1979, pp.21-23. Also in *The Commonwealth at the Summit*, op. cit., pp.217-219.
42. Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, op.cit., pp. 269-70.
43. Commonwealth Heads of Government: The Kingston Communiqué, May 1975, para. 26. Also in *The Commonwealth at the Summit*, op.cit., p. 169, at p.175, para. 26.
44. Chief Emeka Anyaoku, Deputy Commonwealth Secretary-General, "Zimbabwe: Reflections on the Lancaster House Conference", an Address to the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 31 January 1980, (unpublished, available from the Commonwealth Secretariat).
45. Between 16 and 24 June 1976, secondary school pupils in the South Western Township (Soweto) near Johannesburg demonstrating against the compulsory use of the Afrikaans language as a medium of instruction were fired on by police, leading to riots affecting other African townships, with an eventual official toll of 176 dead and over 1000 wounded.

46. Mtutuzeli Matshoba, *Call Me Not a Man* (Rex Collings, London, for Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1979), p. 108.
47. Extent of trading interests detailed in the "First Special Report of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid: Implementation of UN Resolutions on Apartheid by Governments and Intergovernmental Organisations" (UN Doc. A/35/22/Add 1), in *Official Records of the General Assembly, 35th Session, Supplement No. 22A* (1980), pp. 29-40.
48. Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe are members of the Conference.
49. Unveiled in Georgetown, Guyana, during the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, 8-11 August 1972.

## II—The Economic Domain

**K**wame Nkrumah is likely to be remembered most for having been in the vanguard of the battle for freedom in Ghana and all Africa and for pan-Africanism, Non-Alignment and a vibrant internationalism; in other words, for his vision and leadership in the political field. That was the theme of my first lecture. But he was also in the forefront of Third World recognition that political independence was only the beginning, albeit the necessary beginning, in the long uphill struggle to win genuine independence for Third World peoples. He put this view clearly in his autobiography:

No race, no people, no nation can exist freely and be respected at home and abroad without political freedom. Once this freedom is gained, a greater task comes into view. All dependent territories are backward in education, in science, in agriculture and in industry. The economic independence that should follow and maintain political independence demands every effort from the people, a total mobilisation of brain and manpower resources. What other countries had taken three hundred years to achieve, a once dependent territory must try to accomplish in a generation if it is to survive. Unless as it were 'jet propelled' it will lag behind and thus risk everything for which it has fought.<sup>1</sup>

In this statement of the challenge of development Kwame Nkrumah not only emphasised the importance of economic development for real independence; he highlighted the special challenge facing Third World leaders in the pressure of the time-scale—a dimension of the development problem still inadequately appreciated by developed countries when, in their constant admonitions to the Third World to be patient, they refer to their own long historical process of growth. Ghana's experience, in Nkrumah's time and later, as well as the recent economic

history of most of the new countries, have provided ample evidence of the difficulties in attaining development in one generation as Nkrumah sought. The task might have been hardest for the countries that won their freedom in the early years of decolonisation when development economics was a new discipline and countries such as Ghana were laboratories in which early theories of development were tested.<sup>2</sup> But while we have learnt much about what needs to be done both within and between nations to facilitate development, the pressure of the time-scale constantly rises. The imperative of urgent response is being constantly sharpened by the burgeoning expectations created by the communications revolution and mass participation in the political process—phenomena unknown to today's developed nations when they were themselves developing.

Ghana did not achieve the 'jet propulsion' for which Nkrumah hoped. It is understandable that in the immediate aftermath of his rule his failure should have been stressed. This is the toll the democratic ethic exacts, and there is no avoiding it. But, a better balance is now being struck in the assessment of Kwame Nkrumah. As I urged in my first lecture, a balanced appraisal will have to give due weight to his great contributions in such areas as post-war decolonisation, political unity in Africa, the dignity of black people everywhere through his espousal of the concept of the African personality, and the involvement of all African countries in the struggle to rid the Continent of institutionalised and blatant racism in the South. Even in areas where he is considered to have failed, his integrity of purpose, the influence of contemporary thinking on the role of industrialisation in development, and the sheer force of circumstance on the courses he followed, are being more fully acknowledged. Given the severity of the economic problems he faced, it is hardly surprising that Nkrumah went for radical solutions.

Foremost among these was a drive towards rapid industrialisation. In the context of his personal development and of his time, it is easy to understand how he came to give industrialisation such prominence. To begin with, he had spent twelve years abroad in the highly industrialised societies of the United States and Britain, and he had seen how their power to influence world events sprang from an industrial base. Secondly, he recognised that much of the developed world's industry was fed by raw

materials brought out of Africa. Nkrumah took special note of the United Nations figures for 1956, the year before Ghana's independence, confirming that, of world output, Africa provided:

96 per cent of gem diamonds (excluding USSR); 60 per cent of cobalt; 63 per cent of gold; 48 per cent of antimony; 37 per cent of manganese; 34 per cent of chromite; 32 per cent of phosphate rock; 24 per cent of copper; 19 per cent of asbestos; 15 per cent of tin; 4 per cent of iron ore and 4 per cent of bauxite.<sup>3</sup>

And he added that Nigeria, at that time, produced 85 per cent of the world's supply of columbite, and that Ghana was the second largest producer of manganese.

It is inevitable, and right, that African leaders should attempt to come to terms with this paradox of a resource-rich Continent in which so many people remain poor. At the current session of the United Nations General Assembly, President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, in his capacity as Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity, appealed for international support for African efforts to pull what he called "the least developed Continent" out of a state of poverty and suffering.<sup>4</sup> Facing this problem nearly twenty years ago, Kwame Nkrumah felt that there was even greater wealth to be discovered and tapped in Africa. He wrote:

So much was neglected under colonialism that would even have benefited the imperialist interests, if their concern had not been limited to developing the best land, the most lucrative mines, the harbours and towns connected with their economic engagements. They wanted quick and easy returns, and would not occupy themselves with what appeared to be less promising areas of exploitation. Our African view is different. There is no single part of the African Continent which is not precious to us and our development. And with the technological resources available today, what would formerly have been regarded as miraculous can now be done with the help of scientific aids, provided the means are there.<sup>5</sup>

One can appreciate the buoyant optimism of that passage. And he left some legacies of his grand ideas. Ghana still has cheap electricity, which you even export to your neighbours.

But there are, of course, other priorities to be considered in a primarily agricultural economy. If Nkrumah paid too much attention to industrialisation, it was a mistake extenuated by his passionate desire for rapid development and for the dismantling of colonial economic structures that relegated developing countries such as Ghana to be merely raw material providers. And his emphasis on industrialisation was also in line with the thrust of development theory at that time. With hindsight, and the benefit of experience elsewhere, and with advances in economic thought, we now know that while industrialisation is important, its progress can seldom be achieved if agriculture is neglected; the two must run in tandem and be mutually supportive.

And it was this emphasis on industrialisation that led him to give priority to public sector activity and to assign a prominent role to state corporations. This seemed to him the only road to rapid industrialisation in a country without a significant entrepreneurial class to create a thriving indigenous private sector. His interventionism was, however, viewed by his critics purely in ideological terms; and this was a major basis for the increasing hostility he attracted from the Western world. Nkrumah's policies tended to be seen all too readily not in the context of their domestic rationale and circumstance but in terms of the global ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism. That the sheer necessity for bold action to dismantle a dependence generating structure might require stronger state intervention was inadequately appreciated. At least in part, Nkrumah became a victim of the stereotyped perceptions of the rich about the motivations of the poor—perceptions which still remain a great impediment to better relations between developed and developing countries.

But it is on the question of industrialisation that I should like to dwell a while. Criticism of Nkrumah's economic policies, valid as they might be in some respects, must not help to create a climate in developing countries, or in the international community at large, that undervalues the role of industrialisation in the Third World—or, to put it more accurately, that gives theoretical justification for the imbalance that exists. Developing countries,

in particular, must not add psychological impediments to the practical hazards already facing fledgling Third World industrialisation. Nkrumah may have been wrong in making so sharp a turn towards industry. It is no part of the lesson of his mistakes that developing countries should not turn at all. India's early emphasis on industrialisation was itself severely criticised. Now, it is being increasingly recognised that this emphasis has helped significantly in building a base for self-reliant and genuine economic development.

The Third World has three-quarters of the earth's people, but less than a tenth of its industry. The hope is that by the end of this century developing countries will be able to increase their share of world industry to a quarter. It is a hope that can be realised if the industrialisation of the Third World is helped rather than hindered by developed countries and facilitated as a matter of international policy. As Nkrumah recognised, developing countries do not lag behind in industry for any lack of natural resources. They account for some 60 per cent of the world's major agricultural and mineral exports other than oil. But, for the greater part, they sell these commodities in the raw form. It is in the industrially advanced countries that processing and manufacturing take place, and their gain is much greater than that of the producing countries themselves who remain primary producers, and remain poor.

The extent to which the Third World loses by exporting commodities in unprocessed form has been documented by UNCTAD. For just ten commodities, including cocoa, processing even only partially within the countries of production would have raised their income by \$27 billion a year—an increase of 150 per cent.<sup>6</sup> It is ironic that this is also roughly one and a half times the total volume of official aid given by all the Western donor countries to all the developing countries in 1978. Trade, not aid, has long been a Third World plea. Its resonances are sharpened when the bid is for trade in the products of industries based on Third World resources. That extra \$27 billion of the UNCTAD study, representing the value added in semi-processing, today accrues to the industrialised countries. It becomes several times larger if the value added in converting the semi-processed commodities to manufactured goods is also taken into account.

This pattern of trade and industry is a result of history, a

product of the global relationships established during centuries of colonial rule, of deliberate measures—like tariff escalation and differential freight rates on processed goods—taken to discourage processing in the producing countries. Political imperialism may be extinct, but its imprint persists on economic relations like fossilised reminders of another era. The system itself serves to thwart the aspirations of developing countries to become part of the world's industrial society.

Structural change in the world economy to accommodate the new industrial capacity of the South is an urgent necessity. In the Brandt Commission on International Development Issues on which I had the privilege to serve we addressed ourselves to the problem. "Among the greatest challenges to international economic policy for the rest of this century", says the Report, "is the preparation for a new deployment of industrial capacity in the world economy—a shift of historic dimensions."<sup>7</sup> Nkrumah's vision has become a part of the perspectives of the 80s.

Whether from despair or disenchantment some among you may question in good faith if developing countries should not leave industry alone to concentrate on growing more food. My answer would be that there need not be a conflict between the priorities of industry and agriculture in a nation's development. They remain closely interdependent, with the income and production from the one providing the demand for the other. The experience of countries which have in the recent past made notable strides in agricultural productivity, countries like Japan, confirms that agricultural and industrial progress reinforce each other. So does India's experience; even the qualified successes of its green revolution would have been impossible without India's industrial achievements. To manage the critical balance between industry and agriculture and provide healthy conditions in both sectors is indeed one of the most urgent tasks of governments in the Third World.

It is now particularly crucial since in more than half of the developing countries, including those with the most severe food problems, increases in food production are not keeping pace with population growth. Up to the early post-war period, developing countries were net exporters of food. In 1977 they spent \$23 billion on food imports. They now import about 85 million tons of grain, and this is projected to increase to 120-145

million tons by 1990.<sup>8</sup> Third World countries that once fed themselves must do so again. This is where self-reliance must begin. This is where dependency must first end. The Third World, Africa itself, is not doing enough to feed itself. It must do better and must be helped to do better. There can be few higher priorities.

It is worth recalling that even in the early years of decolonisation Nkrumah was an enthusiastic advocate of economic (as well as political) co-operation among developing countries. His own initial efforts centred around West Africa. Soon after the War he started a West African National Secretariat, and called a West African Conference in London, to which with characteristic rejection of the colonial imprint he sought to attract fellow nationalists from the French-ruled territories. It was at this time that he met such other future leaders as Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. It is an interesting matter of record that, together, they considered a movement for a Union of West Africa Socialist Republics!<sup>9</sup>

Against this background, it seems particularly appropriate that after Nkrumah's loss of power it was Ghana that hosted the 1967 meeting to establish an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and that, eventually, Ghana shared in the formal creation of the Community in 1975. ECOWAS has particular, and most welcome, significance as a pioneering effort at involving English and French-speaking African states in joint and co-ordinated economic planning. Moreover, another regional grouping has now crossed the language barrier—that between Portuguese and English-speaking communities in Southern Africa, where the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference has arisen out of solidarity with embattled Zimbabwe and a determination to be free of economic dependency on South Africa—an unequivocal answer to hegemonic notions of a “Constellation of Southern African States”.

By the time Ghana achieved independence Nkrumah had moved beyond sub-regionalism. He had become convinced that a pan-African political union was the ultimate objective.<sup>10</sup> It is in this wider context that we must view his establishment of customs union arrangements involving Guinea, Upper Volta, Mali and Ghana.<sup>11</sup> And it was his analysis of the economic realities of post-colonial Africa that underlay this political phi-

losophy, with its wholly admirable emphasis on self-help. He viewed the twenty or so unevenly-developed separate West African states as the products and the victims of what he called "colonial particularism": non-African considerations which subordinated African development to the needs of the colonial powers. Thus he wrote:

To reverse the position and bring Africa into the realm of highly productive modern nations, calls for a gigantic self-help programme. Such a programme can only be produced and implemented by integrated planning within an overall policy decided by a continental authority.<sup>12</sup>

To prove his thesis that union was a necessary prerequisite for rapid industrialisation, he pointed to the political unions which gave the United States and Russia their present size.<sup>13</sup> He was convinced that pan-African union would provide the integrated base upon which the under-used resources of the Continent could be fully developed for the benefit of its peoples. He may have been wrong in giving primacy to political union. No doubt he underestimated the problems involved in bringing it about—certainly in the early years of heady nationalism. However, in his emphasis on self-help among developing countries, he was a pioneer of ECDC—economic co-operation between developing countries.

And was it really so theoretical a concept as his critics claimed? If economic planning on a national scale is so widely acceptable, he argued, why not continent-wide planning? If giant financial combines—what we now call the transnationals—can plan throughout Africa a strategy which is in essence neo-colonialist, taking resources out of Africa to the greater benefit of the industrialised world, why cannot Africa unite on a continental basis to oppose them?<sup>14</sup> Nkrumah denied that an African Common Market of the kind he envisaged would simply be a pooling of poverty.<sup>15</sup> And his ideas are being vindicated in the 80s.

National and collective self-reliance was, after all, the guiding principle of the African leaders who met in Lagos early in 1980 for the Organisation of African Unity's first ever Economic Summit at which a Strategy and Plan of Action was outlined for

co-ordinating the economic development of Africa.<sup>16</sup> I shall return later to the themes of this crucial meeting; but, suffice it for the moment to note with admiration the OAU playing the kind of pan-African role which was prominent among Nkrumah's aims for the Organisation.

And the OAU is not alone. Since 1958 the United Nations Regional Economic Commission for Africa has been conscientiously carrying out continent-wide research and planning and has been propagating the view that regional integration and co-operation is important for development. The frequent collaboration of the OAU and the ECA in ventures like the 1979 Monrovia Symposium on the future development prospects of Africa towards the year 2000 is to be welcomed.<sup>17</sup> We are surely now seeing a thrust towards pan-Africanism—perhaps along more pragmatic lines than Nkrumah allowed for—but certainly on the basis of a wide acknowledgement of needs that Nkrumah was one of the first to identify.

Efforts at regional co-operation within Africa deserve not only pious good wishes but practical support from the international community. Their successful accomplishment will bring much nearer the realisation of Nkrumah's own vision; but time and emerging circumstances have also brought conviction about their inherent correctness. Nkrumah believed passionately that the future of all African countries was interrelated. Certainly, in economic terms, such a vision now claims wide acceptance. In a world that acknowledges our global interdependence, regionalism within Africa and pan-African regionalism are no longer exotic concepts. They are hardheaded responses to the realities of the 80s.

In these areas, Nkrumah's vision was valid, but I said before that he was not always right. It is no part of my purpose to urge that the Third World must absolve its leaders of error out of a sense of reverence or loyalty. They must take responsibility for the consequences of their policies. They take credit for their successes, whether they are circumstantial or personal; it is fair that they should be blamed for the adversities that follow from their mistakes. And it is only by being alert and tough about failures that we will ensure progress. But we do well to recognise that many Third World leaders are victims not of their own error but of the difficult and sometimes intractable situation which

confronts them. There is a danger that unless the Third World views their record in the light of the complexities and obdurances of the economic and political problems they face, and in terms of its own values and priorities, and not those of the developed countries, it will be playing right into the hands of those who find it convenient to see the problems of persistent poverty and political instability as reflections of levels of competence and ability and not as the product of intransigent and perverse circumstances and the workings of a pernicious system.

It is particularly important that the Third World does not lose sight of the essential relevance of structural change in the world economy to the prospects for real and lasting development within their countries. In both East and West there is a tendency to explain away the intractable economic problems that confront many developing countries by attributing them to the ideological orientation, whether to the right or to the left, that the leadership of those countries for the time being pursues. But the truth is that developing countries across the whole range of the ideological spectrum are finding the problems of real development equally obdurate. And it is from the evolution of development thinking, informed by practical experience rather than the contrasting ideologies of East and West, that they are receiving their best guidance.

Domestic policies are, of course, immensely relevant to enlarging the prospects of development; but in a number of major areas those prospects have nothing to do with ideology. Much of the restructuring that needs to be done at home, like land reform, is as valid in a capitalist as a socialist orientation. What is critical to the success of these efforts is a favourable, or at the very least, a non-hostile external environment.

If that environment remains unpropitious to development, as it now is; if developing countries continue to face such a range of external impediments to growth as unstable commodity prices, declining terms of trade, disincentives to the processing of their commodities, protective barriers against their few manufactures, intolerable debt burdens and massive payment deficits or their avoidance at the price of unacceptable human deprivation; if paying for the modest quantities of oil they use itself consumes 40, 50 or sometimes 60 per cent of their export earnings; if the multilateral international organisations remain

insensitive in critical areas of their need; if a world monetary system continues to prevail almost heedless of their requirements or of the impact of its disorderly behaviour on their economic welfare—if all this, and more, is part of the external environment that bears upon their domestic efforts, then socialist and capitalist leaderships alike will founder in the mire of poverty and sink in a modern-day 'slough of despond'.

The only thing that could make matters worse is for Third World leaders themselves to so completely adopt national prescriptions based on Northern ideological models that they fail to pursue their struggle for a new international economic order. The fact is that developed countries of West and East with less than 25 per cent of the world's population now account for 80 per cent of the world's income, 90 per cent of the world's scientific and technological output, 82 per cent of world trade, 60 per cent of the world's agricultural output, 55 per cent of the world's energy consumption and 69 per cent of its mineral use. The developing countries with 50 per cent of the world's population have only 18 per cent of the world's income. The one-third of the world's population in the poorest countries receive only one-thirtieth of the world's income, i.e., about one-tenth of their proportionate share.<sup>18</sup> According to World Bank estimates, 670 million in the developing countries consume about 200 calories per day less than the minimum daily requirements, and United Nations estimates show that there are 1,200 million people without clean drinking water and 1,100 million without basic education.<sup>19</sup>

That poverty, malnutrition and deprivation should exist on this scale and that such wide disparities should continue in a world still well served by natural resources and with tremendous technological capacity, questions not only the moral quality of our civilisation but also the level of its economic organisation. And it is revealing of the cynicism with which these problems are viewed in many parts of the developed world that references to a new order are still denigrated as Third World rhetoric—as if the old order any longer serves even those whom it once served well.

If any doubts linger over the injustices and inequities of the existing economic order a dispassionate appraisal of the economic problems confronting most African countries must surely dispel them. Africa remains extensively under-developed; in-

deed, as Kwame Nkrumah well knew, it is the most under-developed Continent in spite of a favourable natural resource endowment of land and minerals relative to population.

The serious economic problems of the Continent and its future development prospects were the subject under scrutiny at the OAU's Economic Summit in Lagos in April 1980. The Summit built on the "Monrovia Declaration of Commitment of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU"<sup>20</sup> of July 1979 and a series of in-depth considerations of economic problems which threw up a great amount of data about economic conditions in Africa. It will be remembered most of all for the renewed sense of dedication and hope it generated among those concerned intimately with the Continent's development problems. That the OAU is taking such important initiatives on the development issue and that the African leaders in Lagos saw the solution of many of the economic problems of Africa as possible only through concerted action at the level of the Continent, would have warmed the heart of Kwame Nkrumah. Once more, in the 80s, we are turning to his early vision. He aimed, as I have mentioned, at the creation of a Pan-African Common Market. The establishment of an African Common Market by the year 2000 was one of the objectives agreed upon at Lagos.<sup>21</sup>

Africa's current mood of change and challenge was nobly expressed in a powerful declaration at the United Nations General Assembly in October 1980 by President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria.<sup>22</sup> He asserted that "massive, special, immediate and effective measures are required to deal with the exceptional situation in Africa." Like Nkrumah, President Shehu Shagari superimposed his analysis of economic problems on a background of foreign aggression, spoliation and injustice—in other words, colonialism. President Shehu Shagari's call for a "a decade of reparation and restitution ... as a master plan for the economic recovery of Africa" is symptomatic of the new clarity and energy with which Africans are, in Nkrumah's phrase, seeking African solutions. I recall the words of Edem Kodjo, Secretary-General of the OAU, in his address to the 1979 Monrovia Symposium:

The ancients used to say: 'Woe to the man who is alone';  
today, we might say: 'Woe to the peoples that are alone'.  
To put it in another way, the prospects for growth and

development in Africa must be part of a global framework, a grand design which bears the fair name of co-operation. We cannot conceive of our development as being a separate process, all of a piece, taking place in a vacuum. On the contrary, we must plunge into the thick of the fray, try to influence the sluggish course of events, place new restraints on unreason, prepare a fresh blueprint for development and—who knows?—perhaps even impose a new ethos.<sup>23</sup>

African countries have over 10 per cent of the world's population but only 2.7 per cent of the world's product. A substantial proportion of the world's absolute poor are here in Africa and the infant mortality rate of 137 per 1,000 is the highest for any continent. Life expectancy is 45 years—ten years below the world average.<sup>24</sup> And in spite of its large land resources and low population density, between 1970-77 food production increased only by 1.5 per cent per year, just a little more than half as fast as population itself, thus leading to a sharp decline in the self-efficiency ratio in food, a large increase in the food import bill and worsening market levels.<sup>25</sup> Industrial production was less than 1 per cent of the world total. And yet this is a Continent well endowed with large land resources relative to population, rich in minerals, and with large hydro-electric potential.

It is clear that the situation now facing low-income African countries deserves urgent attention by the international community in the 1980s. And there are serious, urgent problems requiring emergency action. The plight of these countries was much in the mind of the Brandt Commission when it recommended an Emergency Programme. This Programme, which included large-scale transfers of resources to developing countries and a global food programme, as well as an international energy strategy and a start on structural reforms, was to be the main concern of a limited representative summit of world leaders.<sup>26</sup> Preparations are in hand for the convening of such a summit in mid-1981, a time-scale that is none too soon in relation to the urgency of the problems facing low-income African countries. The Summit deserves the active support of Africa.

Africa's response to current problems, as evidenced by the Lagos Summit, is to emphasise collective self-reliance. This

would have been appropriate even if there was not such international neglect of the development problems of Africa. The legacies from colonial times of political fragmentation, of economic, transportation and communications systems oriented to the old metropolises, and of persistent racial domination in South Africa all demand active pan-Africanism in the economic sphere. There are today 47 states south of the Sahara, 26 of which have populations of less than 5 million and 14 less than 1 million. Many of them have misfitting boundaries and some are without access to the sea. For most countries more than 80 per cent of exports are in unprocessed raw materials. With the emergence of these problems, the need for a level of pan-African economic co-operation of the kind that Nkrumah foresaw has now come into prominence.

But it is necessary, at least in the early stages, for self-reliant programmes to be buttressed by international assistance. In the immediate years ahead, concessional financial flows, bilaterally and through international financial institutions, for balance of payments support, as well as longer term investment for regional projects and other infrastructural development, will be crucial. The Brandt Commission recognised these needs in its call for an additional \$4 billion per year for regional projects for the poverty belts of the world.<sup>27</sup> The Commission's call for the achievement of the 0.7 per cent aid target by 1985 is also specially pertinent to Africa's problems.<sup>28</sup>

An effective response is required from the proposed summit and from a new Global Round of North/South negotiations if the urgent problems of Africa and indeed of all developing countries are not in fact to worsen. The African multilateral organisations—the OAU, the ECA, the ADB and the regional institutions such as ECOWAS and SADCC, will have important roles to play in bringing to the attention of the international community these urgent and neglected problems and participating actively in finding and applying solutions to them. The time has now come to make a move from verbal international resolutions to practical action.

Self-reliance does not mean pulling down the shutters on the world outside. On the contrary, it presumes global co-operation and provides the most secure basis for it. Self-reliance means that developing countries individually must do as much as possible

for themselves on the basis of their own resources; and that collectively they must exploit every possible advantage for development from dynamic co-operation among themselves—including the mobilisation of a global effort for beneficial change. Self-reliance is nothing if not a multi-dimensional strategy for development. By adopting it and, above all, by implementing it, developing countries will acknowledge what the developed have long known; that dependence, both material and intellectual, is a poor basis on which to build effective negotiations and that consensus is rarely, if ever, achieved save in the context of countervailing strength. Self-reliance, therefore, is not a substitute for doing business with the world beyond; it could be a major factor in doing business on better terms in 'the era of negotiations'.

If we have indeed entered such an era, the world community will have to be more enlightened in the 80s than it was in the 70s. Let me give you just a small example of what I mean; an example of how the shadow of habitual thinking, outmoded thinking, can fall between contemporary perception and action—how old attitudes, despite enlightenment, can frustrate progress. In 1974, the West, at the height of what it called the "energy crisis", turned down OPEC's offer of a price regime for oil based on indexation—rejected it as rhetoric and condemned it as heresy. The 'Chicago School' actually predicted that the price of oil would be back to \$3.00 per barrel within the year. In effect, it was rejection of an offer of contract in this critical area of energy, a rejection that relied on old-fashioned notions of power—economic, political and military—while ignoring the reality that its dispersal had already occurred. Today the reality is not the avoidance of indexation—for it is applied unilaterally, if convulsively, by OPEC; what was missed was the chance to apply it in a consensual and well-ordered manner. Behind the lost chance was a failure of political perception—failure to allow the glimpse of interdependence that had been offered to influence Northern responses to the events of 1974. We are living with the results—and the West is still not blaming itself but others, and other factors.

We cannot go on giving lip service to interdependence but believing that it requires obligations only of others. It derives from mutual needs and imposes mutual obligations. At its heart

is sharing of power and responsibilities, and—as I said in my first lecture—the question for us all in the 80s should really not be ‘whether’ but ‘how’ that sharing is to take place. Co-management of the world economy is surely the concomitant of interdependence. Irrespective of our preferences for economic theories there is a palpable need for shared management of world society; already excessive dependence on uncoordinated national choices in the economic area is clearly only making the global situation worse. If dominance is out and co-management is declined, the alternative can only be conflict, disorder and chaos. We could hardly then indulge the excuse that they have overtaken and overwhelmed us. For all our enlightenment, our human society, in the full flowering of its technological genius, will have chosen that way—backwards!

Yet the truth is that this issue of sharing—sharing of power, of management, of responsibility—lies at the heart of the present stalemate between North and South. No good purpose is served by calling it other names or pretending that the contention is about other issues. Nor should we be surprised that the sharing of power, the relinquishing of privilege, should occasion difficulty. Has it not always in human history? Yet the overcoming of such reluctance and resistance is the story of the enlargement of economic, social and political justice within national societies everywhere. But to understand the selfishness and even the contradictions of human nature is one thing; to acquiesce in their supremacy is quite another. We must, therefore, convert governments and people everywhere, but especially in the rich industrial societies, to the urgency of the need for change responsive to change itself.

We are clearly in transition from a world in which ‘the few are more than the many’ to a world that is less elitist and autocratic in its global structures; from a world governed by a small directorate of the strong to one whose future must be determined by negotiation and by consensus with the many who are weak; from a world in which we misused sovereignty as a sword to one in which we must increasingly fashion it only as a shield. We must make the transition in all these areas with swiftness because as the old premises of our global order fall away we court the danger of instability, disintegration and chaos unless we erect the new order in time. It is, alas, a danger that is upon us. The old

order is passing and the new one is not yet here. We now face, however, much we pretend otherwise, a crisis of global proportions—and not only in the economic field.

Nowhere are the dangers more acute than in the area of militarisation and its implications for the world's security. 1980, at its beginning, saw the end of the First Disarmament Decade; and at its end will see the close of the Second Development Decade; two decades that in the result both wore false labels. Development faltered—disarmament remained a mirage. The facts are ugly and shameful and searing. It now seems that the number of people in absolute poverty—those who live and die without ever knowing why—at present estimated at 780 million, or nearly one in every five, may actually increase during the 1980s. And, says the World Bank, with a certain clinical detachment, “many developing countries will find it hard to maintain political stability.”<sup>29</sup> In other words, what lies ahead for many as the legacy of the Second Development Decade is human misery and social disintegration.

In what was to be a ‘decade of disarmament’, total global expenditure on arms climbed from \$180 billion in 1970 to \$500 billion in 1980. On present trends, it will reach \$600 billion a year in the 80s at today's prices.<sup>30</sup> World military expenditure now exceeds the total income of all the people (more than 2 billion) in 37 low-income countries, including China. In effect, the developed countries of East and West spend annually on arms some \$365 for every one of their citizens—an amount substantially higher than the average annual income of people in low-income countries. They spend on the means of destruction more than billions of the world's poorest spend each year on the means of survival.

And the developing countries, themselves, are not immune from this propensity to ever higher militarisation—a propensity, what is worse, not always fuelled by considerations of an external character. Their arms expenditure amounted to about \$30 annually for each one of their people, which is admittedly vastly lower than the \$365 per capita spent in the rich countries but still higher than what they spend themselves on average on the health or education of their people. It has become a significant drain on their balance of payment. It is mercifully confined, with three-quarters of the total spent by only 15

countries, many of them located in troubled zones and some, fortunately, among the countries with surplus funds. Even so, how can it be anything but deplorable that the call for disarmament must now reach centres of the developing world whose freedom itself was wrested by the twin cries of decolonisation and disarmament, that were so much at the heart of Nkrumah's internationalism?

But at the centre of the arms race—and of the race to sell arms—is the rivalry between the two super-powers. In 1980 these two alone accounted for 58 per cent of world military expenditure and with their respective allies for 80 per cent. While more than three-quarters of that expenditure went on conventional weapons, it is around the development, accumulation and deployment of nuclear weapons that much of the world's immediate concerns are focussed. Once such weapons were the preserve of a few and these self-appointed custodians of power to annihilate the planet had charge of only a few weapons each. Today it is possible to talk of “a world nuclear map”—a new cartography that starkly portrays man's precarious future. Far from moving to Nkrumah's “World Without the Bomb”, nuclear weapons of varying size, shape and deadliness now number over 50,000. Their combined explosive power is already 1 million times that of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in seconds. A single missile can now carry 200 times the destructive force of that Hiroshima bomb. And it can carry it six thousand miles in less than 30 minutes. Fired from the other side of the world it can hit targets within a few hundred feet. Given the technology of early warning systems and the capacity for retaliation, if the button were pressed now in any of the capitals where they exist, life on this planet could have ended before this ceremony is due to end. We are as near as a finger's width to human extinction.

Why does the world permit it? Why do the people of the superpowers and the major powers, why do their leaders, endorse this contradiction of so suicidal a policy in the name of survival? It is in part because of what has been called “the dominance of military mystique”. Under its spell, the realities of diminishing returns are sublimated to the images of power and security. Peril wears the mask of safety. And beyond the danger of the holocaust, the links between fast depleting world resources and global economic and social tensions are ignored.

The simplistic identification of external enemies is easier and more politically profitable than coming to terms with the realities that an era in transition is producing both at home and abroad. A false rationality has overtaken reason. In mankind's long history over the millennia such moments have always been among the most dangerous for his future.

I have referred earlier to the Report of the Brandt Commission. We called it *North-South: A Programme for Survival*. In doing so, I assure you, we sought neither to be pompous nor dramatic, but simply to convey the gravity of the global situation as we saw it. And who were we? The Commission was drawn from North and South alike; practitioners for the greater part in the world of politics, of finance, of labour, of journalism, but most of all, of development—an incongruous, even improbable, but perhaps not altogether insignificant group of people.<sup>31</sup> For none of us was it a process of writing our own manifesto, but of finding a new route to global agreement. And in our Report which was the result of two years of considerable effort we believe we have offered the world that route. But we do so with no illusions of the dangers that lie ahead for the world economy, for development, for North and South alike; dangers, indeed, that will be encountered even along the route.

You will not be surprised that we say in the Report: "At the beginning of the 1980s the world community faces much greater dangers than at any time since the Second World War".<sup>32</sup> Against the back-drop of all I have said that is a very considerable danger indeed. But those words were written towards the end of 1979 and they were written in an economic, not in a political, context. In fact, in the twelve months since they were written the dangers we talked about have grown immensely more massive and more threatening. Between completing our Report and presenting it to the United Nations Secretary-General in February 1980, 'Afghanistan' occurred; and with it came a major deterioration in East-West relations. Western countries and the overwhelming voice of the Third World have already deplored the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. They have done so essentially in a political context in terms of the threat it poses to detente. That threat was wholly predictable. The responses of the international community should have been foreseen. But the point I make is a somewhat different one.

Events such as Afghanistan which heighten tension between East and West, whether they are triggered by the East or by the West, and whether or not they are responsive to provocations by each other—however they occur—are dangerous for the world. But beyond the area of general danger, they are calamitous for the Third World. East and West each sees itself as ‘the good guy’ and the other as ‘the bad’. Each professes the purity of its commitment to peace and its suspicion of the intentions of the other. In this context of reciprocal selfrighteousness, when East and West begin enlarging their arsenal of global destruction and justifying the escalation in terms of the others’ offensive intent we are, indeed, in a time of peril. And we are at such a time. It is the kind of time when the hawks fly high, when the doves of peace are grounded; when issues like development tend to be put aside, relegated to “less troubled times”; when a massive diversion of resources to military expenditure—resources desperately needed for development and indeed for assisting the developed world out of recession—provides a convenient excuse that there may not now be even the means to alleviate the problems of development.

But the situation is even more serious than that. We could be in a cycle of disaster with East-West tensions retarding North-South progress and widening disparities threatening peace. In a global environment characterised by a struggle for power, naked poverty makes a poor country a hapless hostage to fortune and a pawn in the struggle of the strong. When some of the world’s poorest countries fail to be helped in straightforward ways—like with fair prices for cocoa and an international commodity agreement to keep them remunerative and stable—when they fail to be helped to stand on their feet economically, to grow as nations with economic, social and political institutions established against the erosions of poverty, is it any wonder that they fail to withstand pressures from without?

Non-Alignment, as Nkrumah knew so well, is a great bulwark of detente, but can anyone doubt that persistent poverty and underdevelopment seriously impair it? The failure to find solutions to the problems of development, an inability to respond to the challenge of North-South issues, create conditions propitious to the burgeoning of East-West tensions. It is not only, therefore, that the retreat from detente places development in

jeopardy; it is also that the threat to development bears on the peace of the world—just as disparities within nations have shaken societies to their foundations.

In truth, this is but one dimension of the reality of our interdependent world. Pope Paul counselled us that “the new name of peace is development”.<sup>33</sup> Willy Brandt, in his Chairman’s introduction to the Report alerted us to the simple truth that “he who wants to ban war must also ban mass poverty”.<sup>34</sup> North-South and East-West are now inextricably linked. Failure on either front is clearly mutually dangerous. Success on either could be mutually reinforcing. What is at stake in the development debate concerns the poor directly; but, in truth, it concerns the future of the world.

We cannot, therefore, as some would have it, leave the issues of development for more tranquil times. Coming to terms with them now has become a pre-condition of more tranquil times ahead—and, not only for the poor, but for the rich as well whose threshold of social dislocation may yet prove to be much lower than that of the poor for whom troubled times have long been a way of life. There must be hope, however; for in his long history it is in times of crisis that man everywhere has risen to the greatest heights of courage, imagination and creativity.

There is, indeed, a glimmer of hope that the failures and disappointments of recent years and our present condition of danger may hope to move us, as Nkrumah urged us long ago, from outmoded grooves of thought towards new vistas of perception, towards that revolution in men’s minds which is the essential precursor to all else. If we have in the events of the 70s caught even a glimpse of the limitations of power, of its essential irrelevance to the central issues of our time, of the growing linkages between rich and poor in their common future; if we have begun to see why, in the world of the 80s and beyond, human destiny must be shaped by global management and shared responsibilities—our present condition, serious as it is, will not have been without some gain in the cause of human survival.

Man’s search for peace and development is now one quest. We must be unremitting in it and not allow ourselves to be exhausted by failures or delays; we cannot give up on human destiny. In its “Programme for Survival” the Brandt Report offers

not just a prescription for what the rich countries can do to help the poor; its programme is about what rich and poor can do together to make human survival on a tolerable basis more probable for all the world's people. It is now for the world's people to ensure, indeed it is for the people of the Third World to insist, that governments take this chance—this slender chance—while it still remains the option of hope.

And that brings me back to the democracy of which I spoke in my first lecture; for how else can the insistence of the people be heard and answered? Democracy is the balm which both soothes and invigorates the body politic. As I had occasion to remark elsewhere in my own region of the Caribbean, the therapy of free elections knows no equal.<sup>35</sup>

Democracy demands effort, sometimes self-sacrifice, but the benefits to humanity are incalculable and African solutions to African problems will be human solutions. Kwame Nkrumah may in the end have been overwhelmed by the problems, but in his best years he was himself the product and the pride of democracy; and I end with his advice which now has a wider meaning in our troubled world of the 80s:

History records that it is the peaceful means that endure; the gains of violence are transient; the fruits of patience are imperishable.<sup>36</sup>

That his people and the world's people should yet heed that advice would be the truest memorial to this great man of our time who may have been of Ghana but belonged to all mankind.

## Notes and References

1. Kwame Nkrumah, *Autobiography* (Panaf, London, Panaf Edition 1973), p. viii.
2. Industrialisation in developing countries received great emphasis at this time among development thinkers.
3. Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (Heinemann, London, 1963), p. 151.
4. *Official Records of the General Assembly, 35th Session, Plenary Meetings, Volume 1* (UN Doc. A/35/PV.8, 24 September 1980), pp. 113-119.
5. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, op. cit., pp. 152-53.
6. Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, "Processing before Export of Primary Commodities: Areas for Further International Co-operation" (UN Doc. TD/229/Supplement 2, Geneva, March 1979), para. 26, in *Proceedings of the UNCTAD, Fifth Session, Manila, 7 May-3 June 1979*, Volume III: Basic Documents, pp. 103-123, at p. 108.
7. *North-South: A Programme for Survival*, The Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt (Pan Books, London, 1980), p. 177.
8. Estimates by the World Food Council. Also, *Food Needs of Developing Countries: Projections of Production and Consumption to 1990*, Research Report No.3 (International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, 1977), p. 17.
9. Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, op. cit., pp. 45-51.
10. Legum, *Pan-Africanism* (Pall Mall Press, London, Revised Edition 1965), pp. 32-33. Also Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, op. cit., pp. 135-136.

11. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, op. cit., pp. 141-143, 157. Also Legum, op. cit., pp. 45, 76-77.
12. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, op. cit., 150.
13. Ibid., pp. 155, 157. Also Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, (Panaf, London, Reprinted Edition 1976), p. 221.
14. Kwame Nkrumah, *Neocolonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism* (Nelson, London, 1965) *passim*.
15. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, op. cit., pp. 162-163.
16. OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Second Extraordinary Session, 28-29 April 1980, "Lagos Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa," *UN General Assembly, 11th Special Session, 1980* (UN Doc. A/S-11/14, Annex 1, 21 August 1980).
17. *What Kind of Africa by the year 2000?*, Final Report of the Monrovia Symposium on the Future Development Prospects of Africa towards the year 2000 (Organisation of African Unity, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1979), *passim*.
18. Extrapolated from *World Development Report* (World Bank, Washington, 1980) *passim*.
19. *UN Statistical Yearbook* (New York, 1978) *passim*.
20. Quoted in *What Kind of Africa by the year 2000?*, op. cit., pp. 131-135.
21. OAU, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Organisation* (CM1040 (XXXV). Addis Ababa, 1980), Part II., p. 48.
22. Quoted in *West Africa*, 13 October 1980, p.1999. Text in *Official Records of the General Assembly, 35th Session, Plenary Meetings, Volume 1, 6 October 1980*, op. cit., pp. 463-467.

23. *What Kind of Africa by the year 2000?*, op. cit., p. 47.
24. Extrapolated from *UN Statistical Yearbook*, 1978, op. cit.
25. Extrapolated from *Agriculture: Toward 2000* (UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Rome, 1979).
26. *North-South: A Programme for Survival*, op. cit., pp. 276-282.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 242.
29. *World Development Report*, 1980, op. cit., p. 13.
30. Statistics on world armaments in following passages mainly from R.L. Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditure*, (World Priorities Inc., Leesburg, Virginia, USA, 1980).
31. Membership listed on title page of *North-South: A Programme for Survival*, op. cit.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 267.
33. Pope Paul VI, *The Great Social Problem*, (translation of Papal Encyclical, 'Populorum Progressio', Catholic Truth Society, London, 26 March 1967), cited by Pope John Paul II, address to UN General Assembly, 7 October 1979 (1979: July-October) *UN Chronicle*, p. 89.
34. *North South: A Programme for Survival*, op. cit., p. 16.
35. Extracts from an address delivered in Kingston, Jamaica by Shridath S. Ramphal, *The Troubled Condition of the Caribbean* (Commonwealth Secretariat, July 1980), p. 3.
36. Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, op. cit., p. 48.